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SHARE TRADING AND THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE 1914–1945 
THE DAWN OF REGULATION 
ABSTRACT 
 
In the London of August 1914, there was no statutory regulation of share trading. By the 
beginning of 1946, only traders registered in accordance with the Prevention of Fraud 
(Investments) Act 1939 were permitted to engage in share trading between members of the 
public. This study examines the stages by which share trading in the United Kingdom came to 
be a statutorily regulated activity and by which the London Stock Exchange moved from being 
antagonistic towards public regulation in 1914 to lobbying in 1944 for the new scheme to be 
implemented.  
A number of challenges were posed by changes in the character of the demand for and supply 
of securities which were evident before 1914 but hastened by the 1914-1918 war. There is no 
evidence that the Exchange, its members or outside observers understood how these changes 
would affect the overall character of the market or its sensitivity to risk. Almost all regulatory 
interventions between 1914 and 1945 responded to crises which exposed the failure of 
existing arrangements to cope with the consequences of market changes. Whilst these 
interventions show that self-regulatory arrangements could be effective, they also 
demonstrate the limitations of reliance on self-regulation alone. Although the Exchange’s 
members supported severe action after the crashes of 1929, the criminal justice system again 
proved inadequate to deal with abusive share trading generally. The 1939 legislation 
responded to the criminal justice system’s failure and, for the Exchange, was made palatable 
by protecting its formal independence.   
Each successive regulatory intervention in part responded to compromises in previous 
interventions occasioned by the need to secure acceptance by market operators. 
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
 
 
On 22 May 1946, a block of shares in St Helena Gold Mines Limited was placed on the London 
Stock Exchange. The price approved by the Exchange’s New Issues Sub-Committee was 52s 6d. 
Interest was so great that by 1000 hours, the shares were trading at prices over £5 and ended 
the day at 4⅛ to 4½, falling subsequently to 3½.1 
It was immediately rumoured that the shares had been ‘rigged’2: a rumour that became the 
subject of a disciplinary inquiry by the Exchange. The outcome was that the senior partner of 
the brokers responsible, Keith, Bayley & Rigg, was suspended for two years and six jobbers 
who had made substantial profits received lesser punishments. For some members, these 
punishments were not sufficient. J&A Scrimgeour wrote to the Council suggesting that action 
should have been taken against the broking firm as a whole and not simply its senior partner: 
‘The times are difficult and the difficulties will not be alleviated by timid measures, 
neither can we expect the prestige of the Stock Exchange to be enhanced until full 
measures for the protection of the public, and members generally, are adopted.’3 
Scrimgeours’ interest in the public’s protection was shared by the council, which had asked the 
brokers’ senior partner whether: 
‘ . . . he agreed that the public, in order to obtain an interest in the shares, had to pay 
a premium to Keith, Bayley & Rigg and their friends of £2 a share.’4 
The senior partner agreed, and went on to express his regret for the ‘grave discredit’ this had 
brought to the Stock Exchange. 
For a member whose memory extended to trading on the Exchange before the 1914–1918 
war, such an interest in the protection of the public would have seemed remarkable. Market 
rigs had been mounted before, and had been punished,5 but on the grounds that rigs  
                                                 
1 The Times; 16 October 1946; page 2. 
2  i.e. the manipulation of trading to achieve artificially high or low share prices. 
3  The Times; 18 July 1946; page 7. Stock Exchange Council Minutes; Guildhall Library. Kynaston 
(2001); page 16. 
4  Stock Exchange Council Minutes; Guildhall Library. 
5  For example: the following rigs were reported in Money Market Review: Anglo French 
Corporation, 26 May 1917; Sehampang Sumatra, 14 July 1917; Chaffers Gold Company, 25 August 1917. 
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disadvantaged fellow members of the Exchange, not that they abused members of the public. 
In effect, between 1914 and 1946 there had been a sea-change in the Exchange’s thinking and 
in its practice. Whereas in 1914 the Exchange was solely concerned with overseeing the 
integrity of relationships between its members, by 1946, with government encouragement, 
the Exchange had accepted responsibility for protecting the interests of the wider investing 
public. 
At the time, some commentators recognised the scale of the change that had occurred, for in 
June 1945 The Economist observed that: 
‘All these changes add up to an altered mentality among brokers, which is the 
counterpart of similar movements in so many other fields. It is a mentality which 
prefers reasonable, but secure, profits to long risks with the alternative of brilliant 
success or equally striking failure.’6 
Subsequent commentators have referred to the same changes, although describing them in 
different ways. Michie refers to a state of uncertainty after the end of the war and to the 
Exchange’s need to secure a rapid return to peacetime trading conditions.7 Kynaston, dealing 
with a broader canvas, refers to concern among members that the Exchange had become a 
public institution  rather than a private club that existed to facilitate its members’ trading.8 
Both largely attribute the changed circumstances to the economic effects of the 1939–1945 
war, and to the effect of controls implemented during the war. Doubtless the effect of the war 
was extensive, but it cannot account for the fact that the key legislation underpinning the 
regulation of share trading was passed in 1939 before the commencement of the war and 
manifestly not in contemplation of the onset of war.9 Further, the legislation was brought into 
force in 1944, before the end of the war, as the Board of Trade acquiesced to lobbying by the 
Stock Exchange which had traditionally opposed such legislation. 
This study examines the nature of the change in the regulatory arrangements for share trading 
that occurred between 1914 and 1945, arguing that a combination of factors led to political 
demands for new regulatory approaches. It suggests that the Stock Exchange’s failure in the 
                                                                                                                                               
All of these rigs involved brokers reporting artificial trades in the Supplementary List to create the 
illusion of a rising market in the shares concerned. 
6  The Economist; 23 June 1945; page 858. 
7  Michie (1999); pages 326–327. 
8  Kynaston (2001); pages 30-31.  
9  Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, 1939. 
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1920s to act to stem the growing risk of insubstantial and weakly underwritten new issues 
stemmed from the persistence of the pre-1914 belief that the Exchange should not accept any 
corporate responsibility to investors: a belief that was sustained by a failure to understand the 
direction in which the market was changing and did not change until members were 
confronted by the existential threat of the two crashes of 1929. It goes on to argue that the 
most effective regulatory interventions of the period were undertaken by the Exchange itself, 
at a time when members were galvanised by the enormity (to them) of the threat which they 
faced, and that all interventions by the government were to some extent compromised and 
bore the seed of their own subsequent failure and revision.  
The study suggests that the Stock Exchange and the government faced four challenges   posed 
by a change in the character of the demand for and supply of securities that had begun to be 
apparent before 1914. The investing community expanded to include a large number of first-
time holders whose holdings tended to be small: too small for the traditional relationship 
between stockbroker and client to be economically viable. Such holders either sought security 
through institutional intermediaries, partly encouraged by tax considerations, or traded 
without professional advice becoming prey to unscrupulous traders.  
At the same time, vendors of shares increasingly saw in the market not a means by which to 
dispose of ownership but a source of finance as a decline in corporate profitability together 
with higher tax rates restricted businesses’ ability to finance investment by retention of profit. 
This trend was reinforced by tax reforms which tended to favour companies whose shares 
were traded on a recognised stock exchange.10 
Both the broadening investing community and vendors became less tolerant of speculative 
activity. Smaller investors were more vulnerable and sensitive to the risk of loss. Vendors 
seeking longer term finance preferred stability. In effect, the market became less tolerant of 
the market volatility caused by waves of speculation that had been evident before the 1914–
1918 war, and of old-style company promotion.  As a consequence, the houses that circled the 
Exchange changed: old-style company promoters disappearing to be replaced by new-style 
issuing houses. 
                                                 
10  Reform of death duties in 1894, introduction of rules on close companies in the early 1920s, 
changes to the valuation of securities for death duty purposes in the late 1920s. 
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The first challenge posed by these changes concerned the expectation that investors alone 
should be responsible for managing their own risks or in other words that the buyer should 
beware: caveat emptor. This principle was the foundation of the Exchange’s relationship with 
members. Implicit in this approach was the assumption that clients had both the experience 
and, where necessary, the access to advice to enable them to manage their risks. As the 
market welcomed a larger number of smaller investors who had savings to invest but neither 
the experience to assess and mitigate their own risks nor the access to necessary advice, at 
what point would caveat emptor become an impractical and untenable principle?  
The second challenge was to self-regulation as an organising principle for bodies such as the 
Exchange. To deal with changing circumstances, any organisation must be able to identify 
challenges and to face them successfully. In the case of the Exchange, self-regulation had been 
viewed as essential for the well-being of members, to the extent that the grant of a royal 
charter had been resisted because it would have involved oversight by the Privy Council. As the 
underlying assumptions were challenged, how successfully would the Exchange manage its 
responses? 
The third challenge was to the criminal justice system. Beyond the London Stock Exchange and 
the provincial stock exchanges, share trading could take place free from regulation other than 
the constraint of criminal law and prosecutions. Would the criminal justice system provide an 
adequate response to abuse of unsuspecting investors in off-market transactions? 
The fourth challenge was to the government’s management of the financial system and the 
financing of its expenditure. Between 1914 and 1918, rather than relying solely on taxation, 
the government chose to meet a large part of the cost of prosecuting the war by raising loan 
issues that were traded through the Exchange, a studiously independent organisation. What 
measure of influence or control did the government need to achieve its own policy objectives? 
By 1945, the answers to these questions had become clear. After the twin crashes of 1929, it 
had been necessary to abrogate the principle of caveat emptor. The Stock Exchange had 
eventually been able to act with determination to defend the principle of self-regulation. The 
criminal justice system had failed to meet the challenge of abusive share-pushers. The 
government had concluded that it could achieve its objectives through influencing rather than 
legislating to control the Exchange. 
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In analysing the paths travelled in finding these answers, this study draws a number of 
conclusions.  
The process which led to the introduction of a statutory scheme for regulating share trading 
cannot be understood without an appreciation of the contemporary political environment: a 
context often not fully considered by institutional histories. At no point in the period with 
which this study is concerned was the regulation of share trading a prime concern of the 
politicians involved in considering these issues. It waxed and waned in importance in their eyes 
in proportion to its perceived relevance to the achievement of other objectives. As a 
consequence, politicians were prepared to compromise in implementing proposals for 
regulation of share trading once the objectives of prime concern to them appeared within 
grasp. In February 1919, this led to the abandonment of proposals for extended capital 
controls. In 1938, this led to acceptance of the Stock Exchange’s conditions for acceptance of 
the statutory scheme. These compromises were accepted even though they were known to 
embed weaknesses in regulatory arrangements which in due course led to calls for further 
reform.  
The study also shows how, in the 1920s and 1930s, reliance solely upon the criminal justice 
system as a means of regulating abusive share trading became untenable. There were several 
reasons for this. Such reliance may have been thought credible in the previous century, but by 
the 1930s such narrow reliance coupled with the widening public interest in share ownership 
was exposing to abuse a section of the public that was ill-fitted to protect itself. Regulation 
that depended upon post facto punishment and in many cases upon private prosecution did 
not serve to deter, eliminate or avoid the social damage caused by the abuse.  
There is also some suggestion that attempts to prosecute established City houses or people 
created market antagonism which was inimical to any regulatory purpose. The prosecution of 
Lord Kylsant, which at the time was regarded by some as politically inspired, served to create 
sympathy for him in his plight rather than satisfaction that a wrongdoer had been punished. In 
this way, although prosecutions might satisfy a public demand for retribution, they might 
stand in the way of sensible improvements in practice.  
In part this was due to the nature of prospectus and share issue fraud, the type of fraud with 
which this study has been principally concerned. As the study shows, prospectus and share 
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issue fraud encompassed a wide spectrum of behaviour. In many cases, it was an explicit 
motive of vendors to achieve their commercial objectives within the law; and to achieve that 
they relied upon their advisers and agents. That is one of the services that company promoters 
such as Hatry provided. In the Royal Mail Steamship case, although it was accepted that a 
prospectus had been incorrectly drawn up and so was misleading, the jury appears also to 
have been prepared to conclude that Lord Kylsant did not intend to commit fraud. As the study 
shows, in the Jute Industries case, the vendors’ commercial objective was to dispose of their 
equity interest in spite of worsening economic circumstances, the likelihood of impending 
losses and a declining stock market. Hatry’s purpose was to achieve the vendors’ objective but 
within the law. When the technical weakness of the Royal Mail Steamship prospectus is 
compared with the more substantial weaknesses in the Jute Industries prospectus, where no 
prosecution seems ever to have been considered, the unsatisfactory consequences of reliance 
upon criminal prosecutions alone are made clear. In the end, these were matters of 
judgement.  Prosecution in such circumstances was an uncertain undertaking. 
Nonetheless, the study provides evidence that prosecutions can and did serve a valuable 
regulatory purpose. The exceedingly rapid prosecution of Hatry and his condign punishment 
suggested that he and his colleagues were alone responsible for the London market’s 
problems in September 1929. They also suggested that the problems had been dealt with 
promptly and effectively. This was done so successfully that some newspapers were moved to 
note that arrangements in London were superior to those in New York in this respect. In 1929, 
Hatry was regarded as an outsider. Behind the screen afforded by his prosecution and 
conviction, encouraged by a well-networked Governor of the Bank of England, the Stock 
Exchange was able to reform its systems quietly and to deal discreetly with members whose 
mistakes it did not wish to see repeated. This low-key approach might not have been possible 
had it been handled openly. 
The efficacy of prosecutions and regulation remain matters for current debate. In London, the 
Fair and Effective Markets Review (2015) specifically recommended increases in the maximum 
penalties in respect of certain offences against the possibility that they may be needed in 
extreme circumstances. In New York, Judge Rakoff has suggested on a number of occasions 
that if the Great Recession of 2008 were caused in whole or in part by fraud, as various 
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governmental authorities suggested, then the failure to bring to justice those responsible 
‘bespeaks weaknesses in our prosecutorial system that need to be addressed’.11 
That the Exchange was able to deal successfully with the weaknesses in systems and behaviour 
demonstrated so powerfully in 1929 can be attributed to two factors: the leadership of the 
Governor of the Bank of England and the blindingly obvious risk that the Exchange’s 
independence would be lost. Confident in wider City support and the support of members, the 
self-regulatory Exchange was able to move boldly. The study has shown that the hollowing out 
of underwriting arrangements that contributed to the excess of the new issues boom of 1928 
is evident from documents that were made available to the committee, but has found no 
evidence that their implications were understood by the committee let alone by the 
membership at large. Members’ views were clouded by the desire to repair their incomes 
following the limited trading of the war years, and the risks of poor underwriting may have 
been genuinely difficult to discern. In any event, the committee was powerless to act without 
the support of the membership, which in turn depended upon the membership’s appreciation 
of the need for action. 
This study’s examination of these issues consisted of three discrete exercises. 
The first involved tracking and comparing the archival evidence for negotiation of the principal 
regulatory interventions between 1914 and 1945 that are listed in Appendix One to the 
Chapter. This exercise consisted of an examination and comparison of the records of the 
London Stock Exchange, the Bank of England and relevant government departments, including 
the Board of Trade, Treasury, the Home Office, the Director of Public Prosecutions and the 
Ministry of Health. This study was augmented by an examination of the records of 
parliamentary debates and of committees of inquiry, although the detailed briefing papers 
submitted to the Wrenbury Committee in 1918 and the Greene Committee in 1925 do not 
appear to have survived.12 This study of official papers was supported by an analysis of the 
debates in contemporary books and journals of the case for regulation of share trading. 
                                                 
11  ‘The financial crisis: why have no high-level executives been prosecuted?’ The New York Review 
of Books; 9 January 2014. Downloaded 1 January 2016. 
12  Both the Wrenbury Committee and the Greene Committee were appointed to consider 
amendment of company law. 
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The second study consisted of tracing and examining the records of relevant prosecutions 
between 1914 and 1945. A starting point for this study was provided by lists of share-pushing 
prosecutions between 1900 and 1935 that were submitted to the Bodkin Committee in 1937.13 
To augment this information, the registers of cases referred to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions were also examined.14 As it was evident that the lists prepared from these 
sources were probably incomplete, they were supplemented by digital searches of The Times 
and the Financial Times. A search was then made for all newspaper reports and other records 
of prosecutions that had been identified. 
The third study consisted of tracing and examining the records of a sample of new share issues 
between 1914 and 1945. To provide focus for this study, the sample consisted of all of the 
shares floated by Clarence Hatry, augmented by a study of his activities and career. His 
experience together with the changes he made in his business during the 1920s demonstrate 
the process that led to the disappearance of promoters. Although he was the best known of 
the company promoters operating during the period, famed for his ability to navigate the 
Exchange’s rules to achieve vendors’ commercial objectives, there is no biographical study of 
his life.15 He became the most notorious promoter following the crash brought on by the 
collapse of his companies at the end of September 1929. His actions led directly to a number 
of regulatory interventions during the period, and his trial in 1930, stage-managed by the 
Governor of the Bank of England, provided a screen behind which the Exchange reformed 
itself. This proved critical to the Exchange’s defence of its independence. As his operations 
involved both on-market and off-market issues, and included issues which led to innovation 
within the Exchange and others which led to abuse, this sample afforded an opportunity to 
examine the relationship between the regulated market place provided by the Exchange and 
the unregulated space beyond. In contrast to existing studies, which are largely institutional in 
character, this is material to an understanding of the forces that led to regulatory reform. It 
also afforded an opportunity to explore the network of relationships on which Hatry relied. 
                                                 
13  The Committee was appointed in December 1936 to consider the case for regulating share-
pushing. 
14  The form of these registers changed in the early 1930s from bound volumes to a card index 
system which rendered this check impossible for the final years of the period. 
15  There are a number of short reviews (DNB, DBB, Manley 1976), one or two books reviewing 
fraudsters have included chapters devoted to Hatry (Vallance 1955, Pearson 1961, Gilbert 1986) and 
occasional brief newspaper articles (Sunday Express February 1930). Clarence Hatry was reported to 
have begun work on an autobiography, but no book was ever published and persistent enquiries have 
failed to locate any papers prepared by him. 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
Page 9 
 
The sample was not intended to be representative of all IPOs between 1919 and 1939,16 but 
only of the transactions of a company promoter who ultimately was disgraced. A list of Hatry’s 
corporate transactions is set out in Appendix Two to this Chapter. 
The search for records of Hatry’s transactions was problematic since obtaining a rounded view 
of a transaction would have required examination of the records of all the parties involved: the 
company whose shares were being issued, the company promoter, any banks involved in 
supporting the issue and the London Stock Exchange. Hatry’s papers have not survived: they 
were presumably destroyed by liquidators when his companies were wound up. Nonetheless 
the search successfully located original records that illuminated each stage of a company 
promoter’s work, albeit in relation to different transactions. A list of the archival sources for 
this study is set out in Appendix Three to this Chapter. 
The outcome of these studies is an account of the stages by which the regulatory settlement of 
1945 was developed from the market environment of 1914, which is described in Chapter 
Two. 
Chapter Three describes the developments that occurred during the 1914–1918 war from the 
initial imposition of new issue controls in January 1915 to their removal in 1919. Created by an 
agreement between the Stock Exchange and the Treasury which was enforced solely through 
the Stock Exchange’s own rules, the controls proved dysfunctional because they did not apply 
to off-market transactions. The incentive to enter into transactions off-market which were not 
permitted on-market ultimately undermined the controls’ purpose and frustrated the 
Exchange’s members who had been happy to see controls introduced in January 1915 as a 
means of restoring their livelihood. In 1919, members saw the abolition of controls as vital to 
restoring the economic rents of membership. Others suggested that some continuing control 
would be desirable to avoid the abuse of the new class of inexperienced investors. In the 
event, the Treasury’s attempt in January 1919 to impose permanent controls was to prove a 
humiliating failure. In returning to ‘business as usual’, caveat emptor remained a guiding 
principle. 
The end of hostilities in November 1918 was accompanied by hope that commercial life would 
return to normality and prosperity. For a while, trade and the stock markets boomed. But 
                                                 
16  Studies of such representative samples have been reported elsewhere: Chambers (2010). 
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there was also uncertainty about how the transition to a peacetime economy would be 
managed and whether markets which had been lost during the war could be recovered. In the 
event, the transition proved troublesome and markets were not recovered so that the post-
war boom was followed by a crash in 1920. Slowly business recovered, leading to a further 
boom in 1928. 
As years passed, deeper uncertainties emerged. War had exposed the inefficiency of many old 
industries and had given fresh impetus to new technologies. The character of the investing 
public had been changed as had the risk appetite of many investors. Government expenditure, 
even when reduced in 1920, was at a higher level than before 1914 and required a higher level 
of taxation. As a result, attitudes towards investment were changing with a search for higher 
returns within acceptable levels of risk and volatility. Sustained returns based on continuing 
relationships came to be more valued than short-term speculative gains. 
These circumstances challenged the incomes of Stock Exchange members which did not 
quickly return to pre-1914 levels. In seeking to defend their interests, members demonstrated 
the weaknesses of self-regulation. Chapter Four describes how members coped with these 
pressures in the years between 1919 and 1929. 
In particular, these circumstances challenged the pre-1914 approach to the launch of new 
issues which aimed to realise short-term profits at the time of flotation, often irrespective of 
the consequence in terms of a business’s sustainability. As a result, the houses that encircled 
the Exchange were obliged to take a new direction. Old-style company promoters disappeared 
and new issuing houses were created. Chapter Five describes the change in the financial model 
underlying the business of organising new issues. 
The combination of uncertainty about the future of old and new industries and the emergence 
of many inexperienced small investors looking for higher returns was an opportunity for the 
unscrupulous, which tested arrangements for deterring and controlling abuse. Within the 
Stock Exchange, these arrangements depended upon the Committee’s vigour in refreshing and 
applying the rules. Beyond the Exchange, reliance was placed on prosecutions. Chapter Six 
assesses the performance and failure of the Exchange and the criminal justice system between 
1919 and 1929 in deterring abuse.  
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Matters were brought to a head by the two crashes of 1929: the first in the spring which saw 
the failure of many companies floated in 1928 and the second in September, precipitated by 
the collapse of Clarence Hatry’s companies. The crashes became an existential threat to the 
Exchange, as they coincided with the election of a minority Labour government on a manifesto 
envisaging nationalisation of the Bank of England and the creation of a National Investment 
Bank to direct investment. Members were galvanised to support reforms of the new issue 
rules. Yet as the crisis gradually subsided, the members’ support for reform also subsided with 
the result that certain of the proposals were not implemented. In this process, radical reforms 
were implemented, demonstrating that when certain conditions are satisfied self-regulating 
organisations could act decisively and successfully. These events are analysed in Chapter 
Seven. 
The events of 1929 encouraged the market’s growing risk aversion. As institutional investors 
became important, the London Stock Exchange’s membership became ever more polarised 
between brokers dealing with corporate business and those dealing with personal clients. 
There continued to be battles between these two groups of members which were usually 
determined on favour of a conservative majority of members. These developments between 
1930 and 1939 are described in Chapter Eight. 
Although the reforms implemented by the Exchange in 1930 were successful in eliminating 
weak underwriting within the Exchange, they did not eliminate abuse altogether. Their 
principal effect was to drive abusive activity off-market. A series of scandals ensued which the 
Exchange, government departments and prosecutors were powerless to control. Embroiled in 
campaigns to increase middle class readership, newspapers such as the Daily Mail and the 
Daily Express saw in these scandals an opportunity to gain support, and began to lobby for 
government intervention. The high point of these campaigns was reached in January 1936 
when the Daily Mail’s allegations concerning Maurice Singer, a share-pusher, were completely 
vindicated in a libel action. This emboldened the Daily Mail to campaign for regulation of share 
traders, bringing to the fore the political debate on institutional reform which had begun in the 
early 1920s. In the autumn of 1936, the Exchange acquiesced in the government’s 
appointment of the Bodkin Committee, ostensibly to inquire into the case for regulating share 
trading, but in practice to consider how a system of regulation could be introduced. 
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The report of the Bodkin Committee recommended an approach to regulation which was 
designed to respect the sensitivities of the Stock Exchange by proposing that the London Stock 
Exchange should be recognised but not subjected to any form of oversight by government. 
From the Exchange’s point of view, this outcome was desirable because it would remain free 
to set its own rules and especially the Conduct of Business Rules which protected members’ 
commercial interests. Officials, Conservative ministers and the Labour opposition all resisted 
this lack of oversight, but when the Board of Trade proposed to implement the 
recommendations in a way that would have avoided this problem, the Exchange resisted. 
Eventually, the Board of Trade backed down. 
The events leading to the appointment of the Bodkin Committee and the negotiations which 
led to the implementation of its recommendations are described in Chapter Nine. 
Although the Board of Trade strove to implement the new legislation quickly, its efforts were 
defeated by the declaration of war. On this occasion, the Treasury had planned for the 
introduction of wartime control of new issues and the dysfunctionality of the 1914–1918 
controls was not repeated. Nonetheless, concern among the Exchange’s members grew about 
business bypassing the Exchange. Pressured by members, the Exchange’s Committee came to 
see in regulation a way of ensuring that its members and the members of competing 
exchanges could compete with each other, unconcerned about the activities of off-market 
traders because the registration scheme would virtually eliminate them. For its part, the Board 
of Trade accepted implementation of the Bodkin Committee’s recommendations and thus the 
Exchange’s power to regulate the conduct of members without oversight in return for the 
acceptance by the Exchange that in regulating the market (as opposed to members’ conduct) it 
would respect the wishes of government. In effect, the government had concluded that it did 
not need direct control of the Exchange to be able to achieve its policy objectives. The events 
during the war which led to this conclusion are described in Chapter Ten. 
Finally, a review of the factors that drove developments during the period is set out in Chapter 
Eleven.  
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APPENDIX ONE TO CHAPTER ONE 
PRINCIPAL REGULATORY INTERVENTIONS 1914–1945 
 
Date Nature of the intervention 
January 1915 Introduction of wartime controls of Exchange trading and new issues under 
Temporary Regulations of the Stock Exchange; introduced following 
negotiations between the Treasury and the Stock Exchange about 
reopening the Exchange in January 1915. 
January 1919 Introduction of Regulation 30F under the Defence of the Realm Act, 
following consideration by the Treasury of complaints about the operation 
of the wartime controls in view of the need for continued restriction of new 
issues after the war. The Regulation was withdrawn within a few days of its 
announcement to be replaced shortly thereafter by a severely limited new 
regulation. 
December 1919 New Stock Exchange rule introduced following flotation of Agricultural 
Industries Limited by Clarence Hatry: extended the mandatory disclosure 
requirements for prospectuses to cover offers for sale. 
1928 Companies Act 1928: implementing the recommendations of the Greene 
Committee on amendment of company law which, inter alia, proposed the 
creation of new offences to curb share-pushing. Exceptionally, the new 
offences became effective on the grant of Royal Assent. 
1930 New rules introduced by the London Stock Exchange implementing the 
recommendations of a working party established following the crash of the 
Hatry group in September 1929. 
March 1939 Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1939: implementing the 
recommendations of the Bodkin Committee. Although Statutory 
Instruments bringing the Act into force were published, implementation 
was deferred after the declaration of war in September 1939. 
September 1939 Wartime controls of new issues: implementing the recommendations of an 
internal Treasury Committee which proposed that the new controls should 
be introduced under public law. 
March 1944 Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1939: the Act was brought in to 
force by Statutory Instrument following lobbying by the Stock Exchange 
and the process of creating registers of share traders commenced. 
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APPENDIX TWO TO CHAPTER ONE 
CLARENCE HATRY’S TRANSACTIONS 
 
The list below excludes local authority loan issues between 1925 and 1929. 
 
 
Date Company Business Description of 
transaction 
1913 Union Emigrants Association 
Limited 
Sale of insurance to 
migrants travelling to United 
States. 
Off-market offer of 
shares. 
1913 Union Emigrants Association 
(Italy) Limited 
Sale of insurance to 
migrants travelling to United 
States. 
Off-market offer of 
shares. 
1914 Planet Insurance Limited General insurance company. Acquisition of 
controlling interest. 
1915 City Equitable Fire Insurance 
Limited 
General insurance company. Acquisition of 
controlling interest. 
1915 City Equitable Fire Insurance 
Limited 
General insurance company. Sale of controlling 
interest. 
1916 Commercial Bank of London 
Limited 
Bank. Acquisition of 
controlling interest. 
February 
1917 
Marshalls Limited Provincial department 
stores. 
Capital issue in 
connection with 
disposal of stores by 
Marshall & Snelgrove. 
1917 Jos Eltringham Limited Shipbuilding and ship 
repairing. 
Off-market sale of 
shares (with Sperling & 
Company). 
1917 H&C Grayson Limited Shipbuilding and ship 
repairing. 
Off-market sale of 
shares (with Sperling & 
Company). 
1917 Irvine’s Shipbuilding Limited Shipbuilding and ship 
repairing. 
Off-market sale of 
shares (with Sperling & 
Company). 
November 
1917 
London Foundry Company Brass foundry. Capital issue approved 
by Capital Issues 
Committee. 
1918 Northumberland Shipbuilding 
Limited 
Shipbuilding and ship 
repairing. 
Off-market sale of 
shares (with Sperling & 
Company). 
April 1919 Burton Son & Sanders Limited Food wholesaling. Capital reconstruction. 
June 1919 Amalgamated Industrials 
Limited 
Mining and shipping 
combine. 
Offer for sale. 
July 1919 British Window Glass Limited Glass manufacturing using 
newly acquired process. 
Offer for sale of 
debentures. 
July 1919 CA Vandervell Limited Manufacturing of auto 
electrical components. 
Offer for sale of 
debentures. 
October 
1919 
Leyland Motors Limited Motor vehicle 
manufacturing. 
Offer for sale of 
preference shares. 
November Agricultural Industries Limited Farming. Offer for sale of 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
Page 15 
 
Date Company Business Description of 
transaction 
1919 preference shares. 
January 
1920 
Commercial Bank of London 
Limited 
Bank. Offer for sale of 
ordinary shares. 
February 
1920 
British Glass Industries 
Limited 
Glass manufacturing. Private sale of shares. 
March 1920 Kent Portland Cement Limited Building new cement factory 
in Kent. 
Offer for sale of 
preference shares. 
May 1920 Webb’s Crystal Glass Limited Glass manufacturing. Private sale of shares. 
July 1920 Amalgamated Industrials 
Limited 
Combine of shipping, 
mining, insurance interests. 
Private sale of 
debentures. 
September 
1920 
United Brassfounders and 
Engineers Limited 
Combine of three brass 
foundries. 
Private sale of shares. 
October 
1920 
Hugh Stevenson & Company 
Limited 
Cardboard manufacturing. Private sale of shares. 
November 
1920 
Jute Industries Limited Combine of Dundee jute 
mills. 
Offer for sale of 
preference shares. 
November 
1920/1922 
Esparto Paper Mills Limited Combine of paper mills 
based in East Scotland. 
Negotiations to form 
the combine were 
unsuccessful because of 
a failure to agree 
acquisition prices. 
1923? Wood-Milne Rubber 
TyreCompany Limited 
Tyre manufacturing. Acquisition of a 
controlling interest. 
1923? Clover Paint & Composition 
Company Limited 
Marine paint manufacturing. Acquisition of a 
controlling interest. 
1924 Wood-Milne Rubber Tyre 
Company Limited 
Tyre manufacturing. Sale of a controlling 
interest to British 
Goodrich Rubber 
Limited. 
June 1924 British Goodrich Rubber 
Company Limited 
Tyre manufacturing. Offer for sale of shares 
in the UK subsidiary of 
a US group. 
April 1925 Marshalls Limited Department store. Offer for sale of 
preference shares. 
July 1925 Glasgow Bonding Company 
Limited 
Bonded storage for whisky 
distillers. 
Offer for sale of shares. 
December 
1925 
Drapery & General 
Investment Trust Limited 
Acquiring interests in 
department stores. 
Offer for sale of shares. 
June 1926 Selincourt & Sons Limited Department store. Offer for sale of 
preference shares. 
June 1926 Stagg & Russell Limited Department store. Offer for sale of 
preference shares. 
July 1926 Plummer Roddis Limited Department store. Offer for sale of 
preference shares. 
November 
1926 
Dawson Brothers Limited Department store. Offer for sale of 
preference shares. 
January 
1927 
Clover Paint & Composition 
Company Limited 
Marine paint manufacturing. Offer for sale of 
preference shares to 
finance acquisition. 
May 1927 Corporation & General 
Securities Limited 
Managing local authority 
loan issues. 
Offer for sale of shares. 
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Date Company Business Description of 
transaction 
May 1927 Footman Pretty & Company 
Limited 
Department store. Offer for sale of 
preference shares. 
July 1927 London Public Omnibus 
Company Limited 
Acquiring independent bus 
operators in London. 
Privately arranged. 
October 
1927 
Albion Greyhounds Limited Developing greyhound 
tracks in Glasgow and 
elsewhere. 
Offer for sale of 
ordinary shares. 
November 
1927 
Drapery Trust Limited Department stores. Sale of a controlling 
interest (to 
Debenhams). 
January 
1928 
London Public Omnibus 
Company Limited 
Operating buses in London. Sale of a controlling 
interest (to London 
General Omnibus 
Company Limited). 
February 
1928 
Debenhams Securities Limited Department stores. Offer for sale of 
preference shares 
jointly in New York and 
London (after a capital 
reconstruction). 
March 1928 Photomaton Parent 
Corporation Limited 
Exploiting new process for 
photograph booths. 
Privately arranged. 
May 1928 Alvis Car and Engineering 
Company Limited 
Vehicle manufacturing. Offer for sale of shares. 
June 1928 Retail Securities Limited Investment company. Offer for sale of shares. 
June 1928 International Bitumen 
Emulsions Limited 
Exploiting new process for 
bitumen road surfaces. 
Private placement of 
shares. 
June 1928 Far Eastern Photomaton 
Corporation Limited 
Exploiting new process for 
photograph booths. 
Offer for sale of 
debentures and shares. 
June 1928 Photomaton (Lancashire & 
Midland) Limited 
Exploiting new process for 
photograph booths. 
Offer for sale of 
debentures and shares. 
January 
1929 
Associated Automatic 
Machine Corporation Limited 
Acquiring interests in 
manufacturers of automatic 
vending machines. 
Privately arranged and 
first acquisitions. 
March 1929 Associated Automatic 
Machine Corporation Limited 
Acquiring interests in 
manufacturers of automatic 
vending machines. 
Offer for sale of 
ordinary shares to 
finance acquisition of 
British Automatic 
Machines Limited. 
April 1929 United Steel Companies 
Limited and United Strip and 
Bar Mills Limited 
Steel manufacturing 
combine. 
Offer for sale of shares 
to finance acquisitions. 
May 1929 Allied Ironfounders Limited Light castings. Offer for sale of 
debenture stock to 
finance acquisitions to 
form combine. 
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APPENDIX THREE TO CHAPTER ONE 
CLARENCE HATRY’S TRANSACTIONS: PRINCIPAL ARCHIVAL SOURCES 
 
Transaction stage Nature of documents Location 
Identification and formation of 
vehicle for flotation 
Esparto Paper Mills: 
Correspondence and 
memoranda relating to 
negotiations concerning the 
formation of a new combine, 
including in particular 
negotiation of the prices at 
which the shares of the former 
companies were to be acquired. 
Russell Papers, University of St 
Andrews, Special Collections. 
Jute Industries Limited: 
Correspondence relating to the 
formation of a new combine. 
Jute Industries collection, 
Dundee University Archives. 
Jute Industries Limited: 
Agreements with companies 
forming the new combine. 
Jute Industries collection, 
Dundee University Archives. 
Applications for Listing files, 
London Stock Exchange, 
Guildhall Library. 
Agricultural Industries Limited: 
Information concerning the 
initial negotiations. 
Private information. 
Union Emigrants Association 
Limited and Union Emigrants 
Association (Italy) Limited: 
Documents relating to the trade 
and agreements transferred to 
the new company to be offered 
for sale (including a list of the 
agents in Eastern Europe). 
Board of Trade papers, National 
Archives. 
Debenhams Securities Limited: 
Documents relating to the 
formation of a new holding 
company and its flotation in 
both London and New York. 
Kleinwort & Sons archive, 
London Metropolitan Archives. 
Leyland Motors Limited: 
Documents relating to the 
partial transfer of net assets to a 
new company and liquidation of 
a former company. 
Board of Trade papers, National 
Archives. 
Applications for all securities 
which it was intended should be 
listed. 
Applications for Listing files, 
London Stock Exchange, 
Guildhall Library. 
After 1919, the  
files contain copies of the 
contracts disclosed, including 
contracts by which former 
companies were acquired. 
Creation of supporting syndicate United Steel: M Samuel archive, Lloyds Bank 
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Transaction stage Nature of documents Location 
Record of the syndicate 
negotiations and copy of 
syndicate agreement. 
Archive. 
United Steel: 
Copy of syndicate agreement. 
Marquess of Winchester’s 
memoirs (published). 
 Preparation of prospectus Jute Industries Limited: 
Accounting records of Cox 
Brothers Limited and Gilroy & 
Sons Limited, including 
manuscript comparisons 
between the prospectus and the 
internal accounting records, 
production cost summaries and 
valuation analyses. 
Jute Industries collection, 
Dundee University Archives. 
Agricultural Industries Limited: 
Comparison of the prospectus 
with detailed transactions and 
company structures included in 
the unpublished report of a 
Board of Trade Inspector. 
Board of Trade papers, National 
Archives. 
 Promotional activity for an on-
market transaction 
Jute Industries Limited: 
Re-purchase guarantee between 
directors and Ellis & Company. 
Jute Industries collection, 
Dundee University Archives. 
Jute Industries Limited: 
Advertising programme to 
support flotation. 
Applications for Listings files, 
London Stock Exchange, 
Guildhall Library. 
Corporation & General Securities 
Limited (C&GS): 
Documents relating to actions 
taken by brokers to secure 
acceptance by brokers to secure 
acceptance by disaffected 
jobbers of securities launched by 
C&GS. 
Foster & Braithwaite archive, 
Guildhall Library. 
Underwriting arrangements Applications for all securities 
which it was intended should be 
listed. 
Applications for Listing files, 
London Stock Exchange, 
Guildhall Library. 
The files for all applications after 
1919 contain copies of the 
underwriting agreements. 
Promotional activity for an off-
market transaction 
Northumberland Shipbuilding 
Company Limited: 
Selling memoranda and 
correspondence. 
Kleinwort & Sons archive, 
London Metropolitan archives. 
Stock Exchange consideration of 
application for permission to 
deal 
Applications for all securities 
which it was intended should be 
listed. Particular attention was 
given to the two following 
instances in which permission 
was denied. 
Applications for Listing files, 
London Stock Exchange, 
Guildhall Library. 
 
  DA Trust Pool (a transaction 
managed by James White but 
Applications for Listing files, 
London Stock Exchange, 
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Transaction stage Nature of documents Location 
supported by Clarence Hatry). 
Refusal of application on 
grounds that the planned 
security was not suitable for 
trading. 
Guildhall Library. 
 
Jute Industries Limited: 
Refusal of application on 
grounds that disclosure was 
incomplete. Permission was 
subsequently granted on certain 
conditions. 
Applications for Listing files, 
London Stock Exchange, 
Guildhall Library. 
 
 Transactions subsequent to 
flotation 
United Steel: 
Report of Sir Gilbert Garnsey on 
the financing of the flotation. 
DPP papers, National Archives. 
Also Price Waterhouse & 
Company archive. 
Hatchards Associated Interests: 
Unpublished reports of a Board 
of Trade Inspector. 
Metropolitan Police papers, 
National Archives. 
British Automatic Company: 
Memoranda concerning the 
extraction of pension scheme 
cash and investments. 
DPP papers, National Archives. 
C&GS: 
Correspondence relating to 
management of profits from 
flotation of local authority 
issues. 
Foster & Braithwaite archive, 
Guildhall Library. 
C&GS: 
Liquidator and Special 
Manager’s report on the winding 
up of C&GS and agreements 
with Austin Friars Trust about 
commission on local authority 
issues. 
Board of Trade papers, National 
Archives. 
Agricultural Industries Limited: 
Record of transactions effected 
at or immediately after flotation: 
unpublished report of a Board of 
Trade Inspector. 
Board of Trade papers, National 
Archives. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 1914 – ON THE BRINK OF WAR 
 
 
Introduction 
In July 1914, on the brink of war, the London Stock Exchange was generally acknowledged to 
be the leading exchange in the world.17 The nominal value of securities listed on the Exchange 
amounted to more than £11 billion: more than the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the 
Paris Bourse combined. Of that value, more than 50% related to foreign stocks.18 It existed to 
serve investors not only in the United Kingdom but also investors throughout the world who 
chose to transact their business in London rather than in their local exchange. One-third of all 
negotiable instruments in the world were listed on the London Stock Exchange while the NYSE 
and the Paris Bourse each listed only about one-fifth of the total.19   
What led to the achievement of this pre-eminence has long been debated; but is often 
attributed to the felicities of its bifurcated constitution.20 
The Exchange’s constitution 
Originating in decisions made in 1801 to provide a market for the government debt issued to 
finance the Napoleonic War, the Exchange’s constitution distinguished the powers of the 
proprietors of the Exchange from the powers of the subscribers or members who alone had 
the right to trade on the Exchange floor. Neal et al conclude that this division of ownership 
from operation: 
‘ . . . was the fundamental factor accounting for [the Exchange’s] success as the 
world’s leading stock exchange in the first era of global financial markets.’21 
Responsibility for construction and maintenance of the physical facilities of the Exchange was a 
primary responsibility of the proprietors whose powers were delegated to trustees and 
managers. Although all people permitted to trade through the Exchange were expected to 
acquire a share in the Exchange, there was no bar on shares being held by anyone who was not 
                                                 
17  Cassis (2010); page 98. 
18  Michie (1999); page 88. 
19  Davis and Neal (1998). Davis et al (2003); page 4.  
20  Kynaston (1983). Michie (1999). Davis et al (2003); Neal (2006); Neal et al (2006); Klaus (2014). 
21  Neal and Davis (2006); page 282. 
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so involved. There was, however, a limit on the number of shares that any individual could 
hold. The reward for the proprietors came from the charges that could be levied for permitting 
access to the Exchange so that the proprietors had an interest in maximising the business 
transacted through the Exchange and the profit that could be made by those using its facilities. 
In practice the freedom to choose a marketing strategy that would maximise the proprietors’ 
return was limited by two factors. The limitation of shareholdings meant that any change in 
strategy required broad support. Since all members were expected also to be proprietors, their 
views had to be taken into account22 and they could be relied upon to have trenchant views on 
whether membership should be expanded to maximise membership charges or restricted to 
maximise the value of membership.  
Moreover, as the Exchange was a private body and did not have an exclusive right to organise 
a market for share trading, there was a constant threat that business which would otherwise 
be directed to the Exchange might be diverted either to informal trading between parties 
outside the Exchange or to competing market places such as the exchanges that existed in 
many provincial cities. It might also be diverted to other forms of investment. If the Exchange 
were to be bypassed, the benefits of membership in the form of competitive profits or 
economic rents would be eroded,23 a danger managed by frequent reconsideration and 
adjustment of the Exchange’s rules. As in the case  of other exchanges,  this involved action in 
four areas: the Exchange’s trading capacity; trading practices and conduct of business; listing 
and de-listing securities; and share price manipulation.24 
Access to the Exchange’s trading floor was permitted to members who fell into two principal 
groups: brokers (who acted on behalf of clients outside the Exchange from whom they earned 
commissions); and jobbers (who acted as dealers between brokers, making profits from the 
spread between bid and offer prices). Some brokers also acted as promoters, introducing 
shares for trading on the Exchange (charging fees for introducing and underwriting new 
issues).   
                                                 
22  In 1919, it was argued on behalf of the Stock Exchange that there was no duty to individual 
members beyond providing access to the facilities of the Exchange for a period of 12 months. Judgment 
of Lord Chancellor in Weinberger v Inglis and Others; The Times; 8 April 1919; page 6. The case arose 
over decisions by the committee to exclude from membership people ‘of enemy birth’ (including 
naturalised British citizens). The court did not pursue this argument but indicated that it did not accept 
the contention that the Exchange’s obligation to Members was so narrowly limited. 
23  Macey and Novogrod (2011–2012); pages 963–1003 
24  Macey and O’Hara (2005–2006); pages 583–592. 
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The rule against ‘double capacity’,25 by which brokers could not also act as jobbers, resulted in 
each group being motivated to maximise the volume of trading from which income was 
derived. Brokers could try to increase their commission from clients by increasing their 
commission rates or encouraging their clients to trade more actively. However, a broker would 
fear that increasing the rate of commission might attract competitive undercutting from other 
brokers, either inside or outside the Exchange, and many clients resisted what they would 
have seen as speculative over-trading. Brokers were thus motivated to attract more clients as a 
way of increasing their business. Those brokers who also acted as promoters received no 
promotion fees if there were no new issues, so were interested in maximising the number of 
new issues, and there was in any event a constant need for new issues to replace companies 
that failed. 
For their part, jobbers could attempt to increase their income by increasing the spread 
between bid and offer prices, but this increased the risk of loss on their book so that they too 
were led to encourage the volume of transactions by, for example, maximising the number of 
new issues. Although jobbers thus shared with brokers an interest in maximising business 
transacted through the Exchange, their interests were not congruent. From a jobber’s 
perspective, attracting business might be an end in itself irrespective of the route by which it 
reached the Exchange so that a jobber would, for example, be interested in attracting orders 
directly from provincial brokers. Contrastingly, a broker would expect that such business would 
be routed through a broker member of the Exchange. 
The interests of all members were overseen by the Committee for General Purposes, which 
was elected by members annually. This committee managed the admission of new members 
and was empowered to promulgate the rules governing trading through the Exchange.  
Although nominally the committee had unlimited power to introduce rules and admit new 
members, the requirement for the annual election of the whole committee ensured that it was 
sensitive to the views of members about the preservation of their interests and to changes in 
the balance of members’ views. Committee members expecting to hold their seats at the next 
annual election would expect to be held to account for any undue restriction of the number of 
members or over-enthusiastic admission of new members.26  Thus, whilst the committee was 
responsible for promulgating changes in the rules necessary to reflect changing conditions, the 
                                                 
25  Rule 80. This and subsequent references to the Rules are taken from Poley et al (1913). 
26  Rule 1.  
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power to do this was constrained by the committee’s accountability to the members, their 
homogeneity as a group and their perception of the need for changes occasioned by 
developing conditions.27 
That the committee was responsive to members’ reactions had been demonstrated in 1904, 
when concern among members about the profitability of their businesses eventually led the 
committee to adopt a scheme intended to cap the number of members by requiring that 
applicants for membership should buy the nomination of an existing member (in addition to 
paying the entrance fee and the annual subscription).28 Although this restriction did not prove 
immediately effective, because many existing clerks were immediately introduced to 
membership under existing rules, membership eventually peaked in 1910.  
 
Table 2.1: London Stock Exchange membership May 1904–November 191429 
   Members Clerks  Total 
  Authorised Non-
authorised 
 Total  
No. % No. No. No. % No. 
May 1904 4,779 
64 
609 2,058 2,667 
36 
7,446 
November 
1904 
5,481 
73 
322 1,752 2,047 
27 
7,528 
November 
1905 
5,463 
71 
438 1,762 2,200 
29 
7,663 
November 
1906 
5,397 
71 
493 1,711 2,207 
29 
7,604 
November 
1907 
5,266 
71 
534 1,637 2,171 
29 
7,437 
November 
1908 
5,047 
71 
526 1,531 2,057 
29 
7,104 
November 
1909 
5,034 
69 
652 1,606 2,258 
31 
7,292 
November 
1910 
5,102 
67 
795 1,768 2,563 
33 
7,665 
November 
1911 
5,070 
66 
806 1,758 2,564 
34 
7,634 
November 
1912 
5,052 
66 
828 1,732 2,560 
34 
7,612 
                                                 
27  Macey and O’Hara (2005–2006); page 570. 
28  Committee of Members Minutes 20 April 1904; Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
Michie (1999); page 85. 
29  Quoted in Michie (1999); page 86. Committee for General Purposes Minutes April 1922; Stock 
Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
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   Members Clerks  Total 
  Authorised Non-
authorised 
 Total  
No. % No. No. No. % No. 
November 
1913 
4,971 
67 
816 1,669 2,485 
33 
7,456 
November 
1914 
4,822 
67 
765 1,562 2,327 
33 
7,149 
 
As if to prove that the London Stock Exchange was obliged to be constantly wary of potential 
competition, the attempt to cap membership was followed in 1909 by the creation in London 
of a competing exchange known as the Mincing Lane Tea and Rubber Brokers’ Association 
which sought to take advantage of speculations in plantation company shares. 
As the Exchange was independent, and there was no external oversight mechanism, there was 
no formal means by which the rules of the Exchange could be directly affected by the views or 
interests of parties other than the Exchange’s members so that the rules exclusively reflected 
the members’ interests as they perceived them.  
The Exchange’s Rules 
At the heart of an exchange’s practices lie its rules, for they specify how trading is to take 
place, mitigating the risks that professional traders take when trading through the exchange 
and protecting the benefits that result from the creation of the exchange.  
Rules vary between markets as to the different perceptions of exchange members of their own 
risk appetites and those of the outside interests which they exist to serve. Markets may for 
example offer greater or less liquidity, speed of execution and transaction cost. Different 
combinations of these may better suit the predilections of members and prospective clients in 
different places and at different times. The trade-off between speed of execution and 
transaction cost appropriate to one period or one place may prove unsuitable at another time 
or in another place. Similarly, the riskiness of the securities in which exchanges are prepared to 
facilitate trading and the efficiency with which that riskiness is signalled to prospective clients 
by mandatory disclosure or other means will also vary according to the exchange’s perception 
of its clients’ risk appetite.  
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Arriving at rules that reflect perceptions of risk appetite is unlikely to be a perfect process, 
however, for in practice there are likely to be barriers that may prevent an optimal outcome. 
As an example of this problem, requiring mandatory disclosure in prospectuses of information 
aimed at permitting a realistic assessment of the riskiness of a business might be useful to 
investors but will impose costs that are only borne by the shareholders of that firm. The result 
may be a resistance to imposition of the disclosure requirement. If most firms voluntarily make 
the disclosure nonetheless, and the judgement that the information is significant is shared by 
prospective investors, the result is likely to be a material discount in the market valuation of 
the shares of non-disclosing firms. If, in contrast, few firms make the disclosure, then the 
discount for non-discounting firms will be correspondingly smaller.30 Ideally an exchange 
should be in a position to balance interests and to create rules that create benefits for 
investors and traders until the benefits are outweighed by the costs that they involve. In this 
sense, the self-interests of an exchange’s members will lead to rules that meet the self-
interests of investors.31 
In 1914, the rules of the London Stock Exchange sought to achieve three principal objectives: 
that members could trade confidently through the Exchange because counterparty risk was to 
some extent mitigated; that the benefits of the Exchange were as far as possible protected for 
the benefit of proprietors and members (i.e. that the problem of free-riding was controlled); 
and that investors would be as confident as they wanted to be that the risk attached to 
investment was being managed. As members were motivated to maximise the volume of 
business, not least by maximising the stocks listed by the Exchange, the rules did not focus on 
the quality of listed investments: that was left to the commercial judgement of members and 
their clients. Although on occasion the committee might decide to exclude a stock from listing, 
this did not necessarily prevent members from dealing in stocks on the floor of the Exchange, 
as permission was frequently given to trade in shares that were not included in the Official List 
and which came, eventually, to be included in a supplementary list. 
As far as counterparty risk was concerned, the rules sought to provide comfort that members 
would be dealing with counterparties for whose reputation other members had vouched, 
whose assets stood wholly behind Exchange business, whose creditworthiness, at least in the 
                                                 
30  Akerloff (1970); page 488. 
31  Mahoney (1997); page 1459. 
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early years of membership, was supported by the guarantees of fellow members, and whose 
solvency was not at risk by exposure to other business interests outside the Exchange.  
These objectives were achieved by a number of detailed rules which provided that 
membership of the Exchange was not open to a company but only to individuals who were 
usually nominated by an existing member, although some applications could be entertained 
without nominations.32  Each candidate had to be recommended by three members of not less 
than four years’ standing who had fulfilled all engagements. Each recommender was expected 
to undertake to make a contribution to the applicant’s creditors in the event that the applicant 
was declared a defaulter within four years of his admission.33 No member (or his wife) was 
allowed to be a principal in any business outside the Stock Exchange and no partnership of 
members was permitted to include any individuals who were not members.34 No member was 
allowed to advertise for business or to issue business circulars to anyone other than his own 
clients.35 No member was to try to enforce by law a claim against another member arising from 
a Stock Exchange transaction.36 
Counterparty risk was not eliminated completely, however: there was a constant trickle of 
member failures which had reached a peak in 1894. It would have been  possible to reduce the 
number of failures, or at least to reduce the losses that they caused, by requiring that all 
trading should take place on a cash basis against delivery of scrip as was to be required during 
the 1914–1918 war.37 As a member, Gerald Williams, observed in November 1918: 
‘The one outstanding feature in dealings in the “House” during the past four, 
inherently difficult, years has been the well-nigh perfect safety for all concerned. Not 
only did the cash basis of our transactions effectively reduce to – practically – zero the 
risk involved in the ultimate completion of each bargain, but it tended to stabilise 
markets in a most salutary and hitherto unknown manner.’38 
Beside reducing counterparty risks, most of these rules also served to reduce the risk of free-
riding: of outside interests taking advantage of the Exchange without themselves being 
                                                 
32  Rule 26(1). The specified application form made clear that applications were invited from 
individuals. Rule 28(1) prescribed the process for applications without nominations. 
33  Rule 32(1). 
34  Rule 30. 
35  Rule 74. 
36  Rule 72(1). 
37  Sonne (1915); page 46. 
38  Rules and Regulations Committee Minutes 27 November 1918; Stock Exchange Archive; 
Guildhall Library. Quoted in Michie (1999); page 189. 
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members. Thus the rule that a company could not be a member should have excluded banks 
and insurance companies from direct access to jobbers: strictly they should have routed their 
deals through brokers. The rule banning partnerships between members and non-members  
would have had a related effect. Only members were entitled to use the name and address of 
the Exchange on notepaper: thus marking a distinction from non-members. That this 
distinction mattered is evident from the number of non-members who tried to open offices as 
close to the Exchange as possible.   
The  quality of securities traded on the Exchange was not a principal concern although the  
committee was empowered to approve the quotation in the Official List of any security ‘of 
sufficient magnitude and importance’.39 Beyond this, the conditions for an application for 
listing only required a declaration that the prospectus complied in all respects with the 
requirements of company law and that all of the required documents had been filed with the 
Registrar of Companies.40 Disclosure in prospectuses was thus a matter for the general law, 
presumably to ensure that companies were not deterred from seeking a listing on the London 
Exchange by the imposition of requirements not matched by other exchanges.41 
As for members, the Exchange’s rules had effects beyond the straightforward mitigation of 
risks. Requiring that membership was only open to individuals ensured that incorporated 
businesses such as clearing banks, discount houses and investment trusts could not compete 
directly with members by trading through the Exchange. Insisting that members might only 
trade individually or in the form of a partnership, coupled with a restriction on the number of 
members’ clerks who might be recognised by the Exchange,42 ensured that there was a 
restraint on the scale of Stock Exchange businesses.43 As a result, members’ businesses tended 
to be small and under-resourced and the protection from competition ensured that an 
                                                 
39  Rule 151(1). 
40  Appendix 36 to the rules. From time to time, the rules had lightly anticipated changes in the 
law. For example, the Stock Exchange required that companies included in the Official List should 
appoint auditors before the Companies Acts were amended to this effect. 
41  The risk of such a deterrence effect was cited in the Report of the Select Committee on Loans 
to Foreign States (1875): page xlvii. 
42  Rule 56. 
43  The Partnership Act 1890 imposed a maximum number of partners. Income Tax law restrained 
the retention of moneys within a partnership (by comparison with the rules for taxation of limited 
companies) that became more serious with the increase in the rates of tax following, for example, the 
introduction of Super Tax. Restriction of the number of clerks limited the maximisation of partners’ 
profits by increasing the gearing between the number of partners and the number of clerks. 
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eccentric refusal to adopt new technologies was, for a time, tolerable. The histories of broking 
firms testify to these tendencies before the 1914–1918 war: 
‘In 1906 the novelty of the telephone had not lost its appeal. Very few firms possessed 
one and until some years later this now hard-pressed instrument was regarded as a 
mixed blessing. It was beneath the dignity of important people to use the telephone 
as the view was taken that business should be dealt with either by correspondence or 
in person.’ 44 
 The bar on advertising ensured that members’ businesses remained largely personal in nature 
and, more particularly, that the attraction of new clients was a largely personal matter. This in 
turn meant that, when considering the introduction of new members, firms would be alert to 
possible applicants who would bring new connections and opportunities as, in the final 
analysis, these were vital to the survival of any firm. Michie cites a number of examples of  
this: 
‘The Wagg’s deliberately recruited Lord Walter Campbell in 1877, and then Arthur 
Haydn and Cyril Russell in 1888, in order to develop private client business, and so 
reduce their dependency upon Rothschilds for orders. Similarly, Pember & Boyle in the 
1890s greatly widened the range of activities they covered by recruiting as partners 
FC Stapylton who brought in  private clients, OC Bevan and CA Campbell who had 
strong banking connections, and FH Anderson who had links with the discount 
houses. For the same purpose, de Zoete & Gorton recruited William Mackenzie in 
1896 because of his Far Eastern connections, and then extended that to Greece, Egypt 
and the Middle East with Pericles Nassif in 1900 and Hugh Pritchard in 1910.’45 
Thus although family connections would always have been taken into account when 
considering nominations, hard reality usually ensured that potential contributions to the 
business were considered. Failure to have regard for this would in the end lead to ruin. 
Although banks, discount houses, investment trusts and other incorporated entities were 
denied direct access to the market, members, especially jobber members, would not have 
wanted to deny access to the business they could introduce. After all, banks in particular had 
regular access to those of their customers who were investors: better access than was 
available to the Exchange’s broker members. Moreover, the gradual amalgamation of regional 
banks was leading to larger institutions that could take a broader view of the investment of 
their reserve assets. Before 1909, the members’ interest in making access available had 
                                                 
44  Anon (1963); page 47. 
45  Michie (1999); page 101. 
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combined with the institutional investors’ interest in gaining access and had led to the 
development of informal arrangements by which institutional investors would pass their 
instructions to jobbers, either directly or by way of a friendly broker at a nominal commission. 
Other informal arrangements between brokers and banks enabled banks to trade directly 
between themselves rather than through the Exchange. Similar arrangements provided access 
to London jobbers for provincial brokers.  
When pressure from broker members, occasioned by the same pressure on income that had 
led to a cap on membership, and a need to ensure that business did not bypass the Exchange 
led in 1909 to enforcement of the ban on double capacity, these informal arrangements were 
disrupted. This was the intention, for it was an explicit attempt to prevent free-riding: 
‘By direct communication with our Dealers, country brokers were enabled to deal on 
the London market on as good terms as a London Broker, while evading the heavy 
expense and responsibility of London membership.’46 
In effect, business was being facilitated by members of the Exchange but transacted in a 
manner that denied the Exchange any benefit from charges that would have become payable if 
the business had been transacted through the Exchange and would thus have contributed to 
the costs of maintaining the Exchange.  
At first, the ban on double capacity was not effective as members found alternative means of 
implementing their previously informal arrangements; for example, brokers found jobbers 
who would pass trades through their books for a negligible fee. In 1912, this led the 
committee, under continuing pressure from small broker members, to introduce minimum 
commission rates, which forced members to charge for every transaction they handled, and a 
ban on shunting (the practice of London jobbers undertaking instructions from provincial 
brokers). To mollify banks that had previously benefited from informal arrangements with 
brokers, it was agreed that a broker could offer to a banking client a rebate of 50% of the fee 
charged. The effect was that brokers could continue to benefit from bankers’ introductions of 
business from smaller investors and were not themselves obliged to consider how to access 
this retail business directly. Subsequently, a series of cases referred to the committee led to 
                                                 
46  General Purposes Committee minutes; Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. Cited by 
Michie (1987); page 22. 
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the examination and in some cases termination of existing arrangements that were alleged to 
contravene the new rules.47  
The committee was thus responding to the concerns of members and to the increasing 
influence of broker members when compared with the influence of jobber members.  Jobbers 
had regarded provincial exchanges as useful complements to their business, whereas brokers 
had regarded provincial brokers as annoying competitors aided by the branch networks of the 
joint stock banks which enabled them to gain access to small investors nationwide.  By taking 
the side of small broker members, the committee’s rule changes formally treated provincial 
exchanges as competitors. The informal arrangements that provided provincial brokers with 
access to the London market were not to be used in the immediate future as the basis for a 
national network of exchanges and the Stock Exchange became more restrictive.48   
In this instance, the power of rule-making was being used for an anti-competitive purpose 
which diverged from the interests of investors outside the Exchange and resulted from the 
overall market’s structure. Management of a share-trading market in London by a private body 
that, as will be seen, had resisted attempts to grant it exclusive rights to regulate share trading, 
had left space for the development of competing exchanges not only in London but also in the 
rest of the country. To represent their interests, a Council of Associated Stock Exchanges had 
been formed in 1890, representing exchanges in Glasgow, Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, 
Dublin, Edinburgh, Leeds and Sheffield, with a total membership of about 550 brokers. By 
1914, nine further exchanges had joined the association although one had later withdrawn.49 
Although in general these exchanges adopted rules which were similar to those in London, 
some aspects of the London rules were difficult to match. In some places, for example, the 
scale of the local activity made it impossible to copy the London Exchange’s rules on members 
not undertaking other types of business. 
In London, introduction of minimum rates of commission served the interests of smaller firms 
and individual brokers. It did not serve the interests of the larger or better-established firms 
which were more likely to be dealing with institutional investors or the interests of jobbers. 
                                                 
47  Michie (1998); Bellringer and Michie (2014); pages 129–130 
48  Davis and Neal (1998); page 44. Michie (1999); page 142. 
49  Bristol and Cork joined in 1899. Bradford, Cardiff and Swansea joined in 1908. Aberdeen, 
Halifax, Dundee and Huddersfield joined in 1912. This still left a number of exchanges outside the 
association, notably Newport, Greenock, Nottingham and Oldham. Thomas (1973); pages 193–210. 
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The result was an arrangement that suited best the smaller firms’ perception of their interests, 
even though there was concern that business from institutional investors would be driven to 
other exchanges. Concern on these grounds was indeed voiced to the committee.50  
These developments also demonstrate the way in which the committee used its discretion to 
limit the collateral damage that conflicts between groups of members could cause. Just as  had 
been the case with enforcement of the rule on double capacity, the committee’s  enforcement 
of the rule on minimum rates of commission appears to have been flexible. This was perhaps 
understandable since even for smaller scale trading, the minimum rates of commission were a 
deterrent to business.  In response to them, in 1912, at the instigation of its City Editor, Charles 
Duguid, the Daily Mail launched a low-cost dealing service which matched buyers and sellers 
through small advertisements on its City pages. This service continued until August 1915 and, 
notably, continued in operation when the Exchange itself closed on the outbreak of war.51  
In spite of these occasional lapses from clear-sightedness, there was advantage in the 
Exchange having the freedom to change its rules to reflect members’ perceptions of their 
interests.  The structure of the Exchange tended to balance conflicting interests against each 
other so that all were motivated to maximise the volume of business transacted through the 
Exchange. The result was a market place that successfully reflected the character of the 
markets it existed to serve and was able to change as those markets changed. 
Character of the market: traded securities 
In the 40 years before the 1914–1918 war, the number and value of securities quoted on the 
London Exchange increased substantially. 
                                                 
50  Committee for General Purposes Minutes; 13 July 1914; Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall 
Library. 
51  Michie (1999); page 115. Roberts (2013); pages 190–191. 
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Table 2.2: Nominal value of securities quoted in the Stock Exchange Official List 1873–1913 
(£m)52 
 
 1873 1883 1893 1903 1913 
British government and UK 
public bodies 
858.9 914.6 901.6 1,102.2 1,290.1 
Colonial and foreign 
governments, public bodies 
486.5 975.1 1,031.5 1,411.4 2,034,4 
UK and foreign railways 727.6 1,475.3 2,419.0 3,082.4 4,147.1 
Banks and finance 113.2 102.2 199.5 440.5 609.1 
Canals and utilities 32.9 101.8 140.3 200.1 435.8 
Commercial and industrial 32.6 43.0 172.6 690.9 917.6 
Mines, oil and plantations 8.8 22.4 34.6 50.8 116.4 
TOTALS 2,270.4 3,634.4 4,899.2 6,978.2 9,550.5 
 
As the scale of the market grew, its composition changed, with a decline in the proportion of 
United Kingdom government securities coupled with a rise in the proportion of railway stocks 
(chiefly foreign railway stocks as the United Kingdom railway companies were experiencing 
poor profitability) and in commercial and industrial shares. 
Table 2.3: Nominal value of securities quoted in the Stock Exchange Official List 1873–1913 
(%)53 
  1873 1883 1893 1903 1913 
British government and UK 
public bodies 
37.8 25.2 18.4 15.8 13.5 
Colonial and foreign 
governments, public bodies 
21.4 26.8 21.1 20.2 21.3 
UK and foreign railways 32.0 40.6 49.4 42.0 43.4 
Banks and finance 5.0 2.8 4.0 6.3 6.4 
Canals and utilities 1.4 2.8 2.9 2.9 4.6 
Commercial and industrial 1.4 1.2 3.5 9.9 9.6 
Mines, oil and plantations 0.1 - - 0.1 0.3 
 
                                                 
52  Quoted in Michie (1999); page 88. 
53  Quoted in Michie (1999); page 89. 
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Not only did the market grow absolutely, it also grew in its significance within the United 
Kingdom economy and relatively in comparison with foreign exchanges. 
Table 2.4 : Stock market values of domestic corporate equities quoted on major national 
exchanges at the beginning of 190054 
 Country (and stock 
exchange) 
Number of 
companies 
with listed 
equity 
 Value of domestic equities at 
market prices 
 Sector shares 
Total 
($m) 
Per 
capita 
% 
Ratio to 
GDP 
% 
Rail 
% 
Finance 
% 
Other 
% 
United Kingdom 
(London) 
783 4,300 104 49 49 17 34 
France (Paris) 429 2,139 55 34 43 26 31 
USA (New York) 123 2,860 37 15 62 7 30 
Germany (Berlin) 719 1,110 20 14 9 45 47 
 
Hannah (2007b) comments: 
‘London – capital of a country with just over half the USA’s GDP – was still, in absolute 
terms, larger than New York, even for domestic corporations alone. Paris – with a 
national GDP only one-third the USA’s – was not much smaller, and again, larger if its 
quoted international equity is considered; and it was also nearly twice the size of 
Berlin. The puzzlingly small size of Berlin . . . is partly explained by the relative 
insignificance of rail issues there, while a similar gap – financial issues – appears in 
the New York market. These ‘missing’ equities are . . . largely the result of 
government policy. Germany had nationalised its major railways, and their fixed 
interest indebtedness only appeared as government securities. In the USA, branching 
was substantially banned, so the thousands of American banks were mainly too small 
for a NYSE quotation, while the less numerous European banks were larger and often 
quoted. 
‘. . . it is rather striking that at this time the value of all British investments in the 
United States alone . . .  was about the same as the value of all the common stock 
listed on the NYSE . . . the equity culture was not fully developed anywhere at this 
time, but shareholding was more widespread in Britain and France; western Europe 
also clearly had the more experienced and sophisticated investors.’55  
                                                 
54  Table in Hannah (2007b); page 404. Based on data in Dimson et al (2002); pages 23–26. 
Statistics to establish a similar point but prepared on a different base are quoted in Michie (1990); page 
97. Further estimates of London Stock Exchange market capitalisation expressed as a percentage of GDP 
are set out in Musacchio (2010); Appendix A. These estimates are broadly consistent with those in 
Dimson et al (2002). However, Musacchio (2010) was a response to other calculations in Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) which suggested that certain civil law countries (including France and Germany) had 
larger stock markets than common law countries, a view with which Dimson et al (2002 and 2014) 
would not agree. 
55  Hannah (2007b); pages 405–406. 
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The outcome was that, when the New York market was slow to respond to demand for finance 
for a new industry, the London market was ready to supply capital. Similarly, the London 
Exchange was ready to accommodate Dutch businesses when the Amsterdam Exchange 
proved unready, as it was also welcoming to Canadian ventures.56 In short, London  was a 
readier market for risk capital. 
The expansion in the number and value of shares quoted on the Stock Exchange did not occur 
steadily. 
Character of the market: promoters of new issues 
For years before 1925, it is not easy to be certain how many issues occurred in each year and 
who was responsible for them.57 Some issues were the responsibility of brokers alone, 
specialising in the promotion of issues, although, in view of the shallowness of the organisation 
available to support them, introduction of new securities to the Exchange and finding potential 
shareholders to take holdings in securities would be beyond the resources of most broker 
members. As a result, introduction of new securities and contact with new shareholders 
became in many cases an opportunity for non-members. 
Not in every case, however. Some firms developed expertise in the introduction of certain 
types of security as, for example, did R Nivison & Company, J&A Scrimgeour and Mullens 
Marshall & Company, which between them acted in the introduction of most loan stocks 
issued by British local authorities and colonial governments represented by the Crown 
Agents.58 Other firms, such as Foster & Braithwaite,59 Panmure Gordon,60 Helbert Wagg & 
                                                 
56  Michie (1997); page 140. Hart et al (1997); page 114. Armstrong (1997); page 56. Similarly, in 
the 1890s, the London Stock Exchange was used as the base for flotation of United States brewery 
shares promoted, among others, by Samuel Untermeyer, a lawyer who was subsequently to be related 
to enquiries into the 1907 and 1929 crashes. 
57  In 1929, the first issue of the Issuing House Yearbook was published. That issue reported all 
new issues from 1925 to 1929 of securities that were dealt on the Exchange, identifying the issuing 
house responsible and the sponsoring broker. Subsequent issues were covered by later editions of the 
yearbook although publication did not take place in every year. Although The Times Book of 
Prospectuses is a source for new issue data, that publication does not include new issues not covered by 
advertisements published in The Times and the new issue statistics that it sets out also appear 
incomplete. 
58  Robert Nivison formed his firm in 1887 having specialised in colonial government issues whilst 
working with Westminster Bank; Michie (1999); page 101. 
59  Reader (1979); page 94. Foster & Braithwaite were engaged in the flotation of a number of 
electrical engineering concerns. 
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Company61 and Sperling & Company62 specialised in the introduction of new issues. 
Significantly, however, Helbert Wagg & Company and Sperling & Company were to forsake 
membership of the Exchange in 1912 and 1915 respectively to concentrate on their new issues 
activity. 
Substantially, however, most of the work of bringing new issues to the Exchange was 
undertaken by agents outside the Exchange. Here, too, a degree of specialisation was evident. 
Some houses, including Baring Brothers and NM Rothschild, specialised in acting for foreign 
governments in launching new loans often jointly with houses in other capitals; but also 
became involved in the flotation of larger manufacturing companies. Baring Brothers, for 
example, had acted in connection with the flotation of Guinness in 1886 and subsequently in 
the flotation of Whitbread & Company and Combe & Company.63  
In some rare cases, companies promoted their own flotations using as advisers their usual 
accountants and solicitors.64 Most commonly, however, company promotions were 
undertaken by specialist operators beyond the more established City houses who were 
generally known as company promoters, although this term fell into disrepute and many 
would not have used it of themselves: 
‘In my presence I was spoken of as a great financier – in my absence as a successful 
company promoter.’65   
It was not the formal process that drove businesses into the hands of promoters. Technically, 
the process of promotion was not unduly demanding: it required an aptitude for form-filling 
and record-keeping possessed by many in business.66 Under the Companies Act 1862, the 
process was largely a matter of completing the right forms in the right order and filing them 
                                                                                                                                               
60  McDermot (1976); pages 38–40. Panmure Gordon was engaged in the flotation in 1898 of 
Lipton & Company, the tea merchants, and with the flotation of a number of breweries including Ind 
Coope, Newcastle Breweries and Plymouth Breweries. 
61  Roberts (1992). 
62  Diaper (1990); page 76. 
63  Orbell (1985); pages 53–54. 
64  O’Hagan (1929); Volume II, page 23. Rubinstein (1977). Harrison (1981); page 171. 
65  Bottomley (1892); page 7. Roberts (1993); page 33: ‘by the 1920s the name “company 
promoter” . . . virtually suggested dishonest behaviour’. Nye (2012); page 238, observes: ‘In the day 
census of 1911, just eight firms admitted to being “company promoters”, employing twenty-four staff in 
total.’ 
66  Harrison (1981); page 172. 
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with the Registrar of Companies. As for the Stock Exchange, the requirements were a little 
more onerous. It was necessary for a company to appoint a member of the Exchange 
authorised to: 
 ‘. . . give full information as to the formation of the undertaking . . . and able to 
furnish the committee with all particulars they may require.’67 
But the information required was similar to that required by the Registrar of Companies and 
did not otherwise require the involvement of a specialist intermediary. 
There were, however, two contributions that an expert promoter could make, both of which 
concerned marketing and arose from the likelihood that vendors would be ignorant of the 
Exchange and of possible purchasers of shares. Harrison describes such a circumstance: 
‘Mr Hopper was entirely ignorant of the condition of the money market here as 
regards flotations, and having an absolute faith in the business itself needed little 
persuasion as to the furious demand there would be on the part of the public to take 
shares in such a company, and Mr Wilson and Mr Nowell were almost equally 
simpleminded.’68 
Even though a business’s owners might be convinced of its commercial prospects, a successful 
flotation depended upon potential investors sharing that conviction. It was the role of the 
promoter to use a knowledge of company law and the Stock Exchange’s rules to ensure that 
each issue’s prospects were presented in the best light by whatever prospectus or offer 
document was to be circulated. It was also his role to know where and how potential investors 
might be reached and convinced. To assist in the process of marketing new issues, some 
promoters affected a flamboyant lifestyle, presumably to attract attention and to demonstrate 
the profits that had been earned from their promotions: 
‘Everything was swagger. Swagger directors, swagger officers, swagger bankers, a 
swagger house at the West End, a swagger palace down at Surrey, a swagger yacht 
down at Cowes, swagger entertainments – all matched each other. The whole thing 
was a gorgeous vulgarity – a magnificent burlesque of business.’69  
                                                 
67  Rule 151(4). 
68  Messrs Hopper, Wilson and Nowell were partners in a business floated in 1913 as F Hopper and 
Company Limited. Harrison (1982); page 19. 
69  Van Oss: ‘Whitaker Wright Finance’. Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine; March 1904; page 400. 
For evidence of the effect of promoters’ management of their image see: Sisman (2015); page 13. 
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Some promoters70 sought election to the House of Commons as a platform for self-publicity 
and as a means to gain access to prominent public figures who could be invited to join 
company boards. Many published their own newspapers to advertise their promotions.71 Nye 
(2012) reviews these and other means by which promoters strove to market issues. 
The most prominent promoters had many imitators: lured by the prospect of substantial 
profits. Unfortunately, many gave way to the temptation to exaggerate the merits of less 
satisfactory propositions and to burden what might have been satisfactory propositions with 
capital that they could not service. Many indeed may have been encouraged to do this by 
vendors who had unreasonable expectations of the value of the shares they were hoping to 
sell. This especially occurred when bull markets had passed their peak. At such times, investors 
incurred losses and, not infrequently, the promoter’s excesses were exposed: 
‘Company fraud flourished in periods of intense financial growth. The speculative 
booms of the 1840s, 1860s, 1890s and 1920s afforded promoters their greatest 
opportunities for fraud. During upswings in the business cycle, investors were more 
confident and trusting in the disposal of their capital. Disreputable promotions found 
it easy to hide themselves among the crowded field of new companies.’72 
Writing about an earlier period (1866–1883), Shannon estimated that one-sixth of all new 
promotions during the nineteenth century were fraudulent.73 Not infrequently, a promoter’s 
career led to bankruptcy, which was the fate of Albert Grant in 1877,74 Ernest Terah Hooley  in 
1898 and 191175 and Horatio Bottomley in 1912.76  So successful were some promoters’ 
attempts at self-promotion that it is easy to assume that they were wholly responsible for the 
excesses that occurred. This would be a mistake. There were company vendors who used the 
                                                 
70  For example, Horatio Bottomley, Sir Edward Watkin and Davison Dalziel were all MPs. Birch 
Crisp stood for election on several occasions but failed to be elected. 
71  Horatio Bottomley published John Bull. In 1892, Edward Beall used the Financial Gazette to 
push his shares. Sir Edgar Vincent owned the Statist between 1892 and 1898. Sir Geoffrey Isaacs, who 
was interested in Welsh granite and gold mining, started British Mining in 1900 which was used to carry 
favourable articles about the prospects for Welsh gold mining companies. Armstrong (1997); page 125. 
72  Robb (1992); page 95. Excesses of this type were not unique to England. Similar problems 
occurred for example in the United States of America, Canada, France and New Zealand. Indeed, they 
continue to occur in some jurisdictions:  ‘How Xijian Zhou. An Unknown Chinese MLM Promoter, Made 
$5 billion in a Matter of Months’; Forbes; 9 June 2015. Downloaded from 
www.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara.  
73  Shannon (1933); page 295. 
74  Robb (1992); pages 100-101. 
75  Robb (1992); pages 105-107. 
76  Robb (1992); pages 110-112. 
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services of promoters to secure prices for their shares that exceeded prudent estimates of 
their value. 
This study focuses on the activities of Clarence Hatry, a company promoter who came to 
prominence after the 1914–1918 war, who was to become for many the embodiment of the 
company promoter and whose crash in 1929 was said to have precipitated the Wall Street 
crash. 
Hatry was the son of Julius Hatry, a trader in silk, who had come to England in the 1870s. By 
marriage, his family based in  Zweibrucken had acquired an interest in a silk mill, Escale Frères 
in Sarreguemines in Lorraine,77 which had been ceded to Germany after the Franco-Prussian 
war of 1870. In the aftermath of the war, it was no longer possible to sell through Paris the 
mill’s output of silk velvet and plush for top hats. Julius Hatry was then sent to London and set 
up in Southwark to sell plush to British hat manufacturers.78 Clarence Hatry had taken over his 
father’s business on his death from lung cancer in 1906 but it had closed in 1910 after some 
unsatisfactory dealing in bills of exchange which left Hatry (and his mother) bankrupt.79 In 
1909, while in Brighton to recuperate from illness, Hatry met not only Violet Ferguson, who 
was to become his wife in the spring of 1909,80 but also Deighton Patmore, an insurance 
broker, who was to become his partner. Patmore had clients who wished to borrow money 
against their expectations of inheritance but could not provide the necessary references. Hatry 
suggested to Patmore a way of circumventing this problem by getting his clients to sign each 
other’s loan application forms;81 on its success they went into partnership with Bruce Logan, a 
noted oarsman,82 as Patmore Logan and Hatry Limited. Almost immediately, their offices were 
moved from Patmore’s former address in Leicester Square to 180 Piccadilly.  Their insurance 
                                                 
77  Census records and register details provided by the Archives Municipales, Sarreguemines. 
78  There were several hat factories in Southwark around which were grouped a number of 
suppliers of materials for hats, including representatives for the principal silk mills in Lorraine. It was 
generally believed that French silk plush was superior to British silk for the manufacture of top hats as it 
was less likely to become discoloured through the application of heat. The Hatters’ Gazette. 
79  Mrs Hatry’s public examination in bankruptcy on 18 May 1911: National Archives; file B 9/717.  
Clarence Hatry’s public examination in bankruptcy on 12 January 1911: National Archives; file B 9/563.  
The bills of exchange transactions involved British Bank of Commerce, whose two partners were 
declared bankrupt after the bank became involved in share speculations on behalf of customers and the 
partners had withdrawn excessive funds for personal expenses: National Archives; files B 9/559–562. 
80  This was before Hatry’s 21st birthday. The marriage certificate shows a false birth date. 
81  Pearson (1961); pages 109–110. 
82  The rowing connection was valuable as it provided introductions. For example, Peter Haig 
Thomas, who was to serve as director of many companies for Hatry, was also a noted oarsman and was 
for many years coach of Oxford University Boat Club. 
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and loan broking business proved so lucrative that Hatry was able to pay all of his (and his 
mother’s) debts.83 As importantly, Hatry and Patmore became known for their skills as loan 
brokers among the impecunious young men who frequented the hotels around Piccadilly and 
especially the notorious Cavendish Hotel by Hatry’s office.84 
Hatry’s next scheme involved selling insurance to East European migrants to the United States 
of America.85 Through a network of agents in the Balkans, intending migrants were offered a 
policy that undertook to pay the cost of a return passage to Europe in the event that the 
migrant was denied entry to the USA on arrival at Ellis Island. Having set up the business, Hatry 
sold it to Union Emigrants Association Limited, a company that he formed with an impressive 
board of directors,86 and proceeded to sell its shares. As that scheme worked well, Hatry then 
established a further company, Union Emigrants Association (Italy) Limited, which acquired 
from the first company the right to sell insurance to migrants from Italy, and proceeded to sell 
the new company’s shares as well.87 By this time, Hatry had made the acquaintance of Osborne 
O’Hagan, a successful company promoter who lived at Albany, and O’Hagan’s solicitor, Sir 
Frank Crisp, who was the foremost company lawyer of the day.88 
Hatry then went on to prepare for what would have been his first promotion of a public 
company, the Planet Insurance Company Limited. He acquired this company in January 1914 
and converted it into a public company with the intention that it should compete with German 
insurance companies for reinsurance business. Closure of the Stock Exchange on the 
declaration of war and the imposition of controls on new issues put paid to this scheme and 
the company was not to be floated.  
Hatry’s success in gaining admission to the world of company promotion after his experience 
of bankruptcy testifies not only to his networking and financial skills but also to the openness 
                                                 
83  National Archives; files B 9/717; B 9/563. 
84  Wood and Wood (1954); pages 57–58. 
85  In the years immediately before the 1914–1918 war, there was a great migration from Eastern 
Europe: First Report of the Departmental Committee on Shipping and Shipbuilding (1916). Zahra (2016); 
page 34 et seq. 
86  Notably Lord Ribblesdale, who was politically connected to the Liberal Party and who, when in 
London, resided at the Cavendish Hotel.. 
87  National Archives; file BT 31/222000/135157. 
88  Albany is located on the north side of Piccadilly close to 180 Piccadilly. Sir Frank Crisp was the 
senior partner of Ashurst Morris Crisp and the legal adviser to the Liberal Party. 
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of the City to people who appeared able to introduce profitable business, whatever their 
background. 
Character of the market: new issues 
Clarence Hatry was merely the most notorious of those involved in the business of company 
promotion. At times there were many promoters, some involved in a large number of 
transactions and some engaged only in one or two. Not only did the scale of activity vary 
between promoters, so did the type of activity in which they were engaged. 
For his study of company promotion practices before the 1914–1918 war, Nye attempted to 
calculate the number of promotions during the period 1885 to 1900 and the amount of cash 
that they raised by using the Board of Trade’s statistics for the amount of money raised by 
shares issued by new companies and applying a number of filters to that data. Nye 
acknowledges that the process is imperfect but suggests that the results provide a useful 
indication of the trends experienced.89 The following chart shows Nye’s estimates of the 
numbers of promotions from 1895–1900: 
Chart 2.1: Number of company promotions 1885–1900 per Nye (2012) 
      
 
                                                 
 
89  A full description of the process appears in Nye (2012); pages 177–180. 
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In the same exercise, Nye calculated that the cash raised by these promotions varied between 
£0.7 million in 1885 and £16.7 million in 1897. 
Because the Board of Trade’s practice changed in 1900, Nye could not extend this exercise to 
1914 but instead relied upon analysis of the names of companies formed between 1900 and 
1914. It was common practice for company promotions to begin with the formation of a small 
syndicate whose members would finance the early stages of a promotion in which a company 
would be restructured in preparation for offering its shares for sale. The members of the 
syndicate would then share in the promotion profits. Nye identified companies registered in 
each year with the word ‘syndicate’ in their name. This work showed a serial pattern similar to 
that evident in the chart above, a gradual increase in the numbers of promotions or syndicates 
to a peak after which there was a rapid fall.  
The peak in the 1890s was characterised by a boom in gold mining shares which were heavily 
promoted, and in 1911 there was a similar boom in rubber shares. 
These statistics, whatever their limitations, reflect a market that grew in a series of spurts 
which were attended by increasing speculation and ended with failed promotions and 
bankrupt companies. That the London market continued to grow in spite of these periodic 
collapses suggests that investment through the market was perceived both by potential  
investors and by business owners to offer comparative advantages that outweighed the risks. 
As far as investors were concerned, the relative returns to equity investment compared with 
bonds were attractive. 
Table 2.5 : Nominal and real returns to investment in equities, bonds and bills 1900–191390 
 End 
December 
 Nominal   Inflation 
% 
Real   
Equities 
return 
% 
Bonds 
return 
% 
Bills 
return 
% 
Equities 
return 
% 
Bonds 
return 
% 
Bills 
return 
% 
1900 1.3 1.1 4.2 2.1 -0.7 -0.9 2.0 
1901 -3.9 -1.0 3.3 1.0 -4.9 -2.0 2.2 
1902 3.3 1.9 3.0 1.0 2.3 0.9 2.0 
1903 -2.0 -2.5 3.5 1.0 -3.6 -3.5 2.5 
1904 6.0 3.5 2.7 0.0 12.3 3.5 2.7 
1905 12.3 3.7 2.5 -0.5 6.8 4.2 3.0 
1906 6.3 -1.0 3.7 1.5 1.7 -2.5 2.2 
                                                 
90  Dimson et al (2014); pages 185–186. 
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 End 
December 
 Nominal   Inflation 
% 
Real   
Equities 
return 
% 
Bonds 
return 
% 
Bills 
return 
% 
Equities 
return 
% 
Bonds 
return 
% 
Bills 
return 
% 
1907 3.0 0.3 4.7 3.0 -3.7 -2.6 1.6 
1908 3.2 3.3 2.7 1.4 1.5 1.8 1.2 
1909 -0.8 1.7 1.9 0.5 7.7 1.2 1.4 
1910 3.0 -1.2 3.2 0.9 5.6 -2.1 2.3 
1911 8.2 0.3 3.0 2.3 -0.1 -2.0 0.7 
1912 6.6 0.7 3.4 1.8 2.3 -1.1 1.6 
1913 2.2 -1.4 4.6 -0.4 1.7 -1.0 5.0 
1914 4.1 -1.0 3.1 9.5 -15.3 -9.6 -5.9 
For the decade 1900–1910, these returns imply that the real capital gains on equities were 
−0.3%, the real return to investment in bonds was −2.1% and the equity risk premium against 
bonds was 1.8%, which was to rise for the subsequent decade (1910–1920) to 5.1%.91  
These results continued a trend in the returns to investment in bonds that had been evident 
for several decades: 
Table 2.6 :  Yield on Consols 1863–190292 
 Old 3% Consols New 2.5% Consols 
1863–1872 3.25 3.25 
1873–1882 3.12 3.12 
1883–1892 2.72 2.70 
1893–1902 2.35 2.22 
 
As Armstrong (1990) comments: 
‘. . . rentiers who depended on Consols as their sole or main source of income saw a 
continuous and worrying decline in money income.’93 
Armstrong also points to the decline at this time of the attractiveness of land as an 
investment.94 During this period when yields on alternative investments had been declining, 
some of the factors that had led investors to avoid equities had been reduced by changes in 
corporate practice. In particular, there had been a decline in the practice of issuing partly 
called shares which exposed holders to the risk of further calls being made.95 The relative 
                                                 
91  Dimson et al (2014); page 182. 
92  Armstrong (1997); page 119 
93  Armstrong (1997); pages 119–120. 
94  Armstrong (1997); page 121.  
95  Jefferys (1946). Jefferys (1938). Acheson et al (2012). 
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attractiveness of equity shares was heightened by changes in the incidence of Income Tax. In 
the decade before 1914, the standard rate of Income Tax had been increased, Super Tax had 
been introduced and the effective rate of income tax applied to investment income had been 
increased above that applied to earned income.96 
From the point of view of business owners, the share vendors, the Stock Exchange offered a 
cheaper source of finance than was available to unlisted businesses and the attraction of a 
liquid and active secondary market.97 Internationally, the London Stock Exchange was regarded 
as a favourable source of finance as, before the 1914–1918 war, the equity risk premium in 
London was among the lowest of the pre-eminent exchanges internationally.  
Table 2.7 : Equity risk premia in major exchanges 1900–191098 
Exchange Premium % 
United Kingdom: London 1.8 
France: Paris 2.0 
Germany: Berlin 6.3 
South Africa: Johannesburg 3.0 
Australia: Melbourne 11.3 
Canada: Toronto 4.0 
United States of America: New York 8.7 
 
The reasons for London’s pre-eminence have long been debated. Michie suggests that the 
London Exchange: 
‘ . . . offered a home to almost all securities that required a market and could expect 
to generate business.’99 
Cheffins takes a similar positon: 
‘ . . . even for companies seeking an official quotation, Stock Exchange requirements 
were not rigorous.’100 
                                                 
96  The following changes all took effect before increases were imposed in 1914 in consequence of 
the onset of war. The standard rate of income tax was raised for the year 1909-1910 from 1s to 1s 2d in 
the £. The rate of tax on unearned income was distinguished from that on earned income for the year 
1907–1908. Super Tax was introduced for the year 1909–1910 at rate of 6d in the £ on incomes above 
£5,000. Statistical Abstract (1921); pages 16–18. 
97  Foreman-Peck and Hannah (2013); page 541. Michie (1999); page 141. 
98  Dimson et al (2014); pages 182, 101, 107, 157, 63, 81, and 191. The world average equity risk 
premium was estimated at 3.3%. 
99  Michie (1987); pages 184–185. 
100  Cheffins et al (2013); page 196. 
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The suggestion that requirements in London were less rigorous than elsewhere is questioned 
by Foreman-Peck and Hannah who suggest that it is based on a limited analysis of formal 
requirements and not on corporate governance practice in London, which they suggest was 
more rigorous.101  O’Sullivan, examining the evidence Anglo–American brewery issues between 
1888 and 1892, suggests that such companies complied with requirements in London that 
were more restrictive than in New York. She also cites Samuel Untermyer, a New York lawyer 
who promoted brewery companies in the 1890s but subsequently was influential in the 
development of securities laws in the 1930s, who in an interview in 1890 suggested that 
London’s attraction lay in: 
‘ . . . investment companies . . . played another role, which was to secure demand for 
Anglo-American brewing securities in advance of their public offerings through 
underwriting agreements. It was that guarantee that allowed promoters to offer 
attractive terms to US brewers, thereby sealing the deals, but without assuming all of 
the risk of delivering on them. Since underwriting also contributed to the chances of 
securing an official quotation on the [London Stock Exchange], it meant, as 
Untermyer explained, that the business would have “a value dependent upon its 
earning power, rather than upon its assets, while in this country the value of a 
business is gauged to some extent by the assets that are back of it.”’102 
Thus, according to Samuel Untermyer, London’s advantage lay in the network of financial 
organisations that surrounded and supported the Exchange. 
Against this, the disclosure requirements for public companies were more onerous than those 
for private companies so that becoming a public company involved some loss of privacy, 
although even what might have appeared to be deterrents for business owners were not as 
fierce as they seemed. Nominally, access to the Stock Exchange appeared to require a 
business’s previous owners to cede control, because the rules specified that not less than two-
thirds of the class of shares being issued should be available for trading. However, in practice 
the original owners could hold on to control by varying the company’s capital structure as the 
rule did not require that all classes of a company’s shares should be listed.103 Once a company 
had been listed, there were few practical constraints on the directors’ freedom of action: 
                                                 
101  Foreman-Peck and Hannah (2015); page 3. See also Hannah (2015). 
102  O’Sullivan (2015); page 1383. 
103  Thus a company could decide to apply for preference shares to be listed while its ordinary 
shares were not listed. See Cheffins et al (2013); page 668. Cheffins (2008). Rule 151(2); Appendix 36; 
paragraph 2. 
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‘In the United Kingdom at the turn of the twentieth century company directors 
operated in a laissez-faire (some might say Wild West) environment with almost no 
formal rules to regulate their behaviour and few measures for redress available to 
shareholders.’104 
There was usually no constraint on individual directors’ freedom to trade in shares as they 
wished105 or their freedom to manage their businesses as they thought most appropriate. That 
freedom was supported by the application of voting structures that protected the directors’ 
freedom (for example withholding votes from preference shareholders unless the dividends to 
which preference shareholders were entitled were in arrears). Moreover, directors were less 
troubled by the powers of shareholders than they would have been by the powers of a bank 
that had lent money to their company against security in the form of charges over the 
company’s assets.  
Of course this measure of freedom for directors implied a weakness in the ability of 
shareholders to protect their own interests: a weakness that is to some extent reflected in  
research comparing the investor protection regimes of major countries.106 
Trading in an incorporated form presented one further advantage to owners. Since the reform 
of death duties in 1894, there had been advantage in settling property on the youngest 
members of a family to defer the incidence of estate duty. For an unincorporated business, 
this presented some difficulty since with ownership went management control, thus 
settlement of ownership on the youngest members of a family entailed devolving 
management control. In incorporated business, management control was divorced from 
ownership, which could be settled without disturbing existing arrangements for management 
control. If for some reason estate duty had to be paid, and it was necessary to realise some 
part of the family’s holding, it might often be possible to do this without disrupting day-to-day 
control of the business.  
                                                 
104  Braggion et al (2013a); page 577. 
105  Usually assured by provisions in a company’s Articles of Association. 
106  A general review of this work is in Musacchio (2010); Table 10. The issues covered include: 
proxy voting by shareholders, proportion of capital required to requisition a shareholders’ meeting, pre-
emptive share acquisition rights for shareholders and rights to challenge directors’ decisions. However, 
Foreman-Peck and Hannah (2015) suggest that the poor rating of shareholder protection measures in 
London reflects a failure to distinguish between  differences between the practice of private and public 
companies; and that, with some limited reservations, listed companies adopted more stringent 
practices. This conclusion they regard as consistent with the conclusions of their work on the willingness 
of UK vendors to separate ownership and control of their businesses: Foreman-Peck and Hannah (2012). 
Foreman-Peck and Hannah (2013). 
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Character of the market: investors 
Although it has long been accepted that shareholding spread more widely during the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century,107 there has been dispute about the identity and interests of 
the people who became shareholders. Some, for example, have suggested that even though 
shareholding grew, it ‘remained an activity largely reserved for the wealthy’.108 
Circumstantially, however, other developments suggest that there was a wider interest in 
shareholding. The launch of two financial newspapers in London in the 1880s (the Financial 
News and the Financial Times) that were widely distributed outside London suggests that their 
proprietors thought that there was a wider audience for financial news than before. These two 
titles were followed by many others. By 1914, there were at least 104 separate papers 
concentrating on financial issues.109 There was also a growth in periodicals such as the 
Financial Review of Reviews, founded in November 1905, concentrating on investment and  
brief texts intended to introduce new investors to the mysteries of investment thus 
establishing that book publishers also believed that there was an audience.110 This did not 
necessarily mean that prospective investors would be well informed by reading the financial 
press, for newspaper owners’ motives were conflicting: 
“ . . . the alliance with finance grows closer every year, either by financiers purchasing 
a controlling share of newspapers, or by newspaper proprietors being tempted into 
finance . . . the entire dependence of the Press for its business profits on the 
advertising columns has evolved a particular reluctance to oppose the organised 
financial classes with whom rests the control of so much advertising business.”111 
Nonetheless, research based on analysis of shareholders’ lists suggests that the publishers 
were correct. One study suggests that in the two decades before the 1914–1918 war, the 
average size of shareholdings had been falling: 
                                                 
107  Cairncross (1953); page 85. Robb (1992); page 3. 
108  Powell (1919); page 127. Cheffins (2008); page 191. 
109  Porter (1986); page 1. 
110  Duguid (1901). Duguid (1904). Hirst (1911).Rollaston (1905). Rollaston (1912). 
111  Hobson (1902); page 60. 
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Table 2.8 : Size of shareholdings112 
  
 
 Percentage of holdings in each nominal range 
£0–£100 
% 
£100–£500 
% 
£500–
£1,000 
% 
£1,000–
£10,000 
% 
£10,000– 
% 
Average 
holding  
£ 
1870–1879 32.2 37.7 11.3 18.1 0.8 930 
1880–1889 30.8 46.2 11.6 10.3 1.1 837 
1890–1899 33.0 37.4 11.6 16.0 2.1 1,446 
1900–1909 36.9 38.9 11.2 11.5 1.7 1,106 
1910–1919 49.8 32.4 8.7 8.3 0.7 689 
  The same research suggests that women represented a growing proportion of shareholders: 
 
Table 2.9 : Male and female shareholdings by number and nominal value113 
  Percentage of individual shareholdings 
Number  Value 
Female 
% 
Male 
% 
Female 
% 
Male 
% 
1870–1879 15.0 85.0 5.0 95.0 
1880–1889 23.5 76.5 7.6 92.4 
1890–1899 25.3 74.7 10.8 89.2 
1900–1909 32.9 67.1 13.1 86.9 
1910–1919 33.8 66.2 15.7 84.3 
Many of the female shareholders identified in this research must have held relatively small 
numbers of shares in view of the disparity between the percentage of shareholdings held by 
women by number and by value.  
Thus, this and other evidence114 suggests that, although there undoubtedly were numbers of 
very wealthy and substantial investors, there were growing numbers of investors with 
comparatively small holdings of shares. This posed a challenge for the broker members of the 
Stock Exchange whose businesses were based on personal relationships with their clients. The 
economics of a relationship with an investor with a number of larger holdings would be 
stretched when an investor with a number of smaller holdings was involved. Commission 
                                                 
112  Rutterford et al (2011); page 168. 
113  Rutterford et al (2011); page 169. 
114  Broadbridge (1968). Anderson and Cottrell (1975). Reed (1975). Turner (2009). 
Chapter Two 
1914 – On the brink of war 
 
 
Page 49 
 
income would be limited by the number and value of the transactions that could be expected 
and be less likely to support the maintenance of an active personal relationship. In this 
context, the members’ campaign for the introduction of minimum rates of commission is not 
surprising, nor is the introduction by the Daily Mail of an inexpensive dealing service for 
readers, recommended as it was by the Daily Mail’s City Editor, Charles Duguid, whose text for 
ingenue investors, How to Read The Money Article, had been reprinted on a number of 
occasions.  
In some ways, the involvement of greater numbers of investors was a mark of the Stock 
Exchange’s success, for by this means the growing savings of the middle class were made 
available to finance the expansion of industry at home and abroad. But it also created dangers 
for it tended to introduce to shareholding a class of investors with a lower appetite for risk: 
‘On the other hand, as the shareholder population grew and the significance of these 
kinds of investment increased, so the effects of stock market booms and busts were 
more widely felt. The impact of failure, in particular, tugs at traditional concerns 
relating to the relative vulnerability of women and inexperienced investors left at the 
hands of rapacious and unscrupulous puffers and pushers of dubious shares and other 
financial schemes designed to prise them from their money. Indeed, the social and 
personal cost of financial failures was a central element in the plots of several widely 
read novels of the period, such as Little Dorrit (1857) by Charles Dickens, The Way We 
Live Now (1875) by Anthony Trollope, and The Whirlpool (1897) by George Gissing.’115 
The broadening of the sector of the population interested in investment challenged old 
assumptions about the basis on which an investor could place trust in the investments being 
offered, for as the market grew, so did the risk of fraud: 
‘As reliance on reputation became riskier, verification of information and assets 
assumed heightened importance. Just as the market kept evolving, so too did the 
manner in which trust was distributed, often through processes ever more elaborate 
and suspicious, . . . This was a world of process and specialisation, where the excesses 
and risks of self-interest were meant to be held at bay by, in part, objective 
evaluation. The sociability in which Adam Smith had placed his hopes for harnessing 
self-interest was not a sufficient safeguard in the sometimes criminal capitalism of 
the ruthless free market. Instead trust was built through a series of deliberative 
approaches created or enhanced over a century.’116 
                                                 
115  Rutterford et al (2011); page 181. Easson (2000). Wagner (2008). Michie (2011). 
116  Klaus (2014); page 231. 
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The legal framework 
The process of liberalisation of the British law on the creation of limited companies led to the 
Companies Act 1862, which consolidated the many Acts that had preceded it. In devising the 
legislation, the extent of any protection for the interests of shareholders was a critical issue. 
Difficulty existed because there was no parallel in company law for provisions of partnership 
law that served to protect the interests of partners: the duty of openness and fair dealing of 
partners to each other, the right of each partner to be involved in the management of the 
partnership and the right of each partner to have access to the partnership’s documents.117 
Moreover, there was no equivalent in company law to the right of partners to terminate the 
partnership and to withdraw capital.118 
To limit the effects of this difficulty, the 1862 Act included a section entitled ‘Provisions for 
Protection of Members’119 which included provisions requiring companies registered under the 
Act to hold an Annual General Meeting120 and empowering members to invite the Board of 
Trade to appoint inspectors to investigate the books and affairs of the company. In addition to 
these provisions, the 1862 Act included provisions specifying a number of disclosures that 
were required to be made in prospectuses issued in connection with the creation of new 
companies: including, for example, details of any contracts entered into by the new 
company.121 
In practice, these provisions were to prove disappointingly ineffective. Annual General 
Meetings were (and are) useful, requiring directors to demonstrate their accountability to 
shareholders, but of limited value unless there is full disclosure in preparation for the meeting. 
Similarly, although the appointment of Board of Trade inspectors could lead to valuable 
exposures, the Act required any application to be supported by shareholders holding at least 
one-fifth of the total capital, which could be difficult to arrange and involved shareholders in 
                                                 
117  Lindley (1888); page 303 et seq. 
118  Blair (2003); page 427. 
119  Sections 180–190; Companies Act 1862. This part of the Act followed a section entitled 
‘Provisions for Protection of Creditors’. 
120  Section 49; Companies Act 1862. 
121  Section 38; Companies Act 1862. The requirement was for the disclosure of the dates and 
names of the parties to any contract entered into by the company or people on its behalf before the 
issue of the prospectus. In practice the requirement proved onerous because of its ‘wonderful 
comprehensiveness’: Buckley (1891); page 570. 
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underwriting the cost of the inspection.122 New companies offering their shares to the public 
were to find the prospectus provisions easy to dodge by the simple device of inviting 
applicants for shares to agree a waiver of the provisions. 
Moreover, there were some notable omissions from the Act. For example, it did not impose 
rigorous annual disclosure requirements;123 and it did not require that company annual 
accounts should be audited.124  Further, as Campbell and Turner have pointed out, the Act did 
not  contain many of the protections that have subsequently been added to company law and 
which were to some extent included in the investor protection regimes of other countries at 
the time: 
‘In addition, rights viewed by La Porta et al as playing an important role in protecting 
minority shareholders were absent: insider trading was legal; it was not compulsory 
for firms to have proxy voting; minority shareholders had no rights to force the 
company to purchase shares when they disagreed with fundamental management 
decisions; the issuance of shares with unequal voting rights was not regulated; 
shareholders did not have a pre-emptive legal right to buy new issues of stock; and 
the percentage of share capital required to call a meeting was not mandated.’125 
In subsequent years, dissatisfaction with these provisions led to further consideration and 
amendment. Under the Companies Act 1879, passed after the collapse of the unlimited City of 
Glasgow Bank, banking companies were permitted to re-register as limited companies and all 
banking companies registered after the Act was passed were obliged to subject their accounts 
to annual audit.126 The Court’s decision in Derry v Peek127 led to the Directors’ Liability Act 1890 
which imposed strict liability on directors for disclosures in prospectuses.128 Under the 
                                                 
122  Section 56; Companies Act 1862. 
123  It has been argued that it was the lack of such provisions that prevented unwelcome takeover 
bids: a form of market activity which was in the twentieth century to prove an effective spur to boards 
and corporate performance. Campbell and Turner (2011); page 573.  
124  This had been a requirement of one of the predecessor acts and, from the 1860s, it was a 
requirement of the London Stock Exchange that the annual accounts of newly listed companies should 
be audited. However, it was only after 1900 that the Exchange required that listed companies should 
circulate their balance sheets to all shareholders. 
125  Campbell and Turner (2011); pages 573–574. La Porta et al (1998); pages 1126–1128.  
126  Sections 4 and 7; Companies Act 1879.  
127  The case concerned a prospectus which suggested that a company had the right to operate a 
tramway without a requirement for further Board of Trade approval. This was incorrect and, it was 
argued, the directors should have known that it was incorrect. The court held that although the 
statement was incorrect, the directors were not under an obligation to make enquiries personally which 
would have demonstrated that it was incorrect. Derry v Peek; 14 Appeal Cases 337. 
128  Section 3; Directors Liability Act 1890. 
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Companies Act 1900, waivers of statutory provisions were banned.129  Under the Companies 
Act 1907, the disclosures required to be made in prospectuses were again extended. 130 
Serial attempts such as these not only demonstrate that there was continuing unease about 
the protection offered to shareholders by the law, but also suggest that it was proving 
technically difficult to secure formal protection that shareholders would find adequate.  The 
banning of waivers in 1900 shows why this was the case. It was intended to stop companies 
using waivers to avoid the 1862 Act’s disclosure requirements and the liability provisions of the 
1890 Act. In this instance, the legislator’s objective was not secured by simply banning waivers, 
as a way was found to offer shares for sale without issuing a prospectus. Rather than offering 
its shares directly to the public, at which point a prospectus had to be published, a company 
could issue its shares to a third party which would then offer to sell the shares to the public, a 
transaction for which a prospectus was not required (i.e. an offer for sale). Thus whenever 
disclosure was regarded as potentially troublesome, a sale would be organised as an offer for 
sale. This is merely one demonstration of a tightening of the law being followed by attempts to 
frustrate its purpose.  
This analysis of the weakness of the legal framework for the protection of shareholders may 
seem counter-intuitive, as one might have thought that relatively weak legal protections for 
investors might have been a deterrent for investors: suggesting that they had little reason to 
be confident that they could assess trading risks on a secure basis. Yet the London Stock 
Exchange had proved very successful both in attracting vendors seeking a market for their 
shares and prospective investors seeking return for their funds. Assuming that prospective 
investors would generally act rationally,  the Exchange’s success in attracting investors implies 
that they believed that they could assess their risks reliably and take appropriate steps to 
mitigate their risks even though the legal framework may have been weak. Shareholders may, 
for example, have been able to rely on informal signs of a company’s relative strength. 
Alternatively, the framework’s weakness could be exaggerated. Both of these conjectures may 
have some merit. 
There is evidence that in practice potential shareholders were able to distinguish between new 
company flotations by being alert to ‘signals’: the identity of a company’s directors and its 
                                                 
129  Section 10; Companies Act 1900. 
130  Section 2; Companies Act 1907. 
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governance structure,131 the identity of the flotation’s promoter,132 the form of the 
transaction,133 the treatment of goodwill134 and, generally, City sentiment.135  It has also been 
suggested that in many cases, shareholders came largely from the locality in which a company 
was based and thus had some knowledge of, and may well have been known by, the directors: 
knowledge which may have been the foundation for trust between them.136 Some have 
suggested that shareholders would take account of a company’s dividend record: consistent 
dividend declarations being taken to imply sound management.137 Yet others have suggested 
that favourable or unfavourable treatment of a company and its associates in newspapers was 
critical for shareholders,138 although newspaper criticism was clouded in practice by 
proprietors’ conflicts of interests and their willingness to succumb to a need for advertising 
income and other forms of financial support.139   
There is also some suggestion that, however weak the legal framework may have been, the 
mechanism by which shares came to be listed in London was effective to some degree in 
limiting the incidence of initial offering failures and signalling higher risk of failure. A study 
reported by Burhop, Chambers and Cheffins compared a sample of flotations on the London 
market between 1900 and 1913 with a sample of flotations on the Berlin market, where the 
rules on public offerings of shares had been made more rigorous by virtue of reforms 
introduced in 1884 and 1896.140 The study found that public offering failures: 
‘ . . . were considerably rarer on the relatively strictly regulated Berlin Stock Exchange 
than on the laissez faire London Stock Exchange.’ 
However, it also found that in London: 
                                                 
131  Cheffins (2006); pages 1273–1338. Campbell and Turner (2011); page 594. Foreman-Peck and 
Hannah (2013); pages 540–561. 
132  See letter from Robert Fleming to J Cox: Dundee University Archives: reference MS/66/II. 
133  Some were wary of ‘offers for sale’: The Economist. 
134  The inclusion of goodwill as an asset of the company being floated. Commentators often 
warned investors of the possibility that the value of goodwill may prove illusory. Withers (1910); pages 
73–74. Rutterford suggests that the normal practice was to issue debentures and/or preference shares 
up to the balance sheet value excluding goodwill and to issue ordinary shares to the vendors against the 
goodwill. A departure from this ‘normal practice’ would have constituted a signal to prospective 
investors. Rutterford (2011); page 881. 
135  The effectiveness of City networks is examined in Cochrane (2009). 
136  Franks et al (2008). 
137  Campbell and Turner (2011); page 594. 
138  Duguid (1901); pages 99–102. Porter (1988); pages 49–60. Johnson (2010); pages 204-207. 
Taylor (2012); page 649. Taylor (2013a); page 700. 
139  Porter (1986); pages 1–17. Kynaston (1988); pages 53-54. Porter (2000); pages 71–96. 
140  Burhop (2011); pages 13–17. 
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‘ . . . the failure rate of the more tightly regulated Official Quotation IPOs was 
considerably lower than that of the less regulated Special Settlement sector.’ 
More precisely, the study found that of the Berlin sample, only three of the 335 companies 
that had carried out public offerings between 1900 and 1913 in Berlin had de-listed within five 
years, whereas seven of the 267 companies that had carried out an ‘Official Quotation’ 
offering in the same period (3%) had de-listed.  Of the total public offerings in London, 114 out 
of 825 (13.8%) had de-listed within five years, which implies that of ‘Special Settlement’ 
offerings,141 107 out of 558 (19.2%) had de-listed.142  
At the least, this study suggests that acceptance by the Stock Exchange of an application for a 
security to be added to the Official List should have been a powerful signal of lower risk for 
potential investors, coupled as it was with a high degree of voluntary disclosure of financial 
data including balance sheets and profit track records, which would at least have been an 
indication that the directors who authorised such voluntary disclosure were not defensive 
about their company’s record. The tendency was for larger, more established businesses to 
seek an Official Quotation and for smaller, more speculative companies such as natural 
resource prospecting and mining companies to avoid the Official List.  
This suggests that the effect of the rules imposed by exchanges such as Berlin operated was 
achieved not by enabling investors to assess the risks of particular investments but by denying 
access to the market to smaller, riskier companies.143 Conversely, it also suggests that the 
London market was open to smaller, riskier ventures; and that, although it was not surrounded 
by a legal framework as strong as those elsewhere, it was surrounded by a network of informal 
signalling which the well-attuned investor could use to assess and mitigate trading risk. 
Correspondence in 1920 between Robert Fleming and his old associate, John Cox, of Cox 
Brothers, Dundee, suggests, for example, that he and others would be wary of the companies 
                                                 
141  Companies could apply to the committee for dealings to take place in their shares, even though 
no application was made for inclusion in the Official List. The committee would generally approve such 
an application, nominating a ‘special settlement’ day: i.e. the first day on which deals could be settled. 
Rule 133. All bargains reached before a ‘special settlement’ day had been nominated would be 
contingent upon that approval and unenforceable. Schwabe (1905); page 7. Parkinson (1925); pages 24–
25. The effect of this arrangement was that dealing in such shares was possible although the shares 
were not obliged to comply with the full requirements that applied to shares that were officially listed. 
142  Burhop et al (2012); pages 29 and 32. 
143  Burhop et al (2012). 
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promoted by particular people.144 Of course, this informal network would have been less 
effective for investors at some distance from the market; but for those close to the market it 
must have been sufficiently effective for them to believe that the risks of investment through 
the market did not exceed their risk appetite. 
The literature suggests that the risk appetite in London was very different from that evident on 
other exchanges. This is implied by calculations of the equity risk premia in various markets. 
Significantly, the premium calculated for the London Stock Exchange seems not only to have 
been consistently lower than New York but also Berlin, which was more successful than 
London in limiting the occurrence of failed IPOs.145 In turn, this suggests that one reason for 
the outstanding success of the London Stock Exchange internationally was its openness to 
riskier IPOs. 
Acceptance of regulation by private bodies 
In 1914, share trading was not the only commercial activity to be managed in this way by 
private bodies such as the London Stock Exchange: there were others, many of them 
professional associations. There were indeed similarities between the rules promulgated by 
the Exchange and those promulgated by other such bodies. For example, it was common for 
such organisations to bar the use of advertising, to forbid involvement in other commercial 
activities and to ban practice through a company.146 
There was, however, at least one dissimilarity between the Exchange and many of these other 
bodies. Many of them were by charter or statute given the exclusive right to control the 
provision of a particular service or the right to use a particular title. Thus, various Institutes of 
Chartered Accountants were granted control of the title ‘chartered accountant’.147 Under the 
                                                 
144  This observation is also consistent with conclusions reached by others in respect of 
shareholders in earlier periods. Campbell and Turner (2012) conclude that whilst there certainly were 
naïve investors during the British Railway Mania in 1845–1846 there were also many ‘highly 
experienced’ investors. Campbell and Turner (2012); page 23. 
145  Dimson et al (2002) and (2014). Burhop et al (2012). 
146  Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933); pages 432 and 446. Indeed, the earliest disciplinary cases to 
be considered by the Institute of Chartered Accountants all concerned infractions of these rules, not 
shortcomings in the quality of professional work or advice: Minutes of the Council of the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants; Guildhall Library. This is in some ways a parallel to the Stock Exchange’s 
concentration on members’ business irregularities rather than on the quality of traded securities. 
147  See Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933); page 208 et seq; which cites The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales by virtue of a charter granted in 1880. Notoriously, they were not 
granted control over use of the title ‘accountant’ which continued to be used freely.  
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Solicitors Acts, it was an offence for anyone to claim to act as a solicitor without the 
recognition of the appropriate bodies.148 Naturally there was a price for this public grant of 
exclusivity. For example, grant of exclusivity by way of a charter involved submission to 
oversight by the Privy Council. Although this did not impinge on day-to-day management of 
the institution, it did limit its freedom to amend its rules, as any changes required Privy Council 
approval and thus the approval of the government of the day. 
In the Stock Exchange’s case there was no such exclusivity: either of the description 
‘stockbroker’ or of the provision of ‘stockbroking services’. Anyone could thus offer such 
services, try to create a market similar to the Exchange or indeed advertise that he was a 
stockbroker. The lack of exclusivity was not an accident as the issue had arisen and reform 
been rejected in the 1870s. 
Possible reforms of the Exchange’s constitution were considered by a select committee of the 
House of Commons in 1875. Having enquired into the terms on which loans were floated in 
London on behalf of foreign governments and into various abuses which had occurred, the 
committee considered whether the Exchange was fitted by its constitution to discharge a 
responsibility for protecting the investing public from the abuses of the syndicates floating the 
loans. Whilst the committee was of the view that the Exchange’s committee was not fit for this 
purpose,149 it also concluded that it could not recommend how it could be reformed: 
‘It was suggested by some witnesses that the evils which your Committee have 
described would be met by legislation rendering illegal all contracts before allotment. 
But your Committee were distinctly told by the Chairman of the Stock Exchange 
Committee, that if such a law were framed that Committee would expel a member 
who, having dealt in a loan before allotment, refused to fulfil his contract on the 
ground of its illegality. In all cases when a contract is made illegal for some reason 
which does not carry with it a moral taint, a legal debt is changed into a debt of 
honour, and thus the payment, instead of being prevented is made more certain. So 
long as the Stock Exchange has the power of expelling one of its members without 
appeal or redress, it can be bound by no law which it does not choose to obey. When 
it loses that power, its means of self-government are gone, and the Society as at 
present constituted is at an end.’150 
                                                 
148  Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933); page 21. 
149  Report of the Select Committee on Loans to Foreign States (1876); page xlvii: ‘Such a body is 
not fit for the exercise of judicial powers.’ 
150  Report of the Select Committee on Loans to Foreign States (1876); pages xlvii–xlviii. 
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The question was considered again three years later by a Royal Commission appointed after 
concern about the flotation of loans for foreign states was reinforced by evidence of 
fraudulent company promotions in which the creation of artificial markets in shares was used 
to persuade the public to invest. As far as new issues were concerned, the Commission 
doubted whether it was appropriate for the Exchange to be responsible for investigations to 
detect fraud and proposed that where it was ‘deemed necessary for the public protection’ to 
investigate a new loan or company that investigation should be undertaken by a public 
functionary and enforced by law.151 The report did not suggest who that functionary might be. 
As far as the Stock Exchange’s constitution was concerned, the report recommended that the 
Exchange should be incorporated either by the grant of a Charter or by Act of Parliament. The 
Commission was concerned that the Committee for General Purposes was regenerated each 
year and could not bind any successor committee, creating the possibility that even if the 
Commission’s recommendations for changes in the rules were implemented, they could 
subsequently be changed with ease. The proposal for incorporation was thus accompanied by 
a proposal that changes in the incorporated Exchange’s rules should be made subject to 
approval by the President of the Board of Trade or some other competent public authority. It 
was also envisaged that the newly incorporated body should be exclusively empowered to 
grant applicants a licence to act as stockbroker.152   
Although the Commission was principally concerned with London and the report was silent on 
the precise scope of this suggestion, it was presumably intended that the proposal for licensing 
would have extended to the whole country, as otherwise it might have proved ineffective. 
Notably, this recommendation would have involved public oversight of the constitution and 
rules of the Exchange to accompany the Commission’s recommendation that in certain cases 
investigation of new issues should be a public and not a private responsibility of the Exchange. 
These recommendations were not unanimously supported by commissioners. In a note of 
reservation, Hon Edward Stanhope153 noted: 
‘To attempt to regulate the manner in which business is conducted in the great 
money market of England is going far beyond the province of the State, nor is any 
                                                 
151  Report of the London Stock Exchange Commission (1878); page 20. 
152  Report of the London Stock Exchange Commission (1878); pages 25 and 26. 
153  Conservative MP for Mid Lincolnshire. 
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Government department in any way qualified to undertake it. The report indeed 
recommends that external control should be exercised with a sparing hand. But 
experience seems to show that the first commercial crisis, or the discovery of any 
gigantic fraud, would cause a pressure for further restrictions which the department 
entrusted with these duties could not possibly withstand.’154 
Mr Stanhope’s reservations were supported by two other Commissioners, one of whom, 
Septimus Scott, observed: 
‘This Royal Commission has been sitting more than 12 months yet no important or 
reliable evidence has been volunteered of a character adverse to the general 
practices, or conduct of business on the Stock Exchange. 
‘If proof be required that the internal legislation and administration of the Stock 
Exchange enforce a higher standard of morality than the law can reach, or enacts for 
the regulation of other trades, such proof is to be found in the fact that recently the 
Committee of the Stock Exchange were assailed at law by a member whom they had 
expelled on a charge of dishonourable conduct, the law suit being based on the 
ground that the action of the Committee was not justified in law. 
‘The trial . . . proved abortive.’155 
In short, Scott was suggesting that the Exchange had been an effective, if reactive, regulator of 
its affairs, accepting the evidence of such as Hall Rokeby Price, a member of the Exchange’s 
committee, to the effect that whenever anything nefarious had become known, the 
committee had endeavoured ‘to stop the gap’.156 With this foundation, and the Commission’s 
lack of unanimity, it was an easy matter for the Exchange to persuade Parliament not to act on 
the recommendation. That the Exchange adopted this position is attributable to the 
Exchange’s wish to stand aloof from other traders, the value that it saw in being able to 
manage its own rules without oversight and perhaps a scepticism about the commercial value 
of the monopoly that might be granted by way of charter. Other bodies that were at the time 
campaigning to be granted a charter were soon to discover that such apparent monopolies 
could be subverted.157 
Nonetheless, the recommendations of the 1878 Commission demonstrate that, whilst there 
was strong support for the principle that private bodies may be left to supervise activities on 
which many members of the public relied, acquiescence in the position of the London Stock 
                                                 
154  Report of the London Stock Exchange Commission (1878); page 28. 
155  Report of the London Stock Exchange Commission (1878); page 30. 
156  Minutes of Evidence of the London Stock Exchange Commission (1878); Q1917; page 71. 
157  Edwards et al (2005); page 240 et seq. 
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Exchange was neither unquestioned nor unconditional. Indeed, the fact that the 1878 
Commission was only one example of a series of enquiries suggests that the Stock Exchange’s 
ability to command public confidence was regularly questioned.  
Typically,  enquiries were commissioned in response to public anxiety over evidence of losses 
being suffered by members of the wider public as a result of abusive trading or flotations. 
After all, this is what had led to the appointment of a Royal Commission in 1877158 and the 
earlier select committee in 1875.159  In subsequent years, it was to lead to the commencement 
of further enquiries into the winding up of companies at the end of the 1880s and into 
company law in the 1890s. In effect, it was a condition of sustaining the Stock Exchange’s 
position that the wider investing public was not exposed to losses occasioned by abusive 
behaviour. In part this depended upon the success of the general law in limiting the 
vulnerability of the wider investing public to such behaviour. To the extent that this failed, 
however, it was important that the effects could be mitigated by use of the civil law and that 
the public’s appetite for retribution could be assuaged by the criminal law which would also 
have the effect of deterring repetition. 
In 1914, there was evidence that none of the conditions for sustaining the Exchange’s position 
were being met successfully. 
Between 1870 and 1914, the wider investing public grew materially. It has been estimated that 
between 1870 and 1914, the number of holders of securities rose from about a quarter of a 
million to a million. Although this remained a relatively small proportion of the population and 
by 1914 industrial and commercial securities still only accounted for a modest proportion of 
the nominal value of all securities quoted on the Exchange.160 As Michie notes: 
‘Among those with significant savings in British society the direct holding of securities 
became increasingly popular and this led more and more to experiment with types of 
securities which had once been the preserve of small groups of well-informed 
insiders.’161 
                                                 
158  Report of the London Stock Exchange Commission (1878); page 4. 
159  Report of the Select Committee on Loans to Foreign States (1875); page iii. 
160  Johnson (2010); page 199. Morgan and Thomas  (1961); Table V pages 280–1. 
161  Michie (1997); page 72. 
Chapter Two 
1914 – On the brink of war 
Page 60 
 
That this wider investing public were not ‘well-informed insiders’ exposed them to abuse and 
there were many who took advantage of the opportunity. There were of course highly 
speculative issues floated normally through the Exchange. 
In addition, around the Stock Exchange there grew up many ‘bucket-shops’ operated by non-
members or unlicensed share dealers. In 1911, the editor of The Economist wrote that some 
operated as:  
‘. . . unloading shops which advertise to catch investors . . .’ 
while others were: 
‘ . . . gambling shops which offer facilities to speculators.’162 
Porter traces the name ‘bucket-shop’ to the United States where it had been the practice to 
use a bucket to catch the paper tape on which were printed the latest stock prices.163 Osborne 
observed in 1929 that: 
‘ . . . the origin of the term matters little, as whether the tape goes into the 
bucketeer’s bucket or not, it is very certain his client’s money does.’164 
These organisations, run by non-members, were by definition beyond the reach of the Stock 
Exchange165 but were in essence parasitic in that they sought to appear respectable by creating 
the illusion of a connection with the Exchange: 
‘Bucket shops attracted investors by adopting most of the techniques of normal 
trading: a good address near the London Stock Exchange, an attractive name with the 
description ‘stockbrokers’ or ‘stock and share dealers’; plausible market advice to 
establish confidence; and occasionally some bait of an actual short term profit. The 
end product was the same, large numbers of investors parting with their money 
which they would never see again.’166 
Ephemeral bucket-shops would spring up in a bull market but would disappear quickly when 
prices fell and customers realised that they had been duped.167  
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As a further consequence of the growing interest of investors who were not ‘well-informed 
insiders’ there was an opening for journalists to supply information and advice: an opportunity 
that was recognised in 1884 with the launch of the Financial News.168 That the Financial News 
met a demand is evident from the fact that within a year, the paper was available throughout 
London and in 11 provincial centres ‘including from no less than a dozen vendors in Bradford 
alone’.169 Four years later, the advent of the Financial News was followed by the launch of the 
Financial Times which grew from the London Financial Guide. The nature of the need that the 
Financial Times sought to meet can be gauged by the campaigns that were launched during its 
first year of publication. One was aimed at guinea pig directors (i.e. noblemen who were 
appointed to the boards of new companies for their social attractiveness to potential 
directors). Another was targeted at outside brokers (i.e. brokers who were not members of the 
London Stock Exchange)170 and at the ‘bucket-shops’ that outside brokers ran. An early 
editorial criticised the Financial News for both exposing the dangers of such shops and 
accepting their advertisements: 
‘Our advice to all our readers is to leave this class of business alone; but if they will try 
their luck, then let them be careful to deal only with houses of known respectability, 
whose code of honour – at any rate in this matter – is not that of the Financial 
News’.171 
Whilst in publishing this editorial, the Financial Times may have been taking advantage of an 
opportunity for a new publication to undermine a more established rival, it was pointing to the 
danger that otherwise respectable newspapers would be compromised by financial support 
from outside brokers through advertising or otherwise.172  There was to be no lack of coverage 
for the losses incurred by the wider investing public when they occurred.  
As a result, whilst in 1914 the Stock Exchange remained a private body managing its own 
affairs, the developing interest in share ownership coupled with the development of a class of 
people dedicated to taking advantage of the comparative ignorance of investors had tended to 
increase the vulnerability of that position and to emphasise the importance of satisfying the 
other conditions for continued reliance upon a private body to manage these affairs. 
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The continued incidence of abuse suggests that attempts to use general law to support the 
protection of investors were failing. 
There had been repeated attempts to reform company law to ensure that companies had to 
provide sufficient relevant information in prospectuses to potential investors. These attempts 
had led to significant reforms in 1867 and 1906; but also to changes in the legal responsibility 
of directors for making the necessary disclosures. Yet it is evident from the continued abuses 
that these attempts at reform, however well intended, had failed to achieve their objective. 
There had always been some scepticism over the prospect of disclosure eliminating the risk of 
abuse.173 After all, the information that the law required to be disclosed in prospectuses was 
not designed as a basis for assessing the potential performance of a company, being more 
directed towards the company’s constitution and governance. Moreover there was an 
acceptance that a prospectus was intentionally a ‘selling’ document and that it was 
appropriate to allow some latitude to directors in describing their company’s prospects: 
‘A certain spirit of optimism in a prospectus is to be expected. A favourable view of 
the proposed undertaking may be expressed. A mere expression of expectation will 
not amount to a misrepresentation so long as there is at least a reasonable basis for 
that expression of expectation. There are, however, limits to the expectation which 
may be expressed as Lord Chelmsford said in the Central Railway of Venezuela v 
Kisch: “But although, in its introduction to the public, some high colouring, and even 
exaggeration, in the description of the advantages which are likely to be enjoyed by 
the subscribers may be expected, yet no misstatement or concealment of any 
material fact or circumstances ought to be permitted.”’174 
Perhaps most fatefully, professional investors in the City, in Michie’s terms the ‘well-informed 
insiders’, would not rely upon a prospectus in isolation from their knowledge of the people 
sponsoring an issue and the advice of their networks of City contacts; this appears to have 
been an significant signal for investors.175 Since it was distance of the wider investing public 
from such networks that was  the cause of difficulty, it was unlikely that formal disclosures in a 
prospectus would be effective in allowing prospective investors to mitigate their risks. 
In practice, it was unrealistic to expect that a small investor could seek redress for an 
unreasonable loss by recourse to civil law. In most instances, a single shareholder would not 
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have had access to the information needed as the basis for an action. Moreover although the 
Companies Act 1862 provided a means by which information could be sought,176 the cost of 
any resulting investigation had to be underwritten by the applicant. Even if the necessary 
information was found, the judgment in Foss v Harbottle177 prevented a single shareholder 
from taking an action against directors and accepted that infractions could be legitimated 
retrospectively by a majority vote of shareholders. Of course the shareholder may have had 
grounds for an action against a fraudulent promoter or trader; but often the promoter would 
have disappeared and even if he had not the amount of the small investor’s loss might be 
unlikely to justify the potential costs of a civil law action, however material the loss may have 
been to the investor.   
Taylor suggests that, in the 1880s and 1890s, there had been significant improvements in the 
effectiveness of prosecution as a means of reinforcing the morality of the City. He suggests 
that the creation in 1879 of the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, and reform in 
1890 of the law of company winding up, had created a more centralised approach to the 
prosecution of company fraud. To this was added a more consistent attitude on the part of 
judges. As a result, he suggests that the standards expected of judges became higher and that 
the duties expected of investors shrank.178  
In a series of cases cited by Taylor, bucketeers and promoters had been prosecuted, convicted 
and severely punished: John Grunell was sentenced to four years’ penal servitude in 1895; 
Herbert Krahn was sentenced to four years’ penal servitude in 1897; Edward Morgan was 
sentenced to five years’ penal servitude also in 1897; and Louis Lupton was sentenced to five 
years’ penal servitude in 1898.179 Even these sentences were not the limit of the punishment 
that might be meted out. In 1895, Jabez Balfour, the promoter of the Liberator Group of 
companies was sentenced to seven years’ penal servitude for offences in each of two 
indictments to run consecutively not concurrently. In 1904, Whitaker Wright, Managing 
Director of the London and Globe Finance Corporation, was sentenced to seven years’ penal 
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servitude: a punishment that he did not serve as he died before he could be taken to prison 
after swallowing a cyanide capsule.180 
Indeed, Taylor (2013b) suggests that in the late nineteenth century, prosecution was the 
principal means by which abusive activity was deterred and thus, to some extent, regulated. 
He cautiously cites the 1901 opinion of the Inspector General in Companies Liquidation: 
‘Gangs of “unscrupulous and fraudulent promoters” who used to operate in darkness 
had now been uncovered and “many of these have been brought to justice and 
removed from the sphere of active enterprise, while others have found in the scanty 
response made by the public to their schemes, that the business is no longer of a 
profitable or attractive character.”’181 
Taylor concludes: 
‘The criminalization of fraud was increasingly seen as essential, not only in the name 
of commercial morality, but of economic stability. The increased number of 
prosecutions was not a temporary experiment but established a new norm which 
came to be accepted by government, business, the courts, and the general public 
alike. There was to be no stepping back from two key principles: first, that certain 
transgressions by company directors, managers and promoters were criminal, and 
second, that the state had a responsibility to prosecute at least some of them.’182 
Taylor suggests that: 
‘Major criminal prosecutions helped to restore confidence at key points of crisis, as we 
have seen with the City of Glasgow Bank and Liberator prosecutions in the 1870s and 
1890s. The stream of smaller cases, taking place not only in London but at assizes 
throughout the country, had a cumulative impact, reinforcing societal values and 
standards and reminding company managements that acts of misappropriation and 
misrepresentation were not committed without risk, and that if prosecuted, they 
stood a good chance of imprisonment.’183 
He supports this suggestion by pointing to evidence that successful prosecution came to be 
reflected in popular fiction ‘as an agent for retribution’, citing Headon Hill’s 1896 novel, Guilty 
Gold: A Romance of Financial Fraud and City Crime, in which Horace Vardon and his 
conspirators are prosecuted.184   
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Whilst it may have been the case as Taylor and others have suggested that successful 
prosecutions had contributed to the City enjoying a reputation as a reasonably safe place for 
business,185 prosecutions were limited in their effect which was necessarily retrospective: they 
only took place after the deed had been done and the losses incurred. It can have been little 
comfort to a prospective investor who could not afford to lose money that if a company failed 
and an investment proved unwise, even though recovery of the money would be unlikely the 
malefactor would be punished.  Other than by deterring fraudsters, prosecutions did little to 
prevent fraud and, as Taylor himself admits, they plainly did not eliminate fraudulent practices: 
‘Even the prospect of imprisonment was insufficient to deter those determined to 
defraud, for the potential gains were too enticing. And for those managing honest but 
failing businesses, the temptation to conceal losses in the hope of better times ahead 
was too great, for if the deception worked it was unlikely ever to be discovered.’186 
In any case, many believed that even when the fraud was evident, the prospect of prosecution 
was not certain either because the malefactor was not pursued or because he absconded.187 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that these imperfections were widely regarded as an 
unavoidable cost of a pattern of market organisation that was generally accepted. As it was 
expressed by John Stuart Mill: 
‘. . .  as a general rule, the business of life is better performed when those who have 
an immediate interest in it are left to take their own course, uncontrolled either by 
the mandate of the law or by the meddling of any public functionary. The persons . . . 
who do the work, are likely to be better judges than the government of the means of 
attaining the particular end at which they aim.’188 
Mill concluded: 
‘. . . laissez-faire, in short, should be the general practice: every departure from it, 
unless required by some great good, is a certain evil.’189 
Ideas of this sort dominated British political thinking until the end of the nineteenth century. 
Few regarded the state as more than a means of securing necessary conveniences or as 
anything but a collection of individuals who took care to pursue their own interests more 
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effectively than any other person, functionary or agency could be expected to do.190 It was thus 
not only an intellectually satisfactory convention, it was desirable in practice because it 
appeared realistic and efficient. The ideal was a freedom in which people could seek their 
particular ends, either individually or in voluntary association with each other, unconstrained 
by external controls.  
It was in this context that organisations such as the London Stock Exchange flourished. To 
outsiders, the ways of the Stock Exchange seemed arcane, so that it was easy to believe that 
management of its business would be ‘better performed’ by those ‘who have an immediate 
interest in it’.  
This is not to say that the prevailing orthodoxy was not challenged. Arnold, for example, had 
attacked it as: 
‘. . . the specially British form of Quietism, or a devout, but excessive reliance on an 
over-ruling Providence.’191 
Attacks of this sort had been used to support campaigns for social legislation dealing with 
matters such as factory inspections and workers’ compensation, which were significant 
departures from laissez-faire principles.192 There was, in short, a growing recognition that 
problems of maintaining wealth and competitive advantage may require approaches different 
to those that were appropriate to a period of rapid accumulation of wealth. In his 1902 book, 
Liberalism, Herbert Samuel attempted to deal with three principal objections to what he saw 
as a desirable change from an outdated orthodoxy. Dealing firstly with the objection that a 
classical liberal or laissez-faire approach had already achieved improvement in people’s 
condition and, if left alone would continue that process, Samuel suggested that the 
improvement that had already been achieved owed much to actions of the state and could not 
be attributed to some general evolutionary process.193 The second objection considered by 
Samuel was that improvement required the elimination of the unfit and that this was best 
achieved in conditions of free competition. He responded by suggesting that a laissez-faire 
environment had not shown itself to be effective in eliminating the unfit.194 Finally, he dealt 
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with the objection that the state is incompetent and that people when left alone will find a 
way out of their difficulties whereas social reform tended to weaken self-reliance: 
‘Let governments abstain from war, let them practise economy, let them provide 
proper protection against violence and fraud, let them repeal restrictive laws, and 
then the free enterprise of commerce will bring prosperity to all classes, while their 
natural ambitions on the one hand, the pressure of need on the other, will stimulate 
the hindmost to seek and to attain their own well-being: such was their doctrine. . . 
Liberalism became a negative policy . . . in the same spirit . . . State interference as a 
whole was condemned as injurious to commerce and relaxing to character.’195 
Samuel responds that if this attitude continued to prevail, the social reforms of the 1890s 
would not have proved possible and continuing reform would also prove impossible. A 
changed approach was justified by the growing effectiveness of the machinery of government, 
and changes in circumstance. Regulation could prove an aide to fulfilment rather than a 
hindrance.196 Samuel was echoing the thoughts of John Simon who in 1897 had written that in 
parallel with: 
‘. . . the idea of individuality as secure from legislative interference there has grown 
up, in apparent contradiction, the idea of individuality as secured by legislative 
interference.’197 
Thoughts which were to be reflected in 1912 by JM Robertson who was to suggest that laissez-
faire might be reasonable when state intervention was proposed in the interest of a privileged 
group but was not reasonable when the proposed intervention was ‘scientifically planned’ and 
intended to serve: 
 ‘. . . the well-being of the entire community.’198 
They also lay behind the developing trade unions199 and such reforms as the introduction of 
the National Insurance Act in 1911 which created a contributory insurance scheme for illness 
and unemployment.200  
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However, for as long as the principles of laissez-faire commanded wide support, not only for 
their intellectual coherence but also for their effectiveness in practice, organisations such as 
the London Stock Exchange would continue to be accepted as an appropriate form of market 
organisation.  
Conclusions 
Although superficially the pre-1914 Stock Exchange appeared successful, pressures were 
already evident that, after the war, would lead to fundamental change. The widening of 
interest in share ownership, which was to be enormously encouraged during the 1914–1918 
war, was already evident before 1914. Pressure on the incomes of members had been evident 
for some years and had led members to look to the rules to protect their interests by insisting 
on strict compliance with the rules governing double capacity and access to the market, 
especially for provincial brokers. That members were relying on the rules in this way may 
suggest that they were not entirely confident in the London market’s ability to maintain its 
position through vigorous competition even before its ability to face competition not least 
from overseas exchanges was tested by the war. 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER THREE: 1914–1918 – SURVIVING A WAR 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The onset of war in 1914 led the London Stock Exchange to close: opening again five months 
later in January 1915. Reopening only became possible when agreement had been reached on 
a measure of protection for members from calls to meet liabilities contracted before the onset 
of war and on controls to govern wartime trading. Trading controls were unprecedented and 
proved dysfunctional as they were promulgated in the form of Temporary Regulations of the 
Stock Exchange which did not apply to off-market trading. They thus served as an incentive to 
enter into transactions off-market which were not permitted on-market, which both 
undermined the purpose of the controls and frustrated the Exchange’s members. In 1919, 
members saw the abolition of controls as the means by which their livelihood could be 
restored with the result that an attempt by the Treasury to impose lasting controls proved a 
humiliating failure. 
The onset of war 
The life of the London Stock Exchange was dramatically disrupted by the declaration of war. 
Austria’s ultimatum to Serbia and the diplomatic exchanges which followed, communicated on 
23 July 1914, contributed to growing international tension which was in turn reflected in 
volatile trading in many European exchanges201 and in stock prices in London.202 Between 
Monday 20 July 1914 and Thursday 30 July 1914,203 2.5% Consols fell by 8.9%. Equities suffered 
similar falls: Great Eastern ordinary shares falling by 12.5%. The greatest falls were registered 
by international stocks, many of which were traded in London but held by investors outside 
the United Kingdom who found it convenient to trade in London. Between the same dates, Rio 
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Tinto Copper ordinary fell by 23.6% and Canadian Pacific common fell by 14.6% as investors 
attempted to realise their holdings.204  
Such rapid price falls exposed the weakness of the thin capitalisation of most members of the 
Exchange. Both brokers and jobbers relied on two sources of finance: bank borrowing secured 
on holdings of securities and the fortnightly timetable for settlement. Both of these sources of 
finance were challenged by the increasing uncertainty. As stock prices fell, so did the value of 
the securities which members had pledged to their banks as collateral for their loans. In turn 
this led to a demand for additional security to be pledged.205 Quite apart from this, many 
members had borrowed from foreign banks to take advantage of lower interest rates and 
found that, with the coming of war, many foreign banks decided to terminate their loan 
facilities and to demand repayment. Although in many cases English banks proved ready to 
replace these facilities, there was a penalty in terms of higher interest rates.206 As far as 
investors’ balances were concerned, the onset of war meant that settlement became less 
prompt and thus less certain.  
The inevitable consequence of this financial pressure was that members failed. On 29 July 
1914, a fortnightly settlement day, seven firms were hammered: six brokers and one jobber 
which had specialised in Rio Tinto Copper. On 30 July 1914, the Paris Bourse announced that 
settlement was to be postponed by one month. This challenged all members involved in 
arbitrage business between London and Paris, for they would be obliged to wait until 31 
August to receive the proceeds of sales in Paris whilst being expected to make payment 
immediately for purchases in London. That day brought the failure of four more firms of 
members.207 That the financial challenge arose partly from the uncertainty of international 
investment and settlement resulted in the failures affecting not only small firms involved only 
in domestic business, but also larger well-respected broking firms such as JG Eiser & Company 
and Derenburg & Company.208 
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At the beginning of the week, as the market was becoming more volatile, some newspapers 
had called for the market to be closed.209 A proposal to this effect was considered by the 
committee when it met on the afternoon of 30 July 1914; but perhaps because they were 
reluctant to interrupt members’ freedom to go about their business the committee decided 
only that it would meet again in the morning of Friday 31 July.210 After hours, a number of 
major firms told the Secretary that if the Exchange opened on 31 July, they would be obliged 
to default largely because they: 
‘. . . had incurred liabilities on behalf of foreign firms who could not or would not 
remit . . . option dealers . . . had been badly caught in the frightful slump in prices 
precipitated by the war scare. Others had been financing speculative railways, 
harbour works, mines, &c. A select few were money brokers, who had borrowed 
millions from the banks and discount houses to relend them to members of the House 
with little or no margin.’211 
In the face of such representations, which were  reportedly  supported by the Bank of England, 
the joint stock banks and the major merchant banks, the Chairman and Secretary determined 
that the Exchange should close: a view which the committee endorsed when it met at 1000 
hours.  Thus began a closure that would last until Monday 4 January 1915: a period of 157 
days.212 
At first the closure was welcomed, for it brought immediate relief.213 In a market bereft of 
purchasers, prices would have fallen rapidly even if members had been willing to quote prices 
which increasingly they were not. Business would have been thin and bank borrowings would 
have been uncovered by the declining value of assets pledged as security: a problem that 
would have affected many outside the Exchange let alone members. However, this sense of 
relief gradually changed. Closure meant that there was no formal trading, which in turn meant 
no income for members. Although there was some street trading, this was at best a poor and 
unsatisfactory substitute for there was no public recording of trades or prices and settlement 
outside the rules of the Exchange was riskier. Moreover, there was a tendency for investors to  
find other means of trading: such as the Daily Mail’s service. In short, as time went on, 
members began to press for the Exchange to reopen. 
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Closure also thwarted plans of people outside the Exchange who must also have supported 
attempts to secure an early reopening. One such group involved Clarence Hatry.  
For some time, he had been planning to launch  a new reinsurance company to compete with 
the well-established German reinsurance businesses. At the time, the British insurance 
companies largely relied upon reinsurance treaties with German and Austrian companies with 
which business amounting to about £20 million was placed each year (largely consisting of fire 
risks).214 As it was, there was an opportunity for a British company to compete for this 
business; but the coming of war magnified this opportunity by disrupting established 
relationships as the newspapers reported: 
‘It is reported that in many cases in the United States merchants have been  
instructing their brokers to replace their German marine policies by American and 
British policies . . .’215 
In November 1913, to take advantage of these opportunities, Hatry’s insurance broking 
company, Patmore, Logan and Hatry Limited, had acquired the Planet Insurance Company 
Limited, a small insurance company which had been formed in 1908 by Reginald Luck, an 
insurance manager. In March 1914, reorganisation of the share capital was authorised by the 
Court and in April 1914, the company had re-registered as a public company. These 
constitutional changes suggest that a public offering of the company’s shares was in prospect. 
In this project, Hatry was assisted by Sir Frank Crisp, the leading company lawyer and legal 
adviser to the Liberal Party, who was to act as Hatry’s solicitor until his death soon after the 
end of the war.216 Crisp invited his neighbour, Sir Douglas Dawson, who after a diplomatic 
career became Secretary of the Order of the Garter in 1904217, to become a director as Sir 
Douglas later recalled: 
‘In August 1914, shortly after the war broke out, I was approached by my old friend 
and neighbour Sir Frank Crisp regarding a certain reinsurance company which was to 
be brought out on the board of which he suggested I might like to take a seat.  He had 
frequently listened to my views regarding the German Menace to peace in Europe, 
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and he told me there was a chance to get a score off the German. Hitherto, he 
explained, German and Austrian financiers had in England enjoyed a monopoly  of the 
business of reinsurance, making thereby an annual profit which he estimated at eight 
millions sterling. It was proposed to start a small British reinsurance company, with a 
small capital at the outset, to take over the business of the foreigner banished by the 
War.’218 
 These plans were confirmed  by a press report in  January 1915 that a new reinsurance 
company, to be known as ‘the Planet’ was to be formed with a capital of £1 million.219   
There were thus many interested in the Exchange reopening; although it was not to be 
straightforward. Closure had been accomplished without government action by a decision of 
the committee to stave off the threat of insolvency for many firms.  Reopening without 
appropriate protections would simply have exposed firms to the same threat. Avoiding that 
consequence required government assistance. Unfortunately, the government was not initially 
enthusiastic. 
Restoration of Exchange business on normal lines required that arrangements should be made 
to deal with three different classes of liability:  
‘ . . . the loans and contangoes existing at the end of July carry over; next, the 
differences on bargains executed between July 27 and 31; and third, the cash 
bargains entered into in Throgmorton Street while the House was closed.’220 
The first class of liability was covered initially by the government’s general moratorium which 
eventually expired on 4 November 1914. Its imminent expiry represented a problem in the 
form of the short-term debts of London Stock Exchange members (£81 million) and provincial 
exchange members (£11 million).221 As the government declined to provide direct assistance to 
members, this was eventually resolved by an agreement with joint stock banks that had 
received assistance from the government that they would not call loans until one year after 
                                                 
218  Dawson (1927); pages 349–350.  
219  Insurance Guardian; February 1915; page 3. In fact the authorised share capital had been 
increased to £500,000 in March 1914 and again to £1,000,000 in October 1914. The further increase in 
October 1914, which incurred a Stamp Duty charge of about £1,270 suggests that a public offering of the 
company’s shares remained in contemplation: even during the Exchange’s closure. Similarly the 
newspaper report in February 1915 suggests that the plan had not been abandoned by that stage 
notwithstanding the introduction of controls on new issues. 
220  Lawson (1915); pages 134–135. 
221  The amounts of the loans were established by the committee which circularised members. The 
Economist; 17 October 1914. 
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the end of the war.222 For such banks, the government did not provide a guarantee against 
losses. In the event that a lender tried to sell the securities, the Stock Exchange would   take 
action against the lender under the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act. It had however been a 
condition of the government’s approval of this scheme that its consent should be sought for 
any proposal that the Exchange should reopen. The government thus increased its power and 
influence over the Exchange.223 Once this agreement had been reached, the outstanding 
settlement, which had been deferred on closure, went ahead on 18 November 1914 without 
significant difficulty.224 
 As for street trading while the market was closed, dealers were left to settle bargains on the 
basis agreed between the parties. 
By chance, the deferred settlement took place on the same day as the launch of £350 million225 
3½% War Loan which was to prove disappointing in that the Bank of England was obliged to 
subscribe for large amounts surreptitiously to create the impression that the stock had been 
oversubscribed. It had been thought feasible to launch the new stock whilst the Exchange was 
closed; but in retrospect this was one of the factors that had made pricing more difficult.226 In 
any event, after this experience, the Treasury was more amenable to discussions of reopening, 
which were made easier because of a rise in the prices of shares on the street market to the 
levels of 27 July 1914.227 Negotiations led to an agreement which was announced on 23 
December 1914. The House was to reopen on 4 January 1915, but was subject to a number of 
restrictions intended to protect the market against the forced realisation of securities, to 
eliminate  operations to depress prices and to close the market to the enemy. Trades were to 
be settled in cash and not ‘continued from day to day’. Minimum prices were to be specified 
for stocks so that the value of securities lodged with banks as security could not be 
undermined. Admission to the Exchange was to be limited to British-born and naturalised 
                                                 
222  The assistance had been in the form of currency note facilities. For other lenders, the 
government arranged that the Bank of England would advance 60% of the value of securities held 
against outstanding loans valued at the prices ruling before closure of the Exchange. Interest was to be 
charged at 1% over Base Rate. The Bank also undertook not to press for repayment of the loans until 
twelve months after the end of the war.  
223  Morgan (1952); page 26. 
224  The Economist; 21 November 1914. Financial News; 19 November 1914. One firm, Williams & 
Wimbrush failed; Financial Times; 19 November 1914. 
225  Roberts (2013); page 189 et seq. 
226  Wormell (2000); pages 85–87. 
227  Morgan (1952); page 27. 
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members and clerks. Naturalised members originating in enemy countries had to satisfy the 
committee that they had been ‘de-nationalised in their country of origin’. No dealing would be 
permitted in any new issue made after 4 January 1915 unless ‘specially allowed by the 
committee and approved by the Treasury’.228 
New issue controls 
The arrangements for approving new issues were set out in a Treasury announcement on 19 
January 1915 and contained four provisions. Issues for United Kingdom businesses would only 
be approved if they were shown to be in the national interest. Issues for businesses in the 
British Empire overseas would only be approved if there were shown to be urgent necessity or 
special circumstances. Issues for businesses outside the British Empire would not be approved. 
Issues relating to the renewal of instruments for foreign and colonial governments, municipal 
corporations, railways or other undertakings were expected to be generally exempt from these 
restrictions.229  
This agreement resulted from private negotiations between the Treasury and the Stock 
Exchange; and for effect it relied not upon public law but upon contract law as it applied to the 
relationship between the Exchange and its members. Although this mechanism had the 
advantage that enforcement through the Exchange’s normal arrangements could be swifter 
than a court process, it also had disadvantages. The agreement only applied to the Exchange’s 
members: it could not apply to others such as the members of provincial exchanges, with 
whom there appears to have been no attempt to negotiate parallel agreements. Neither could 
it apply to traders who were not members of any formal exchange. 
Moreover, the approval  of new issues was to be in the hands of a new committee established 
by the Treasury which contained no members with current involvement in trading in the 
market: a decision which was later to lead to frustrations. 
                                                 
228  Temporary Regulations; 23 December 1914. Sonne (1915); pages 45–48. 
229  Sonne (1915); pages 49–50. 
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Table 3.1: Initial members of the Treasury Fresh Issues Committee 
Name Background230 
Viscount (later Earl) St Aldwyn231 Former Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
Director of London Joint Stock Bank and Yorkshire 
Penny Bank. 
 
Later: Chairman of the Committee of London 
Clearing Banks. 
Lord Cunliffe Governor of the Bank of England. 
Sir Frederick Banbury Conservative MP for City of London. Director of the 
London & Provincial Bank. Chairman, Great 
Northern Railway. 
Sir Thomas Whittaker Liberal MP for Spen Valley, Yorkshire. Former 
regional newspaper editor. Chairman and Managing 
Director of Life Insurance Institution. Temperance 
campaigner. 
Capt EG Pretyman Conservative MP for Essex, Chelmsford. 
Parliamentary Secretary, Board of Trade 1915–1916. 
 
Above all other considerations, the December 1914 agreement showed the Exchange and the 
Treasury in pragmatic mood. Faced with the demands from members to reopen the market, 
and the need to arrange some financial protection for members from the effects of the 
declaration of war, the committee compromised in accepting the Treasury’s controls which in 
other circumstances would have been an anathema. For their part, having established the right 
to sanction the reopening of the Exchange, the Treasury compromised by allowing the 
Exchange to reopen in return for some measure of control and restriction for the sole purpose 
of ensuring that the war effort was not undermined.  
Reactions to the agreement were mixed. Some welcomed it as the means of permitting the 
Exchange to reopen and accepted that it was reasonable to limit the risk of speculation at a 
                                                 
230  From Who Was Who. 
231  Known widely as ‘Black Michael’ after the villain in ‘The Prisoner of Zenda’. Hicks Beach (1932); 
page 388. Lord St Aldwyn resigned in April 1916 (through his wife) in view of his ill health and imminent 
death. Lord Cunliffe succeeded him. Hicks Beach (1932); page 355. 
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time when there should be a concentration of resources on the war effort.232  Newspaper 
reports also suggested that the wartime regulations offered an opportunity: 
‘. . . for experimenting under most unusually favourable conditions with what, but for 
the political truce now existing, we should be disposed to call a ‘practical socialism’. 
For many years past, a section of public opinion has been agitating . . . in favour of 
some form of control by Government over all public issues of capital . . . We have now 
reached the stage where no new issues of capital can take place in this country 
without the sanction of the Treasury; but we venture to think that it is perfectly well 
understood that the Treasury’s sanction implies no guarantee of business success . . . 
the establishment of this system of Treasury control had done much to protect the 
British investor from many ill-considered schemes with which the market would 
otherwise have been flooded . . . The primary object of the Treasury regulations was 
doubtless to prevent the export of capital. A secondary object, which has been equally 
well achieved has been the prevention of loss to the average investor.’233 
Others mused that the restrictions may have gone too far: 
‘For a public department, however powerful, to attempt to muzzle the financial and 
commercial institutions of the country is a pretty strong step not to be easily justified. 
But when it goes farther, and forbids any new financial business to be undertaken 
without its express permission, we begin to rub our eyes and to ask ourselves, “Can 
this be the country to which the gospel of laissez-faire flourished only a few years ago, 
and Mr Lloyd George was one of its prophets?” . . . There is just a bare possibility that 
the Minister who arrogates to himself this autocratic power may not be infallible.’234 
At the time, there was little information about the way in which the new controls would 
operate. Apart from the brief statement of the purpose of the new issues control, there were 
no statements of the policy to be followed by the new advisory committee and no guidance on 
the criteria which it would apply.235 Presumably this omission was intentional for the Chairman 
was strongly urged by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to reduce the number of issues to the 
                                                 
232  The Accountant; 30 January 1915; page 149. Money Market Review reported that the controls 
had met with general approval and an acceptance that all other issues ‘must be subordinated to the 
paramount necessity of harbouring the country’s financial resources’. Money Market Review; 9 January 
1915; page 21. 
233  The Accountant; 5 April 1915; page 437. See also: Money Market Review; 23 January 1915; 
page 50. 
234  Lawson (1916); page 234. 
235  This omission was later to be compared unfavourably with the practice adopted by an 
equivalent committee formed in New York. Financial Times; 9 January 1919; page 2. The US Capital 
Issues Committee was inaugurated in January 1918 as a committee of the Federal Reserve Board to 
express an opinion on whether a proposed issue was compatible with the national interest. It was in 
essence a voluntary arrangement without legal basis although certain stock exchanges (such as the New 
York Stock Exchange) made a favourable opinion a prerequisite for listing. Shortly thereafter, in March 
1918, legislation was passed providing a legal framework for the committee and creating the War 
Finance Corporation which took over responsibility for the committee. Willoughby (1934); chapter 1. 
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unavoidable minimum.236 Equally, there was no guidance on the process which it would follow 
and the way in which its decisions would be communicated. All of this was left to be settled in 
practice. This allowed the market to believe initially that new issues could still be launched as 
can be seen from the newspaper suggestions in February 1915 that Hatry’s new insurance 
company, the Planet, was still to be launched. 
Growing concern 
As time went by and the Committee’s modus operandi became clearer,237 the negative voices 
became stronger and more insistent. 
The first sign of concern emerged in June 1915 after the London Chamber of Commerce had 
established a ‘financial section’, whose first objective was to report on new capital issues.238 
Two weeks later, a second sign appeared in the form of a letter from Mr AA Bauman, the 
Chairman of the chamber’s new section, reporting his concern at the Treasury’s refusal to 
approve an issue with which he had been involved: a proposal to amalgamate the Rubber 
Share Trust and the Culloden Tea and Rubber Trust. The scheme involved the shareholders of 
the two predecessor companies exchanging their shares for shares in a new company, the 
Culloden Consolidated Company, which would take over their operations.  Although this 
exchange of shares did not itself require any transfer of cash, the scheme also involved the 
raising of some cash for working capital; and although the Treasury’s Committee did not offer 
reasons for its decision it was inferred that the raising of working capital had been critical. 
A similar complaint emerged a few months later, over a proposal that Barclays Bank should 
take over the United Counties Bank. This proposal also involved a cashless exchange of shares 
although again the opportunity was to be taken to raise a small amount as additional capital. 
The committee’s refusal of this proposal was excoriated by the newspapers: 
‘The unanimous decision of the Press, and we believe of the highest financial 
authorities, was that the scheme is a beneficial one, and that the last possible 
objection to it was removed when the proposal to raise additional capital was 
abandoned . . . The fact appears to be that the Advisory Committee of the Treasury 
simply blundered. As to the reasons for the blunder, it would, perhaps, be unwise to 
inquire, except that we may point out that all the principal members of the 
                                                 
236  Letter dated 17 April 1915 from the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Hicks Beach (1932); page 329. 
237  Kynaston (1999); page 11. 
238  Financial Times; 12 June 1915; page 2. 
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Committee are very busy men . . . A more unpleasant impression, however, is left by 
the refusal to discuss the matter, for if the directors of Barclays Bank are treated this 
cavalierly, what chances have the lower lights in the financial world of securing 
reasonable consideration?’239 
The sustained strength of the reaction, coupled with the fact that it attracted political 
attention, led to a reversal of the committee’s decision: at least as far as the amalgamation 
was concerned.240 
The force of this reaction to the committee’s decision on the Barclays proposal was 
undoubtedly strengthened by the collapse of the Bleriot Manufacturing Aircraft Company, 
whose shareholders decided on 15 January 1916 that the company should be wound up.241 The 
company had survived less than six months from the date on which its shares were offered to 
the public, having received the approval of the Treasury’s Committee on the recommendation 
of the War Office which wanted to encourage the manufacture of aircraft.242 The company’s 
failure was widely attributed to the predations of its promoter, Harry Lawson. The 
juxtaposition of the rejection of what was widely seen as the solid Barclays proposal and the 
approval of the ill-fated Bleriot issue was poisonous. 
The reaction to such apparently inexplicable decisions was exacerbated by the manner in 
which both the committee and the Treasury went about their business. Applications to the 
committee were considered on the basis of formal submissions in response to formal 
questionnaires. Personal representations were not invited or permitted. Frequently, decisions 
were  long delayed and were always issued without explanations so that the market was left to 
infer the grounds on which a decision had been reached and thus how any future application 
might be considered. Mr Bauman described the committee’s procedure in the following way: 
‘I submit that [the Committee’s] powers are not exercised justly, because  the parties 
seeking permission to issue are not heard. The parties are obliged to make their case 
in writing and are left in ignorance as to how much of their case is laid before the 
Committee and in what terms. This conduct on the part of a committee responsible to 
                                                 
239  Editorial; Financial Times; 6 November 1915; page 2. 
240  Financial Times; 18 January 1916; page 2. 
241  Financial Times; 14 January 1916; page 4. 
242  Financial Times; 21 January 1916; page 2. 
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no one but the department which appoints it is a confusion of administrative and 
judicial functions which is dangerous to the community.’243 
These procedures were criticised roundly in correspondence published in the Financial Times: 
‘The Committee as constituted is a secret or Star Chamber, superior to the law, and its 
methods are arbitrary, autocratic and guided neither by logic or precedent.’244 
Concern about such questions had arisen early; but it proved difficult to engage the Treasury’s 
interest. By mid-July 1915, the new financial section of the London Chamber of Commerce had 
prepared a report on cases of hardship and injustice alleged to have arisen from the Treasury 
Committee’s decisions.245 It was not until January 1916 that the chamber was able to report 
that a deputation had ‘waited upon the Treasury’ to discuss the complaints and that: 
‘. . . a promise had been made that the representations of the deputation would 
receive special consideration.’246 
Whatever consideration may have been given to these representations, there was no 
discernible change in the committee’s procedures and the opprobrium in which it had come to 
be held, as the Chairman of the London Chamber of Commerce suggested in a letter to the 
Financial Times: 
‘Since its formation in January 1915 . . . the Committee has been condemned to bear 
an ever-increasing load of unpopularity . . . the unpopularity arose from the arbitrary 
manner in which the Committee carried on its operations, the absence of any 
indication of a clear line of policy guiding its decisions, and the fact, which speedily 
became known, that it had no statutory sanction for its existence or legal power to 
enforce its views. The Committee was like the ancient tyrant of who we are told in 
Holy Writ – “Whom he would he slew and whom he would he kept alive”.’247 
By this stage, it had become clear that the committee was disinclined to approve any new 
issue which involved the subscription of cash, even where it was arguable that the issue would 
                                                 
243  Letter to the Editor; Financial Times; 22 June 1915; page 3. This description was largely 
consistent with a subsequent description given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (R McKenna) to a 
question: Financial Times; 16 January 1916; page 2. 
244  Financial Times; 10 June 1916; page 2. 
245  Financial Times; 10 July 1915; page 4. 
246  Financial Times; 14 January 1916; page 3. The delay in meeting the Treasury (and the 
chamber’s frustration at it) is described in a letter from the chamber’s Chairman, Mr F Faithful Begg: 
Financial Times; 6 June 1916; page 2. 
247  Letter from Mr F Faithful Begg, Chairman of the London Chamber of Commerce: Financial 
Times; 2 May 1916; page 2. 
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serve the national interest.248  Whilst on the one hand the London Chamber of Commerce and 
others campaigned against what they regarded as an unsatisfactory state of affairs, others 
looked for ways around the problem. 
Finance raising alternatives 
Many resorted to the most obvious alternative: borrowing from banks or from the Ministry of 
Munitions. This was the course adopted by companies such as Spillers & Bakers Limited, 
Leyland Motors Limited and United Brassfounders. In each case, new manufacturing capacity 
to meet wartime requirements was financed by bank loans.249 This represented a departure 
from peacetime practice by which companies would have financed investment in productive 
fixed assets by retaining profits or issuing shares, and implied a higher level of gearing than 
most would have been prepared to contemplate. Whilst this might have been relatively risk-
free in a wartime context in which many companies could expect that all of their production 
would be bought by the government, by the end of the war it would increase pressure to issue 
shares to replace bank borrowing as indeed was done by Spillers, Leyland Motors and United 
Brassfounders.250 As a variation of this approach, some companies  accepted loans or deposits 
from shareholders in the expectation that, at the end of the war, they would be exchanged for 
shares. 
Bank borrowing was often not available to finance new ventures. In such cases, the purchase 
of an existing quoted company provided an alternative. In Hatry’s instance, the Planet acquired 
from Austrian and German interests a controlling interest in City Equitable Fire Insurance 
Company, a small quoted insurance company which specialised in fire reinsurance. In short 
order, the company’s capital was reorganised, presumably with a view to issuing shares at 
some stage, and the controlling interest was then sold to interests led by Gerard Lee Bevan, 
                                                 
248  An example of the committee appearing to ignore a national interest was provided by Spillers & 
Bakers Limited which proposed to raise cash to increase its food manufacturing capacity, arguingit was 
important to support the war effort. The proposal was refused. Financial Times; 8 May 1916; page 2.  
249  In the case of Spillers, the capacity was required to meet the food requirements of the forces in 
France. Leyland Motors Limited supplied all the heavy lorries required by the Royal Flying Corps. The 
whole of United Brassfounders’ production was diverted to the manufacture of munitions designed for 
trench warfare. 
250  Leyland Motors and United Brassfounders were both to become clients of Hatry. Leyland 
Motors became a client by the summer of 1918 at the latest (i.e. before the end of hostilities) when 
planning began for a public offer of shares, in part to replace bank borrowing. United Brassfounders’ 
issue occurred somewhat later, in 1920, and was a private rather than a public issue. Gerard Lee Bevan 
memorandum dated 7 September 1920. National Archives; file HO 144/2745. 
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the senior partner of Ellis & Company, stockbrokers.251 Taking the profit from this sale, Hatry 
and his associates then acquired from investment trusts controlled by Viscount St Davids252 a 
controlling interest in Commercial Bank of London Limited, a small quoted bank which had 
been formed in 1906 to finance trading between England and Japan. When it proved difficult 
to develop that business satisfactorily, it had been acquired by Viscount St Davids and his 
associates to concentrate on banking business within England but on the commencement of 
war had reduced its activities. Hatry used the bank, which he augmented by the acquisition of 
Reuters Bank,253 as his main vehicle for stock market operations. 
A third alternative to an issue of shares on the London Exchange was a private issue of shares 
outside the market, which of course remained possible because the wartime restrictions on 
new issues only applied to the London Exchange. This possibility was taken up quickly, 
especially by shipping interests as reported by the Financial Times: 
‘One of the striking effects of the high freights that can now be earned by vessels of 
almost any description is the revival of the one ship company that was a prominent 
feature of joint stock promotions in certain cities about fifteen years ago . . . The very 
fact that no new issues of capital are sanctioned by the Treasury except of public 
utility and importance – and not necessarily then – makes the danger the more 
insidious, as many of these one ship companies are private and the funds to float 
them will be privately solicited.’ 
The newspaper’s report listed 88 such companies with a combined capitalisation of about £2.5 
million.254 
The attractions of this business had led firms to forsake membership of the Exchange. Some 
firms such as Helbert Wagg & Russell had followed this course before the  war, commencing 
business as an issuing house under the name Helbert Wagg & Company.255 In 1915, they were 
followed by Sperling & Company which in due course was to concentrate upon shipbuilding 
and ship repairing companies.256  There was sufficient activity to justify the creation of new 
                                                 
251  Vander Weyer (2011); page 96. 
252  Viscount St Davids was a prominent supporter of the Liberal Party, and would have been known 
to Hatry’s solicitor, Sir Frank Crisp, who was legal adviser to the Liberal Party. 
253  Emden (1951); page 221. 
254  Financial Times; 22 November 1915; page 3. 
255  The new firm was established on 1 January 1913. Roberts (1992); page 364. 
256  Diaper (1990); page 75. 
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firms such as BST Limited which, in 1915, was established by a group of provincial brokers to 
specialise in new issues.257 
Exchange reactions 
Whilst all of this activity was helpful in sustaining businesses, it was frustrating for Exchange 
members. Trading in the market was in any event depressed by the war; and most of the 
activity that was taking place off-market would in other times have been expected to take 
place on-market. Pelion was heaped on Ossa by the fact that former members of the Exchange 
such as the partners of Sperling & Company were actively participating in the off-market 
activity denied to continuing members: 
‘It is a scandal that while members of the Stock Exchange have loyally observed 
[these restrictions] since reopening the Exchange, outside firms have been allowed 
not only to conduct speculative three monthly and option accounts but to issue 
literature generally in the form of gratuitously circulated newspapers inciting the 
public to do business on these lines.’258 
A similar report appeared in December 1916: 
‘It is absurd to prohibit speculation in securities under the . . . safeguards of the Stock 
Exchange while permitting irresponsible people to circulate and advertise publications 
registered as newspapers inducement to gamble without safeguards. Something 
more drastic than the present mild warnings which the responsible newspapers 
advertise gratuitously is needed.’259 
Admittedly the controls improved some aspects of trading: 
‘The one outstanding feature in dealings in the ‘House’ during the past four inherently 
difficult years has been the well-nigh perfect safety for all concerned. Not only did the 
cash basis of our transactions effectively reduce to – practically – zero the risk 
involved in the ultimate completion of each bargain, but it tended to stabilise markets 
in a most salutary and hitherto unknown manner.’260 
                                                 
257  The new business was led by Edgar Crammond, who was the secretary of the Liverpool Stock 
Exchange, a position he left in 1918 to become Managing Director of BST. Subsidiary companies were 
established in major cities around the country to secure support from provincial brokers in obtaining a 
bigger share of underwriting for new issues which gravitated towards London. In the mid-1920s, the 
network was re-organised under a new holding company and re-named British Shareholders Trust 
Limited. The Times; 26 June 1918; page 10. 20 June 1924; page 22. 
258  Money Market Review; 16 September 1916; pages 163–164. 
259  Money Market Review; 20 December 1926; page 371. 
260  Letter from Gerald Williams to the committee; Rules and Regulations Committee minutes; 27 
November 1918. Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
Chapter Three 
1914–1918 –Surviving a war 
Page 84 
 
Yet in the long term, such improvements in trading did not outweigh the cost of business being 
diverted to off-market trading. 
Treasury frustration 
The Treasury was also frustrated by the extent of off-market activity, for the only device 
available to limit this activity was the occasional issue of public notices urging restraint.261  
Presumably this device proved ineffective, for the Treasury appears to have consulted 
Parliamentary Counsel in 1916 on replacing the Stock Exchange’s Temporary Regulation by a 
new Regulation under the Defence of the Realm Act 1914 (DORA) to control new issues. Such 
regulations were a straightforward and quick way of issuing legislation. At the time this was 
thought impracticable as the War Ministry’s lawyers took the view that regulations could not 
be issued under DORA that were not closely related to military requirements.262 
As a result, the Treasury was left with responsibility for a control that not only fell short of 
achieving the objective of controlling new issues and share trading but was also attracting 
considerable business and, at times, political criticism.263  
Cabinet review 
Towards the end of 1917, this criticism led to a review of the controls as one element of the 
Cabinet’s consideration of a proposal from the French government for a co-ordinated 
economic offensive.264 The Cabinet committee’s report accepted that: 
‘ . . . it is essential . . . that not merely undertakings directly connected with the war, 
but also others upon which the national well-being depends, or which involve 
expenditure of capital for urgent matters of reconstruction should receive the 
Treasury consent more readily and much more promptly than has been the case in the 
past. We have had before us various instances of delays and refusals which we cannot 
but regard as contrary to the national interest and indeed injurious to the successful 
prosecution of the war.’265 
                                                 
261  For an example of such warnings see The Times; 8 March 1917; page 12. 
262  Letter from Parliamentary Counsel dated 24 October 1918. National Archives; file 
T12200/37031. 
263  There had been a series of Parliamentary Questions. 
264  Appointment of a committee to consider an economic offensive; National Archives; Cabinet 
minutes; 20 August 1917; page 5; CAB/23/3/68. 
265  Interim Report Number 7 of the Economic Offensive Committee; National Archives; Cabinet 
minutes; CAB/24/4/34. 
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The committee recommended that, as a matter of urgency, a new Cabinet committee should 
be established to consider appeals by government departments in cases where a new issue 
had been approved by a government department but not approved by the Treasury within two 
weeks. This recommendation was subject to the reservation that: 
‘It is perhaps hardly necessary to add that promoters’ schemes, purchase of patents, 
fancy additions for the purchase of goodwill and other forms of watered capital 
should all be discouraged, and that only genuine issues of capital for the purposes 
described should be sanctioned.’ 
In effect, the committee had accepted criticism of the speed with which the Fresh Issues 
Committee worked, and its recommendations were accepted by the Cabinet after receiving a 
memorandum from the Ministry of Munitions: 
‘ . . . there is money available for speculative issues which is not attracted by war 
loans; if the New Issues Committee would allow issues of shares by aircraft companies 
and by companies requiring capital for extension of mining and certain industrial, 
chemical , and alloy steel processes, the speculators’ money would be brought to the 
service of the State and relieve the Ministry of making advances to such companies, 
advances which have to come out of the proceeds of war loans.’266  
When announced, this change in practice was not warmly welcomed: 
‘The concession has not been made a day too soon and may lose much of its value if 
the composition of the Cabinet Committee is not more practical than that of the New 
Issues Committee itself . . . the best thing of course would be to reform the Committee 
on the lines of, say, the Board of Referees for Excess Profits Duty,267 but not to give 
too great an affront to the members who are personally irreproachable, we suppose 
we must accept the Cabinet Committee as an Appeal Court.’268 
                                                 
266  National Archives; Cabinet minutes; 21 February 1918; page 1; CAB/23/5/43. The 
recommendation was approved after circulation of a memorandum by the Ministry of Munitions which 
suggested that the manufacture of munitions had been held up by the Treasury control; National 
Archives; Cabinet minutes; CAB/24/40/82. The memorandum had been written by Sir Laming 
Worthington-Evans who was Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Munitions but before the war 
had practised as a solicitor who was knowledgeable about company law and, indeed, was a published 
author on the subject. In 1915 and 1916, as a backbencher, he had asked Parliamentary Questions about 
the committee’s processes. 
267  The Board of Referees was created to minimise parliamentary objections to the detailed 
provisions of Excess Profits Duty. External to the Inland Revenue, it comprised ‘persons sufficiently 
experienced in general business to appreciate the issues involved’. Its 29 members included nine 
accountants and successive senior partners of Price, Waterhouse & Company served as members. The 
first appointments were announced on 7 December 1915. Stamp (1932); page 170. Billings et al (2014); 
page 93. 
268  Financial Times; 5 March 1918; page 2. Similar sentiments were expressed in The Accountant; 
16 March 1918; page 227. 
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Thus, in the spring of 1918, none of the parties involved were entirely satisfied with the Fresh 
Issues Committee’s operation. For businesses needing to raise money, the introduction of an 
appeal mechanism did little to assuage their concerns about a system that seemed to them 
autocratic, unfair and even capricious. For the Stock Exchange, an appeal mechanism did 
nothing to curb the resentment of members that their patriotic co-operation had led to 
difficulty for their clients (i.e. companies wishing to raise money) and had also led to a loss of 
business through diversion to off-market activity. For the Treasury, the review had largely 
accepted the market’s criticisms of the way in which the Fresh Issues Committee and the 
department had applied the controls: an outcome that cannot have been welcomed. 
Moreover, the control’s effectiveness was threatened by the development of off-market 
activity. If the Treasury considered that controlling speculative activity around new issues 
mattered, introduction of an appeal mechanism did nothing to correct the weakness inherent 
in the control. 
Above all of this, experience of the control had left many businesses in a sub-optimal position. 
Those which had not obtained approval for proposed share issues and had financed new fixed 
assets by bank borrowing were left with higher gearing than they desired. Many that would 
have preferred to issue shares through the Exchange had resorted to off-market issues. All of 
those businesses are likely to have looked forward to the end of the war as a moment when 
they could regularise their finances, assuming that the new issues control would be relaxed.  
Reconsideration in 1918 
Perhaps sensing that there was an opportunity for change, the Exchange chose this moment to 
renew its complaints to the Treasury about off-market activity. On 6 May 1918, the committee 
sent the Treasury a circular from Graham Marsh & Company, an outside broker;269 and a 
further circular from the same company was sent on 6 June 1918.270 Finally, on 24 September 
1918, the Exchange sent a letter enclosing a memorandum circulated on behalf of  Sperling & 
Company and complaining: 
                                                 
269  National Archives; file T18210. 
270  National Archives; file T12200/22511. The Stock Exchange appears to have submitted similar 
circulars on other occasions as an internal Treasury memorandum refers to circulars in respect of Russo-
Canadian Development Corporation Limited, Kwall Tin Fields of Nigeria and Harmony Transvaal 
Development Company: National Archives; file T12200/37071. Documentary evidence of these 
submissions does not appear to have survived. 
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‘The Committee desire to point out that a considerable hardship is inflicted on 
Members of the Stock Exchange owing to lack of efficient Government control over 
outside issuing houses and that the Public are being educated to the knowledge that 
issues of fresh capital can be made irrespective of the interests of the country or the 
wishes of the Treasury provided no use is made of recognised Stock Exchanges.’271 
The memorandum which was the subject of this letter had been circulated by Clarence Hatry 
on behalf of Sperling & Company, soliciting subscriptions for shares in Northumberland 
Shipbuilding Company (NSC).272 
For some time, Hatry and Sperling & Company had been co-operating with each other to take 
advantage of commercial opportunities in shipbuilding and ship repairing. In 1917, Hatry had 
acquired interests in three small dockyard companies: H&C Grayson, Jos Eltringham, and 
Irvine’s.273 it was expected that the end of the war would be followed by a boom in 
shipbuilding as merchant fleets sought to replace ships that had been destroyed during the 
war. When the acquisition of H&C Grayson had been announced, Money Market Review had 
commented: 
‘. . . there is no doubt that owing to shipping losses and the very large accumulation 
of deferred repairs to ships now running under war conditions businesses of this 
character will enjoy considerable after war prosperity.’274 
NSC was owned by Furness Withy Group who decided that the business should be sold. With 
Sperling & Company’s support, in July 1918 the company was acquired by Robert Workman, a 
London ship broker, who had family connections with shipbuilding in Belfast. Sperling & 
Company, with the support of Kleinwort Sons & Company and others, planned to use NSC as a 
base for rationalising the shipbuilding industry. Whilst Sperling & Company appears to have 
been a prime mover in designing the scheme, Hatry’s contribution was to market the proposal 
to potential investors. The memorandum which attracted the Exchange’s attention was a part 
of that marketing. 
The Exchange’s letter was eventually considered by a then junior official, Otto Neimeyer, who 
recommended that, in view of the need for regulation of new issues to continue after the war, 
a regulation instituting formal control should be considered: 
                                                 
271  National Archives; file T12200/37071. 
272  Kleinwort & Sons Archive; London Metropolitan Archives. 
273  Diaper (1990); page 80. 
274  Money Market Review; 2 June 1917; page 321. 
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‘It seems to me that we must once again consider whether strong methods should not 
be taken against offenders. . . I can see no administrative step that we can take on 
present powers which is likely to be effective. 
‘Specific legislation forbidding capital issues except with the approval of the Treasury 
is I take it impractical but there still remains the possibility of a Defence of the Realm 
Regulation. When this was discussed in September 1916 . . . Parliamentary Counsel 
saw considerable objection to using the [DORA] to deal with matters only indirectly 
connected with the Defence of the Realm, but I am not quite sure that this objection 
holds, in view of the things we have done under the Act. It is not much more violent I 
should have thought to prevent various forms of diverting possible subscriptions to 
War Bonds by a regulation than it is to prevent as we do selling securities abroad 
unless we approve of it. I believe not only Stock Exchange but public opinion would 
support the rule which had the result of preventing wild cat speculations and I 
suggest that the question for such a rule ought now to be reconsidered. There is it 
seems a good deal to be said for starting the policy now, when we should have the 
support of the Stock Exchange Committee, in view of the possible post-war control 
which will surely be very necessary.’275 
With the approval of the Permanent Secretary, Sir John Bradbury, and the First Parliamentary 
Counsel, work on this proposal was started. In mid-December a draft regulation was sent to 
the Stock Exchange for the committee’s comments and, once the committee’s observations 
had been taken into account, a final version of a regulation was completed. 
Regulation 30F 
What was to become Regulation 30F prohibited the issue of shares stock or securities, for cash 
or otherwise, by any person unless it had been licensed by the Treasury. But in addition to this 
provision, which extended the remit of the existing Stock Exchange regulation to all outside 
issues, Regulation 30F prohibited the sale of any security which had been issued since January 
1915 without Treasury sanction. In other words, Regulation 30F would have obliged companies 
which had issued shares since 1915 outside the Stock Exchange to seek Treasury approval 
retrospectively.  
The new regulation was announced on 24 February 1919 in the form of a press release;276  and 
elicited a furious response. 
                                                 
275  Memorandum dated 1 November 1918: National Archives; file T12200/37071. The change in 
approach to DORA reflected differences in legal interpretations of the meaning of ‘the necessity of war’ 
rather than an increasing laxity in applying DORA. The background to the different interpretations is 
described in Hull (2014). 
276  Treasury press release C10917. Reproduced in Sperling’s Journal; March 1919; pages 20–21. 
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The extension of the wartime regulation was not welcomed. As soon as the armistice had been 
signed, there had been a call for relaxation of the controls.277 Moreover it was known that 
there was pressure to make new issues278 from businesses which had been looking forward to 
the end of the war as an opportunity to repair unsatisfactory financing that they had been 
obliged to accept during the war. But they may have been assuaged by announcement of a re-
casting of the Fresh Issues Committee to include market experience which should have offered 
a prospect of a more pragmatic approach from the committee. Moreover, the extension of 
regulation to off-market issues might have been welcome as a means of discouraging abusive 
selling of shares to unsophisticated investors. After all, the need for this had been recognised 
in two recent reports.279 But the retrospective application of the regulation to issues since 
January 1915 would have been a grave disappointment to businesses involved in such issues 
which had expected to regularise their position at the end of the war and promised to 
destabilise markets in a way that neither the Treasury nor the Stock Exchange had foreseen.280 
The effect of the regulation would have been to undermine the value of any share that had 
been issued without Treasury sanction as it could not be sold. Such a share would not have 
been acceptable to a bank as security for a loan as it could be realised by the bank in the event 
of the debtor’s default. As a result, Regulation 30F would have required banks that had 
accepted such shares as security for existing loans to oblige their debtors to provide valuable 
security to cover the loans or to repay them. 
In the face of a storm of complaint, the government had no choice but to climb down. Three 
days after the announcement of Regulation 30F: 
‘. . . all that Mr Bonar Law could do was to ask for mercy and turn a somersault. “Do 
not judge us too harshly,” he said; “we are doing our best”, and after defending the 
retrospective clause as perfectly just, he said it would nevertheless be cancelled. It 
                                                 
277  The Times; 13 November 1918; page 13. 
278  The Times; 6 December 1918; page 13. 10 March 1919; page 17. 
279  The report of the Wrenbury Committee on Company Law Amendment included a reservation 
by a member, AS Comyns Carr, warning of the risk that many new investors would lose money as a 
result of abusive share advisers. Wrenbury report (1918); pages 13–14. The report of the Vassar-Smith 
Committee on Financial Facilities made a similar point. Vassar-Smith report (1918); page 8.  
280  The Times, somewhat unpersuasively, argued that arguments about retrospection were not 
significant and that the prime interest lay in ‘what sort of new issues are now to be much more freely 
sanctioned’. The Times; 6 March 1919; page 15. 
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came into force on Tuesday morning and was withdrawn on Thursday evening. What 
a government!’281 
It then took some time for a revised version of the regulation to be published: a delay that 
attracted further complaint in the press: 
‘It seems that the delay in drafting the amended Order had been due to the absence 
in Paris of the Chancellor of the Exchequer – an example of the way in which our 
affairs are managed nowadays . . . Really the case in favour of control is 
unanswerable but where doubt comes in is with regard to the competence and the 
judgement of the controllers. They have made some howling blunders in the past four 
years.’282 
For the time being, the New Issues Committee remained in operation; but its decisions were 
regularly marked by withering comment on contentious decisions such as the refusal 
(subsequently reversed) to approve an issue by the South Perak Rubber Syndicate;283 its refusal 
to sanction a share splitting scheme proposed by Commercial Union;284 and its approval on 6 
March 1919 of an issue by the Co-operative Medical Bottle Company Limited which Truth 
described as: 
‘ . . . the most recent promotion of a notorious gang (with an ex-convict among them) 
whose joint-stock ramps ought to have led to a prosecution long ago.’285 
When the revised Regulation 30F was issued, attempts to control domestic issues ceased 
immediately and attempts to control issues on behalf of overseas undertakings eventually 
ceased later in 1919.286 The first domestic prospectus to appear under the new arrangements 
was published on 21 March 1919 on behalf of Wiggins Teape.287 
                                                 
281  Article headed ‘Our Financial Muddlers’; Truth; 5 March 1919; page 330. A proposal to issue the 
regulation had been approved in November 1918 by Stanley Baldwin as Financial Secretary at the 
Treasury and by Bonar Law when he was still Chancellor of the Exchequer. Its announcement in 
February 1919 was made by Austen Chamberlain who had become Chancellor, on Bonar Law’s 
becoming Leader of the House. 
282  Article headed ‘The New Issues Farce’; Truth; 19 March 1919; page 423. 
283  Truth; 12 March 1919; page 375. 
284  The Commercial Union proposed to divide its £10 shares into two shares of £5. The Times; 22 
February 1922; page 1919. 
285  Truth; 19 March 1919; page 423. 
286  On 12 September 1919, letters were sent to members of the New Issues Committee thanking 
them for their services which would no longer be required. National Archives; file T172/1039. 
287  The Times; 21 March 1919; page 19. 
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From February 1919, for discouragement of ‘wild cat speculation’ such as had occurred soon 
after the armistice,288 the Treasury pragmatically relied upon other restraints on Stock 
Exchange trading. In 1915, the Stock Exchange’s Temporary Regulations, which had been 
agreed by the Treasury and were expected to apply until ‘the end of the war’, specified that 
trading had to be settled in cash on a day-to-day basis and options business was not permitted. 
In the event, although hostilities had ended in November 1918, a formal declaration of the end 
of the war was considerably delayed which meant that the Temporary Regulations remained in 
force.  
For the press, this would have been too subtle. At the end of March 1919, Truth lamented: 
‘Down to a few days ago, [the government] argued very strongly – and I think 
irresistibly – that in view of the national financial situation it is essential that control 
of new issues should be maintained. But, having no will of its own on any subject, the 
Government is always amenable to pressure, and so, after its usual habit, it has 
swallowed everything that it said and reversed its decision. There was, of course, the 
difficulty that fatuous blunders were made in granting or refusing permission for new 
issues, but it would not have been impossible to find men and devise means for 
ensuring a more judicious and efficient control. As it is, a great deal of money will 
now be diverted to all sorts of unnecessary and undesirable propositions, and the 
shadier class of company promoters will have the time of their lives.’289 
With hindsight, it is evident that the 1914–1918 war had given fresh impetus to changes in the 
character of the market that had begun before 1914. In large part, the war had been financed 
by the issue of government stock leading to a great increase in the national debt from 25% of 
GDP to 135%.290 Much of this debt had been acquired by small investors who had not 
previously held securities tradeable through the Stock Exchange and had been sold to them by 
agents such as Arthur Wheeler291 who were not members. 
At the time, there were some who understood some of the risks that this change would create. 
Reports of two of the many committees established to consider questions that would arise on 
the close of the war foresaw that people who had become investors through buying War Loan 
would be vulnerable to abusive share traders in the boom that was expected would follow the 
                                                 
288  An example of such speculation was provided by trading in the shares of Hudson’s 
Consolidated. The Times; 26 November 1918; page 11. 
289  Truth; 26 March 1919; page 466. 
290  Skidelsky (2014); page 167. 
291  Subsequently knighted for his efforts. 
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war. In July 1918, AS Comyns Carr commented in a minority reservation to the Wrenbury 
Committee report: 
‘We have seen during the war a remarkably widespread diffusion of money, and a 
wonderful growth in the habit of investment, among classes of the population to 
whom both are a novelty . . . After the war it may be expected that a large number of 
people who never were investors before will be willing to entrust their savings to 
commercial companies but will not be very well equipped to select those which are 
worthy of their confidence. Simultaneously there will be a large crop of new schemes  
. . . offering unique opportunity to the fraudulent and over-sanguine . . .’292 
The committee’s majority added a waspish comment that Carr had not attended most of the 
committee’s meetings and took no account of his observations. Carr was at the time legal 
adviser to the Ministry of Reconstruction293 which sponsored another committee which was to 
comment on the risks of share trading fraud. That committee, whose members included Sir 
John Bradbury294 and Sir Alexander Roger,295 was chaired by Sir Richard Vassar-Smith, the 
Chairman of Lloyds Bank. Its report, published in November 1918, generally supported 
extension of the Treasury’s control of new issues but went further, suggesting that: 
‘ . . . permanent measures would be taken to prevent, or make more difficult, the 
promotion and issue of unsound propositions.’296 
The report went on to suggest that banks: 
‘ . . . should undertake some responsibility for the bona fides of undertakings on 
behalf of which they agree to accept subscriptions.’297 
This understanding of the changing character of the market and the risks it created does not 
appear to have been shared widely by Exchange members. Neither was it shared by another 
committee that considered post-war conditions. The Commercial and Industrial Policy report 
recognised that it might be necessary for exceptional measures to be taken in the immediate 
                                                 
292  Wrenbury Committee (1918); pages 13–14. 
293  The Minister responsible for the department was Dr Christopher Addison, who had contributed 
a foreword to Carr’s 1912 book on National Insurance. 
294  Permanent Secretary to the Treasury. 
295  Former Chairman of Commercial Bank of London Limited, acquired by Hatry in 1916, and 
Director General of the unit that had been responsible for the production of munitions for trench 
warfare during the war.  
296  Vassar-Smith report (1918); page 8. 
297  Vassar-Smith report (1918); page 10. 
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aftermath of the war but that in general only capital issues on behalf of foreign governments 
or states should be controlled.298 
There were other examples of the Exchange not seeing clearly the direction of the market. 
Rapid withdrawal of Regulation 30F was a humiliation forced upon the Treasury through a 
failure to appreciate the effect that a retrospective reinforcement of the wartime controls 
would have upon existing bank loans. Treasury officials might well have expected that this was 
the type of issue the Stock Exchange’s practical men of finance would have spotted when 
shown a draft of the new regulation.  
A further example is provided by the failure at the beginning of the war to appreciate that the 
existence of an unregulated space in parallel to the regulated marketplace provided by the 
Exchange would provide an opportunity for businesses to subvert the new issue controls. As 
the wartime controls depended for their effectiveness entirely upon the Exchange’s 
Temporary Regulations and not upon public law, there was little that could be done by either 
the Exchange or the Treasury to restrain off-market activity that was supported by banks and 
estimable City houses such as Kleinwort & Sons. Although businesses had begun by seeking 
ways to achieve their objectives within the regulated market in spite of the controls, when this 
proved impossible they had been prepared to operate off-market. By lobbying in 1918 for 
controls over the unregulated space, the Exchange acknowledged that the unregulated 
marketplace was beyond its influence. By making Regulation 30F retrospective in its effect, the 
Treasury signalled its recognition that the existence of an unregulated marketplace had 
undermined its dependence on the Exchange’s Rules alone. 
Conclusions 
Thus both the Exchange and the Treasury came to reconsider and adjust their respective 
positions. 
For its part, at the beginning of the war, the Exchange’s traditional position was to resist 
government control and to refuse proposals that it should be responsible for overseeing any 
share trading activity not carried on by its members. By December 1914, it was prepared to 
welcome government controls of new issues as a condition of being able to open again. By 
December 1918, it was lobbying for the institution of controls over all share trading, wherever 
                                                 
298  Commercial and Industrial Policy report (1918); page 42. 
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it was carried on. This was a tacit acceptance that, however effective the Exchange might be in 
regulating the conduct of its members, their interests could be at risk unless off-market activity 
was also controlled. Unfortunately, the committee had misjudged the view of members about 
the best way to protect their interests. Having been supportive of controls in January 1915, 
members’ support had withered as it became clear that the benefits of membership were 
being eroded. Off-market activity was not only possible but profitable and they were not 
allowed to participate in it. In 1919, they did not support the Committee’s view that their 
interests would best be served by formalising the controls so that they applied to all trading 
wherever it took place. Members preferred that controls should be removed altogether. 
As for the Treasury, the war demonstrated that it needed the support of the market. Financing 
the war through the issue of debt would have proved impossible without a properly 
functioning exchange. But, in addition, the effectiveness of the new issues controls in part 
depended upon their acceptance by the market. As the market came to realise that the 
controls were to be applied inflexibly by a committee that appeared not to understand the 
market, so support waned and a determination to use the unregulated marketplace grew, 
subverting the controls. 
Such failure of market understanding and of management of the controls resulted in both of 
the regulatory interventions during this period being compromised. The wartime controls were 
undermined because off-market activity was not regulated. The post-war regulatory 
arrangement was compromised because rather than regulating all new issues, wherever they 
were to be traded, reliance had perforce to be placed in discouraging speculation by delaying a 
return to peacetime conditions. This was at best a blunt instrument, as post-war trading was to 
demonstrate. 
  
CHAPTER FOUR: 1919–1929 – THE POST-WAR STOCK EXCHANGE 
 
 
Introduction 
The end of hostilities in November 1918 was accompanied by hope that commercial life would 
return to normality and prosperity.299 For members of the Stock Exchange this required not 
simply an end to controls on new issues, which was accomplished by the spring of 1919, but 
also a release from the constraints on trading. This required the agreement of the Treasury 
which was not immediately forthcoming. 
On their own, however, these two steps were not sufficient to recover prosperity: they were 
prerequisites of the Exchange beginning to compete to recover its pre-war position. The years 
of war had isolated the London Stock Exchange from international markets. UK investors had 
been major sellers of international securities while US investors had been major purchasers. By 
1919, the New York Stock Exchange had grown in its significance in international bond trading: 
a market in which London had been pre-eminent before 1914.300 At the same time, the 
provincial stock exchanges had developed and, although London remained the market in which 
the largest holdings could be traded without affecting the market unduly, for smaller holdings 
they offered an alternative to London. Members knew that with the end of the war there 
would be a battle to recover the position that had been enjoyed before the war. 
Members were also to find that the investing community was changing in character. Whereas 
before 1914 investment had largely been the preserve of a class that was to a degree 
insouciant about risk and the possibility of loss, after 1918 there were many smaller investors 
who were more vulnerable to loss and who were relatively ignorant about investment. During 
the war, there had been a material increase in the salaried class reflecting the expansion of 
four groupings: the professions,  civil servants and administrators, managers involved in the 
running of large-scale industry and those women who were able to hold  on to positions that 
                                                 
299  Paxman (2013); page 288. 
300  Kirkaldy (1921); page 347. 
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they had gained during the war. There had also been a concomitant reduction in the real 
income available for saving or expenditure in the hands of the richest in society.301 
For their part broker members of the Exchange, whose incomes were in any event squeezed by 
cost inflation, found that the smaller holdings of many new investors were not sufficient to 
justify the cost of the traditional relationship between a broker and client.  
In short, in 1919 members found themselves competing to recover their trading position and 
seeking all possible ways of increasing their incomes.  
The challenge for stock markets 
Hopes of post-war success depended upon market activity. To make good the years of poor 
income during the war, and to accommodate the many partners and staff returning from 
active service, members required a rapid return to pre-war levels of activity to generate the 
commissions on which they relied. Although technically it was possible to augment 
commission income by own account trading, in the spring of 1919 this was expensive because  
trading had to be settled in cash: the wartime restrictions on trading remained in force.  
Nonetheless, people returned to the Exchange expecting that good times would return. Capital 
restrictions during the war had increased interest in shares issued beyond the reach of the 
Exchange which appeared to suggest that there would be a surge in activity. Meeting this 
demand was not expected to be easy as the years of low activity during the war had depleted 
capital through death and dissipated skills.302 
Although activity improved in 1919, measured either by market turnover or numbers of new 
issues, the heightened level was not to be long sustained. Statistics for market turnover were 
not maintained at the time so that precise measurements of activity levels are not available; 
but in 1961 Paukert published estimates of  the value of transactions in non-governmental 
securities on the basis of returns of Stamp Duty on share transfers: 
 
                                                 
301  Marwick (2006); pages 342–343. Bowley & Stamp (1924); pages 57–59. 
302  Michie (1999); page 171. 
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Chart 4.1: Estimated value of dutiable Stock Exchange transactions 1911–1930303 
                 
When the incidence of inflation is taken into account, Paukert’s data emphasise that, after the 
boom that occurred immediately after the end of hostilities, activity fell back and must have 
been particularly disappointing.  
‘The froth was off the pint, and what lay underneath was worse than anything 
purveyed under liquor control. Old markets had gone, others had shrunk; the world 
had too many ships, preferred oil to coal, was trying to operate the delicate 
nineteenth-century supply and demand mechanism when the conditions in which that 
had worked not too badly had been irreparably shattered. Unemployment, which 
averaged 3.1 per cent in the latter half of 1920 rose to 13.5 per cent in 1921 and 13.8 
per cent in 1922. The Government reacted in the worst possible way: “reconstruction, 
when not put in the dustbin, was put on the shelf”.’304 
A similar pattern is shown by the data for new issues: 
                                                 
303  Paukert (1961); page 304. Paukert extracted the source data from the annual reports of the 
Commissioners for Inland Revenue. Sales of government securities did not attract Stamp Duty so are not 
included in the estimates. Paukert compiled a second series based on information from bank clearings 
on account settlement days (for the period when account settlement was permitted). He concluded that 
the two series were broadly comparable in spite of a number of differences in their coverage (e.g. the 
stamp duty data included provincial exchanges as well as the London Exchange). 
304  Marwick (2006); page 323; quoting Tawney (1943); page 8. 
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Chart 4.2: New capital issues of the United Kingdom 1920–1930 305 
             
 
In 1921, after the end of the post-war boom, new issues of home stocks fell sharply and 
although they reached a new peak in 1928, did not match again the activity which immediately 
followed the end of the war. To some extent, the decline in activity was offset by a gradual 
increase in Empire and Foreign issues. However, sponsorship of new Empire and Foreign issues 
tended to be concentrated among a small group of broking firms so that it would not have 
offset the effect on many members’ incomes of the decline in Home issues. 
Some firms were modestly successful in financial terms. Foster & Braithwaite’s profit, for 
example, ranged between about £70,000 and £160,000 in these years.306 In 1919–1920 James 
Capel & Company’s five partners were able to divide profits of £89,000.307 Cazenove’s profits, 
whilst variable, were also substantial: 
‘Taking the business as a whole, it was steadily rather than vastly profitable during 
the first post-war decade. In only two years (1919 and 1921) did the net profit fall 
below £50,000, while only in another two (1927 and 1928) did it rise above £150,000. 
In the best year, 1927, the profit of £171,710 would have been less than that earned 
by several other firms; though at a time when an eight-bedroom house in Belgravia 
cost less than £5,000 . . . it was a tidy enough sum to be divided among eight 
partners.’308 
                                                 
305  Midland Bank figures. Reproduced in Grant (1937); page 135. 
306  The firm had almost failed before the war and was in consequence cautious in trading. Reader 
(1979); pages 132, 134, 179. 
307  Reed (1975); page 74. 
308  Kynaston (1991); page 117. 
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However, Philips & Drew, with five or six partners at the time, might only achieve an annual 
profit of £10,000.309   
These few indications of the profitability achieved by some more prominent firms were 
flattered, especially in later years, by contributions from income other than basic commissions. 
Cazenove, for example, developed as a sponsor of new issues, either alone or in association 
with an issuing house.310 The firm’s first steps in this direction resulted from a client, Balfour 
Beatty, fostering the creation of Power Securities Limited to finance electricity supply 
companies, presumably to ensure that there was demand for its own construction business. 
Foster & Braithwaite acted for Hatry’s local authority loan issuing business.311 However, many 
Members would have enjoyed smaller incomes. Aggregate information drawn from Income 
Tax returns suggests that in 1927 the overall income reported by stockbrokers and jobbers was 
no greater in real terms than the income that had been reported by the same group in 1909;312 
and perhaps provides an explanation for the slow decline in the 1920s in the number of 
members acting as principals of firms. 
These years also saw a number of mergers between firms. Michie, for example, draws 
attention to the merger of Mullens with Steer, Lawford & Company in 1921; and Cazenove 
with JE Tomkinson, Brunton & Company in 1919.313 Whilst each merger may have been 
justified publicly in terms of the new business that the merged business could handle, mergers 
would have had the additional attraction of increasing profit by squeezing fixed costs to 
support greater activity.  
The evident commercial pressure on members led to campaigning by the Exchange for an end 
to the constraints imposed by the wartime government. Whilst there had been an early 
release from the wartime controls on new issues, this had been at the expense of the 
Exchange’s desire to restrict the freedom of outside brokers and had been followed by a long 
                                                 
309  Reader and Kynaston (1998); page 11. 
310  Cazenove encouraged this by supporting Balfour Beatty in the creation of Power Securities 
Limited, and then sponsored Power Securities’ issues for power companies. Kynaston (1991); page 111. 
311  Established in 1925. 
312  Worswick et al (1967); page 101. The study reported True Gross Income (i.e. income reported 
in accordance with Income Tax rules but adjusted to remove permitted tax deductions) of £9,450,000 in 
1909 and £15,540,000 in 1927. In the same period, the total income of professions in general had risen 
from £30,750,000 to £74,650,000. These totals included all who described themselves as stockbrokers 
and jobbers: not just London Exchange members. 
313  Michie (1999); page 226. Kynaston (1991); page 94. 
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delay in formally declaring an end to the war, with the prospect of returning to account 
settlement, and the re-commencing of options trading and arbitrage.314 Although this meant 
that members could not augment their commission-based income by own account trading,315 
members were not unanimous in wanting a rapid return to trading for the account. Those who 
could recall events at the beginning of the 1914–1918 war understood the risk associated with 
holding open positions and argued either for the maintenance of cash trading or compulsory 
margins between the value of securities purchased and the amount financed on credit. This 
was an early indication that members’ risk appetite was changing. Broadly, before 1914, the 
Exchange had not been risk averse: its success had depended upon members’ extreme 
competitiveness. In 1919 this had not disappeared, but there were signs that it was waning. 
1919 still provided graphic examples of speculative activity316 that would have contributed to 
the government’s nervousness about the risks of liberating Exchange trading too quickly. 
Commercial pressure undoubtedly also led to repeated challenges by members to the 
Exchange’s rules and constitution. Although the committee sought consistently to safeguard 
the interests of members, in seeking a strategy it was hampered by differences between 
groups of members.317 Jobbers did not necessarily share the interests of brokers. Larger firms  
which tended to concentrate on larger and institutional investors (such as Foster & 
Braithwaite318) did not necessarily share the interests of smaller brokers dealing mainly with 
smaller private investors. In balancing members’ interests, the committee was not assisted by 
the balance of voting power which tended to favour smaller broking units compared with 
larger firms and brokers rather than jobbers. 
                                                 
314  Michie (1999); page 187. 
315  Whyte (1924); pages 64, 78, 82. 
316  For example, in 1919, the Beecham Trust, managed by James White, brought together a 
syndicate (of which Clarence Hatry was a member) to create a corner in the shares of Mexican Eagle. 
The activities of the syndicate led to wide fluctuations in the market price of the shares. The plan 
appears to have been to obtain a controlling interest in the shares, create a shortage on the market and 
then to sell at a substantial profit (a plan that White was to use again in 1927 in dealings in shares in 
British Controlled Oilfields Limited).  Sunday Express; February 1930. The Times; 13 October 1927; page 
5. 
317  This was evident in the debates about restoration of account settlement. Although the 
Government indicated in 1921 that it would no longer oppose restoration of the account, some 
members opposed restoration on the ground that it helpfully limited the risk of trading on credit. 
318  Michie (1999); page 223. 
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The first constitutional challenge from members came in April 1919 when  a number of firms319 
proposed that the members should buy out the proprietors. In proposing this change, the 
supporting firms argued that: 
‘Under the present arrangement, the greater the exertions of the members to get 
more business, the higher became the entrance fees and subscriptions, and the bigger 
is the dividend paid to the proprietors.’320 
Underlying this proposal was the Exchange’s own financial problem. During the war its income 
had fallen because members on active service had not been required to pay subscriptions and 
because membership had not been sustained. The average subscription income of the 
Exchange for the years 1909–1918 (including the war years) had been about £194,000; but the 
concessions granted in view of war service had amounted to £55,394 in 1916, £658,163 in 
1917 and £78,331 in 1918.321 Other sources of income such as rents had also fallen. Yet at the 
same time costs had risen, not least because of rises in staff costs. Although the Exchange had 
sold property in 1918 to meet a part of the deficit, that did not meet the continuing problem 
whose solution required either an increase in subscriptions or an increase in the number of 
members (or perhaps both). Neither of these would have been welcome to members troubled 
by restoring their own profitability. 
The proposal to mutualise the Exchange came to nothing. Buying out the proprietors would 
have involved paying a capital sum for the income stream they were being invited to forego.322 
Since the proprietors would expect that the capital sum would equal the present value of the 
expected income stream, the transaction would not have reduced costs to members unless, as 
a result of gaining control, they could have achieved material reductions in their contributions 
to the Exchange’s running costs. Members obviously were not persuaded that the uncertain 
potential cost reductions merited incurring the immediate cost.323 Although this attempt to 
                                                 
319  Including Rowe & Pitman, W Greenwell & Company and de Zoete & Gorton. Michie (1999); 
page 197. 
320  Stock Exchange Committee minutes; 7 April 1919. Stock Exchange Archive Guildhall Library. 
321  Sir Willam Plender’s report; 2 February 1919. Stock Exchange minutes; April 1919; Stock 
Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
322  Estimated at £3.6 million in November 1919 by Sir William Plender. Stock Exchange minutes; 
Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
323  To meet such a payment, each member would have been called upon to contribute £900 or to 
support the servicing cost of a large loan. A subsequent compromise proposal for ownership of the 
Exchange by a new company, which would be owned equally by the members and the proprietors was 
rejected by the proprietors in May 1921. 
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minimise the cost of membership through restructuring the Exchange came to nothing, the 
committee and the proprietors were forcefully made aware of the commercial sensitivities of 
the membership and their expectation that new admissions would be carefully controlled. 
Subsequent campaigns over the rules reflected these same sensitivities and the divergences 
between the interests of different groups of members. Debates over the permitted maximum 
number of partners in a firm, the maximum number of clerks permitted, the creation of branch 
offices, the control of commission rates and the sharing of commissions all tended to lead to 
conclusions in favour of smaller firms that held a majority of voting power and thought 
themselves at risk from the commercial ambitions of larger, better-capitalised, more profitable 
firms.  
In 1923, the nine largest firms of brokers tried to persuade the committee to liberalise the 
rules on commissions,324 reflecting the views of institutional clients: 
’In the ordinary course of everyday business, I meet businessmen of high position in 
the City of London, both bankers, merchants and others who are accustomed to 
dealing on the Stock Exchange, and I find them of the opinion that, if the Stock 
Exchange is to remain the chief centre of dealings in securities, there will have to be a 
radical alteration in the existing rules and scales of commissions . . .  It is pretty 
obvious that with lower minimum commissions and in certain cases a greater 
freedom permitted to brokers to charge their clients what they think right and deal 
where they might, a much greater volume of business will come to the Stock 
Exchange, and after all that is the result which must benefit the House in general.’325 
The attempt at reform failed although later some relaxation was agreed.  
Similarly, debates over double capacity and direct access were settled in favour of broking 
members who held more voting power than jobbers and felt at risk of being bypassed if 
country brokers were enabled to approach London jobbers directly.  
As the smaller members predominated, the outcome generally favoured retention of the 
status quo, although at times the effect was perverse. Rather than ensuring that outsiders did 
not bypass London brokers, the ban on direct access tended rather to encourage provincial 
                                                 
324  A letter to the committee was signed by Mullens & Marshall, Cazenove & Akroyds, Cohen 
Laming Hoare, Grieveson Grant & Company, Heseltine Powell & Company, R Nivison & Company, Rowe 
& Pitman, J&A Scrimgeour & Company and J Sebag & Company. Kynaston (1991); page 110. 
325  The views of CP Serocold, a partner in Cazenove. Stock Exchange minutes; Commissions; 14 
December 1922. Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
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and overseas brokers to bypass the Exchange completely. Overseas brokers and banks began 
to set up their own branch offices in London,326 and provincial brokers developed trading links 
between provincial exchanges rather than directing their business to London. Although the 
individual provincial exchanges could not support market makers, collectively they could. In 
contrast to the London Stock Exchange, the rules of the provincial exchanges did not prohibit 
jobbers from dealing with non-members so that they were able to offer a dealing service to 
members of all provincial exchanges. The most prominent of the provincial jobbers to do this 
was JW Nicholson & Son, based in Sheffield.327 These were strategic failures by the Exchange 
which resulted from the narrow-sightedness of the voting majorities: an underlying weakness 
of all self-regulating organisations. 
All of this activity within the committee rooms of Throgmorton Street was paralleled by 
members’ sustained efforts to maximise income and reduce costs. On occasion, these efforts 
were pursued almost irrespective of the risks involved, as was for example the case with the 
gradual degradation of underwriting contracts. 
After changes in companies law allowed companies to pay commissions for underwriting 
newly issued shares,328 underwriting of new issues had by 1920 become commonplace. Typical 
underwriting contracts envisaged that the principal underwriters guaranteed an issue: their 
commission only being paid if all sums due under the issue had previously been paid. If there 
were defaults, the principal underwriter was called upon to make them good. At some point, 
probably in 1920, the normal terms of such agreements changed so that the principal 
underwriter’s commission became payable even if there were defaults. Subsequently, practice 
changed again so that contractually the principal underwriter was relieved of responsibility on 
appointment of sub-underwriters. As a result, principal underwriters could no longer be held 
accountable for the creditworthiness of the sub-underwriters they had appointed. In each 
instance, a contractual change reduced the principal underwriter’s exposure. This presumably 
                                                 
326  Firms such as de Saint Phalle Limited and Harvey Fisk & Sons were branches of US brokerage 
houses. National City Bank, Bankers Trust, Guaranty Trust, Equitable Trust and Higginson & Company 
were all established in London by 1921. Michie (1999); page 218, 243. 
327  Thomas (1973); page 218, 221, 237. 
328  Companies Act 1900; section 8. Before that date, payment of underwriting commission was 
held to be illegitimate, on the ground that it was tantamount to the issue of shares at a discount: Mr 
Justice Kay’s judgment in Faure Electric Accumulator Company Limited (1886) 40 ChD 141.  
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was reflected in the rate of commission payable to the principal underwriter and thus reduced 
the cost of the transaction. It also had the effect of increasing the risk to investors.329 
Members tended to react fiercely to any innovation that threatened to bypass them. In 1925, 
jobbers threatened to boycott loan stock that had been issued by Plymouth Corporation but 
not offered for public subscription. On that occasion, the difficulty was: 
‘. . . smoothed over at a second meeting of the jobbers in the Consol, Corporation and 
Colonial markets . . . when they agreed, as regards any further issue, to deal only in 
stocks that have previously been issued for public subscription. It is known that 
several other British Corporations have been approached by various people of late, 
who have offered to take lines of stock at prices that appeal to the City Fathers of the 
Corporations concerned, such stock to be marketed outside the regular roads that 
lead directly into the Consol market.’330 
However fierce the immediate reaction undoubtedly was, the outcome was that the new 
approach was allowed to develop, even though it is likely to have been frowned upon by the 
Bank of England.331 Although initially suspicious, members would not stand in the way of new 
business, provided that it did not bypass them. 
In short, at the beginning of 1929, the Stock Exchange was nervous rather than content. The 
membership was beginning to become more polarised. New issues during 1928 show how far 
the process had gone. Almost 25% of the total subscribed in 1928 arose from new issues 
sponsored by just five firms:  
                                                 
329  Finnie (1931); page 131 et seq. In practice, one consequence was that the creditworthiness of 
sub-underwriters declined as was to be realised in the aftermath of the 1928 boom. ‘The Menace of 
Weak Underwriting: Cost of Carelessness’; Financial Times; 21 June 1929; page 6. 
330  The Economist; 7 February 1925; page 251. The Times; 22 January 1925; page 19. The stock in 
question was an issue of £500,000 4¾% Redeemable Stock (1943–1955) for Plymouth Corporation. It 
was the first issue by Clarence Hatry’s company, Corporation & General Securities Limited (C&GS). Using 
his experience in launching commercial issues, Hatry had bought the whole of the stock which had 
enabled him to undercut the rates offered to Plymouth by brokers competing to sponsor the issue but 
bypassed the market. The jobbers were assuaged by assurances given on Hatry’s behalf by his brokers, 
Foster & Braithwaite, and C&GS was able to develop its business. Letter dated 16 June 1926 from Cecil 
Braithwaite to Clarence Hatry; Foster & Braithwaite Archive; Guildhall Library.  
331  Previously, the issue of local authority loan stocks had been the preserve of three firms of 
brokers: R Nivison & Company, J & A Scrimgeour & Company and Mullens Marshall & Company who 
maintained a queuing system for colonial and local authority stocks which was generally approved by 
the Bank of England. Attard (2004); pages 200–201. In practice, local authorities had little choice but to 
accept the rates and prices quoted to them by these brokers.  
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Table 4.1:  New issues in 1928: top five lead brokers ranked by total amount subscribed.332 
  Number of 
issues 
 Total amount subscribed  Average size of 
issue £ £ %age of total 
Cazenove 6 8,417,000 7.2 1.402,833 
Rowe & Pitman 5 5,719,270 4.9 1,143,854 
J&A Scrimgeour 5 5,472,500 4.7 1,094,500 
Evans Gordon 3 4,852,500 4.2 1,614,000 
R Nivison 1 3,900,000 3.3 3,900,000 
Sub-total 20 28,361,270 24.3 1,418,064 
Others 268 88,442,437 75.7 330,009 
Total 288 116,803,707 100.0 405,568 
 
Of the 20 issues sponsored by these five firms, in eight cases no issuing house was named in 
the Issuing Houses Yearbook, suggesting that the lead brokers concerned had  acted directly 
for the company concerned.333 Overall, these figures understate the significance of these firms 
since they exclude bonds, and thus exclude the overseas and home government issues that 
were to a large extent managed by only four firms: J&A Scrimgeour, R Nivison, Mullens 
Marshall and Foster & Braithwaite. If lead brokers are ranked by reference to the number of 
issues managed, a different group of firms emerges: 
Table 4.2: New issues in 1928: top five lead brokers ranked by number of issues334 
  Number of  
issues 
Total amount subscribed Average size of 
issue £ £ %age of total 
T Gordon Hensler 18 3,392,775 6.3 188,488 
John Gibbs Son & Smith 15 2,507,050 5.2 167,137 
Charles Stanley & Company 16 2,205,500 5.6 137,844 
Wood Dunkley 7 2,075,666 2.4 296,524 
Tritton Labouchere 10 1,974,250 3.5 197,425 
Sub-total 66 12,155,241 23.0 184,170 
Others 222 104,648,466 77.0 471,389 
Total 288 116,803,707 100.0 405,568 
 
                                                 
332  List of new issues taken from Anon (1931). Lead brokers taken from Issuing Houses Yearbook 
(1929).  Harris (1933) reports that the list set out in Anon (1931) included a small number of errors. 
However, it did not report these errors in detail or reproduce an amended list: hence the original list has 
been used. The 1929 yearbook attributed issues to issuing houses and brokers on the basis of 
information supplied to the publishers by issuing houses. 
333  Five of the eight cases in which no issuing house was involved were sponsored by Rowe & 
Pitman. 
334  Sources as for Table 4.1. 
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The process of polarisation between brokers was merely one reflection of other changes taking 
place in the investment market, in particular the development of large companies and the 
development of investment intermediaries. 
Large companies and institutional investors 
One  outcome of the new issue and merger booms was a substantial increase in the number of 
domestic manufacturing and commercial companies quoted on the Exchange and in their total 
values. In 1907, there had been only 569 businesses in domestic manufacturing and 
distribution quoted on the Exchange: by 1924, there were 714.335 Hannah suggests that 
quotation permitted the development of major businesses that would have been beyond the 
resources of most individual owners: 
‘Without the facilities of the stock market for aggregating wealth . . . such companies 
would not have been formed. In 1919 there was only one such “giant” firm, the J&P 
Coats sewing cotton combine, in which the family owners had been pioneers in 
diluting their ownership by a flotation of their capital three decades previously. By 
1930, however, a further six companies – Unilever, Imperial Tobacco, Imperial 
Chemical Industries, Distillers, Courtaulds and Guinness – had attained this “giant” 
size and the number of such companies continued to increase thereafter.’336 
These ‘giant’ companies were owned by very large numbers of shareholders: 
‘Thus seven very large firms in 1926 (Imperial Tobacco, Courtaulds, Anglo-Persian Oil, 
Brunner-Mond, Vickers, Dunlop Rubber and Cunard Steamship) with paid-up capital 
of £119.6 million, had 385,500 shareholders, and 85 per cent of the holdings were 
£500 or less.’337 
In parallel,  there was a growth in institutional investment in domestic industrial equity shares. 
Traditionally, major institutional investors such as life assurance companies had regarded the 
stability of capital values as more important than the potential for growth: ordinary shares 
were thought to carry an undue risk of capital loss. This orthodoxy had been challenged by 
increases in interest rates in the decade before the 1914–1918 war which had led to insurance 
companies suffering from substantial losses on longer-dated fixed interest stocks. During and 
immediately after the war, experience had worsened as insurance companies had 
                                                 
335  Hart and Prais (1956); page 156. 
336  Hannah (1976); page 70. 
337  Foreman-Peck (1984); page 396. Data published by The Economist suggested that the number 
of shareholders in these seven companies was about 265,000. The Economist; 30 March 1929; page 691. 
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accumulated large amounts of undated government stocks whose value had been undermined 
by inflation.338  
As investment performance was being hit by such losses, there was a new demand for ‘with 
profits’ policies from people whose interest in investment had been kindled by the war but 
who were unenthusiastic about investing directly. Insurance companies were in competition 
with each other to attract this new business and thus became more keenly interested in 
maximising their investment performance.339 A 1924 study of American experience suggested 
that between 1866 and 1922 equities had out-performed bonds in terms of both capital and 
income.340 In 1927, responding to a suggestion by Keynes that a similar study should be 
performed in the UK, Raynes found that experience in the UK had been similar to the US 
experience: ordinary shares out-performing fixed interest securities in both capital and income 
terms.341  
Chart 4.3: Income yields on ordinary shares and debentures 1912–1926 as presented by HE 
Raynes in 1928342 
              
                                                 
338  The Economist; 21 May 1921; page 1016. Scott (2002); pages 79–80. 
339  Johnson et al (1957). The extent of competition and the change in practice reportedly led to an 
increase in the net interest earned on the Prudential’s investment fund from £3.14.8 in 1912 to £5.7.7 in 
1928. At the same time, the Prudential’s expense ratio fell from 38.5% in 1912 to 24.9% in 1928. The 
Economist; 23 March 1929; page 619. 
340  Smith (1924). 
341  Raynes (1928). Raynes was an actuary working for Legal & General, which was a major supplier 
of life assurance and of insurance-based pension schemes. 
342  Comparison of return to investor of £54,000 on 31 March 1912, in ordinary stocks or shares, 
with that of a similar sum invested in the corresponding debenture and preference share issues. Raynes 
(1928); page 24. 
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As for the capital value, Raynes calculated that by 31 March 1927 the capital value of a sample  
of debentures and preference shares would have fallen from £54,000 in 1912 to £42,588, 
whereas the ordinary shares would have risen in value from £54,000 to £80,073.343 Although 
Raynes’ study covered a relatively short period, which admittedly was affected by the 1914–
1918 war, the result was consistent with the outcome of the earlier American study and, 
rather than being an unforeseen revelation, had confirmed what many insurance companies 
had sensed for themselves for they had already changed their investment policy. 
The evidence of better returns and the pressure of competition had led insurance companies 
to become significant investors in equities, either directly or through holdings in the many 
investment trusts launched in the 1920s.344 The trend was reinforced by the insurance 
companies’ experience of the post-war boom: 
‘The City view was that the institutions had helped the government in its moment of 
need and were getting caned for it in the aftermath.’345 
During the war, the insurance companies reserved a large proportion of their investment funds 
for the government by buying gilts, but in 1919 and 1920 the market for gilts was falling and 
the value of their holdings was depreciating yet they were expected to pay substantial 
amounts in taxation. In 1920, Sir Gerald Ryan, the Chairman of  Phoenix Assurance, reported a 
gross profit of £636,637, but from that sum had to provide £170,077 for depreciation in the 
value of investments and pay £438,260 in taxation: 
‘The twentieth century conversion of the offices from insurance companies to 
investment houses had not a little to do with the tax regimes of these years.’346 
When viewed cumulatively and when account was taken of the effect of inflation, the 
difference was striking: 
                                                 
343  Raynes (1928); page 27. 
344  82 investment trusts were established between 1925 and 1929. Cassis (1990); page 142. 
Trebilcock (1998); page 501. 
345  Trebilcock (1998); page 494. 
346  Trebilcock  (1998); pages 493–4. 
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Chart 4.4: Equities and bonds: indices of real values 1914–1929347 
               
Growing interest in investment in equities on the part of insurance offices did not imply that 
they shared the risk appetite demonstrated by the pre-war market: they were interested in 
long-term sustainable returns but subject to a controlled degree of risk, as the case of Phoenix 
Assurance demonstrates: 
‘But the striking defensive move, which clearly paid off for the Phoenix, was the 
increased commitment to debenture and fixed interest stock . . . By contrast, ordinary 
shares, in which the markets suffered the most harrowing fortunes, were lightly 
represented in the Phoenix balance sheets.’348 
                                                 
347  Dimson et al (2014); page 186.  1900=100. 
348  Trebilcock (1998); pages 499–501. 
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Chart 4.5:  Percentage of total net investment by insurance companies in corporate 
securities 1923–1930349 
     
Chart 4.6: Net investment by insurance companies in different types of corporate security 
1923–1930350 
                       
Gradually, institutional investors were to concentrate their business on a small number of 
brokers. Initially, there may have been an attempt to deal with a number of brokers but this 
did not last: 
                                                 
349  Scott (2002); page 85. Based on the Board of Trade’s annual reports on life and other long-term 
insurance business. 
350  Scott (2002); page 86. 
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‘In April 1926 the board approved a list of 55 stockbrokers, including some of the best 
known London firms such as Laing & Cruickshank, Messel & Co, Kitcat & Aitken and 
Helbert Wagg & Co. Very quickly the investment department . . . was producing 
impressive digests of stockbrokers’ advice and detailed statistics. Armed with this 
information the investment committee moved away from investment trusts and 
began cautiously buying shares on its own account . . .’351 
Although the process took time, Standard Life gradually reduced the number of brokers with 
which it dealt so that, by 1950, Cazenove were handling about one-quarter of the company’s 
transactions.352 
The result of these changes in investment practice was that institutional investors, insurance 
companies and others became more important to brokers. To some extent, these 
developments counteracted the tendency of some businesses to bypass London for the 
Exchange was the only market place where shares in such large businesses and large  
transactions could be traded. They also encouraged the polarisation of the membership, for 
institutional investors tended to gravitate towards the brokers who specialised in corporate 
business, relying on them not only for trading support but in other ways: 
‘ . . . during the late 1920s Standard [Life] was consulted regarding a number of 
rationalization schemes involving firms in which it was a major shareholder. Despite 
any concerns regarding their share price impacts, it rejected the opportunity of 
replying directly in favour of relying on its brokers to make its views known.’353 
As the two groups of members began to grow away from each other, so it became more 
difficult for each to understand the other’s business and the implications for management of 
the Exchange. Moreover, since only a relatively small number of brokers specialised in 
corporate business, their voting power in Exchange meetings tended to be smaller.  It thus 
became more difficult for the committee to balance the interests of members. 
Born of a pent-up demand for financial restructuring created by the wartime restrictions and a 
general optimism that the end of hostilities signalled a return to pre-war business as usual, the 
1919–1920 boom was an aberration.  
The pre-war market had been characterised by extreme competition that required investors to 
be tolerant of risk. In 1919, investment in equities attracted many, both individuals and 
                                                 
351  Moss (2000); page 194. 
352  Moss (2000); page 195. 
353  Scott (2002); page 94. Moss (2000); pages 194–195. 
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institutions, who did not share the risk appetite of pre-war investors. Squeezed by poor 
returns from alternative investments and high rates of tax on unearned income,354 many 
people were attracted to investment for the first time. For many, their potential holdings 
would be small and their sensitivity to loss would be high. 
Similar pressures of poor alternative returns and high taxes affected institutional investors 
such as insurance and pension funds. They tended to be more interested in longer-term 
sustainable returns, partly because they saw themselves as quasi-trustees of policy-holders’ 
funds but also because they were conscious of competition between funds.  
Both of these groups of investors contributed a growing sense of caution. 
Vendors  
This matched the character of vendors. By the end of the war, it was evident that many 
businesses would require fresh investment. There was a demand for investment not only in 
infrastructure but also in new, larger companies to take advantage of economies of scale. It 
was also evident that some industries required reorganisation to take advantage of the 
improved manufacturing methods that had been proved to be effective during the war and 
that had been or were being adopted elsewhere in the world. Whilst there were many 
opportunities for profitable investment, taking advantage of them would require a longer-term 
perspective.  
Conclusions 
Thus the character of the market was changing. There were greater numbers of investors with 
relatively small holdings of shares seeking higher returns than could be achieved by holding 
government stocks but who were vulnerable to the risk of loss. They were matched by vendors 
who increasingly looked to issuing shares as a way of financing the longer-term capital 
investment that their businesses needed to make. For them, stable, sustainable relationships 
were preferable to volatility. 
Ironically, this was happening at a time of deep uncertainty. Businesses that had devoted all of 
their wartime production to the war effort found that they had to win back their old customers 
and markets. The inefficiencies of old established industries had been exposed during the war 
                                                 
354  Samuel (1919). 
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and were being exposed by competition with new overseas suppliers whose development had 
been encouraged by war. There was no certainty about the future performance of the 
businesses in these industries. Newer industries, such as automotive manufacturers, had been 
encouraged by the war and looked to have good prospects but there was no certainty about 
their ability to take advantage of their opportunities. These factors fed an uncertainty about 
the future income streams to be expected from investments in these industries although their 
prospects were assumed to be good. This uncertainty would have extended to the commercial 
value of businesses and assets, and a need on the part of investors for advice. 
This trend had potentially profound implications for the Exchange.  
Gradually it led to a polarisation of members between those who acted for largely corporate, 
institutional investors, and those who tended to act more traditionally for personal investors. 
They were exposed to the differing requirements of the clients they served, and their 
experiences can be seen in the many arguments about rule changes that took place in the 
1920s. Members acting for corporate clients were behind attempts to change the structure of 
commission rates, for example. For so long as the smaller, more personal businesses 
predominated, arguments were decided in their favour, frustrating the larger firms and the 
direction in which the market was headed. 
Equally, insistence by smaller firms on preservation of rules that discouraged the development 
of larger, better capitalised firms that could better serve the retail investor market frustrated 
members who wanted to take advantage of this opportunity and ensured that the business 
went elsewhere.355 
Traditionally, the Exchange had tended to permit dealing in almost all securities for which 
applications were made. The committee sought to ensure that applicants had complied with 
the requirements of company law but little more. As a result, it was possible for issues that 
were almost meritless to be admitted to the floor of the Exchange and for collapses to occur 
periodically. 
From the Exchange’s point of view, this approach was reasonable. It existed to provide a place 
where shares could be traded at the risk of the principals to each trade. Members’ income 
                                                 
355  One consequence was that there was to be no equivalent in London to the development of 
Merrill Lynch & Company in New York. Perkins (2003); pages 178–199. 
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depended upon the volume of trade. Even trading in comparatively meritless stocks produced 
commission income for members. It was for members’ principals to manage their own risks. 
However, the post-war changes in the character of the market heightened the risk for the 
Exchange of this approach, for it assumed that members’ principals were able to manage their 
own risks. Many new shareholders with relatively small holdings were likely to have little 
knowledge on which to base their investment decisions, nor access to brokers who could 
advise. Yet it was these shareholders who were also likely to be particularly vulnerable to 
losses. 
Potential small investors were thus left to find support and advice outside the market. In the 
case of the more prudent, this led them towards the life insurance companies and investment 
trusts, which tended to increase the weight of institutional investment and further pressure on 
the incomes of smaller members. In the case of the less prudent, this led them towards less 
scrupulous outside traders who would trade in meritless securities.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: 1919–1929 – POST-WAR NEW ISSUES 
 
 
Introduction 
 The circumstances that changed the character of demand for and supply of securities, and led 
to changes within the Stock Exchange also challenged the pre-1914 approach to the launch of 
new issues. The traditional approach aimed to realise short-term profits at the time of 
flotation and was thus not in many cases a means of raising money for a business’s 
development but a means to transfer ownership of a business. In an increasingly risk-averse 
market place this approach inevitably came to be questioned. 
The promoters 
The principal agents in this process, popularly known as company promoters, were diverse, 
offering a wide spectrum of services and varying in their attitude to risk. Some promoters 
concentrated on more substantial businesses, conservatively valued, whilst others, such as 
Clarence Hatry, specialised in finding creative means by which more optimistic valuations 
could be achieved for more problematic flotations. Finally, there were other promoters who 
used abusive selling techniques to sell worthless securities to unsuspecting investors.  
Many of those involved in company promotion immediately after November 1918 had been 
involved before the war. Some, like Frederick Szarvasy and Sperling & Company, had continued 
their activities during the war whilst others had returned from active service.  
Frederick Szarvarsy, the son of Alexander Szarvasy, a Hungarian banker, had come to England 
in 1901 and worked for the stockbrokers Montagu Oppenheimer (later Montagu Stanley). At 
some point before 1914, and with the support of Lord Charles Montagu, he acquired Cornhill 
Contract Corporation,356 which had some experience of managing new issues.357 On this base, 
                                                 
356  This company, which was owned by William Bennett, seems to have been similar to City of 
London Contract Corporation Limited which was established by H Osborne O’Hagan. He recalled that ‘. . 
. the words ‘Contract Corporation’ were taken as a part of the title of nearly every other company which 
was formed by company promoters to carry on finance business.’ O’Hagan (1929); Volume II; page 454 
et seq. 
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he developed a business as an issuing house under the name British Foreign and Colonial 
Corporation Limited. During the war, although naturalised, his offer to serve as an interpreter 
in France was rejected by the War Office; but he was excused from internment and had 
concentrated on acquiring and managing interests in shipping in Wales.358 In 1919, his 
company sponsored eight new issues.359 
The directors of Sperling & Company had resigned as members of the Exchange at the 
beginning of the war, presumably having decided that their company promotion business 
would fall foul of the Exchange’s wartime Temporary Regulations. With the assistance of 
Clarence Hatry,360 they had marketed new issues outside the Exchange throughout the war and 
in 1919 sponsored a series of issues that were listed on the Exchange.361 
On their returning from active service early in 1919, Oliver Clare, and the other principals of 
Clare & Company,362 were welcomed back.363  
Another promoter, James White, had operated in London throughout the war. Just before the 
onset of war in 1914, he had orchestrated the purchase of the Covent Garden estate from the 
                                                                                                                                               
357  For example, the flotation of Chesterfield Tube Company Limited in 1906. 
358  Szarvasy’s interest in shipping in Wales was investigated by MI5 after suspicions were aroused 
by the sinking of six ships through enemy action. The investigation concluded that the allegations had 
been made by local interests which had been antagonised by the views of Szarvasy’s representative on 
the board of the company, his manager A Emil Davies. Szarvasy withdrew Davies from his position in 
Wales. National Archives; file HO144/1723/256186. Davies later wrote pamphlets on new issues and 
prospectuses for the Fabian Society and promoted investment trusts which designed to appeal to small 
savers and aimed to maximize returns by supporting Clarence Hatry’s flotations. 
359  S Smith & Sons (Motor Accessories) Limited; The Times; 21 March 1919; page 20. Crossley 
Motors Limited; The Times; 5 April 1919; page 20. Manganese Bronze & Brass Limited; The Times; 28 
April 1919; page 19. Greenwich Inlaid Linoleum Company Limited; The Times; 12 May 1919; page 21. 
Frost Brothers Limited; The Times; 12 May 1919; page 21. Johnson & Phillips Limited; The Times; 22 May 
1919; page 23. Forster’s Glass Company Limited; The Times; 12 August 1919; page 16. Edison Swan 
Electric; The Times; 6 November 1919; page 19. 
360  Hatry is presumed to have been excused from active service on the grounds of his indifferent 
health. His health broke down in 1910 and 1920, leading to prolonged absences from London, and 
caused concern during his imprisonment. 
361  Hatry sponsored six new issues in 1919 including Amalgamated Industrials Limited; The Times; 
4 June 1919. British Window Glass Limited; The Times; 25 July 1919. CA Vandervell Limited; The Times; 
29 July 1919. Leyland Motors Limited; The Times; 13 October 1919. Agricultural Industries Limited; The 
Times; 3 November 1919.  
362  Joseph John Jarvis; advised by Harry Clifford-Turner of Clifford-Turner & Hopton, solicitors. In 
the 1930s, he was to lead attempts to create employment opportunities in Jarrow, following the closure 
of Palmers Shipbuilding. 
363  Clare & Company sponsored nine new issues in 1919, including Straker-Squire Limited; The 
Times; 3 June 1919. Borax Consolidated Limited; The Times; 29 July 1919. Western Counties Shipping 
Company Limited; The Times; 17 December 1919. 
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Duke of Bedford by a syndicate of investors including Sir Thomas Beecham’s father.364 Flotation 
of a company to hold the estate was frustrated by the declaration of war and the closure of 
the Exchange, which left White and the investors seeking ways to extricate themselves. In 
1917, he created the Beecham Trust in part as a vehicle for further company promotions and 
market operations such as an attempt to create a corner in Shell-Mex shares during 1919.365 
There were many others, including Arthur Wheeler, the Leicester-based broker, who had spent 
the war marketing War Loan;366 Ernest Terah Hooley, an undischarged bankrupt who had been 
involved in some spectacular promotions before the war;367 and BST Limited, which had been 
incorporated in 1915 by a group of provincial brokers to secure new issues business in 
London.368 
Capital issues after the war 
The coming of peace presented promoters with a commercial opportunity for the control of 
capital issues during the war had created a pent-up demand from businesses which had not 
been able to raise capital. Planning had started well before the armistice in November 1918. 
In August 1918, Leyland Motors (1914) Limited moved its registered office from Leyland to 
Clarence Hatry’s office address in London and, in September 1918, Hatry and his associate, 
                                                 
364  Beecham (1944); page 142. 
365  The Times; 13 October 1927; page 5. Beecham Trust sponsored or financed four new issues in 
1919: Austin Motor Company Limited; The Times; 29 January 1919; page 16. Dunlop Rubber Company 
Limited; The Times; 26 March 1919; page 20. Tyre Investment Trust Limited; The Times; 2 July 1919; 
page 21. Amalgamated Cotton Mills Trust Limited; The Times; 31 May 1920; page 22. This last issue 
financed the Trust’s acquisition of Horrockses Crewdson Limited. White and Beecham Trust were also 
responsible for the failed promotion of DA Pool Limited, a company which had been intended to finance 
creation of a USA subsidiary for Dunlop Rubber by introducing a promotion technique commonly used in 
New York. Application for Listing file. London Stock Exchange Committee minutes; November and 
December 1919; Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
366  Wheeler had commenced in business on his own account in 1899 as a stockbroker and 
specialised in circularising potential investors with information about forthcoming issues: possible for 
him because he was not subject to the rules of the London Exchange. Keyworth (1985); page 789 et seq. 
Kinross (1982); page 36 et seq. 
367  Before the war, Hooley had been involved in the flotation of various bicycle manufacturers 
(including Dunlop, Singer and Swift) and other companies such as Bovril and Schweppes. In 1919, he 
sponsored an issue of shares by Jubilee Cotton Mills Limited. Richardson et al (1985); page 329 et seq. 
Harrison (1981). Meredith (1931). O’Hagan (1929). 
368  New issues sponsored by BST Limited in 1919 included: Baldwins Limited; The Times; 15 
October 1919; page 19. National Archives; file CAOG 9/108. 
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Gerard Lee Bevan, both became directors. In the months that followed, the company’s capital 
was reconstructed and a new company formed.369 
Largely owned by the Spurrier family, Leyland had been formed in the mid-1890s, and 
reconstructed as a public company in 1914. It had seen remarkable growth during the war, as a 
result of being chosen to supply all the heavy vehicles that were required by the Royal Flying 
Corps in France. Meeting this demand had been very profitable but had required factory 
extensions which needed to be re-financed at the end of the war. The company also needed to 
raise capital to finance the further expansion which it expected would be possible after the 
war. As a result, its gearing was higher than would have been regarded as normal in 
peacetime: 
‘The typical approach . . . was to issue debentures and/or preference shares up to the 
balance sheet value excluding goodwill and to issue ordinary shares to the vendors 
against goodwill. Any surplus money provided a small amount of working capital.’370 
The Spurrier family appear to have had another objective. Although small dividends had been 
paid during the war, they had been very much smaller than the recorded profit. This may have 
been no more than the result of cautious management to meet excess profit duty liabilities 
that could not be assessed until the end of the war, but the result was that by the end of the 
war there was a large balance of accumulated profit theoretically available for distribution by 
way of dividend.371 In the hands of shareholders, dividends would have attracted Income Tax 
and Super Tax liabilities which could be avoided by liquidating the company and distributing 
the remaining net assets to shareholders. Such payments would have been classed as capital 
receipts for tax purposes and were not taxable. In the event, this is what Leyland did: the old 
                                                 
369  National Archives; file BT 31/22241/135481. Although planning began early, the expected 
flotation did not occur until late 1919 because time was taken to consider a merger with two other 
companies, one of them being Daimler. Turner (1971); page 15. 
370  Rutterford (2004); page 121. 
371  This is an inference based on the published accounts as at 31 December 1915 and the 
disclosure in the 1919 prospectus of the total amount of profit earned during the war years. The 
company did not publish accounts for subsequent years. To satisfy the Companies Act requirement that 
accounts should be filed each year, the company took advantage of a weakness in the Companies Act 
1908 which did not specify that the accounts filed should be for the most recently completed accounting 
period: section 26(3) of the Companies Act 1908. Thus the company re-filed the 1915 accounts. National 
Archives; file BT 31/22241/135481. Turner suggests that the flotation deprived the company of money. 
As a business of national importance, it would have been entitled to a refund of wartime taxes that it 
was denied because a new company, created for the purpose of the flotation had taken over. Turner 
(1971); page 15.  
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company was liquidated after transferring its trade to a new company that offered its shares 
to the public.  
Leyland is only one example of a transaction being designed to achieve the particular 
objectives of the vendors: whether to meet financial expectations, as in the case of Leyland, or 
to protect the vendors’ management control in the case of Agricultural Industries Limited.372 In 
another case, Amalgamated Industrials Limited, the transaction appears to have been 
designed to facilitate a combination of the vendors’ interests with those of a potential 
acquirer.373 
This held good not just for new issue activity in London but also for activity outside London: 
perhaps most notably in Lancashire where there was feverish activity surrounding cotton mills. 
Large profits had been made during the war, and continued during 1919. Owners and 
promoters took advantage of investors’ belief that profits would continue by re-capitalising 
mill companies and encouraging mergers. Re-capitalisation usually involved substantial 
increases in issued share capital which were justified by quoting the replacement cost of the 
mills owned by the companies. As it was expected that business would continue to be 
profitable, there was no serious questioning of the implicit assumption that all of the mills 
being valued at replacement cost would indeed be replaced if there were to be a choice.374 
New issue activity within recognised exchanges quickly led to imitative activity outside the 
exchanges featuring many insubstantial promotions. The volume of this activity is difficult to 
gauge, but early in 1919 it was sufficient for periodicals such as Truth and Money Market 
Review to begin publishing regular columns warning investors of the latest abusive 
promotions. By the beginning of July 1919, the Miscellaneous Notes column in Truth was 
appearing each week, featuring on each occasion two or three schemes that readers were 
                                                 
372  Floated by Hatry in November 1919 to raise money for the development of the agricultural 
estates in Lincolnshire of the Dennis family, the new group’s corporate structure was designed to enable 
the Dennis family to retain management control of the estates without interference from the 
shareholders who bought the shares offered for sale. The Times; 3 November 1919. 
373  Floated by Clarence Hatry in June 1919, this company consisted of an eccentric group of 
interests in mining and shipping companies. A controlling interest was quickly bought by John Slater who 
proceeded to add further shipping, mining and marine insurance interests. The Times; 4 June 1919. 
Within 18 months, the company was being wound up, there having proved to be no logic in the combine 
that Slater created. Subsequently, a libel action by Hatry elicited apologies from a newspaper that had 
blamed the failure on his financial mismanagement. 
374  Daniels and Jewkes (1928); page 167 et seq. Higgins eand Toms (2003); page 209 et seq. Higgins 
et al (2015); page 5 et seq.  
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advised to avoid.375  Such warnings were not new, but before 1919 had only appeared on an 
occasional basis in both titles. The schemes varied widely. On 2 July 1919, Truth warned 
readers of the activities of Edward C Lovegrove, an outside broker; Mandevilles Limited whose 
publication Financial Mail was pushing shares in London and County Trust; and Howard Harvey 
of London & York Trust who was pushing shares in a Manchester to London Air Service, a 
Manchester printing company and Summit Motor Engineering.376  
After the end of 1919, the economic environment changed radically with cuts in government 
spending, a sharp increase in Bank Rate and the effect of declining demand internationally 
leading to worsening expectations and a rapid fall in share prices. Unsurprisingly, although new 
issue activity continued unabated for a while, it became more difficult to persuade investors to 
buy. Whereas Hatry had been able to achieve an over-subscription for Leyland preference 
shares in October 1919 with a coupon of 6%, in November 1920 he was unable to sell all of the 
preference shares of Jute Industries Limited offered with a coupon of 9%, the temptation of a 
full six months’ interest payment early in 1920 after only two or three months of trading and a 
balance sheet showing an exceptionally large asset backing for the shares that were offered.377 
News of the difficulties faced by many of the promotions of 1919 would also have deterred 
investors. Even companies thought to have especially promising prospects were caught short 
by adverse circumstances and commercial misjudgements. 
At the end of the war, Leyland Motors had seemed to face a most satisfactory future. By the 
end of 1919, its future looked far less certain. Throughout 1919, the government had been 
looking for ways of disposing of its war surplus equipment: not least the fleet of second-hand 
Leyland lorries that had been used by the Royal Flying Corps. For Leyland, there was a risk that 
the market for its new vehicles would be undermined by the availability of second-hand 
lorries. Warned of this threat through Spurrier family connections, Leyland was able to buy all 
                                                 
375  A similar column appeared weekly in Money Market Review under the title: Cautionary Notes.  
376  Truth; 2 July 1919. Summit Motor Engineering demonstrates the emptiness of many promoted 
companies. It was proposed that Summit would sell motor-cars which it would fabricate from 
components bought from various manufacturers. It was not itself to manufacture. There was no 
explanation of how the company would design and co-ordinate the manufacture of the components it 
would need. 
377  The Times; 11 November 1920. Following the example of the Lancashire cotton mill companies, 
Jute Industries Limited’s balance sheet included all of its jute mills at revaluation cost. The asset backing 
for the preference shares was almost 200% rather than 100% as was usual. Valuation analysis: Dundee 
University Archives. 
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of the second-hand lorries in France, together with a depot to the west of London where they 
could be refurbished. Whilst this cauterised the immediate threat, it burdened Leyland with an 
unplanned bank loan which was to take years to pay back as the second-hand lorries were 
gradually sold.378 If this were not enough, Leyland’s reputation was to be harmed by a 
commercial misjudgement. One of the objectives for raising capital in 1919 had been to 
finance the development of a Leyland car to complement the range of lorries and buses. When 
launched in the autumn of 1920, the first fruit of this new development, the Leyland Straight 
Eight, was a disaster. More expensive than a Rolls Royce, for a while the car held the speed 
record at Brooklands; but it did not sell. Within months of the launch, it was decided that no 
more would be produced unless orders were forthcoming: none were. Only 18 were ever built. 
Indeed Leyland was to become a music-hall joke: its Trojan vans, while cheap, had precisely 
the same gauge as the standard tram so music-hall comedians claimed that any that got stuck 
in the tracks could only escape by following the trams to the garage.379 
This was a period when asset values appreciated rapidly, encouraged by understandable 
expectations of peace and of the exploitation of new technologies and industries which had 
been brought to the fore by the 1914-1918 war. As Leyland Motors showed, even the more 
promising businesses, such as those involved in vehicle manufacture, were badly affected 
when the most optimistic expectations were dashed and for many years suffered the 
consequences of over-optimistic flotation. Using published balance sheets, Lewchuk shows 
that, as a percentage of net assets, Leyland Motors’ net profit fell sharply after the new issue 
in 1919 before recovering later in the 1920s. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
378  The purchase of the lorries became a well-publicised political scandal as the official who was 
responsible for this aspect of the programme to dispose of war surplus equipment was a member of the 
Spurrier family who had been a director of Leyland Motors before the war. Select Committee on 
National Expenditure (1920); Third report; page xxiv. The precise circumstances of the involvement of 
Leyland Motors were described in the evidence of Colonel George Spurrier; Select Committee on 
National Expenditure; 8 June 1920; page 68. 
379  Turner (1971); page 18. 
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Table 5.1: Leyland Motors Limited: Net Profit over Net Assets 
 (three year moving average) %380 
 
 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 
Leyland 
Motors 
-10.6 -27.4 -44.9 -48.0 -43.8 -36.3 -26.1 -12.0 4.1 14.8 17.3 
Industry 
average 
1.4 -3.0 -4.0 -1.2 0.3 2.1 4.2 5.8 7.8 8.3 8.8 
 
In parallel, a collapse in food prices and land values left Agricultural Industries Limited with a 
falling income from which to service the bank loans raised to pay the dividend that had 
provided Hatry with his promoter’s profit.381 A collapse in demand for canvas meant that Jute 
Industries Limited struggled to pay dividends on its preference shares.382 A similar collapse in 
demand for cotton led to many Lancashire mills suffering the same problem of over-
capitalisation.383 These problems were to overhang the market for many years.384 
As had happened on previous occasions, the optimistic appreciation in asset values also 
provided an opportunity for the unscrupulous to take advantage of the willingness of investors 
to accept uncritically promoters’ ill-founded valuations.385 These problems were to overhang 
the market for many years.386 They were also to lead to fundamental changes among company 
promoters. This experience was to lead to fundamental changes among company promoters.  
The end of the promoters’ business model 
Although Clarence Hatry’s business survived this collapse, his experience demonstrates why 
1920 was so catastrophic for promoters. The problem lay in the share trading in which all 
promoters indulged to support the prices of the shares they sponsored and to provide some 
                                                 
380  Lewchuk (1985); page 17. 
381  Board of Trade Inspector’s draft report dated 17 January 1950; pages 41–42. National Archives. 
382  Dundee University Archives: reference MS 66/X. 
383  Higgins et al (2003). 
384  In the case of Agricultural Industries the difficulty led to disputes between the shareholders and 
the Dennis family which eventually led to litigation in the 1950s. In the case of Leyland Motors Limited, 
the over-capitalisation led to disputes between the directors and holders of the ordinary and preference 
shares over proposals to reduce the company’s capital. In the case of Jute industries Limited, there were 
disputes between the directors and the London-based preference shareholders who eventually 
accepted a capital reduction scheme in 1929.  
385  Toms (2015); pages 3-5. 
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assurance to small investors that there would be a market in the stock offered for sale. As Sir 
Robert Kindersley, a director of Lazards, later told the Macmillan Committee: 
‘ . . . the average investor today does not like anything without a market, and you 
cannot possibly have a market with £50,000 of stock or £100,000 of stock for that 
matter, there is bound to be no market in stock and it is very difficult of negotiation in 
consequence.’387 
To ensure that there was an active market, promoters were prepared to support applications 
for shares and to buy shares in a falling market to sustain the price. They would in any event 
hold parcels of shares themselves so that they could benefit from any increase in the price of a 
share after issue.  
In these endeavours, Hatry had for some years been assisted by Gerard Lee Bevan, the senior 
partner of Ellis & Company, Hatry’s principal stockbroker, and Chairman of City Equitable Fire 
Insurance Limited (CEFI), which Hatry had sold to him in 1915.  Bevan controlled personally the 
investment decisions of both of these concerns388 and used his authority to support Hatry’s 
new issues. Thus, when Jute Industries Limited was floated on Armistice Day 1920, Ellis & 
Company issued a guarantee to certain directors that within a short period after the flotation it 
would buy any equity shares for which they applied on flotation.389 The effect of these 
applications was that the company was able to announce that the issue had been substantially 
subscribed, although underwriters were left to take up 30% of the shares offered for sale.390 
The unfortunate consequence was that, as share prices fell in 1920, both Ellis & Company and 
CEFI were left with substantial holdings of shares that fell substantially in value, exposing the 
bank loans that had been raised to finance the holdings. As the loss in value threatened the 
stability of both firms (and thus a complete collapse in the market price of Hatry issues) Hatry 
involved himself in attempts to save both of them. In 1921, he contributed to a scheme by 
which CEFI floated a new company, City Equitable Associated Interests Limited, which acquired 
three smaller insurance companies whose investment funds were immediately amalgamated 
                                                 
387  Minutes of Evidence; Macmillan Committee; Question 1526. 
388  The circumstances in which Bevan came to exercise this degree of control are set out in the 
judgment of Romer J in the litigation which followed: In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Corporation; 
(1925) 1 Ch  407. 
389  Dundee University Archives; reference  MS 66/II/10/50. 
390  The Times; 18 November 1920. 
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with those of CEFI.391 This somewhat desperate ruse failed because the market continued to 
fall. As a result, both Ellis & Company and CEFI became insolvent and were liquidated. Hatry 
then sought to buy holdings from the liquidators to avoid open market disposals that would 
undermine further the value of holdings in the hands of his own company, Commercial Bank of 
London Limited (CBL).392 This approach also failed and led to the liquidation of CBL although, 
on the basis of assurances given by Hatry about the prices at which shareholdings would be 
realised, the liquidation took the form of a Members’ Voluntary Winding Up which assumed 
that the company was solvent. These assurances proved difficult to make good when the 
liquidator came to realise the remaining assets.393  
Hatry was thus faced with a commercial disaster for he risked having to dishonour a promise 
to his supporters that they would not suffer a loss through the liquidation of CBL and the 
possibility that, having dishonoured his promise, he would be obliged to cease his business 
activities. He was saved from this prospect by good fortune: an introduction to Arthur 
Collins.394 
Collins was an exceptional combination of entrepreneur and local government accountant. He 
had been a prize winner in the first competitive examinations of the Institute of Municipal 
Treasurers and Accountants (IMTA), a young Treasurer of the City of Birmingham and also a 
young President of his Institute. Before the war, Collins had travelled widely lecturing on local 
government financial management and had seen an opportunity to advise local authorities on 
long-term planning and the raising of loans. During his year as President, he resigned as City 
                                                 
391  The circumstances were described in Sir Richard Muir’s opening speech for the prosecution at 
Bevan’s trial; and in the statement of G Adair, a director of one of the three companies acquired by CEFI. 
National Archives; file HO 144/2745. 
392  Correspondence in May 1922 between JD Langton & Passmore, solicitors acting for Hatry, and 
the Legal Department of London Joint City and Midland Bank. HSBC Archive; file UK 0273/0026. 
393  For example, the liquidator disposed of CBL’s remaining holding of shares in Agricultural 
Industries Limited by a sale at a nugatory sum to members of the Dennis family from whom Hatry had 
first acquired the business in 1919. This is one of the means by which the Dennis family retained control 
of the family farming estates which they had first sold in 1919 and which they still farm in 2015. Board of 
Trade Inspector’s report. National Archives. 
394  There is no record of the way in which this introduction was effected. It may have come about 
through Sir John Crisp, a partner in Ashurst Morris Crisp, who had taken over as Hatry’s solicitor on the 
death of his father, Sir Frank Crisp, and who is recorded to have introduced Hatry to Foster & 
Braithwaite, the stockbrokers, who became involved in the new business and who proved instrumental 
in securing its acceptance by Stock Exchange members, notwithstanding fierce opposition by jobbers 
and the incumbent brokers. It was Foster & Braithwaite who in turn introduced Hatry to the Marquess 
of Winchester, who chaired Hatry’s new company. 
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Treasurer of Birmingham, and at the end of his year established the Municipal Loans Bureau 
which developed a business by using the connections he had made through the Institute.395 By 
1925, his attempts to reduce the cost to local authorities of raising new loans through the 
money market had come to nothing, having been opposed by three firms of brokers396 which 
dominated the market and were able to dictate the terms that local authorities were obliged 
to accept. Frustrated by his failure, Collins was still seeking a way of breaking this impasse. 
For Hatry, the introduction to Collins must have seemed like an answer to a prayer. Hatry was 
able to combine Collins’ expertise and connections with his own market skills to break the 
stranglehold of the three incumbent brokers. This opened the way to a new business that 
offered the prospect of considerable profits, not least because at this time local authorities 
were more interested in raising new loans than private businesses were interested in new 
issues. Hatry incorporated a new company, Corporation & General Securities, to undertake this 
business and offered shares in the new company to the former shareholders in CBL, 
discharging his promise to them that they would not lose as a result of the collapse of CBL.  
Hatry was able to survive the collapse of 1920, but the effort this required serves to explain 
why many promoters did not survive. The company promoters’ business model had run its 
course and was not to survive the 1929 crash for its fundamental weakness had been exposed. 
Company promoters had long depended upon the willingness of people and institutions to join 
syndicates to finance their promotions, in effect using short-term money to buy companies 
that were then immediately to be sold by some form of public offer. It was of the essence that 
syndicate members should be able to realise their interest in the promotion as quickly as 
possible, probably at a substantial profit, but at least without too great a risk of loss. For 
example, the agreement covering the formation of the Preliminary Steel Syndicate in April 
1929 specified that the Syndicate should be closed within six months. In practice this meant 
                                                 
395  Biographical note published in the IMTA Journal on Collins becoming President. An 
advertisement for the new Bureau appeared on page one of the first issue of the journal after Collins 
left office as President. 
396  R Nivison & Company, Mullens Marshall & Company, J&A Scrimgeour & Company. Documents 
relating to attempts by these brokers to preserve their position are held in a Crown Agents file.  National 
Archives; file CAOG.9/108. 
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that the Syndicate should be closed within a relatively short time after the projected issue of 
shares.397  
In return for acting as ringmasters for syndicates and vendors, the company promoters were 
able to take substantial profits for themselves. Both syndicate members and vendors must 
have realised that this was happening and must also have been prepared to tolerate it for so 
long as their own commercial ambitions were realised. Jute Industries Limited provides a 
transparent example of this. Having decided to realise their equity, the mill owners 
approached Hatry with a view to his floating their companies;398 presumably they expected to 
realise a price that reflected their view of their entity’s value whilst allowing an appropriate fee 
for Hatry. He realised a substantial profit which was justified by valuing the mills at 
replacement cost: a value which the mill owners obviously thought could not be justified by 
their private expectations of future profit. 
When market conditions militated against the realisation of a substantial profit by immediate 
sale, there was risk of substantial loss. Company promoters were certainly aware of that risk 
and protected themselves by extracting profits as they were made and giving them to their 
wives, where they could be protected under the Married Women’s Property Acts.399 Hatry’s 
wife, Dolly, was certainly used in this way, as is attested by the memoirs of the family of his 
former insurance broking partner, Deighton Patmore;400 her ownership of the Hatry stud at 
Alfriston;401 and the fact that she made substantial profits from share trading during Hatry’s 
imprisonment in the 1930s and in part financed his purchase of Hatchards after his release 
from prison.402 
                                                 
397  Memorandum on Steel Industries of Great Britain Limited. M Samuel & Company Limited 
Lloyds Bank Archive; file S/1/1/6/228. In the event matters were delayed, and in June 1929 members of 
the preliminary syndicate were persuaded to become members of a successor syndicate: ‘the A Share 
Syndicate’. The agreement for that syndicate envisaged that the A shares in question would be sold by 
19 December 1929: within six months of the formation of the new Syndicate. 
398  Grimond (1979); page 24. Pearson (1961); page 112. 
399  Devices of this sort had long been a resort of fraudsters and promoters: Holcombe (1983); page 
160. 
400  Patmore (1968); page 2. 
401  Examination of telephone directories. 
402  Other promoters seem to have used a similar approach. For example, after his imprisonment 
and bankruptcy, Hooley was able to continue living on his estate at Papworth Hall. Similarly, although he 
was obliged to sell his stud at Alfriston (to Hatry), Bottomley was able to retain his nearby country 
house. 
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But however readily promoters could protect their own profits, to continue in business their 
financial supporters also had to be confident of profits. 
This is the significance of Hatry’s experience in 1921 and 1922. As the stock market fell in 1920, 
so it became more difficult to attract investors by public offers. Yet again, the flotation of Jute 
Industries Limited illustrates this. Hatry’s initial supporters would have expected to realise 
their interest quickly and at a profit, which in Hatry’s case was only possible with the support 
of Gerard Lee Bevan and Ellis & Company’s guarantees. For Hatry to remain in business, it was 
necessary for him to honour promises to his supporters that they would not lose. There is a 
tendency in some biographical references to Hatry to characterise this honouring of promises 
as a demonstration of an ethical approach to business.403 It was a matter of commercial 
necessity: a matter of life and death. Promoters could not afford to disappoint their supporters 
too often. 
The result was that the old-style promoters gradually disappeared. Clare & Company withdrew 
from company promotion after the death of Oliver Clare in 1921. Sperling & Company became 
deeply involved in ultimately unsuccessful attempts to rescue its shipbuilding interests from 
the effects of the slump in demand for new ships. Hooley was obliged to withdraw from 
company promotion by prosecution arising from the fraudulent promotion of Jubilee Cotton 
Mills Limited. Hatry survived, partly because by offering shares in a new venture he could claim 
that syndicate investors had not lost, and partly because his business took a new direction. On 
one hand, he managed loan issues for local authorities, and on the other hand he 
concentrated on the formation of combines rather than the speculative issues that had 
disfigured the 1919–1920 boom.404 
Even those such as Frederick Szarvasy, who had been successful and continued as promoters 
for some time, eventually withdrew to concentrate, in his case, on company rescues.405 
In spite of the withdrawal of many company promoters, new issues remained in demand which 
led some existing houses to develop a new issues business406 and to the creation of new 
                                                 
403  Pearson (1961); page 137. 
404  The combines with which Hatry became involved included Drapery Trust (provincial 
department stores), London Public Omnibus Company (London bus operators), Associated Automatic 
Machine Corporation (coin-operated machines on stations and other public places), Allied Ironfounders 
(small foundries) and United Steel (steel manufacturers). 
405  Such as Dunlop Rubber and, eventually, Royal Mail Steamship. 
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houses with the financial support to provide assurance of stability and the sustained 
relationships that both investors and vendors increasingly sought. 
In 1921, this led to the formation of Cull & Company by four ex-partners in a jobbing firm 
specialising in oil shares who had made a fortune shortly before the war when Burmah Oil was 
introduced to the Stock Exchange.407 With a background in oil, this new house was quickly 
involved in sponsoring an issue of preference shares for Mexican Eagle408 and in facilitating a 
£5.7 million sale by Royal Dutch of a portion of its holding in Shell Transport & Trading.409 This 
was followed in 1922 by the creation of Power Securities Corporation which was formed by the 
utility engineering company, Balfour Beatty, with the support of British Thomson-Houston, and 
which, like Cull & Company, became another client of Cazenove.410  This company was to 
specialise in new issues for electricity supply undertakings such as Lancashire Electric Light & 
Power Company Limited.411  
In succeeding years, a series of new creations followed: Gresham Trust in 1924, Charterhouse 
Investment Trust in 1925, Quadrant Trust in 1927412 and Dawnay Day in 1928.413 
Charterhouse’s creation was a project conceived by Sir Arthur Wheeler, Harry Clifford-Turner 
and Nutcombe Hume who had together been involved in Gresham Trust, an issuing house 
founded by Wheeler in 1924 to sponsor small issues.414 Hume had joined Wheeler in 1921 from 
Clare & Company, having been introduced by Clifford-Turner who acted as legal adviser to 
both Clare & Company and Wheeler.415 
The new Trust’s prospectus was published on 12 November 1925, and its first new issue was 
announced on 23 February 1926: a company called International Pulp and Chemical Company 
                                                                                                                                               
406  For example, the business of Samy Japhet: Japhet (1931); page 122. 
407  The Times; 3 October 1921; page 17. 
408  The Times; 3 May 1922; page 20. 
409  The Times; 13 June 1922; page 15. 
410  The Times; 20 October 1922; page 18. Kynaston (1991); pages 103–104.  
411  The Times; 2 February 1923; page 16. 
412  Formed by Phillip Hill, this was to lead to the formation of Phillip Hill & Partners a few years 
later.  In 1928, the company sponsored issues by Madame Tussaud’s, Timothy Whites (chemists) and 
Taylors (chemists).  
413  Formed by Guy Dawnay and Julian Day; in 1928 the company sponsored an issue by Financial 
Newspapers Proprietors. 
414  Kinross (1982); page 37. 
415  Dennett (1979); page 15. Kinross recalled that Hume ‘was driving a bus when Wheeler originally 
met him’. Kinross (1982); page 47. 
Chapter Five 
1919–1929 – Post-war new issues 
Page 130 
 
Limited which was formed to acquire the share capital of Koholyt, a company based in 
Koenigsberg which produced chemical pulp for use in paper manufacture. Charterhouse was to 
be responsible for four new issues in 1926, five in 1927 and a further five in 1928.416  
When the first edition of the Issuing Houses Yearbook was published in 1929, it listed 94 
houses that had been responsible for new issues between 1926 and 1929:417 a list that was 
remarkable both for the comparatively small number of issues handled by businesses similar to 
those of old-style promoters and for the fact that it was headed by Charterhouse Investment 
Trust, a house that had been formed as recently as 1925. 
 
Table 5.2: Top ten issuing houses ranked by total amount subscribed for issues in 1928418 
  Year of 
formation 
(per 
yearbook) 
Number of 
issues 
Total 
amount 
subscribed £ 
 
%age of 
total of all 
issues 
Average 
amount 
subscribed 
£ 
Charterhouse Investment Trust 1925 6 7,867,500 6.7 1,311,250 
British Foreign & Continental  1910 3 7,567,000 6.4 2,522,333 
Barings Brothers - 1 3,840,000 3.3 3,840,000 
Scottish Finance 1926 13 2,912,775 2.5 224,060 
Standard Industrial Trust 1920 6 2,755,000 2.4 459,167 
Lothbury Investment Trust 1919 3 2,300,000 2.0 766,667 
London & Yorkshire Trust 1919 5 2,233,500 1.9 446,700 
French British & Foreign Trust 1924 13 2,232,500 1.9 173,269 
Helbert Wagg 1919419 3 2,165,000 1.8 721,667 
Eastern Rubber Growers 1926 1 2,080,000 1.7 2,080,000 
  54 35,973,275 30.6 666,172 
Other issues  234 80,830,432 69.4 345,429 
TOTALS  288 116,803,707 100.0 405,568 
 
                                                 
416  Issuing Houses Yearbook (1929). 
417  Individual issuing houses listed in the yearbook were not necessarily independent of each 
other. In a number of cases, houses were related to each other, dividing business between them on, for 
example, grounds of size. Thus, Sir Arthur Wheeler was associated with three houses: Moorgate Issues 
Limited which dealt with small issues and was a subsidiary of Gresham Trust which dealt with larger 
issues and Charterhouse Investment Trust which dealt with even larger issues. 
418  The table is based on the list of issues included in Anon (1931). The list included only corporate 
issues and thus excludes bond issues for home and overseas governments and public sector bond issues. 
In respect of each issue, the list takes account of the first-named issuing house recorded in the Issuing 
Houses Yearbook (1929).  
419  Formed to acquire the predecessor business which had been formed in about 1800. 
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As the underlying source for the table excludes bond issues by home and overseas 
governments and public sector bodies, it understates the role of issuing houses such as Barings 
Brothers, NM Rothschild and Schroders which specialised in such issues.  
For the new businesses, the quality of the issues sponsored was critical. Shareholders would 
not have welcomed losses any more than a promoter’s supporters but were more likely to be 
long-term rather than short-term holders. They were also likely to be more risk averse, having 
decided that investment through an intermediary was more attractive than investing directly 
through the Exchange. Moreover, it was more difficult to withdraw all profits instantly, 
protecting them by transfer to a wife. In short, investment trusts tended to be conservative in 
their choice of investments. In describing Charterhouse’s early years, Dennett comments: 
‘Hume’s early training in the City . . . invariably led them to turn down any proposal 
that was not totally sound. The background of a company for which Charterhouse 
made an issue or in which it intended to invest had always been explored in detail by 
Hume . . . The numbers of propositions which, after investigation, he discarded before 
presenting to the board, indicated the exactitude of his standards. When the 
downward slide began, Charterhouse did not find itself committed to businesses that 
were likely to fail.’420 
This approach was attractive both to vendors discouraged by the disastrous experience of 
company promoters during the 1920–1921 stock market collapse, but also to prospective 
investors for in time it would lead to a reputation for prudent decision-making. 
New issues in the late 1920s 
This was not the only change from the boom of 1919–1920, however, for there was also a 
change in the character of the securities being listed. The former boom featured a large 
number of substantial businesses that were raising capital to take advantage of what they 
believed to be attractive prospects. In the later boom, such businesses were less in evidence. 
There were, however, many issues floated to take advantage of opportunities to increase 
profits through rationalisation. It was at this time that the national chains of department 
stores were being created through the acquisition of formerly independent regional 
department stores by Drapery Trust (a Hatry promotion),421 United Drapery Stores and Gordon 
                                                 
420  Dennett (1979); page 36. 
421  The first acquisition by Drapery Trust was Marshalls Limited, for which Hatry had organised 
share issues in 1917 and 1919/1920. The idea came from RP Gaze, who was a director of Marshalls 
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Selfridge. Each of these three groups was created to increase profitability by joint purchasing 
and joint marketing and was to prove successful and long-lived.422 The boom witnessed a 
number of other issues of this kind including the following from Hatry’s portfolio: London 
Public Omnibus Company,423 Associated Automatic Machine Corporation,424 Allied 
Ironfounders425 and, fatefully, Steel Industries of Great Britain, which was to be the cause of 
Hatry’s downfall. In addition, a large number of investment trusts were launched: in 1928, no 
fewer than 28 trusts were raising about £16.5 million (more than 10% of all money raised in 
1928). 
However, issues such as these did not satisfy the demand for shares with the result that the 
1928 boom also saw the issue of a large number of small and highly speculative issues, many 
of which were imitating successful businesses: 
Table 5.3: Categories of speculative stocks issued in 1928426 
  Number of issues Amount subscribed 
£ 
Average amount 
subscribed £ 
Gramophone and radio companies 29 3,989,500 137,569 
‘Parent’ finance 16 3,284,000 205,250 
Safety glass patent companies 5 711,750 142,350 
Other patent companies 4 737,500 184,375 
 
The ‘parent’ finance issues were so named by The Economist in January 1929 in describing: 
‘ . . . the practice . . . of floating speculative concerns, formed in many cases to exploit 
entirely novel and untried mechanical devices, and almost immediately disposing of 
                                                                                                                                               
Limited and became Managing Director of Drapery Trust and subsequently a director of Debenhams 
Securities Limited after its acquisition of Drapery Trust. 
422  Corina (1978); pages 100–101. Drapery Trust was acquired by Debenhams in 1927–1928 and its 
chain of department stores still exists. United Drapery Stores eventually specialised in clothing and was 
acquired by the Hanson group in the 1980s. A number of smaller regional Selfridge’s stores were sold to 
the John Lewis Partnership in the 1940s and the remaining stores were eventually acquired by Charles 
Clore in 1965. 
423  Formed by Hatry in 1926 to acquire the remaining independent bus operators in London, the 
company was sold in 1928 to London General Omnibus Company, which thus regained its de facto 
monopoly of bus operation in London. The short-lived group was built around the Admiral Line, and was 
the first London bus company to operate Leyland six-wheel buses.  Omnibus Magazine; January 1930. 
424  Formed by Hatry to acquire independent coin machine operators: mainly on railway stations. 
425  Formed to acquire independent light foundries. It manufactured Aga and Raeburn cookers 
among many other products. Tripp (1951). 
426  Analysis of the issues listed in Anon (1931). 
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their ‘rights’ in this, that, or the other territory, to a swarm of new companies, which 
in turn appeal to the investor’s largesse.’427 
One of Hatry’s issues, Photomaton, a company formed to exploit a patent for photographic 
booths which were erected in railway stations, spawned two such companies: Photomaton 
(Eastern & Central) Limited and Photomaton (Lancashire & Midlands) Limited. This was not a 
new device as Hatry had first used it in 1913.428 
In parallel to the renewal within the Exchange of interest in new issues, there had been an 
increase in off-exchange activity. This had come about in 1924–1926, mainly as a result of the 
arrival of share traders from New York who had been driven away by a campaign undertaken 
by Albert Ottinger, a newly appointed New York Attorney General, who intended, with support 
from the NYSE, to drive out abusive off-exchange share selling.429   
‘The Better Business Bureau in New York, has sent me its annual report, which 
contains a long list of cases in which, largely through its efforts, proceedings have 
been taken under the famous Martin Act for the suppression of fraudulent bucket-
shop and stock-selling businesses. I have previously mentioned that on the application 
of the Attorney General the Supreme Court granted temporary injunctions restraining 
several firms from selling so-called bankers’ shares or “units” based on stock of Ford 
Motor Co. of Canada. It now appears that the injunctions were confirmed by final 
judgments, and that among the defendants against whom Supreme Court Justice 
May granted a permanent injunction on April 13 were “Hoshor, Montanye and Co., 
Jefferson K Hoshor, John C Hoshor, and Edwin L Presby.” 
These are some of the individuals who, operating in London first as WC Montanye 
and Co and subsequently Hoshor, Montanye and Co. Limited, have hoodwinked so 
many unwary British investors into buying unmarketable “units” at prices enormously 
in excess of the market value of the real shares of the Ford Co. actions against Hoshor 
and Co (and also against the two rival rampers, British American Securities Limited, 
and Co-operative Securities Limited) are now pending in the courts here, and I am still 
willing to put victims or their solicitors in communication with the solicitors who are 
acting for the plaintiffs.’430 
                                                 
427  The Economist; 19 January 1929; page 111. 
428 In 1913, Hatry formed and then sold shares in Union Emigrants Association Limited and then 
Union Emigrants Association (Italy) Limited. The two companies were the first known examples of Hatry 
offering shares for sale. Their business consisted of selling to intending migrants from Eastern Europe 
insurance cover against the contingency that, on arrival at Ellis Island, the migrants might be denied 
admission to the USA. 
429  Ott (2009); pages 58 and 59. The legislation empowering the Attorney General, the action 
which was taken and its effect were described by the Assistant Attorney General in two papers: Winter 
(1927a) and (1927b). 
430  Truth; 10 June 1925; page 1087. 
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The units in question appear to have amounted to an entitlement to a share of a trust’s 
holding of shares in Ford Motor Company of Canada, a structure redolent of a scheme put 
forward in 1919 by James White: DA Trust Pool, for whose units an application for listing was 
made to the London Stock Exchange but rejected on the grounds that the resulting security 
was not suitable for trading on the Exchange.431   
Quite apart from the dubious nature of the securities being offered to investors, complaints 
were raised over the selling techniques they adopted: 
‘Investors should be on their guard not only against the posted “literature” but also 
against the plausible-tongued touts who may call upon them. Quite recently two 
unsophisticated ladies in the country were visited and were hoodwinked into parting 
with no less than £700.’432 
At some point some of the share-pushers who had come from New York must have formed 
liaisons with members of the Stock Exchange, for members of the Exchange were later shown 
to have been connected with share-pushers of American origin. In particular, an investigation 
of the accounting records of Mr Cyril James, who sponsored Australian Commonwealth 
Carbide, Sunbeam Gramophone and others, showed that he had been pushing shares for 
which the notorious American promoter, Jacob Factor, was responsible.433 Mr James was not 
alone as was shown by an investigation of Charles Stanley & Sons which had sponsored a large 
number of suspicious issues including Belgian Finance Company Limited: 
‘Working in cooperation with Scottish Finance (a promoting concern with a sinister 
record).’434 
Some members of the Exchange had not been able to resist the temptation of the business 
generated by promoters who had been driven to London by the threat of prosecution in New 
York. Jacob Factor should have been well known to members, however, as a result of articles 
alleging that he was a ‘notorious share pusher’ which had appeared in the Daily Mail on 
                                                 
431  Application for Listing file. Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. An appeal against the 
Quotations Committee’s original decision was also rejected. The scheme was intended to finance the 
creation of a new manufacturing subsidiary in North America for Dunlop Rubber, the original USA 
subsidiary having been sold during the war. 
432  Truth; 18 February 1925; page 256. 
433  Report of the Sub-Committee appointed to investigate the report of 14th March 1930 relating 
to Mr C de B James; 10 April 1930; London Stock Exchange minutes; 14 April 1930; Stock Exchange 
Archive; Guildhall Library.  
434  Special Report (No 2) of the Sub-Committee on New Issues and Official Quotations; 4 April 
1930; London Stock Exchange minutes; 7 April 1930; Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
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numerous occasions from March 1926. On several occasions, Factor had initiated libel 
proceedings with a view to stopping the publication of further articles, but on each occasion 
had failed, as had been well reported in the press. In short, members had been willing to 
facilitate the share promotions of an alleged fraudster.435 
Their susceptibility to such temptations suggests that members’ and promoters’ financial 
problems had not all been solved by the income that the 1928 boom had generated. Hatry’s 
own circumstances demonstrated this. Superficially he had enjoyed great success since the 
launch of his local authority loan business in 1925, to the extent that, on his fortieth birthday 
in December 1928, he was able to celebrate with a spectacular party in his newly refurbished 
home in Stanhope Gate, just off Park Lane. Apart from the acknowledged success of the 
formation of Drapery Trust and its sale to Debenhams, he had been instrumental in a series of 
new issues and was involved in re-financing a number of companies such as Alvis Cars & 
Engineering. But in January 1929, his companies were short of cash to the extent that, when 
Associated Automatic Machine Corporation acquired British Automatic Machines in January 
1929, the investments of its pension schemes were immediately taken over and realised for 
cash, for which shares in Hatry promotions were substituted.436 It subsequently became 
apparent that the appearance of success had to some extent been an illusion, for the 
dominant position in the local authority loan market had been achieved by aggressive price-
cutting which left little room for profit.437 
Conclusions 
Just as the membership of the Stock Exchange was becoming polarised, so were the businesses 
involved in sponsoring new issues. Although some of the company promoters survived for a 
while, the weakness of their business model had been exposed and their approach to business 
did not survive. They were to be replaced by two groups. One group, consisting of brokers and 
new issuing houses in the form of or backed by investment trusts was joined by a number of 
the large houses that had previously concentrated on international stocks who were meeting 
                                                 
435  Daily Mail; 30 March 1926; 21 May 1926; 24 July 1926; 23 December 1927. Evening News; 31 
March 1926. Continental Daily Mail; 24 July 1926. The Times; 12 January 1928; 31 January 1928; 6 
February 1928; 11 February 1928. 
436  A manoeuvre reminiscent of the scheme to support City Equitable Fire Insurance in 1921. 
National Archives; file DPP 1/91. This was one of a number of allegations reported to the Director for 
Public Prosecutions that did not lead to charges at Hatry’s trial. 
437  Envelope ‘Papers re Corporation Loans, Corporation & General Securities &c’ in Foster & 
Braithwaite’s private papers; Foster & Braithwaite Archive; Guildhall Library. Reader (1979); page 150. 
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with greater competition for that business. The essence of these companies was to build 
sustainable businesses through careful choice of the companies whose securities they would 
float. 438 
This process was encouraged by the growing interest in industrial reorganisation and 
rationalisation with an accompanying increase in the capital required and the size of issues. 
Such developments encouraged the growth of larger institutions that could provide access to 
funds on the scale required and manage larger-scale issues. 
As the risk appetite of the market changed, so did the market’s view of the company 
promoters’ business model. As the syndicate agreement for the 1929 steel scheme 
demonstrates, promoters designed their schemes to realise profits quickly, both for 
themselves and their supporters. A number of the companies they floated proved to be long-
lived, such as Jute Industries and Leyland Motors. Most, like Jute Industries, would find 
themselves burdened by financing arrangements that proved embarrassing. That vendors and 
investors found other, more stable, models more attractive is evident from the rapid growth of 
new houses such as Charterhouse Investment Trust. Some of the people involved in the new 
businesses had worked for old-style promoters. Sir Arthur Wheeler established and for some 
years led Gresham Trust and Charterhouse, and Nutcombe Hume had worked for Clare & 
Company before joining Charterhouse. The key change was not the people involved but the 
financial structure within which they worked. 
Although the change served the interests of investors and vendors, there was one respect in 
which it was a loss to the Exchange: some promoters had been agents for innovation either by 
probing the possibility of achieving vendors’ objectives whilst complying with the rules or by 
challenging market orthodoxy. The activities of C&GS provide an example of this process. By 
combining with Arthur Collins’ expertise and network of contacts, Hatry was able to challenge 
the brokers who had formerly controlled local authority loan issues, with the result that the 
costs of loan issues were reduced.  
It is striking that these developments occurred as the result of market changes and not in 
response to regulatory interventions on the part either of the Stock Exchange or the 
                                                 
438  Thomas (1978); pages 49-50. 
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government. Investors and vendors decided that the old-style company promotion process did 
not match their risk appetite and acted accordingly. 
In parallel, there was a growth in abusive off-market activity. Investors with limited holdings of 
shares did not represent a remunerative prospect and were shunned by most stockbrokers. 
Moreover, by comparison with the NYSE, the London Stock Exchange did not encourage 
members to support new investors. Unsuspecting investors became the prey of ruthless off-
market operators, some of whom were able to secure permission to deal on the floor of the 
Exchange for weak securities through the assistance of members. It is unclear to what extent 
the members concerned were aware of the abuses for which these off-market operators were 
responsible, although several had been the subject of ‘exposés’ in the national press and such 
specialist titles as Truth and Money Market Review so that members should at least have been 
suspicious. They were inviting criticism for being complicit with these operators and 
endangering the reputation of the Exchange; their activities focused attention on the 
arrangements to control trading practices. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 1919–1929 – REGULATING SHARE TRADING - PART I 
 
 
Introduction 
In retrospect, the enthusiasm with which in the 1920s off-market operators took advantage of 
the opportunities for abuse of investors and with which members were prepared to collude 
with the unscrupulous are unsurprising. Members saw opportunities to restore their incomes; 
off-market operators saw opportunities to take advantage of unsuspecting investors. The 
climate of uncertainty surrounding business and asset values provided an environment in 
which those who wished to take advantage of such opportunities could persuade themselves, 
if they wished, that there might be some justification, however tenuous, for outrageously 
optimistic valuations. For those responsible for regulating share trading and deterring abuse, 
these were bound to be difficult times. 
Speaking of regulation of share trading in the 1920s without qualifying the term is misleading. 
None of the organisations involved, the London Stock Exchange, the Board of Trade and the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), either accepted responsibility for regulating share 
trading in the sense of managing the risks that all parties took in becoming involved in trading 
or would have thought it necessary that all such risks should be managed for all parties. The 
Exchange believed itself to be running a members’ organisation with the narrow objective of 
limiting members’ counterparty risk, and accepted no responsibility towards outsiders whose 
transactions took place through the market. They were expected to manage their own risks. If 
they were unable to do this, then they should not be dealing. As for the Board of Trade, it saw 
itself as responsible for ensuring that proper arrangements existed for members of the public 
to seek redress if deals misfired and for egregiously abusive practices to be punished in the 
hope that others might be deterred from such practices. The DPP’s responsibility extended to 
ensuring that egregious cases were prosecuted, but no further. 
The events of the 1920s challenged the limited view of their roles held by each of these three 
organisations. 
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London Stock Exchange 
From the beginning of the return to peacetime trading in 1919, the Exchange’s committee was 
diligent in policing compliance with the Exchange’s rules and in amending them not only to 
reflect the need for new peacetime arrangements but also to respond to evidence of traders 
taking advantage of weaknesses in the rules. 
For many years, company law had required that prospectuses covering new issues of shares 
should include various disclosures including, for example, information about goodwill, the 
company’s contracts and promoters’ profits. Those requirements did not apply to offers for 
sale, in which another company owning shares in the company being floated offered those 
shares for sale. By structuring a new issue as an offer for sale, a promoter was thus given the 
opportunity to avoid inconvenient disclosure. A document would be published, which looked 
like a prospectus and gave a great deal of the information that would be expected in a 
prospectus, but left out key details. 
One such offer came to the committee’s attention in November 1919. An application was 
made for permission to deal in the shares of Agricultural Industries Limited (AIL): one of  
Hatry’s promotions. The documents were in strict compliance with the law and the rules. 
However, the committee’s papers suggest that the committee was sceptical about the 
completeness of the information disclosed because the application file contains manuscript 
annotations suggesting that someone attempted to calculate the profit that Hatry as promoter 
was making from the promotion. These annotations indicate that there was no profit for the 
promoter: an answer that must have seemed incredible to whoever made the annotations. It 
was indeed incorrect. A misleading impression had been created by the non-disclosure of 
agreements between AIL, Hatry’s company Commercial Bank of London Limited (CBL) and the 
farming companies being acquired by AIL from the Dennis family: disclosure that would have 
been required in a prospectus but was not required in an offer for sale. Under these 
agreements, CBL was enabled to extract cash from the farming companies by way of dividend 
as ownership of their shares was passed from the Dennis family to AIL by way of CBL. Payment 
of that dividend was obscured in the published information and was the source of the 
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promoter’s profit.439 Because the profit was obscured, it was not reflected in the annotations 
in the application file. 
Realising that this inconsistency between the law and the rules was an open door for 
manipulation, the sub-committee that reviewed AIL’s application recommended that the 
Exchange should reconsider its disclosure requirements in respect of offers for sale. At a 
subsequent meeting a week or two later, the committee approved a proposal that permission 
to deal in shares would only be granted in respect of shares offered for sale once all the 
information that would have been required in a prospectus had been published and advertised 
in two national newspapers.440 
This was not quite the end of the matter. Almost a year later, the committee rejected an 
application for permission to deal in the shares of another Hatry promotion: Jute Industries 
Limited (JIL), which was also structured as an offer for sale. JIL had been formed to float six 
jute mills which it had acquired from the families who formerly owned them. Towards the end 
of October 1920, the formal offer documents were approved by the board of JIL: a week or 
two before the offer for sale was announced and, crucially, a day or two before signature of 
the final mill acquisition agreement with Cox Brothers, the largest of the family companies. 
The formal offer for sale disclosed all of the acquisition agreements save one: that with Cox 
Brothers Limited. None of the disclosed agreements showed a profit for the promoter as the 
whole of the promoter’s profit was to be taken in the course of transferring Cox Brothers 
Limited to JIL.  When the formal documents were submitted to the Exchange, the agreement 
with Cox Brothers was omitted as it had not been signed before the formal application to the 
Exchange was drawn up. This failure to disclose an agreement was spotted by the Exchange’s 
secretariat and led to the committee’s rejection of the application: a rejection which the 
committee was later to reverse, but only on condition that the omitted agreement and the 
information in it should be published and advertised in every newspaper in which the original 
offer for sale had been advertised. Remarkably, this elicited the admission that the original 
                                                 
439  Confirmed by comparison of the Board of Trade Inspector’s report which was not published, 
and the Exchange’s application file. National Archives; file COS 2424/45. Application for Listing file; Stock 
Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. The Board of Trade Inspector’s report appears to have been the first 
issued under the revised provisions under the Companies Act 1948. The Board of Trade’s policy with 
regard to publication of such reports changed subsequently. 
440  Stock Exchange minutes; Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
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offer for sale had been advertised in 93 newspapers, and an assurance that amending 
advertisements had been placed in all of them.441 
Changing the rules without enforcing them would have been pointless, and the JIL episode 
demonstrates that the Exchange was, to some extent, an active enforcer: at least as far as 
Hatry’s transactions were concerned. But there were limits to the Exchange’s activism. 
Arguably, the Exchange had been in a position to spot the dangers of a decline in the quality of 
underwriting. The problems which were to be experienced in 1929, the year of the crash, were 
the result of two factors combining: a series of changes in the drafting of underwriting 
contracts, which had reduced the liabilities of lead underwriters, and the acceptance as sub-
underwriters of insubstantial companies that proved unable to meet their commitments. 
Throughout the 1920s, when applying for permission to deal in shares, companies were 
required to submit copies of contracts, the existence of which had to be disclosed in a 
prospectus. Thus copies of underwriting contracts were made available to the Exchange and, 
indeed, can still be found in the applications files. As a result, even if the relevant committee’s 
members were not personally aware of changes in underwriting practice, access to the 
contracts themselves should have put them on notice of the changes in the liability of lead 
underwriters. There is no evidence in the committee minutes of any appreciation of the 
exposure to poor underwriting that this was to create.  
It would be unreasonable to suggest that the committee should have spotted sub-
underwriters who were potentially incapable of meeting their underwriting commitments. 
Often they were numerous and their financial circumstances were not known to the 
committee. Yet the contractual arrangements were known and the possibility that they would 
lead to a heightened counterparty risk could perhaps have been seen. 
Of course, the implications of such a gradual weakening of contractual terms are much easier 
to see in retrospect; but the implication is that, for whatever reason, the Exchange was in 
reactive mode, acting when problems confronted a committee, as in the case of JIL, but not 
seeking to deal with incipient risks before they became problems. Implicitly, the Exchange left 
its members to decide which risks should be run.  
                                                 
441  Application for Listing file. Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
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Throughout the 1920s the Exchange made no further changes to the rules concerning new 
issues, which presumably was welcome to financially stressed members keen to develop 
business. Newly floated companies had understandably experienced difficulty in the 
circumstances of 1920. Many had suffered trading losses which created the impression that 
they had been over-capitalised on flotation. Some indeed had failed. But the gravity of the 
economic circumstances of 1920 had not been foreseen, so these companies’ difficulties were 
not automatically regarded as a demonstration of a systemic failure. Leyland’s case is an 
example of a business with good prospects whose management, in company with many 
others, had made judgements that in retrospect seemed unwise. Amalgamated Industrials 
Limited fell into insolvency in 1921, little more than a year after its flotation, because of the 
collapse in demand for new ships. Joseph Nathan (the manufacturers of Glaxo),442 Handley 
Page (aircraft manufacturers), Austin Motors and Kommer Vehicles, all of which issued new 
capital in the aftermath of the war, were all later obliged to seek reductions in their capital.  
A study published by the Balfour Committee observed: 
‘ . . . over-capitalisation is not something quite definite, recognisable at any time, to 
which it is possible to attach a label and in respect of which a culprit is necessarily in 
the background, though there can be no doubt as to the existence of culprits in some 
cases or as to the evil and the losses which have resulted. In so far as over-
capitalisation results from normal changes in value or in profits it is inherent in 
business and cannot be avoided. In so far as it results from the skill of men in 
exploiting the cupidity and ignorance of the public it merits opprobrium.’443 
This memorandum, prepared for the committee by DH Allan, an accountant, concentrated 
upon the effect of over-capitalisation on the costs and competitiveness of industry because 
that had been the focus of campaigns in Bradford and elsewhere. It did not consider the effect 
on investors, especially unsophisticated investors. 
Nonetheless, towards the end of 1928, it was recognised in the press that the quality of new 
issues may have declined and this must also have been understood by the Exchange: 
‘The flood-tide of the new issue season is again at its height . . . To the impartial 
observer . . . this autumnal rush has seemed to include a more than usually large 
number of highly speculative enterprises born of the popularity of shilling shares, and 
                                                 
442  Glaxo was a dried milk baby food marketed under the slogan: ‘Glaxo builds bonny babies’. 
443  Balfour Committee (1928); page 174. The examples of capital reductions are taken from a list of 
capital reductions that was presented to the committee with the draft report but was not published. 
National Archives; file COS 5288.  
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nurtured by the boom in safety glass, gramophones, and photographic processes  . . . 
A feature of the year has been the repeated over-subscription of speculative issues, 
the attraction of whose deferred shares as gambling counters were more regarded by 
the public than their merits as an investment.’444 
The Economist returned to this theme in January 1929, when it described a practice by which, 
once floated, a company sold some element of its business to another company whose shares 
were then offered for sale to the public. Blue Bird was one such company: 
‘Five generations of the “Blue Bird” family have come into being during the last four 
and a half years. The earliest company had a motor garage business, and sold its 
wholesale petrol trade to a second concern, which sold its retail business to a third. 
The last-named disposed of its “foreign” rights to a fourth, and a fifth was organised 
last December to acquire holdings in the other four.’445 
Reflecting concern about the decline in quality, the committee belatedly made small changes 
to the rules to require more prominent disclosure of details of the capital of a company 
applying for permission for dealing in its shares.446 By this stage, the damage had been done. 
The combination of members seeking to escape from financial pressure and the unwillingness 
or inability of the Exchange to curb their excesses had the result that in 1928: 
‘ . . . practically any rubbish could be sold and the brokerages paid out on these issues 
were substantial.’447 
Prosecution 
Quite apart from the failure of the Stock Exchange rules to prevent the decline in the quality of 
new issues that occurred during the later 1920s, there were signs that public law generally was 
failing to deter abusive share promotion and selling activity.  
In the 1920s, the occurrence of two booms and the increase in abusive activity, which had 
been foreseen before the end of the war and which evidently gathered speed as the decade 
wore on, might have been expected to lead to an increase in prosecutions especially of 
fraudulent promoters and abusive share-pushers. After all, in other jurisdictions, this is 
precisely what happened. After a press campaign for the protection of bondholders from 
                                                 
444  The Economist; 10 November 1929; page 830. 
445  The Economist; 19 January 1929; page 112. The Blue Bird Garage in King’s Road Chelsea was 
created by Sir Malcolm Campbell, who named all his land speed record-holding cars Blue Bird. 
446  The Economist; 5 January 1929; page 5. 
447  Kinross (1982); page 71. 
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pushers trying to persuade them to exchange sound investments for shares in all manner of 
speculative ventures, the Attorney General of Ontario: 
‘ . . . decided to crack down on those who failed to comply with Ontario’s Companies 
Act by not filing prospectuses before advertising shares for sale.’448 
The outcome was a series of prosecutions. 
In England, the level of prosecutorial activity against share pushers can be assessed from 
evidence provided to the Bodkin Committee in 1937. In response to a request from the 
committee, the Board of Trade prepared a report of action taken in respect of suspected share 
pushing activities. This showed that between 1910 and 1929 no more than 34 cases had led to 
some form of action, including prosecution in some cases: fewer than two in each year.449 A list 
of the cases is set out in Appendix One to this Chapter. It also showed that an interesting range 
of charges was used, which may suggest that there was some difficulty in finding charges that 
matched precisely the activities of pushers, although the DPP appears to have believed that for 
most purposes the available charges were adequate.450 A list of the charges used is set out in 
Appendix Two to this Chapter. 
In addition, between 1919 and 1929, a small number of prosecutions arose from charges 
relating to allegedly fraudulent prospectuses. In 1920, Ernest Terah Hooley and others were 
prosecuted on charges relating to a fraudulent prospectus in respect of Jubilee Cotton Mills 
Limited. This was to be the last of Hooley’s long list of company promotions. Known as the 
Napoleon of Finance, he had a reputation as an irrepressible salesman: 
‘As a traveller in stocks and shares the Risley Squire was a super-barterer without 
contemporary compare. He could sell anything, and knew the ball game to a tick – 
how and when to place his Sam Slick commodities. 
It was no use telling him you didn’t fancy such-and-such a “line”. “All right,” he would 
say, “I must see if I can’t find something you do fancy. I’ll call again.”’451 
                                                 
448  Armstrong (1997); page 98. 
449  National Archives; file BT 298/69.  
450  The Director gave evidence on this point to the Greene Committee. He suggested that the 
provisions of the Larceny Acts generally sufficed: adducing necessary evidence was a greater problem. 
Answer to Question 1741; 13 May 1925; Minutes of Evidence of the Greene Committee (1925). 
451  Bell (1939); page 165. 
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A year later, Isaac Hickson was prosecuted on charges arising out of the operations of the 
National Alliance House Purchase and Investment Company Limited.452 In 1922, Gerard Lee 
Bevan was prosecuted on a number of charges including one relating to the prospectus issued 
by City Equitable Associated Interests Limited in 1921.453 Albert Augustus Scanlan was 
prosecuted in 1924 on charges relating to a company called Marchants Limited.454 Finally, in 
1927, Colonel Edmund Eaton and others were prosecuted on charges that related to Chalk Fuel 
Power Gas and By-Products Corporation Limited.455 
How effective all of this was as a deterrent is not clear: there is no way of measuring how 
much abusive activity there might have been had no prosecutions taken place. The evidence 
suggests, however, that there was an increase in abusive share-pushing after the end of the 
war and particularly after 1925. It also suggests that, driven out of New York by the campaign 
of Albert Ottinger, American share-pushers found that England offered a relatively benign 
environment in which to ply their trade.456 This at least suggests that in England prosecutions 
were not proving an effective deterrent; the record of prosecutions may offer some 
explanations. 
There is a parallel between the English experience in the 1890s and the New York experience 
in the 1920s: in both cases, the pursuit of company promoters and share-pushers through the 
courts sprang from a person’s mission, albeit springing from different motives.  
In the 1890s in England, this role had been taken by John Smith, the Inspector General of 
Companies Liquidation, who used his power to undertake public examinations of companies in 
liquidation to investigate company failures and reveal potential cases for prosecution. When 
he left his position in 1903, his department was restructured and the series of revelations 
came to an end.457  
                                                 
452  The Times; 28 October 1921; page 4. 
453  The Times; 21 November 1922; page 6; and subsequently. Vander Weyer (2011); page 216 et 
seq. 
454  The Times; 15 April 1924; page 5. 
455  The Times; 22 June 1927; page 28; and subsequently. 
456  Interestingly, although there was a history of American share-pushers extending their activities 
to Canada, Armstrong (1997) does not suggest that the exodus of share-pushers from New York in the 
mid-1920s led to an increase in their activity in Canada, which may suggest that the prosecution activity 
in England was also viewed by share-pushers to be more benign than in Canada. 
457  Batzel (1987); page 364. 
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Smith viewed companies as a device that the unscrupulous used to avoid the public exposure 
that would be given to business malpractice under the Bankruptcy Acts: a process with which 
he was familiar as he had for some years been Inspector General of Bankruptcy. He viewed his 
appointment as Inspector General in Companies Liquidation as an opportunity to close this 
loophole.458  
In New York, in the mid-1920s, Albert Ottinger was to use action against share-pushers and 
promoters as the foundation for his campaign to secure election as Governor of New York.459 In 
this he was assisted by the NYSE, which regularly reported to him instances of traders and 
conduct that might warrant investigation. There is no evidence (either in the Stock Exchange 
Archive or the records of the DPP) that the London Stock Exchange ever considered making 
such reports. As far as is known, the Exchange only once brought the matter to public 
attention when it submitted evidence to the Greene Committee on the Amendment of 
Company Law.460 
In England in the 1920s, there was no one with the missionary zeal in an official position with 
the necessary powers to act against company promoters and share-pushing fraud. 
Throughout the decade, every prosecution arising from an allegedly fraudulent prospectus 
followed an earlier process which had attracted public attention. On 14 March 1921, Barry 
Police Court saw the beginning of criminal proceedings against the Chairman, Managing 
Director and six other officials of the National Alliance House Purchase and Investment 
Company which had attracted attention six months earlier.  In September 1920, Laura Frish 
had sought the Court’s permission to issue a writ against the company on the grounds that she 
had been induced to purchase certificates from the company by misrepresentations in a 
prospectus. Permission of the English Court was required because the writ would be served 
out of jurisdiction as the company had been registered in Scotland, although the victims of the 
alleged misrepresentations lived in Wales. The company argued that the application was an 
abuse of process: calculated to gain public attention for a violent and unjustified attack on the 
integrity of the company and its directors. In fearing public attention the company was proved 
right, for the effect of the application was to draw public attention to an allegedly fraudulent 
                                                 
458 Batzel (1987); page 355. 
459  He was to fail in this. He marginally lost the election to FD Roosevelt by 25,000 votes in 1928. 
Ott (2009). 
460  Greene Committee Minutes of Evidence (1925); 29 April 1925. 
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promotion which led hundreds of people to lose money.461 In 1921, it was this reaction that led 
to a prosecution instigated by the DPP at which 200 witnesses provided evidence for the 
prosecution. 
Six years later, in 1927, the Registrar of Friendly Societies appointed John Fox as an inspector 
to investigate the affairs of the House Coal Association Limited. Mr Fox’s report found that: 
‘There is abundant evidence that the scheme was promoted and carried out . . . with 
the sole object of putting money into their own pockets and with no regard whatever 
for the interests of the subscribers, which it was their duty to safeguard. The capital 
was subscribed upon the faith of statements contained in the prospectuses . . . which 
were false and which they knew to be false.’462 
228 people had been inveigled into subscribing, 80 of whom were never to see any coal at all 
for their money. In the midst of the attention attracted to this report, a prosecution was 
launched by the DPP.463   
In part, this apparent reluctance to prosecute was due to the limited powers and resources of 
the DPP. It was also due to the marked reluctance of the Board of Trade to order inspections 
using powers under section 109 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 that were the 
equivalent for companies of the investigative powers of the Registrar of Friendly Societies. As 
the DPP observed in giving evidence to the Greene Committee: 
‘I have cases from time to time in which I have a grave suspicion that a company is 
not being honestly conducted. Shareholders communicate with me – I ought to say 
very occasionally – and I am entirely without any powers of investigation. It is useless, 
as I have pointed out in this memorandum, to send anyone down to the office of the 
company. Why, you would be a trespasser; you would be turned out: you have no 
right of any sort or kind. What is the good of writing to the directors or the Secretary? 
That brings you no further, and the only section, apart from an investigation when 
criminal proceedings are intended or are instituted, is section 109, and it has been 
rather a matter of comment in my department that the Board of Trade are very 
difficult to move under section 109. It is also very hard on the shareholders to put up 
                                                 
461  Frish v National Alliance House Purchase and Investment Company. The Times; 9 September 
1920; page 4. 16 September 1920; page 4. 
462  The Times; 12 November 1927; page 4. 
463  The Times; 30 January 1928; page 9. Throughout the 1920s, there is not a single example of a 
prosecution following the appointment of an Inspector by the Board of Trade under the equivalent 
powers within the Companies Acts. 
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the money to meet the expenses of the investigation. If that could be a little more 
frequently put in force, I think the public would be advantaged.’464 
As a result, each instance of a public prosecution relating to an allegedly fraudulent prospectus 
followed public attention attracted either by a private proceeding or another investigative 
process. This suggests that unless there was public pressure, the DPP was reluctant to 
prosecute in such cases. Taylor himself suggests that the DPP may have been unenthusiastic 
about such prosecutions: 
‘Understaffed, overworked, and under constant pressure to provide value for money, 
the DPP learned to steer clear of the bigger financial cases.’465 
The Director’s caution was well justified for fraudulent promotions were expensive to 
investigate and then to prosecute. In the Jubilee Cotton Mills trial, there were six defendants, 
each legally represented. 50 witnesses were called by the prosecution and were each 
subjected to cross-examination by each of the six defence teams. All of this took time, a lot of 
time, and required skills beyond the normal resources of the police. The trial lasted from 
Thursday 9 March 1922 to Saturday 8 April 1922. Before that, two police officers had worked 
on the investigation full time from September 1921, assisted by other officers within the 
Metropolitan Police, officers from the provincial police forces in Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire 
and Lancashire, and external teams of company lawyers and accountants. During the trial, the 
team was augmented by three more officers who were assigned to observe the jury and 
associates of the defendants as the Director had been warned that attempts might be made to 
tamper with the jury.466  
Moreover, in each of the cases prosecuted in the 1920s, the charge that a prospectus was 
fraudulent was accompanied by charges alleging that the defendants had personally extracted 
money from the transaction, so that it would not have been necessary to argue the merits of a 
prospectus in the absence of an allegation that a person had gained a demonstrably 
illegitimate personal benefit. For the unscrupulous, the implication would have been that, 
provided a way could be found of extracting profit from a flotation by a legitimate means, 
prosecution for uttering a fraudulent prospectus would be unlikely.  
                                                 
464  Answer to Question 1812; Evidence of Sir Archibald Bodkin, Director of Public Prosecutions; 13 
May 1925; Minutes of Evidence of the Greene Committee. 
465  Taylor (2013b); page 248. 
466  DI Collins’ report dated 16 April 1922; National Archives; file MEPO 3/518. 
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Prosecution would have been even more contentious in respect of scrupulous vendors shown 
to have authorised a prospectus shown subsequently to have been in breach of the law. 
Doubtless it would have been the vendors’ intention to get the best price for their shares 
however difficult the commercial proposition may have been, but for upright respectable 
vendors, breach of the law would not have been acceptable. It was one of the functions of a 
company promoter to ensure this was achieved. If the promoter went too far and failed to 
comply with the law, from the vendors’ point of view this would have been unintentional.467 
 When six of the jute barons of Dundee chose Clarence Hatry to mastermind the flotation of 
JIL, they knew of his reputation.468 They must also have known that the future of their mills 
was challenged by the growth of competition from mills in Bengal,469 the termination of 
wartime controls, which exposed the Dundee mils again to the volatility of raw jute prices, and 
the growth of unrest among workers in Dundee.470 By the time that the JIL prospectus was 
published, the largest mills had reduced their working hours and their labour force to reduce 
production as sales were falling and losses were in prospect.471 It is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that Hatry was chosen to manage the flotation to devise a means of obtaining a 
satisfactory (for the vendors) price for the mills against a background of worsening prospects.   
The prospectus published by JIL demonstrates why it would have been difficult to base a 
prosecution on the merits (or demerits) of a prospectus in the absence of evidence that cash 
had been extracted illegitimately.472 In that instance, the reader was invited to concentrate on 
                                                 
467  The difficulty of proving intent is the source of the development in the sphere of factory law of 
strict liability for charges which were regarded not so much as ‘crimes’ but as ‘regulatory offences’: a 
distinction not reflected in company law in the 1920s. Croall (2003); page 45. 
468  Correspondence between Robert Fleming and John Cox. Dundee University Archives: reference 
MS 66/I1/10/50. 
469  Shares in three prominent Bengal mills were quoted on the Dundee Stock Exchange. Dundee 
Stock Exchange Archive. Dundee University Archives: reference MS 69. 
470  The Bengal mills had been developed using money from the Dundee jute barons themselves. 
Three Bengal mill companies were quoted on the Dundee Stock Exchange. The Government’s wartime 
jute purchasing scheme was ended early in 1920. Dundee University Archives. For the growth of worker 
activism in Dundee see Walker (1979). 
471  The accounting records of the largest of the six mill companies, Cox Brothers Limited, suggest 
that the company began to record gross losses in mid-October 1920, a month before the offer for sale 
was published. At that point, Cox Brothers Limited began to reduce its workforce to stabilise the average 
cost of production. Dundee University Archives: reference MS 66/II/4. 
472  There is no suggestion that cash was extracted illegitimately in the case of JIL. Hatry took his 
profit as a promoter by way of a dividend paid legitimately by Cox Brothers Limited as it passed through 
the hands of CBL, his company. The vendors all received their consideration in the form of cash paid to 
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the high profits earned during the war and immediately thereafter. There was no mention in 
the prospectus of recent events such as the growth of international competition, the 
termination of wartime central purchasing, the development of labour unrest or the decline 
into loss-making. Nor was there any mention of the collapse in the international price of raw 
jute which had occurred in the summer of 1920 and threatened the balance sheet valuation of 
the mills’ stocks of raw jute which in October 1920 were still carried at original purchase 
price.473 However, the prospectus warned that the wartime profits would not necessarily be 
repeated. Moreover, the most explicit reference to the wartime profits appeared in 
advertisements placed by one of Hatry’s companies: not in the prospectus itself, for which 
alone the directors were responsible. Whilst in retrospect it is evident that the families were 
selling their equity in the face of worsening trading conditions which they did not expect to 
improve in the short term, it was the company promoter’s function to achieve the vendors’ 
objectives without exposing them to a risk of legal action.474  
Irrespective of whether the JIL prospectus was itself fraudulent, the circumstances of the 
flotation demonstrate why prosecution would have been fraught with difficulty and also the 
limitations of the suggestion that disclosure of information in a prospectus afforded protection 
to a potential investor. The weakness of JIL’s future prospects could have been spotted by an 
investor who was knowledgeable about the state of the jute industry, but the investor in 
London may not easily have had access to such knowledge. A potential investor might also 
have paused to wonder why the conservative jute barons of Dundee had chosen the end of the 
                                                                                                                                               
them by CBL as purchaser of their shares. Analysis of payments due to former shareholders; Cox 
Brothers Limited Archive; Dundee University Archives: reference MS 66/II/10. 
473  The accounting practice followed, for example, by Cox Brothers, was that during an accounting 
period raw jute would be valued at purchase price: an adjustment to current market price being made 
at the end of the period when a balance sheet was drawn up. Thus, once a substantial fall in the market 
price had occurred, the directors would have expected a material loss to be recognised at the end of the 
accounting period: as indeed happened in the spring of 1921. This prospect would therefore have been 
known to the directors of Cox Brothers Limited in November 1920 when the JIL prospectus was 
published. Dundee University Archives: reference MS 66/II/11/20. 
474  The analysis of the company’s trading position is based on the accounting records of Cox 
Brothers Limited, the largest of JIL’s predecessor companies, a large collection of which is held by 
Dundee University Archives: reference MS 66/II/3-8. A book containing various memorandum accounts 
includes a weekly analysis of production costs and average cost per unit of production. The account 
shows that total labour costs were falling, as the company reduced its workforce, yet average costs were 
static. The implication is that costs were being managed in the face of falling sales so that average costs 
per unit did not rise and that for such action to be taken the company’s management must have been 
aware of the true trading position. 
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1919–1920 boom in share prices as the moment to sell their equity. In essence, these were 
matters of judgement which would have been problematic in criminal court proceedings. 
These factors serve to explain why prosecutors were unenthusiastic about flotation-related 
prosecutions, undermining any deterrent effect that prosecutions might have had. In practice, 
prosecution tended to result from an accident of public attention rather than being a 
foreseeable consequence of criminal behaviour. Of course there remained the possibility of a 
private prosecution, but only if the aggrieved parties were able and willing to finance it. 
Greene Committee 
Although the JIL case demonstrates the weakness of mandatory disclosure as a basis for 
investor assessment of the riskiness of an offer, the Greene Committee was to add three new 
requirements for mandatory disclosure: a statement of the rights to dividend and capital of 
each class of a company’s shares, a statement of any dividends declared during the three years 
before the prospectus and a statement certified by the auditors of the net profits for the three 
years before the prospectus.475 
Unsurprisingly in the light of the evidence presented, concern about the effectiveness of 
prosecutions lay behind two other groups of recommendations made by the Greene 
Committee. 
Having been appointed following the Court’s decision in the City Equitable case, reaction to 
the committee’s report concentrated on the position and liabilities of directors and auditors. 
City Equitable’s Articles of Association had exempted its directors and auditors from liability 
for loss, except when it was due to ‘wilful neglect of default’.476 The Committee recommended 
that such an exemption should no longer be permitted.477 As far as the issue of shares was 
concerned, the committee adopted a stance similar to that of the Stock Exchange, limiting 
itself to recommending changes to the law reflecting the Exchange’s rule change in December 
1919.478 
                                                 
475  Greene Committee report (1926); pages 16–17. 
476  Re City Equitable Fire Insurance (1925) ChD 407. 
477  Greene Committee report (1926); pages 19-21 and 37–38. 
478  Greene Committee (1926); pages 17–18. 
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However, in taking evidence, the committee was made aware of American share-pushers who 
were attempting to sell ‘units’ in England and the response of authorities in New York when 
similar attempts had been made there: 
‘ . . . it is within our knowledge that the New York Stock Exchange are taking very 
vigorous measures about what they call the foisting on the public of fraudulent shares 
and things of that kind.’479 
The committee must have been persuaded that existing practice was incapable of dealing with 
this abuse, for it recommended strengthening the law so that: 
‘ . . . the offering from house to house of shares, stocks, bonds, debentures  . . . should 
be made an offence . . . ’480 
This recommendation was taken up in the Companies Act 1928, although not unquestioningly, 
for the Board of Trade at one stage decided that the new offence should: 
‘ . . . not be confined to hawking “from house to house” but cover all personal 
canvassing.’481 
This may suggest that the Board of Trade harboured some misgivings about prohibiting ‘house 
to house’ selling in view of the risk that defining the offence might prove problematic in 
practice: as indeed proved to be the case. 
The new offence was regarded as being of such importance that it was the only measure to 
come into force immediately on the King’s Assent being granted: implementation of all other 
sections of the Act being deferred until a consolidating measure could be introduced. The new 
provisions were not universally welcomed, however: 
‘The Board of Trade appears confident that these share pushing provisions will 
eventually end the activities of the vendors of rubbishy shares. We are sorry that we 
cannot share this confidence. 
‘You can never save people from their own foolishness by Act of Parliament.’482 
Although the new legislation had been expedited, it was more than a year before the first 
prosecution took place: the new offences were to prove absurdly easy to circumvent.  
                                                 
479  Answer to Question 1073. Minutes of Evidence of the Greene Committee; 29 April 1925; page 
55. 
480  Greene Committee report (1926); paragraph 93. 
481  Draft minutes of Board of Trade Council; 10 June 1926; National Archives; file COS 2964. 
482  Money Market Review; 11 August 1926; page 299. 
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In support of the Director’s efforts, the committee made a second group of recommendations 
that were intended to deal with the difficulty of investigating cases. It was proposed that 
section 109 (which dealt with Board of Trade inspections) should be amended to remove the 
practical difficulties of which the Director had complained and it was urged that the Director 
should be given new duties to prosecute. Some of these changes were made in the new 
Companies Act, although the Board of Trade was nervous of the cost: 
‘It was thought that the result of amending Section 109 of the Companies Act so as to  
fix the security at a nominal sum and provide that costs, when the investigation is 
followed by a prosecution, shall be defrayed out of public funds, would be to increase 
the number of applications, the expenditure of money and the work of the 
Department. 
‘After consideration, however, it appeared to the Council to be desirable on the whole 
to put the recommendation in the Bill.’483 
Nonetheless there remained a marked difference between the amended powers of the 
Director and the powers that had been used in New York. To American share-pushers, the new 
Companies Act 1928 offences must have seemed tame by comparison: 
‘To enable the Attorney General to expose fraud, he is given broad and drastic powers 
of investigation, of subpoenaing witnesses, examining them and compelling the 
production of books and papers. Charges are not required, but mere suspicion or the 
public interest is sufficient to warrant the investigation. Severe penalties are provided 
for refractory or contumacious witnesses, who may be arrested and sentenced to a 
fine of $5,000 or two years’ imprisonment for refusing to attend, answer questions or 
produce necessary documents. Receivers of fraudulently acquired property are 
provided for, as also are injunctions against fraudulent practices.’484 
This is a description by the Assistant Attorney General of New York of the powers created by 
the Martin Act in 1921;485 it is these powers that were used by Albert Ottinger.486 The key to 
the effectiveness of these powers of investigation is that they could be employed on the basis 
simply of suspicion that a fraud may have been committed or may be about to be committed, 
                                                 
483  Draft minutes of Board of Trade Council; 10 June 1926; National Archives; file COS 2964. 
484  Winter (1927b); page 520. 
485  New York was the 41st State to introduce legislation on this subject, referred to as ‘Blue-Sky 
Laws’. Mahoney identifies three general approaches adopted in these laws. He identifies 12 States that 
required a public official to review the merits of a proposed issue (‘merit review’). In 29 States, a public 
official was empowered to veto issues that appeared fraudulent (‘ex ante fraud’). In seven States, 
including New York, issues were not required to be approved in advance but securities fraud was 
prohibited and a public official was empowered to investigate. Mahoney (2003); page 232. 
486  Indeed, they remain in force. ‘New York Supreme Court denies Barclays’ motion to dismiss 
NYAG’s Martin Act claim’. Headline dated 24 February 2015. Downloaded from www.lexology.com.  
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thus avoiding the need for cause to be shown before intrusive investigations of a company’s 
records can begin. 487 
Although the vigorous action taken in New York was mentioned to the Greene Committee, 
there is no evidence that they inquired what that action was or under what powers it was 
being taken, or that there was any inquiry into developments in other jurisdictions such as 
Canada where, in 1926, licensing share salesmen was being actively considered.488 By 
comparison, the creation of a new, flawed offence of door-to-door selling of shares was an 
inadequate response which manifestly failed to deal with the difficulties of exposing potential 
cases.   
Even jurisdictions that were believed to have used the Greene Committee’s recommendation 
as a basis for new legislation went further. In 1929, France adopted similar legislation 
prohibiting the practice of ‘démarchage financier’.  The measure required that sales, purchases 
and every other operation in connection with shares or bonds should take place on premises 
used for banking purposes to the exclusion of all other commercial premises.489 
An alternative approach, involving registration of share traders, was considered but rejected 
by the Greene Committee partly because it was not considered appropriate for introduction by 
way of amendment of company law.  
How anticlimactic this outcome must have been. The committee had accepted that in some 
forms share promotion represented an abuse that required a response. It had also accepted 
that the existing response was inadequate. Implicitly it had accepted that current prosecutorial 
practice was not a satisfactory deterrent.  In effect, it had seen that the dangers of which AS 
Comyns Carr had warned in his reservation to the Wrenbury Report had come to pass.  
Moreover, the government had accepted that the problem was of sufficient importance to 
require urgent action in the form of expedited legislation. 
Yet the result was a disappointing change to the law which many believed was itself 
inadequate.   
                                                 
487  Loss et al (1958); page 22. ‘The section has a majestic one-sentence sweep.’ 
488  Armstrong (1997); page 130. The papers of the Greene Committee held by the National 
Archives do not include the briefing and research papers that would have been made available to the 
committee. 
489  The Economist; 5 January 1929; page 30.  
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Conclusions 
What is remarkable about the 1920s is that so little was done to guard against the dangers of 
abuse. 
The London Stock Exchange took some pains to monitor and insist upon compliance with the 
rules, but was slow or reluctant to improve them to deal with emerging problems. Thus 
nothing was done to prevent the slide in the quality of underwriting. Furthermore, although 
the Exchange’s committee had brought the problem of share pushers to the attention of the 
Greene Committee in 1926, and must at least have had suspicions of the respectability of the 
operators for whose issues certain brokers sought permission to deal, there appears to have 
been no action to prevent the issues going forward. 
In this, the Exchange adopted a different stance from the NYSE which reported cases of 
abusive off-market activity to the local authorities, supporting Albert Ottinger’s campaign to 
counter abusive share traders. There is no evidence of such reports being made in London. The 
NYSE’s support for the Attorney General’s campaign reflects an interest in ensuring that he 
was successful. New York was one of the last States to introduce a Blue-Sky law in 1921, and 
had not followed the example of some other states in introducing regulatory oversight either 
of share traders or new issues. Failure on the part of the Attorney General would have 
encouraged supporters for prior regulatory approval of new issues which would not have been 
welcome to the NYSE. Presumably the London Stock Exchange did not see similar advantage in 
supporting prosecutions in London. Whatever criticism was levelled at individual members for 
colluding with off-market operators, the Exchange itself stood to be criticised for being slow to 
discourage abuse. 
This was not the only failure, however, for the criminal justice system failed to deter abuse. A 
number of systemic weaknesses contributed to this failure: the inadequate powers assigned to 
the authorities, the inappropriate charges available to them, inefficiencies in the police service 
and the limited resources available to mount prosecutions. Overriding all these factors, fraud 
prosecutions appear only to have had a deterrent effect when driven by a person with a 
missionary zeal. In England in the 1920s, there was no such person, and there must be a 
suspicion that the authorities were not determined to pursue cases with the necessary vigour. 
That the system was failing was to some extent recognised at the time.  
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The Greene Committee was admittedly guarded in its recommendations, but its proposals for 
new charges demonstrate that it believed that existing law did not deal adequately with off-
market operators’ abusive selling. Moreover, in recommending the creation of a new offence 
of door-to-door selling, the Greene Committee implicitly accepted that it was no longer 
acceptable to rely on prosecuting after a fraud had been committed. 
It is however puzzling that, having been told that the authorities in New York had been so 
effective in dealing with such operators that they had left New York and come to England, 
there is no evidence that the Greene Committee inquired  into the laws that had proved 
successful in Ottinger’s hands. It is perhaps especially puzzling as the Greene Committee did 
consider the possibility that registration of migrant traders might afford an effective means of 
control, although it decided that this possibility lay outside its terms of reference. 
To some extent, the government’s sensitivity must be seen against the background of 
widespread political acceptance that financial institutions were failing. 
Initially, at the end of the war, complaints about capitalism had limited appeal. The Labour 
Party’s political programme, outlined in 1918, built on the experience of government 
intervention during the 1914–1918 war and spoke of democratic control of finance and the 
nationalisation of financial institutions.490 It did not command broad political support, 
however, for the Labour Party won only 22.2% of the votes cast in the December 1918 General 
Election. But gradually, as people realised that their post-war expectations would remain 
unrealised491 as  a result of disappointing economic performance, support grew for critiques of 
capitalism. From the notion that capitalist civilisation was decaying, developed by the Webbs 
in 1923,492 by way of Keynes in 1924,493 support grew for modifying capitalist markets by the 
creation or reform of central institutions, until by 1928 it had become supported in some form 
by all political parties:  
 ‘In large companies of diffuse ownership, where the shares are mainly held by the 
general public and not by interests represented by the directors, abuses are 
increasingly frequent, for which the secrecy of accounts is at least partly responsible. 
The common practice of publishing balance sheets which convey entirely inadequate 
                                                 
490  Labour Party (1918). 
491  As articulated in Eliot (1922). Bowra (1949); pages 160–161. 
492  Webb and Webb (1923); page 86. 
493  Keynes (1924). 
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information to the shareholders themselves or can only mislead them, facilitates the 
continuance of mismanagement, and is the cause of loss and deception for the 
investing public for the investing public by placing a premium on “inside information, 
gossip, and breach of confidence”.’494 
These sentences are quoted from the chapter of the Liberal Industrial Inquiry of 1928 which 
described the problem the country faced and went on to suggest that dealing with the 
problem would require the rationalisation of industry. To achieve that, the inquiry suggested, 
would involve the national direction of financial resources through a Board of National 
Investment which would direct public sector investment and raise money by loans as 
needed.495 Although the inquiry’s proposed board would not have powers to direct private 
investment, it was expected to become influential in the direction of savings. 
Even if they would not have supported the proposals of the Liberal Industrial inquiry, there 
were Conservative Members of Parliament who recognised that radical change should be 
considered: 
‘The war period shattered preconceived economic notions, proved possible theoretic 
impossibilities, removed irremoveable barriers, created new and undreamt-of 
situations. Yet by far the greater part of the legislation which today governs trade 
and industry dates from before that period. We are surely entitled to ask whether it is 
now adequate to meet the vastly changed conditions of the modern economic era.’496 
They proposed that obstacles to rationalisation should be removed and that compulsory 
powers should be given to those promoting rationalisation. Co-partnership schemes would be 
introduced in the larger industrial units thus created, and in banks.497  
In 1926, the Independent Labour Party had published a report entitled Socialism in Our Time498 
which proposed not only the nationalisation of certain major industries but also the 
nationalisation of the banking industry. In 1928, the Labour Party published a pamphlet 
written by RH Tawney at the invitation of the Party Conference to encapsulate the Party’s 
programme which observed: 
‘. . . with grave concern the present diversion of a considerable proportion of the 
national credit and national savings into enterprises which, from a public point of 
                                                 
494  Liberal Party (1928); page 85. 
495  Liberal Party (1928); page 111 et seq. 
496  Boothby et al (1927); page 35. 
497  Boothby et al (1927). 
498  Written by JA Hobson, HN Brailsford, EF Wise and A Creech Jones. 
 
Chapter Six 
1919–1929 – Regulating share trading – part I 
 
 
Page 159 
 
view, are at best useless, and at worst, mischievous. It holds that any sane method of 
allocating them among different undertakings should be based on qualitative, as well 
as quantitative, considerations and that services of national importance must be 
adequately financed before resources are placed at the disposal of enterprises 
concerned with luxuries or amusements.’499 
Eventually, in 1929, the Balfour Committee of Industry and Trade reported, and concluded, 
that the machinery for supplying British industry with financial facilities was: 
‘ . . . adequate and suitable . . .’500 
But this conclusion was modified by the observation that: 
‘ . . . we desire to make it perfectly clear that the statement . . . that the machinery . . . 
is on the whole adequate and suitable must not be understood to imply that an 
adequate supply of new capital is actually being absorbed by British industry for 
essential purposes such as the re-conditioning and modernisation of industrial plant, 
buildings and equipment.’501 
In retrospect, these conclusions seem complacent. They were published early in 1929, as the 
1928 boom was collapsing amidst a series of corporate collapses that caused grievous losses 
for many investors, implied that the financial system was flawed and thus supported the 
contention that reform of the system was necessary. That it was possible for the Balfour 
Committee to reach its conclusions and for them to be supported by the Stock Exchange and 
others in part resulted from the market not realising that corporate failures were imminent 
until the last minute. For example, concerns about corporate failures were not reported in 
newspapers until the end of 1928.  
In such views, the Balfour Committee would have taken comfort from the Greene Committee’s 
review of company law which had broadly concluded that there was little need for change to 
the law on prospectuses. 
Finally, the main criticisms of the process of raising capital by public offers of shares focussed 
on the problems of over-capitalisation rather than abuse of investors. This question was 
examined by the Balfour Committee on the basis of professional advice that suggested in any 
flotation there is always a risk of over-capitalisation as the value of a business is a matter of 
judgement and that it can occur through trading at a loss as easily as on flotation. Although 
                                                 
499  Labour Party (1928); page 26. 
500  Balfour Committee (1929); page 48. 
501  Balfour Committee (1929); page 50. 
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abusive over-capitalisation on flotation was a problem, it was difficult to suggest how it might 
be identified in advance so that it could be eliminated without creating undue restrictions. 
On this basis, the arguments in political circles concerning the alleged failures of the capitalist 
financial system were dismissed: only to be revisited in the light of the twin crashes of 1929. 
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APPENDIX ONE TO CHAPTER SIX – CASES OF SUSPECTED SHARE-PUSHING 
1910–1929 
Number Name of concern and 
individuals 
Date of 
complaint 
Principal shares 
involved 
Action taken Modus operandi 
106/10 Lennox & Co 
Charles Stirling 
July 1910 Not known Bankruptcy 
proceedings by 
investors. 
Advertised for 
investors – money 
used for share 
transactions. 
183/11 A1 Investment Securities 
Kent Outcrop Coal 
Syndicate 
A Jackson 
October 
1911 
Electricity 
syndicate 
Enquiries made at 
instigation of DPP. 
No prosecution. 
Issued circulars. 
169/11 Kaslo Slooan Mining 
Corporation 
J Linares 
October 
1911 
Kaslo Slooan 
Mining 
Corporation 
No prosecution. 
Company liquidated. 
Not known. 
96/12 Ceylon Travancore Rubber 
& Tea Estates 
J Chansay, JM Craig, JA 
Vincent 
March 
1912 
Ceylon 
Travancore 
Warrants issued 
against Chansay and 
Vincent for fraudulent 
conversion. 
Vincent discharged at 
Guildhall. 
Chansay escaped to 
Italy. Extradition 
proceedings not taken 
in Italy – arrested but 
then released. 
Issued circulars. 
123/12 IH Bos & Co 
D Dronkers, I Bos 
January 
1913 
Various cotton 
shares – margin 
deals 
Warrant issued for 
conspiracy and false 
pretences. 
Not executed. 
Dronkers and Bos left 
country. 
Issued circulars. 
35/13 Hunter Stevenson 
S Wickens 
March 
1913 
Oak Deposits Wickens charged by 
Metropolitan Police 
with conspiracy to 
defraud in 1921. 
Result not known. 
Issued circulars. 
74/13 John McGowan 
J McGowan 
April 1913 J Lyons & Co Ltd Sentenced to 18 
months’ hard labour 
at Old Bailey in March 
1914 for fraudulent 
conversion. 
Issued circulars – 
failed to deliver 
shares. 
129/13 Barclay Fox & Co 
WB Dumont 
July 1913 Dealings in 
options 
Enquiries at 
instigation of DPP. 
No prosecution. 
Issued circulars. 
1/13 Brixton Skating Rink 
P Morgan 
October 
1912 
Brixton Skating 
Rink 
Morgan sentenced to 
six months (2nd 
division) at Old Bailey 
for obtaining money 
by false pretences and 
publishing false 
prospectus – April 
1913. 
Published false 
prospectus. 
173/13 Henry James 
H James, JA Pollock 
October 
1913 
Brooke Bond Ltd Pollock sentenced to 
nine months’ hard 
labour at Old Bailey – 
December 1913. 
Issued circulars. 
183/13 GE Martin 
GE Martin 
October 
1913 
Junior Army & 
Navy Stores 
No prosecution owing 
to death of Martin. 
Issued circulars.  
186/13 Empire Share Exchange 
J Partington 
October 
1913 
Not known Partington sentenced 
to 15 months’ hard 
labour at Old Bailey – 
March 1914. 
Issued circulars – 
failed to deliver 
shares. 
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Number Name of concern and 
individuals 
Date of 
complaint 
Principal shares 
involved 
Action taken Modus operandi 
56/14 Percy Tarbutt & Co 
PC Tarbutt, E Janson 
June 1914 Sopa Diamond 
Mine Ltd 
No prosecution. Floated company. 
Shares realised high 
prices but were 
subsequently 
worthless. 
42a/15 Algiers Oil Trust 
JAC Johnson 
April 1915 Various Johnson acquitted at 
Old Bailey in June 
1916 on charge of 
false pretences. 
Advertised shares for 
sale in daily 
newspaper – failed to 
deliver shares. 
39/16 Eastern Palms Estate and 
Trading Syndicate 
P Morgan, E Gammage, 
Mrs IM Gammage, J 
Morgan 
June 1916 Straits Coconut & 
Copra Co 
(bogus company) 
No prosecution 
against directors – had 
left the country. 
Bancroft Small fined at 
Old Street Police Court 
for offence against 
Newspaper Printers 
and Reading Room 
Repeal Act 1869 in 
connection with the 
‘Financial Critic’ which 
boosted the shares of 
these countries. 
Induced public to 
invest by making false 
statements as to 
prospects and assets 
of bogus companies. 
39/17 Pacific Coconut Oil Co Ltd 
W Speller, R Morgan 
August 
1917 
Pacific Coconut 
Oil 
Enquiries at 
instigation of DPP. 
No prosecution. 
Induced complainant 
to purchase shares in 
doubtful company. 
66/18 Inclusive Finance and 
Produce Co Ltd 
W Russell, A Culliford, P 
Calls 
August 
1918 
Inclusive Finance 
and Produce Co 
Ltd 
Culliford and Calls 
fined at Mansion 
House – October 
1918. 
Contravention of 
Paper Restriction 
Orders (wartime 
measure). 
Issued circular. 
102/20 Chalk Fuel Power Gas and 
By-products Corpn Ltd 
EC Eaton, Sir Charles 
Soames, RG Harley 
October 
1920 
Chalk Fuel et al Eaton sentenced to 
four years’ penal 
servitude. 
Soames and Harley 
sentenced to six 
months at the Old 
Bailey in January 1928 
for conspiracy, false 
pretences etc. 
Issued circulars. 
61/22 Small Investors Share 
Exchange 
WW Carver 
August 
1922 
Pool operations 
and option 
dealings 
Carver bound over in 
sum of £50 – false 
pretences. 
Issued circulars. 
75/22 Oil and Mineral Land 
Syndicate 
J Johnson, Lt Col F Peter, 
Lord Haldon and J Kirby 
September 
1922 
Offered for sale 
land reputed to 
be oil bearing. 
No police prosecution. 
Board of Trade took 
action against Lord 
Haldon – fined at 
Mansion House for 
offences against 
registration of 
Business Names Act 
1916. 
Issued circulars. 
10/24 Lamport Graham and 
Payne 
G Graham 
July 1924 Various Graham sentenced to 
four-and-a-half  years 
penal servitude at Old 
Bailey for false 
pretences. 
Obtained money for 
shares – failed to 
deliver – absconded. 
73/24 Mortimer Gibbs & Co 
T Tracy 
August 
1924 
Mexican Eagle Tracy sentenced to six 
months with four 
months’ hard labour 
(consecutive) for false 
pretences at 
Westminster Police 
Obtained money for 
shares – failed to 
deliver – absconded. 
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Number Name of concern and 
individuals 
Date of 
complaint 
Principal shares 
involved 
Action taken Modus operandi 
Court in July 1925. 
25/24 K MacIntyre & Co 
 
October 
1924 
Ford Motors Units Enquiries undertaken 
at instigation of DPP. 
No prosecution. 
Company wound up. 
Directors returned to 
USA. 
Issued circulars. 
121/24 Murgatroyd Nickolls & Co 
W Hall 
December 
1924 
Various Warrant issued at 
Mansion House in 
January 1925 for 
Nickolls for false 
pretences. 
Not executed. 
Obtained money for 
shares – failed to 
deliver – absconded. 
11/25 British American 
Securities 
February 
1926 
Ford Motors Units Enquiries at 
instigation of DPP. 
No prosecution. 
Issued circulars. 
9/25 John D Gray 
FS Sewell, T Edwards 
February 
1925 
Marginal deals Enquiries proceeding. Issued circulars. 
34/25 Norman Williams & Co 
J Williams 
May 1926 Option dealings Report to DPP. 
No prosecution. 
Issued circulars. 
8/27 Frederick C Owen 
FC Owen, CW Dickinson 
February 
1927 
Margin deals Dickinson sentenced 
to three years’ penal 
servitude in June 1936 
for false pretences. 
Issued circulars. 
Obtained money by 
falsely representing 
that he had purchased 
shares for clients. 
70/27 Media Shares and 
Exchange Company 
James Bond 
October 
1927  
Radio Corporation 
of America 
No prosecution. 
Bond warned on 
instruction of the 
Assistant 
Commissioner 
regarding his business 
behaviour. 
Issued circulars – 
inviting shareholders 
to submit their 
certificates for 
examination. 
77/27 Tyler Wilton & Co Ltd 
W Williams, T Charlton, 
AC Bowles, R Chickell, 
Jacob Factor 
November 
1927 
Allied Mines 
Limited, Hecla 
Consolidated 
Mines Ltd 
No prosecution. 
Company 
compulsorily wound 
up. 
Issued circular letter. 
Bowles issued 
financial journal – 
Financial Recorder – 
recommending Tyler 
Wilton & Co Ltd as 
reliable brokers. 
2/28 R Ewing & Co. 
Corporation of British 
Investors and the 
Financial Star 
Daily Financial Star Ltd 
S Godfrey MS Godfrey, TIS 
Appleton 
December 
1927 
Anneville Gold 
Mines Ltd – 
Geraldine Copper 
and Lead Mines 
No prosecution. Issued circulars and 
financial journal – 
employed share touts 
to call on clients – 
persuaded them to 
sell good shares and 
buy worthless shares. 
Concerns appear to 
have succeeded each 
other and were 
interlinked. 
9/28 Financial Recorder Ltd 
AC Bowles 
February 
1928 
Hecla 
Consolidated 
Mines Ltd 
Williams Lea & Co 
fined £30 and five 
guineas costs. 
Bowles fined £100 and 
five guineas costs at 
Guildhall in July 1928 
for offences against 
Newspapers, Printers 
and Reading Rooms 
Repeal Act 1869 (DPP 
case). 
Issued journal – 
Financial Recorder. 
14/28 R L Warner 
AE Chapereau, N Schapiro 
(American) 
January 
1928 
Ashanti-Obuasi 
Reefs Ltd 
Warrant issued April 
1928 at Guildhall for 
arrest of Warner for 
Called on complainant 
– persuaded him to 
part with money for 
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Number Name of concern and 
individuals 
Date of 
complaint 
Principal shares 
involved 
Action taken Modus operandi 
fraudulent conversion. 
Arrested March 1936 
by Metropolitan 
Police. No evidence 
offered owing to 
death of complainant. 
Further charged under 
Aliens Order 1920 – 
being found in UK 
without leave of an 
immigration officer. 
Adjourned to allow 
him to leave UK – left 
via Croydon airport in 
July 1936. 
purchase of shares – 
converted money to 
his own use. 
2/29 City News And Stock 
Exchange Observer 
A Osborn and A Paris 
January 
1929 
Various Williams Lea & Co Ltd 
fined £30 and five 
guineas costs at 
Guildhall in July 1929 
for offences against 
NP&RRA 1869. 
Three further 
summonses under 
same Act dismissed in 
May 1929 
(DPP case). 
Issued financial 
journal. 
75/29 Waite,  McGregor & Co 
GF Steward, H Walters 
December 
1929 
Various Enquiries at 
instigation of DPP. 
No prosecution. 
Principals left country. 
Issued financial 
journal – Stock Market 
Indicator – boosting 
shares and employed 
share touts. 
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APPENDIX TWO TO CHAPTER SIX – OFFENCES QUOTED IN APPENDIX ONE 
 
Short title used in 
Appendix One 
Relevant legislation Description Maximum penalty 
False pretences Larceny Act 1861 as 
amended by the Larceny 
Act 1916. 
Obtaining property by 
intentionally misrepresenting a 
past or existing fact 
Penal servitude for any term 
not exceeding five years – 
section 32 of the 1916 Act. 
Fraud  Not strictly an offence – the 
offences which are commonly 
called fraud being otherwise 
described technically – in 
general parlance, it is the 
intentional deception made for 
personal gain or to damage 
another individual 
 
Fraudulent 
conversion 
Larceny Act 1916 (which in 
this respect repealed and 
replaced the Larceny Act 
1901). 
Converting property entrusted 
to a person for a particular 
purpose to his own use or 
benefit or any other purpose 
than that originally intended 
Penal servitude for any term 
not exceeding seven years – 
section 20(1) of the 1916 
Act. 
Newspapers, 
Printers 
Newspapers, Printers and 
Reading Room Repeal Act 
1869. 
Various provisions relating to 
the inclusion in printed works 
of the names and addresses of 
printers and publishers 
Fine of £20 for each 
omission, neglect etc. 
Offences against 
Companies Act 
Companies Act 1929 – 
sections 34 and 35. 
Sections relate to the issue of 
prospectuses – as to their 
required content – and as to 
forms of application for shares 
not being issued without an 
accompanying prospectus 
Fine of £500: section 35(3). 
Offences against 
Paper Restriction 
Orders 
 Wartime orders issued to limit 
the use of paper 
 
Offences against 
Registration of 
Business Names 
Act 
Registration of Business 
Names Act 1916. 
Provides for the registration of 
business names 
 
It is unclear whether the 
charges related to a failure to 
register or a failure to register 
appropriate details 
For a default in registration: 
fine up to £5 for every day 
for which the default 
continues – section 7 of the 
1916 Act. 
 
For false statements in a 
registration – imprisonment 
with or without hard labour 
up to three months or a fine 
up to £20 or both – section 
9 of the 1916  Act. 
  
  
CHAPTER SEVEN: 1929 – THE YEAR OF TWO CRASHES 
 
 
Introduction 
Matters were brought to a head by the two crashes of 1929: the first in the spring, which saw 
the failure of many companies floated in 1928, and the second in September, precipitated by 
the collapse of Clarence Hatry’s companies. The crashes became an existential threat to the 
Exchange as they coincided with the election of a minority Labour government on a manifesto 
envisaging nationalisation of the Bank of England and the creation of a National Investment 
Bank to direct investment. These events galvanised members to support reforms of the new 
issue rules although as the crisis gradually subsided, so their support also subsided and certain 
proposals were not implemented. 
The first crash of 1929 
By the end of January, there was bad news of two speculative promotions. At the annual 
meeting of  Ner Sag Limited, one of the more notorious promotions which owned rights to a 
bed design which it was claimed would never sag, shareholders had rejected the accounts 
after being told by the directors that the company’s financial position could not be determined 
readily from the accounting records. The directors had presented a bankruptcy petition against 
the promoter, Mr Brandreth, whose whereabouts were unknown.502 
On the same day, it was reported that Blue Bird Holdings, a newly floated company, had failed 
to make cash payments for shares of other Blue Bird companies that had been promoted in 
the previous two years and which it had promised to acquire. At a meeting at the end of 
January, the promoter, Mr Lorang, attempted to explain why the cash raised by the flotation of 
Blue Bird Holdings had not been available. As The Economist reported: 
‘These explanations do not altogether lighten the shareholders’ darkness.’503 
Blue Bird was an example of what The Economist called ‘parent finance’: a technique for  
milking the maximum cash from highly speculative promotions. Companies would be formed, 
                                                 
502  The Economist; 26 January 1929; page 172. He was subsequently apprehended and prosecuted. 
The Times; 18 February 1929; page 7. 
503  The Economist; 26 January 1929; page 169. 
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allegedly to exploit a new invention or process, and then floated. After flotation, the company 
would sell some of its entitlement to exploit rights within a particular territory to another 
company whose shares would in turn be offered to the public.  Apart from Blue Bird, there 
were many examples of this practice, including some floated by Clarence Hatry.504 
Nervousness about speculative promotions was heightened in February505 by an increase in 
Bank Rate from 4½ to 5½%. In addition,  there was a growing realisation that no party might be 
able to win an overall majority in the General Election, which in turn contributed to 
speculation about the process by which a government might be formed after an inconclusive 
election and what its programme might be.506 Inevitably, the uncertainty led to a fall in share 
prices, which disproportionately affected shares floated in 1927 and 1928.  It also led to new 
issues in February and March proving unsuccessful: especially the more speculative 
promotions. A number failed lamentably to attract subscriptions so that large numbers of 
shares were left with underwriters. 
Table 7.1: Shares issued in February–March 1929.  
Proportion of issue left with underwriters – five largest507  
 
 
Company 
 
Nature of offer 
Proportion left with underwriters 
% 
Roadway Time Tables 320,000 5 shilling shares 92% 
Trowbridge Tyre & Rubber 550,000 5 shilling ordinary 90% 
Curzon Bros & Maxims 594,000 5 shilling ordinary 90% 
Walls & Highley Theatres 95,000 8% £1 cumulative 
participating preference 
400,000 1 shilling ordinary 
82% 
Multidoor 580,000 5 shilling ordinary 80% 
 
After Easter,  the prices of shares floated in the 1928 boom continued to fall.  
                                                 
504  The Economist; 19 January 1929; page 111. Hatry had floated Photomaton Parent Corporation 
Limited, Far Eastern Photomaton Limited, and Photomaton (Lancashire and Midlands) Limited. 
505  7 February 1929. 
506  ‘The Minority Dilemma’. The Economist; 16 February 1929; page 327. 
507  The Economist; 6 April 1929; page 756. 
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Table 7.2: Low denomination shares issued in 1927 and 1928: market price changes January–
June 1929508 
 
   1929 14 Jan 
1929 
27 June 
1929 
Jan–June 
1929 
Highest 
price 
Lowest 
price 
Price Price Rise or 
fall  % 
Duophone  12/= 1/6 6/3 1/7½  -74.5 
Electramonic 3/8 1/= 2/= 1/= -50.0 
Dominion Records 2/1¾  6¾  2/1½  10½d  -58.8 
Photomaton Parent 15/7½ 12/3 15/= 13/9 -8.3 
Far Eastern Photomaton 3/9¼  4½ d 3/6 1/= -71.4 
Ner Sag  £4/0/0 4/1½  50/=  12/6 -75.0 
Ner Sag (Overseas) 9/6 5d 7/6 9d -90.0 
Photomatik Portraits 1/2½  1½d  10½d 2½d -76.2 
British Filmcraft 2/9 6 d 2/4 ½ 10 ½ d -63.2 
British Lion Film Corp. 41/6 4 ½ d 1/4  ½ 6 ¾ d -59.1 
Whitehall Films 7 ½ d 1 d - - - 
Waste Food Products 18/9 2/- 15/- 3/11 ½ -75.3 
 
None of this can have been helped by the fact that some of the weakest companies floated in 
1928 and early 1929 were already being wound up.509  Nor was the position improved by court 
hearings in which companies tried, often vainly, to insist on underwriters taking up their 
shares.510 The North British Artificial Silks case attracted particular attention as it was found 
that the issuing house, Tokenhouse Securities, had agreed with the company that it should not 
be liable for non-performance by sub-underwriters. Within the Exchange, the committee was 
receiving a series of requests for it to adjudicate on disputes between members arising from 
underwriters and others seeking to avoid liabilities.511  
                                                 
508   Table reproduced from The Economist; 29 June 1929; page 1461. 
509  For example: Poso-graph Great Britain Distributing which had been floated on 25 October 1928. 
510  FA Hales Limited v Cross Keys Trust Limited; Financial Times; 2 July 1929; page 11. North British 
Artificial Silk v Tokenhouse Securities; Financial Times; 26 July 1929; page 10. 
511  Hoblyn & King v Pike & Bryant: re Poso-Graph Parent Corporation; 9 May 1929. CH Eden v J 
Joseph & Company: re American and Dominions Unbreakable Records (ADUR); 17 May 1929. J Joseph & 
Company v Higginson Wallis & Company: re ADUR; 4 June 1929. 
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These public and private disputes led in July 1929 to a campaign in the Financial Times about 
the consequences for investors of poor underwriting, canvassing ways in which the position 
could be improved and calling for the Exchange to take action to bring an end to the abuse: 
‘If a finance house has not sufficient standing to procure genuine and honest sub-
underwriters then it should never float companies. Anyone can obtain a promise of 
money from a man who never intends to fulfil his promise. This is definitely a matter 
upon which the Stock Exchange Committee should take action.’512 
Unbeknown to the press, action had already  been taken  as the Sub-Committee on New Issues 
and Official Quotations had been asked to investigate instances in which sub-underwriters had 
defaulted and issues which had shown other unsatisfactory features. The committee’s report 
dated 9 August 1929, which was limited to an examination of public documents, listed 29 cases 
that warranted further investigation and suggested that there were probably other cases that 
the committee had not identified because the appropriate reports had not been published. In 
each of these cases, subscription of a material amount of the company’s capital was in arrears: 
the highest being Transmutograph Limited with subscribed capital of £83,000 of which 78.36% 
was in arrears.513 The report noted that the paid up capital of the syndicate that had 
underwritten the shares was merely £9. In some of the cases, preliminary expenses 
represented a substantial proportion of the subscribed capital: the highest being Universal 
Refrigerators Limited whose preliminary expenses represented 43.9% of subscribed capital.514  
Ten firms of brokers were involved in the cases named by the committee: including the two 
firms that had been most active during the boom: T Gordon Hensler & Company (18 flotations 
in 1928) and Charles Stanley & Company (16 flotations in 1928).515   The number of cases and 
firms identified suggested that there was a significant problem. 
The report recommended that, in view of the number of cases, the brokers in question should 
be ‘seen’ or in other words interviewed and asked for an explanation. It also recommended 
that the rules should require that brokers sponsoring an issue should confirm that they had 
                                                 
512  Financial Times; 25 July 1929; page 7. 
513  The company had been floated in March 1929. The brokers responsible were Simpson Miller & 
Springer. 
514  The company had been floated in December 1928. The brokers responsible were T Gordon 
Hensler & Company. 
515  The ten brokers named in the report had been responsible for 67 out of the 288 new issues in 
1928. 
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satisfied themselves that underwriters and sub-underwriters were good for their 
commitments.516 
The Horne Group 
Before action could be taken on this report, the market’s attention had passed to a different 
issue. Up to this point, attention had been taken by companies that had issued shares: not by 
the people or businesses promoting them. At the beginning of August, The Economist drew 
attention to a company whose business was reorganising companies and floating issues: 
British Cement Products and Finance Company Limited. The company had been formed in 
1926 by HS Horne, a former stockbroker, to take interests in independent cement 
manufacturers which he formed into a group trading under the brand ‘Red Triangle’ cement in 
competition with O’Hagan’s ‘Blue Circle’ group. He had gone on to form Associated Anglo-
American Corporation, Carmelite Trust and Anglo-Foreign Newspapers, all of which took 
interests in newspaper companies.  
All of these companies were intended to exploit Mr Horne’s theory that by acquiring 
substantial share interests, financial trusts staffed by progressive thinkers and advised by 
technical experts could use their voting power to maximise industrial efficiency.  Each of the 
companies was financed by loans secured on the share interests being acquired. As market 
share prices fell, so concern about the finances of his companies grew and their own share 
prices also fell, partly encouraged by the fact that accounts were published late. Unease was 
encouraged by fresh approaches to existing shareholders to raise additional capital: 
approaches that were accompanied by requests that the prospectus circulated to shareholders 
should be returned to the company.517 By mid-September 1929, the Horne companies’ share 
prices had fallen by more than 75% from the highest prices they had reached during 1929.518 
                                                 
516  Stock Exchange minutes; 12 August 1929; Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
517  Circular letter. Fremantle papers; Buckinghamshire County Records Centre, Aylesbury. The 
prospectus in question is not with the Fremantle papers so was, presumably, returned as requested. The 
Stock Exchange Archive does not hold a copy of this prospectus which suggests that there was no 
application to deal in the shares concerned. 
518  The Economist; 20 July 1929; page 126–7. 3 August 1929; page 230–1. 14 September 1929; 
page 485.  
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The Hatry Group and the United Steel scheme 
At this point, attention turned to the Hatry group, for his companies were also known to 
borrow money to finance share interests, and had been slow in publishing accounts. 
From the beginning of 1929, Hatry’s companies had been short of cash. This may have been 
caused by the fall in share prices, as in 1921; but as his companies’ accounting records have 
not survived, the precise cause cannot be known. In the following months, Hatry was to resort 
to a number of desperate measures to raise money. In January and February 1929, on the 
acquisition of British Automatic Company (BAC) by Associated Automatic Machine 
Corporation, the BAC pension scheme’s investments were replaced by Hatry group securities 
and realised for cash.519 In January 1929, Hatry formed Iron Industries Limited with a nominal 
capital of £650,000. On 4 February 1929, Austin Friars Trust (AFT) applied for 500,000 of the 
650,000 £1 shares paid for by a cheque drawn by Austin Friars Trust which was immediately 
loaned back by Iron Industries. The capital was later increased to £700,000. AFT’s shares in this 
newly created shell company were then used as security for bank loans amounting to 
£600,000.520 In May 1929, Hatry sought the agreement of the directors of CGS to make a public 
offer of £400,000 of its shares but was opposed by Frederick Braithwaite of Foster & 
Braithwaite. Although no offer was ever made, contracts for underwriting the issue were 
placed and used as security for a loan of £400,000 from Westminster Bank.521 In August 1929, 
British Photomaton Trading Company Limited was formed to develop the Photomaton 
business in the United Kingdom and whose shares were distributed to shareholders in existing 
Photomaton companies.522  
Meanwhile, having organised the flotation of Allied Ironfounders Limited, which brought 
together 15 English and Scottish foundries engaged in making light castings,523 Hatry conceived 
the idea of a similar amalgamation of heavy iron and steel companies and, in the process, 
writing off their accumulated losses. In February 1929, he began soliciting support for his 
                                                 
519  National Archives; file DPP 1/91. 
520  Manley (1976); pages 54–55. 
521  Note dated 28 May 1929 of a meeting on 17 May 1929. Foster & Braithwaite Archive; Guildhall 
Library. CGS Companies’ House file. National Archives; file BT31/218878/203047. 
522  The Times, 8 August 1929; page 16. 
523  The issued share capital of Allied Ironfounders Limited was £1.6 million. In addition, the 
flotation was to raise £748,800 through an offer of £780,000 6% Convertible Debenture Stock at 96%. 
The Times; 13 May 1929; page 24. 
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scheme524  which envisaged that a new company would acquire the share capital of the 
companies being amalgamated, and that subsequently the new holding company would issue 
its own shares to meet the cost of acquisition. It was planned that the nominal value of the 
new company’s share capital  would be considerably smaller than that of the predecessor 
companies so that the underlying businesses would be relieved of the servicing cost.  Between 
the original acquisition and the share issue, the scheme would be financed partly by bank 
borrowing and partly by cash deposited by members of a syndicate created for the purpose.525 
Hatry envisaged that once the initial transaction had been completed, the new company would 
acquire controlling interests in other steel companies thus leading in time to the amalgamation 
of the whole industry.  
The scheme went through a number of iterations, but was eventually announced on 16 April 
1929 when the directors of United Steel Companies circulated a letter to shareholders setting 
out the terms of the offer which was conditional upon acceptance by 90% of each class of 
shares. Although the required acceptances had not been received by the deadline, the 
acceptance period was extended and the condition was satisfied by the new deadline: 19 May 
1929. As a result, the transaction went ahead; the due date for payments to be made to 
shareholders was set as 19 June 1929.  
Hatry had not been able to settle the financing arrangements for the transaction before 19 
May 1929. Indeed, it was not until 24 June 1929 that he reported to M Samuel & Company 
that he had placed the preference shares to be issued by the new holding company:526 Steel 
Industries of Great Britain Limited.  He explained that: 
                                                 
524  M Samuel Private Office memorandum; 18 February 1929; Lloyds Bank Archive. 
525  M Samuel Private Office memoranda; 8 April 1929 and October 1929. Lloyds Bank Archive. File 
S/1/1/6/228. The total amount required for the purchase of the debentures and shares of United Steel 
and United Strip & Bar was £4.2 million. In addition, Hatry undertook to repay the bank overdrafts of 
these companies which amounted to approximately £2.9 million. Memorandum of Sir Gilbert Garnsey to 
form the basis of a Proof of Evidence. National Archives; file DPP1/91. 
526  This completed the financing of the streel scheme. It was once thought that Hatry was not able 
to complete the financing; but that misunderstanding was dispelled when Sir Gilbert Garnsey’s report 
became available on the opening by the National Archives of the files of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions. Sir Gilbert’s memorandum makes clear that the steel scheme financing was completed, 
and that Hatry’s companies must therefore have been short of cash before the steel scheme was 
conceived. Manley (1976); page 81. Walker (1977); page 81. Jones (1981); page 150. Jones (1995); page 
143 et seq 
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‘ . . . he had faced considerable personal opposition from several quarters, chiefly 
Vickers and Nivisons and the Governor of the Bank of England.’527 
Nivisons had suffered from Hatry’s competition as they had been one of the three firms of 
brokers who had monopolised local authority loan issues before Hatry had turned his attention 
to that market. Moreover, at the beginning of 1929 he had been responsible for floating a loan 
for the City of Melbourne. This was Hatry’s first Empire issue528 and thus was a new threat to 
Nivisons’ business. For his part, the Governor had his own interest in industrial reorganisation, 
and may have believed that Hatry’s intervention was inconvenient. He was also close to 
Nivisons and the other firms that handled Empire issues, for they managed a queuing system 
that controlled the flow of Empire issues and was approved by the Bank of England. 
To stem this opposition, on 29 May 1929 Hatry had visited the Governor who told him: 
‘ . . . so far as it was possible for him to comment on Mr Hatry’s proposals, he was not 
satisfied that: 
(1) a project on this scale (i.e. to embrace 60% of the whole Steel Industry of the 
country) was feasible or immediately desirable: 
(2) a sound valuation and examination of the conditions of the Companies and of the 
Plant &c both from a financial and industrial point of view, had been made: 
(3) the people were ready at hand to run the nationalized industry.’529 
The Governor went on to say that he had been responding to questions from bankers by telling 
them that he opposed the scheme.530  Three days later, the Governor described his impression 
of this meeting in a letter to Frank Tiarks, a director of Schroders: 
‘The impression left on my mind is something like this: he has already bitten off a 
scheme as large as (or larger than) he can chew: if he could further actualise a dream 
and join the two together on your and my backs, he would be relieved – and also 
successful. For the moment he is absorbed by the prospect of this relief and success – 
                                                 
527  M Samuel Private Office memorandum; 24 June 1929; Lloyds Bank Archive. 
528  Connolly papers; National Library of Australia. 
529  Bank of England Archive; file ADM 1 /2. The difficulty is unlikely to have been caused wholly by 
the Governor as the failure of the Conservative Party to win a majority in the General Election on 30 
May 1929 will have contributed. Frederick Szarvasy’s opinion had been that ‘. . . if the Conservative 
Government got back with a majority of 40 he was certain there would be a considerable boom in such 
shares as these.’ M Samuel & Company Private Office memorandum; 22 May 1929; Lloyds Bank Archive. 
530  Wood and Wood (1954); page 152. 
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to it he would give up profit and leadership, just as he has already given up other 
good things. A dangerous and perhaps an ailing Mr Hatry.’531 
In the face of the Governor’s opposition, Hatry might have considered aborting his scheme, for 
completing the financing proved difficult. Any technical difficulty relating to the proposed steel 
combination was magnified by the result of the General Election at which a minority Labour 
government was elected on a manifesto envisaging reforms of City institutions and 
government direction of investment. It was expected that share prices would fall in reaction to 
the outcome of the election and this would make it more difficult for Hatry to raise further 
bank loans using share holdings as security. Perhaps Hatry had lost the ability to be objective 
about the scheme, an opinion formed by Hubert Meredith when he discussed the steel 
scheme with Hatry: 
‘As he sat opposite to me, smoking away at his pipe, the financier disappeared and in 
his place there seemed to me to be a very vain man undertaking a colossal task, not 
with the idea of making money out of it, but with the object of showing the world 
what a great man Clarence Hatry really was.’532 
For whatever reason Hatry continued, but although by 24 June 1929 he was able to place the 
new preference shares he had not been able to arrange the loans that the new holding 
company would require in the interim. Hatry’s later recollection, which was to be hotly 
disputed, was that at a meeting of the four key directors on Sunday 23 June 1929, one of 
them, John Gialdini, had suggested that they could create documents that would serve as 
collateral for bank loans by duplicating receipts for subscriptions to local authority loan issues 
and certified share transfers. The Hatry companies would then be able to raise the necessary 
money.533 Recognising that the steel scheme would fail unless the necessary cash was found, 
the four directors agreed to take this course, and proceeded to duplicate documents and use 
                                                 
531  Letter dated 1 June 1929. Bank of England Archive; file SMT 118/7. Similar letters were sent to 
Edward Peacock, a partner in Barings, and Sir Guy Granet of Higginsons. These letters are part of a 
continuing correspondence between the Governor and others concerning Hatry’s steel scheme. 
532  Meredith (1931); page 309. 
533  Some have suggested that this was not the first occasion on which Hatry and his associates had 
done this: Michie (1999); page 262. This study has only found evidence of one previous anomaly that 
may have been the result of irregular use of loan certificates. That occasion appears also to have been 
Gialdini’s responsibility. Sir Gilbert Garnsey’s memorandum; pages 15–16; National Archives; file DPP 
1/91. If the issue of supernumerary receipts had been a regular feature of Hatry’s operation, it might 
have been normal practice to print sufficient blank receipts in advance for this to happen. At Hatry’s 
trial, evidence was adduced that it was necessary for additional blank receipts to be printed for 
Gialdini’s scheme to be implemented. This also suggests that the issue of additional receipts in 1929 was 
exceptional. 
  Chapter Seven 
1929 – The year of two crashes 
 
 
Page 175 
 
them as collateral for new short-term loans.534 Hatry later suggested that the directors were 
partly moved to adopt this course of actions by a somewhat emotional outburst by Gialdini: 
‘Gialdini, however, persisted and said that we were within an ace of success after 
colossal efforts . . . and that the alternative meant failure and with it a big crash in 
which enormous sums would be lost by the public. He had thought seriously about the 
whole position and rather than face such a crash he had made up his mind that he 
would blow out his brains.’535 
This stratagem did not satisfy the banks that Hatry had not been able to repay on time. M 
Samuel & Company for one refused to advance new money until the repayment terms of an 
old loan had been honoured, which he proved unable to do.536  
The September 1929 crash 
By September, Hatry’s cash shortage was becoming critical. Whilst he was expecting that the 
steel scheme would lead to his realising a substantial profit, that was not expected to 
materialise until October537 and thus would not be available to meet either loan repayments 
due in September or to replace the duplicate receipts that had been created in June and would 
also expire in September.538 In the end, Hatry’s banks lost patience and on Monday 16 
September 1929 Lloyds Bank and Westminster Bank decided to commission an investigation 
into the financial condition of Hatry’s companies. Sir Gilbert Garnsey of Price, Waterhouse & 
Company was appointed on Wednesday 18 September.539 
On the market, prices of Hatry-related shares began to fall, suggesting that news of Sir 
Gilbert’s appointment had leaked. For Hatry, a fall in the prices of his companies’ shares 
threatened a repeat of 1921: when price falls had reduced the value of investments deposited 
as security for bank loans.   By mid-September 1929, he had already taken steps to support the 
                                                 
534  Hatry Trial Transcript; Norman Birkett’s speech; 24 January 1930; page 33 et seq. National 
Archives; file DPP 1/91. 
535  Statement prepared by Hatry for use in litigation concerning irregular Drapery Trust share 
certificates. National Archives; file HO 144/17846; page 20. As for the contentious nature of these 
assertions, see letter dated 29 January 1931 from Hatry to his solicitor, Atherton Powys. National 
Archives; file HO 144/17846. 
536  £500,000 loan to Austin Friars Trust due August 9th.. M Samuel & Company Private Office 
memorandum; 8 August 1929; Lloyds Bank Archive. 
537  The expected net profit was £1,400,000 which it was hoped would be realized in the first half of 
October. M Samuel & Company; Private Office memorandum; 12 September 1929. Lloyds Bank Archive. 
538  The receipts in question related to a City of Wakefield loan for which the period for conversion 
of subscription receipts into formal certificates was to expire at the end of September. 
539  Lloyds Bank Archive. Sir Gilbert Garnsey’s memorandum; National Archives; file DPP 1/91. 
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price of his companies’ shares and he now redoubled these efforts.  A number of trust 
companies placed purchase orders with country brokers for shares in Hatry-related companies. 
Simultaneously, sale instructions were given to London brokers. The overall effect was 
intended to be a demonstration of purchasing pressure that would support the shares’ prices. 
In this it failed, for the price of Hatry-related shares continued to fall.  
If the banks had thought they were dealing with a localised liquidity issue they were about to 
be disabused, for on being told of Sir Gilbert’s appointment Hatry went to see him and gave 
him two pieces of information: that his group’s deficiency was of the order of £20 million and 
that  local authority loan receipts and certified share transfers had been duplicated  irregularly. 
A deficiency of £20 million would have been shocking as it was larger than Lloyds Bank’s issued 
share capital and this implied a potentially disabling loss for the bank.540  But the duplication of 
loan and share certificates also was equally troubling for it suggested that banks and others 
might mistakenly have accepted false documents as collateral for loans. 
On being persuaded by Hatry that his assertions were serious, Garnsey reported to his two 
instructing banks who then reported to the Governor of the Bank of England, who in turn 
convened a small group which met on Thursday 19 September to consider the problem. In the 
meantime, share prices continued to fall.541 
At this stage, the Governor’s group knew little. They knew that a decision to investigate the 
Hatry group had led to an immediate justification for concern over the Hatry’s group’s stability, 
and the revelation that there had been improper handling of scrip. However, whilst the scale 
of both was uncertain it was believed to be serious. They would have feared that when news 
of these two problems leaked, the uncertainty would cause the market to react badly.  Not 
least because there would be doubt over the reliability of scrip, the title documents in which 
the Exchange traded. The Governor’s group may also have been conscious of the political risk 
that news of Hatry’s attempt to avoid failure by creating false documents would confirm 
suspicions of the standards of behaviour in the City. 
                                                 
540  As at 31 December 1928, the total of the bank’s issued share capital was £15,810,282. 
Shareholders’ equity (i.e. issued share capital and reserves) amounted to £27,287,231. 
541  Jones (1995); page 144. Jones cites an unpublished memoir by (later Sir) Thomas Robson, who 
undertook the detailed investigation for Garnsey.  Bank of England Archive; file ADM 33/10. 
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In the face of these threats, at the Governor’s suggestion the group adopted a two-fold 
strategy: to limit market disruption and to localise responsibility for the crisis. 
To limit disruption, it was agreed that trading in the stocks and securities mentioned by Hatry 
would be suspended as soon as practicable;542 that banks would be encouraged not to do 
anything that would precipitate further disruption in the market, by, for example, foreclosing 
on brokers who were financially embarrassed;543 and that Sir Gilbert should be appointed 
liquidator of Hatry’s principal companies to give him the authority necessary to investigate 
without delay.544 It was initially hoped that the extent of any difficulty would become clear in 
time for settlement to proceed on Thursday 26 September, the normal account day.545 
However, once the extent of Hatry’s price support scheme became clear, it was realised that 
settlement would be problematic not least for the country brokers who had implemented 
purchase orders for Hatry-related shares. If settlement had gone ahead as normal, these 
brokers would have been obliged to make payment for the shares they had bought: even 
though many of the companies on whose instructions the purchases had been placed were by 
this time in liquidation and would be unable to repay the brokers. Since the cash would then 
be paid to the companies on whose behalf the shares had been sold, in effect the country 
brokers’ cash would have increased the Hatry group’s cash. Settlement did not proceed.546 
These first actions were paralleled by a master-stroke: it was agreed that Sir Gilbert should 
persuade Hatry and his associates to confess to the Director of Public Prosecutions. This they 
did, somewhat to the Director’s embarrassment, on Friday 20 September 1929.547 
It is not obvious why Hatry and his associates should have agreed to confess. Hatry must have 
known that if he did not confess the authorities would not have been able to prosecute 
                                                 
542  On Friday 20 September 1920, the Exchange suspended trading in Associated Automatic 
Machine Corporation ordinary shares, Corporation & General Securities ordinary shares, Drapery Trust 
preference shares, Far Eastern Photomaton shares and debentures, Oak Investment Corporation shares, 
Retail Trade Securities shares and Wakefield Corporation 4½% Redeemable Stock 1949/1959.  
543  Eventually agreed at a meeting of clearing banks on Tuesday 24 September 1929. 
544  To this point, Sir Gilbert had been operating on behalf of the banks that had instructed him and 
required the acquiescence of the companies he was investigating to gain access to records. 
545  Bank of England Archive; file ADM 33/10. 
546  Settlement postponed on 25 September 1929. Settlement postponed indefinitely on 5 October 
1929. Bank of England Archive; file ADM 33/10. 
547  In the brief to counsel to appear at the magistrate’s hearing, the Director stressed that to 
ensure that proper formalities were observed, he had arranged for a police presence at the interview. 
National Archives; file DPP 1/91. Subsequent letters from the Director confirm that he was aware of the 
Governor’s interest. 
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immediately, if at all. They had no information on which to base charges other than his 
admissions made to Sir Gilbert, who himself said that it would take many months to 
investigate the Hatry group. As the Jubilee Cotton Mills case demonstrated, substantial 
amounts of police work would be necessary to supplement an accountant’s investigation. Even 
if Hatry did not appreciate the difficulty that stood in the way of prosecution without a 
confession, it seems probable that his solicitors, Messrs Wontners, would have advised him.548 
It is possible that Hatry was given to believe that in confession lay the only way by which he 
might one day return to his business; but if so there is no record of this having been the case. 
549 
The manner of the confession was also exceptional. For most malefactors, the first encounter 
with a law enforcement agency would not be an interview with the Director of Public 
Prosecutions. Quite apart from any other consideration, a Director would be careful to avoid 
an early involvement that might undermine the objectivity of a decision whether a prosecution 
should proceed. Perhaps even more remarkably, having obtained Hatry’s signature to a 
statement confirming his confession,550 the Director and the police arranged for Hatry and his 
associates to appear before the City magistrates on the next day, a Saturday. That day’s 
newspapers bore the news of Hatry’s arrest. On Sunday and Monday the newspapers bore the 
news of the first hearing and the bare facts of the charges brought against the directors. News 
of the crash was dominated by reports of the prosecution. The impression created was that 
although the crisis might be serious, it had resulted from the criminal activity of one man and 
his associates and thus was limited in its extent and significance. 
                                                 
548  The Director’s brief to counsel records that Hatry and his associates had been advised by 
Wontners. National Archives; file DPP 1/91. 
549  Notably, other commentators have failed to offer convincing explanations for the confessions. 
Kynaston refers to Hatry’s confession as either ‘vainglorious’ or ‘selfless’ according to taste. Kynaston 
(2000); page 179. However, Kynaston’s account of these events does not refer to the meeting on 
Thursday 19 September at which the Governor urged Garnsey to persuade Hatry to confess to the DPP 
and thus does not take this pressure into account. Manley does not offer an explanation. Manley (1976); 
page 57. Pearson suggests that Hatry ‘no longer cared’. Pearson (1991); page 125. There is some 
suggestion that Hatry and his colleagues had decided to confess at least one week before the events of 
Thursday 19 September; but apart from a single reference in a document prepared by the DPP, this 
suggestion is not corroborated. Statement of Case prepared by the DPP against John Gialdini for use in 
extradition proceedings. National Archives; file HO144/17846; page 51. 
550  Copy statement. National Archives; file DPP 1/91. 
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Hatry’s trial 
By acting with such speed and such flexibility, the Director achieved what the Governor and his 
group must have hoped. The speed was to be maintained. Hatry and his associates stood trial 
at the Old Bailey in January: only three-and-a-half months later.551 On the fifth day of the trial 
they changed their pleas to guilty and were sentenced. In sentencing Hatry, the judge told him: 
‘You stand convicted of the most appalling frauds that have ever disfigured the 
commercial reputation of this country; frauds more serious than any of the great 
frauds upon the public which have been committed over the past 50 years, according 
to my personal experience, for they have been carried out by means of wholesale 
forgeries of Bearer Securities in Trustee Stocks which neither banker nor broker or any 
member of the public would ever dream of suspecting to be otherwise than genuine . . 
. I am unable to imagine any worse case than yours . . .’552 
Coming from Mr Justice Avory, these words were telling. At the time, he was the senior King’s 
Bench judge and in one capacity or another had been involved in almost all major fraud trials 
since 1900. He was later to admit that he enjoyed fraud trials above others.553 He was well 
connected in the City, frequently presiding at the swearing in of the Lord Mayor. His words, 
conveyed in what one witness recalls was a ‘cruel and ice-cold’ voice,554 articulated precisely 
the message that the City and the Governor would have wished to convey; and the sentence 
was condign. At 14 years with hard labour, this was not only the maximum sentence for 
forgery,555 it was also the longest sentence handed down for a non-capital crime in 1930.556 
This seems to have been more than Hatry had been led to expect, for one of the spectators in 
Court later recalled that he reeled when it was handed down.557 
                                                 
551  In fraud trials during the 1930s, the typical delay between the events leading to charges and a 
trial was two years. 
552  Trial Transcript, Day Five; National Archives; file DPP 1/91. 
553  Sir Home Gordon recalled:  ‘he twice told me that of all the cases he tried, the one that 
interested him most was Hatry’s. He really preferred the intricacies of a financial case to the human 
tragedy connected with murder trials.’ The Times; 17 June 1935; page 21. 
554 Hutchinson (2015); page 362. 
555  It is possible that Hatry expected a sentence of no more than seven years, which was the 
maximum sentence for fraud. However, in addition to fraud he was charged with forgery for which the 
maximum sentence was 14 years. Moreover, there was a precedent for a promoter/fraudster being 
sentenced to imprisonment for more than seven years. In 1895, Jabez Balfour, when convicted on 
several counts of fraud, was handed down two maximum terms of seven years to be served 
consecutively: McKie (2004); page 220. As a junior barrister, Sir Horace Avory had been a member of the 
prosecution team at Balfour’s trial.  
556  Criminal Statistics for 1930 (1931). 
557  Kinross (1982); page 57. 
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Hatry was later to maintain that, although he had pleaded guilty, he was in fact not guilty of 
forgery. In a letter dated 30 March 1930, to the Marquess of Winchester who had served as 
Chairman of Austin Friars Trust, Hatry wrote: 
‘ . . . the Corporation Stocks  (the subject of the prosecution) had become irregular 
and were never forged . . .’558 
This perhaps surprising contention appears to depend on the fact that corporation loan 
certificates were indeed not issued by Hatry’s company: the local authorities themselves did 
that. Hatry’s company was issuing receipts on its own authority allegedly for cash subscribed 
which it was legally entitled to do. In other words, the receipts may have been fraudulent but 
were not forgeries. As Hatry and his associates pleaded guilty before their defence could be 
presented at the trial, this argument was not deployed. The Marquess of Winchester for one 
was not convinced by Hatry’s claim to be innocent of forgery, although, in company with many 
others, he believed that the sentence handed down was excessive.559  
Immediate prosecution of Hatry and most of his associates560 served as a dramatic and 
unmissable sign that the authorities had established who was to blame for the problem that 
had occurred and that any market difficulty was limited to securities that had been within 
Hatry’s reach. This diverted the thrust of what otherwise would have been a campaign for 
further investigation and, subsequently, wider reform: 
                                                 
558  Underlining in original. Fascimile letter reproduced in Winchester (1934); insert after page 272. 
This suggestion is consistent with an assertion made by Hatry in a statement prepared for use in 
litigation concerning irregular Drapery Trust transfers: ‘It is important to note that all scrip certificates 
issued in respect of stock issues sponsored by C&GS were their own documents of title issued by them 
at Pinners Hall and not be the Corporation.’ (underlining in original). National Archives; file HO 
144/17846. Pearson maintains that the charge of forgery against Hatry was based on assertions in his 
original confession statement dated 20 September 1929 which was signed without the benefit of legal 
advice on the precise wording of the statement which, as a result, included misrepresentations of the 
true position. Pearson (1991); page 125.Consistently with Pearson’s suggestion, Hatry’s first statement 
suggests that it was loan stock certificates which had been forged which was incorrect. National 
Archives; file DPP 1/91.  
559  Winchester (1934); page 275. 
560   John Gialdini escaped to Italy where he was able to stay as the existing extradition 
arrangements did not extend to the offences with which he was charged. Following diplomatic pressure, 
and the personal intervention of Mussolini, he was prosecuted in Italy and convicted: only to be 
released in a general amnesty a year later. National Archives; file HO 144/17846. The file also contains a 
letter dated 29 January 1931 from Hatry to his solicitor, Atherton Powys, suggesting ways in which the 
case against Gialdini could be strengthened and dealing in particular with the circumstances of the 
meeting on 23 June 1929. 
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‘Like nothing of the kind for a generation or more the crisis in the City – though 
already under control – is the talk of high and low. Questions connected with it are 
certain to be raised in the present House of Commons. It will be found as impossible 
as unwise to resist the demand for special public inquiry supplementary to the usual 
processes of financial and legal investigation.’ 
‘Reasons are evident. In the post-war situation of trade and employment any 
unnecessary check to confidence is a peculiar injury to the State and to every class of 
people. Political reactions are still more mischievous than financial – worst when 
suspicion is not dispelled by disclosure. There has been an object-lesson on a larger 
scale. The meddling of garish speculation with the Lancashire cotton-trade has 
proved a commercial and social calamity. The ramifications of the present affair 
penetrate absurdly into municipal finances as well as industrial. These aspects 
concern more or less every investor and voter and family in the land. 
‘. . . The British public in its post-war mood is sitting up and taking notice. It is very 
slow, but when it finally awakes it never is put off.’561 
Hatry’s conviction implied that the market’s problems could not have been systemic because 
they resulted from the criminal activity of a single promoter against which no system could be 
entirely proof.562 What is more, it implied that the market’s systems had worked well for they 
had led to the swiftest action against the person who was to blame. Indeed, the newspapers 
commented favourably on how well London compared with New York.563 
A similar strategy was later to be adopted in New York with rather less success. On 24 March 
1933, Charles Mitchell, the Chairman of National City Bank, was indicted for tax evasion: 
offences that had come to public attention in the course of hearings of the senate committee 
that inquired into the causes of the 1929 Wall Street crash. The New York Times reported: 
‘. . . the prosecution of an outstanding violator of the banking laws would be the most 
salutary action that could be taken at this time. The feeling is that if the people 
become convinced that the big violators are to be punished it will be helpful in 
restoring confidence shaken by the Senate committee revelations.’ 
                                                 
561  ‘Other People’s Money’. Article by JL Garvin; The Observer; 29 September 1929; page 16. 
562  There are other examples of prosecution being used in this way. Tickell (1996). 
563  The Observer; 26 January 1930; page 15: reporting The Evening World in New York. The use of 
prosecutions to demonstrate the effectiveness of action against fraudsters remains an aspect of 
regulatory policy: Fair and Effective Markets Review (2015); pages 88–89: ‘However, it is possible that in 
future there will be convictions in a case where there are a larger number of aggravating factors and 
either a very significant breach of trust by senior individuals . . . At present there would only be a limited 
amount of headroom under the maximum sentence for judges to impose an increased custodial 
sentence in order to mark the seriousness of the offence and send an appropriate general deterrent 
message.’ 
Chapter Seven 
1929 – The year of two crashes 
Page 182 
 
Dealing with the aftermath 
In the meantime, the Stock Exchange, the Bank, the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Health 
were left to deal with the problems created by the crash free from public attention: final 
resolution of the deferred settlement, reform of systems to avoid a recurrence and 
consideration of members associated with weak underwriting. 
Settlement of Hatry-related deals 
The Exchange began by attending to the deferred settlement. At first the Exchange expected 
that when any uncertainty about allegedly false certificates had been resolved, settlement 
could be achieved by normal processes: any disputes being finally determined by the courts. 
This option soon proved unattractive for it was quickly realised that it would be expensive and 
take a long time to deal with every case. During that time, the uncertainty would overhang the 
market.564 But there was another disadvantage, for the outcome of this process was likely to 
be that all of the losses caused by the Hatry frauds would be borne by parties outside the 
Exchange as members resorted to law to oblige their clients to pay for transactions undertaken 
on their instructions. The committee quickly concluded that the Exchange’s reputation would 
be harmed if small investors were to be penalised for these frauds: they would be seen as 
bearing the brunt of the excesses of City traders. But the alternative of indemnifying 
investors565 was not straightforward for it would require members to meet losses for which 
they were not personally responsible.566  Gradually the committee came to the view that: 
                                                 
564  For example, the investigations into registration of share transfers undertaken by Sir Basil 
Mayhew for Associated Automatic Machine Corporation continued into 1930 with the result that the 
company was not able to recommence share registration until January 1930. Only at this point could 
disputes be defined and dispute resolution begin. This led to an action by Kleinwort & Sons against 
Associated Automatic Machine Corporation on the grounds that the bank had advanced money against 
transfers of the company’s shares that had been falsely certified by the company’s secretary (one of 
Hatry’s companies). At first instance, the judge (in fact Mr Justice Avory) found in favour of Kleinwort, 
but this judgment was overturned on appeal over an interpretation of the law of agency. The case was 
concluded in February 1934 (i.e. after more than three years) by a judgment of the House of Lords; thus 
vindicating the Stock Exchange’s assessment in October 1930 that waiting for legal determination of all 
outstanding disputes would be time-consuming. Kleinwort Archive; London Metropolitan Archives; file 
02-08-01-002-0012.  
565  Another alternative was canvassed: the annulment of outstanding transactions under the 
provisions of Rule 74. This rule provided that a transaction could be annulled by the committee where it 
could be shown that it resulted from fraud or willful misrepresentation. Transactions undertaken for the 
purpose of ‘rigging’ a market by creating a false price were regarded as fraudulent. Schwabe (1905); 
page 238, citing the Court of Appeal judgment in Scott v Brown (1892): ‘the sole object of the purchase 
was to cheat and mislead the public.’ Thus superficially, Rule 74 appeared to give the committee power 
to annul Hatry’s share support deals. This option was, however, rejected because it would have required 
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‘. . . the Stock Exchange had been the victim of conspiracy and fraud and that in 
equity the loss should be shared among the parties.’567 
The difficulty lay in persuading members to share that view.  
On 25 November 1929, an unofficial meeting was convened with a number of members by the 
Chairman and Deputy Chairman at which it was suggested that a fund should be established to 
take responsibility for settling the disputed trades: 
‘The Chairman said that it was most desirable for the credit of the City of London and 
the good name of the Stock Exchange that the Settlement should be carried through 
without disasters and appealed to the parties to try and find some solution of the 
problem and to include provincial Brokers in any arrangement effected.’568 
The implication is that although the Chairman and Deputy Chairman had formed a shrewd 
view of the steps that were necessary, they believed it would not be wise for the committee to 
act without prior confirmation of members’ support. 
From this initiative sprang agreement to create by subscription a fund that would settle 
bargains deferred from 26 September in respect of five Hatry-related companies.569 The 
purpose was to ensure that all liabilities to the public would be met in full and to this end the 
fund would take delivery of all the shares that would have to be delivered on settlement day. 
Of the total amount estimated to be required by the fund (£1 million), £200,000 was 
contributed by members and others (including banks) who had no commitments under 
outstanding bargains involved in the settlement. The balance was to be met by brokers (both 
members of the Exchange and country brokers) and dealers in agreed proportions.570 By the 
middle of January 1920 the fund had been established,571 so that on 22 January 1930, as 
                                                                                                                                               
a separate demonstration of fraud in respect of each transaction. As the share price support scheme 
implemented by Hatry had involved a large number of trust companies and others, this process also 
threatened to be lengthy and expensive. It would also have thrown all of the losses on people outside 
the Exchange. 
566  In other words, most of the Members who had been principally involved in Hatry’s share price 
support schemes had gone out of business after the crash so it was other, surviving, members of the 
Exchange who would bear the cost of an indemnity for investors. 
567  Stock Exchange (1930a); page 6. 
568  Stock Exchange (1930a); page 7. 
569  Associated Automatic Machine Corporation, Photomaton (Parent) Corporation, Corporation & 
General Securities, Retail Trade Securities and Oak Investment Trust. 
570  Stock Exchange (1930a); pages 10–15. 
571  Members’ subscriptions fell short of the total required. The total was achieved by a final 
contribution by the Bank of England (£25,000) on condition that it should not be mentioned in public. 
Bank of England Archive; file ADM 33/10. 
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Hatry’s trial was under way, the committee was able to agree that settlement would take place 
on 13 February 1930. It went through ‘without a hitch’.572 
This agreement was innovative. It acknowledged that it was not desirable to allow liability to 
fall upon outside interests, thus abrogating the principle of caveat emptor; it involved 
members who had no personal exposure to the outstanding Hatry settlement; and it involved 
country brokers from whom the London Exchange would customarily have stood aloof. It could 
hardly do otherwise as Hatry’s price support scheme had involved provincial brokers. Thus 
there was a recognition that the London and the provincial exchanges shared a joint interest in 
avoiding further disruption and ensuring that the losses that would be crystallised on 
settlement should not fall upon the public. Acceptance of this joint interest was not 
uncontentious, and resulted from a series of short-term motives. London members wished to 
ensure that members of the public did not suffer losses and were doubtless grateful for the 
provincial brokers’ contributions to the fund which otherwise would have been a charge to 
London members. For their part, country brokers wished to avoid insolvency.  
Nonetheless, the agreement involved, however momentarily, an acceptance that for some 
purposes the market had to be viewed as a whole. Traditionally, the Exchange had sought to 
control a segment of the national share trading market in the interests of its members: 
emphasising the distinctiveness of its membership and their trading standards especially by 
comparison with other traders and exchanges. Hatry’s share price support scheme had 
exploited these distinctions; and, to manage its consequences, the Exchange had been obliged 
to compromise.  
Neither the fund nor the acceptance of provincial exchanges were to last. 
Systems and processes 
The Exchange next turned to the implications of the crash for the integrity of its systems and 
processes by setting up a working party. It discovered that Gialdini’s scheme of creating 
duplicate loan and share documents exploited weaknesses in the Stock Exchange’s processes, 
firstly in respect of quoted companies and secondly in respect of local authority loans. 
                                                 
572  Stock Exchange (1930a); page 9 
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It was Hatry’s normal practice to persuade companies that he floated to appoint one of his 
companies, Secretarial Services Limited (SSL), as company secretary and registrar. Quite apart 
from making the management of the flotation easier, it ensured that after flotation there was 
a continuing relationship between Hatry’s group and the companies that were floated. As 
registrar, SSL was responsible for recording share transfers and issuing replacement share 
certificates to the new shareholders. In days of paper-bound processes, this was laborious and 
transferees could wait for a long time before their new certificates were issued. This was 
especially difficult for anyone who was an active trader, and at times of heightened activity. 
The scale of the difficulty can be judged from the guidance given to bank securities clerks in 
the many textbooks on the subject.573 
Thus a practice had developed by which company registrars would certify share transfers to 
show that they had been received together with valid share certificates for cancellation and 
replacement. The certified share transfer would be regarded as tantamount to a bearer 
security and would be accepted by banks and others as proof of ownership. In practice, the 
issue of certified share transfers had become somewhat abused in practice, as bank securities 
departments had found that it was easier to transfer certified transfers rather than attempting 
to register each transfer which was time-consuming and wearisome.574  
Gialdini’s scheme involved duplicating share transfers and falsely certifying them, which was 
not a difficult matter as certification only involved a rubber stamp and a signature.575 The 
falsely certified share transfers were then submitted to banks as collateral for loans. 
To deal with these problems, the working party proposed that there should be some degree of 
Exchange oversight of the process of certification, and a tightening up of processes within 
banks’ and others’ securities departments. All of the working party’s final proposals in this 
respect were implemented.576 
                                                 
573  Lewcock (1931); pages 44–90. Kiddy (n.d.). Head (1912). 
574  Share certificates were problematic because the process of registration was time-consuming 
and laborious. On occasion it might also have been necessary to notify a company’s registrar of the 
bank’s security interest in a holding represented by a particular certificate. These administrative chores 
were avoided if the security was held in bearer form. Internal reports on secretarial practice in the light 
of the Hatry collapse. Lloyds Bank Archive. Lewcock (1931); pages 59–60. 
575  Examples of these documents exist in the Hatry Trial Exhibits; National Archives; file DPP 1/91. 
576  Stock Exchange minutes; Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
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As for local authority loans, Gialdini’s scheme took advantage of a change in the process of 
issuing local authority loans which Hatry had engineered by insisting that when a new local 
authority loan was offered publicly, applicants should send their application forms and any 
accompanying cash payment to one of his companies. That company would then issue a 
receipt that would certify both that the money had been received and that the holder of the 
receipt would receive a loan certificate from the authority concerned on presentation of the 
receipt (generally within six months). These receipts were generally accepted by banks as 
tantamount to bearer securities. Normally it was a bank that acted in the capacity of receiving 
agent, in return for a commission. By substituting one of his own companies for a bank, Hatry 
had been able to cut the cost of issuing loans and to undercut the orthodox brokers who had 
previously enjoyed a monopoly of this activity. 
On receiving applications, Hatry’s company would then hold the cash received until it was 
required by the local authority. Many wanted the money immediately after issue, but others 
did not want all of the money immediately and were happy to leave it on deposit with Hatry‘s 
company, C&GS, even though it did not profess to be a bank. The benefit to the authority was 
that Hatry offered a slightly higher rate than the clearing banks. The benefit to Hatry was that 
he was in effect borrowing money but at a lower rate than he would have had to pay a bank.  
All local authority loans were required to comply with the ‘Stock Regulations’ issued by the 
Ministry of Health which approved each issue and the draft notices inviting applications. All of 
the loans issued through C&GS were approved in this way. Although the Ministry of Health 
appear to have regarded this approval process as largely an administrative matter, from the 
perspective of the local authorities concerned it will have seemed that the receiving procedure 
proposed by Hatry was both known to and approved by the Ministry. There is no evidence that 
the Ministry ever inquired into these arrangements when considering requests for approval. 
Gialdini’s scheme involved using the company that received loan applications to issue 
duplicate receipts: i.e. receipts for more than the total nominal sum of a local authority’s loan 
stock. The receipts were treated by bank security departments as bearer securities and thus 
would be accepted as proof of ownership for the purposes of lodging security for new bank 
loans. This was another instance of bank security departments having become careless as they 
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found temporary cash receipts less troublesome to manage than formal loan certificates.577 
Gialdini argued that use of the receipts in this way was relatively risk-free provided that the 
receipts were recycled before the deadline by which receipts had to be submitted to the local 
authority for issue of loan certificates in their place. 
Eliminating these weaknesses required action by the Ministry of Health as well as the 
Exchange. In principle, the Exchange wanted to ensure that its rules for certification applied 
equally to local authority issues as well as to corporate securities; but the local authority loans 
were subject to the Stock Regulations which first required amendment.   
On investigation, it was found that the regulations existed in two forms (having initially been 
issued under two separate Acts of Parliament applying to different groups of authorities) and 
had not been reviewed for many years. When the Exchange working party had finished its 
work, the Ministry of Health revisited the Stock Regulations, amending them to reflect the 
latest Exchange practice and replacing them with new, consolidated regulations. In addition, 
the regulations imposed requirements concerning the appointment of receiving agents and 
the deposit of funds received from applicants.578 
Weak underwriting 
Having dealt with weaknesses in the procedures for dealing with  share and loan transfers, the 
working party dealt with the implications of the August 1929 report on weak underwriting 
which arose from the first crash of 1929 and was not related to the Hatry crash in September 
1929. Consideration was given to ways in which insubstantial issues could be avoided and ways 
in which underwriting arrangements could be strengthened. In both respects, the working 
party chose an approach that placed responsibility upon directors, advisers and brokers to 
ensure that arrangements for a proposed issue were appropriately strong, coupled with 
disclosure of the judgements they had made.   
                                                 
577  For reasons similar to those for share certificates. 
578  Original regulations: 3 August 1897, S&RO 1897 Number 614 applying to County Councils and 
S&RO 1897 Number 615 applying to District Councils. subsequently amended. New Regulations: SR&O 
1932 Number 438, subsequently consolidated in S&RO 1934 Number 619. The need for regulation of the 
appointment of receiving agents and the deposit of funds received was reviewed by the House of Lords 
Committee considering the Wakefield Corporation Bill on 15 March 1930. Wakefield had left substantial 
funds on deposit with Corporation & General Securities Limited following a loan issue early in 1929. 
Throughout September 1929 it had been attempting to obtain a promised payment from CGS but failed 
and incurred a substantial loss which it met in part by levying a special rate. Bank of England Archive; file 
C40/634. 
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It was first proposed that permission to deal would generally not be granted in a series of 
circumstances that had caused particular difficulty. For example, where preliminary expenses 
formed an undue percentage of the proposed capital,  applications for permission to deal 
would not be considered until after publication of the first annual report and accounts. 
Similarly, applications from subsidiary companies would probably not be considered until after 
publication of the holding company’s first annual report, especially where the company’s 
principal asset is a patent, new process or invention or an undeveloped commercial enterprise. 
It was also suggested that the committee responsible would look more cautiously at 
applications to record bargains in the Supplementary List from companies that had not 
published a prospectus.579 
The committee proposed that whenever an unquoted company applied for permission to deal 
for its shares but had not published a prospectus and, furthermore, accounts for at least two 
years had not been made up and audited, an advertisement should be published containing 
specified details about the company for which the directors were to be collectively and 
individually responsible. Among other details, the advertisement was to include: 
‘A statement setting out clearly the working capital with which the Company started 
or is to start business, additions (if any) since made and whence derived, and the 
amount available at the date of the statement of working capital, after providing for 
all purchase considerations, promotion profits, preliminary expenses, losses, and 
interest or dividend payments to date, with a statement by the Directors that in their 
opinion the working capital available is sufficient, or, if not, how it is proposed to 
provide the additional working capital thought by the Directors to be necessary.’580 
As far as underwriting arrangements were concerned, the working party explicitly rejected 
suggestions that new rules could bar undesirable underwriting: 
‘. . . the Committee has come to the conclusion that it is practically impossible to 
frame effective and at the same time workable regulations which would act as an 
efficient bar to undesirable underwriting and at the same time leave unfettered that 
which is beyond reproach.’ 
‘The Committee can only impress upon Members, especially those who sponsor an 
issue, that it is their obvious duty to examine carefully the quality of the underwriting 
and sub-underwriting.’581 
                                                 
579  Stock Exchange (1930b); page 11. 
580  Stock Exchange (1930b); page 16. 
581  Stock Exchange (1930b); page 5. 
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The committee also proposed that the required advertisements should be expected to include 
information concerning ‘small or unknown underwriting companies’: an expectation to be 
given force by empowering the committee to require disclosure of other particulars which it 
thought necessary.582  It also observed that: 
‘It would be desirable if such particulars were also given in a Prospectus and the 
attention of Issuing Houses, Banks, Auditors and others who allow their names to be 
given in a Prospectus is directed to this point.’583 
To support the committee’s assessment of these matters when considering applications, it was 
given power to commission an independent accountant to verify a company’s statements and 
to defer decisions on whether to grant permission to deal until after receiving the accountant’s 
report.584  
These recommendations represented significant departures from existing practice.  The new 
rules empowered the Exchange to use discretion in considering whether disclosure was 
appropriate: emphasis was placed on the adequacy of disclosure rather than on formal 
compliance. This approach can be contrasted with the prevailing approach in 1919,  when the 
application by Agricultural Industries Limited was accepted by the committee, even though 
there was reason to believe that the Offer for Sale created a mistaken impression through 
careful use of the rules to obscure information.  
Moreover, straightforward disclosure was no longer to be regarded as sufficient protection for 
investors: directors were to be expected to take responsibility publicly for ensuring that 
arrangements were sound. Coupled with this was a larger role for professional advisers: partly 
in taking responsibility for advising on the adequacy of disclosure in prospectuses and related 
documents but also in providing assurance for directors on the adequacy of the judgements 
that directors and others were being called upon to make. For example, it became good 
practice for directors making a statement on the adequacy of the company’s working capital to  
commission auditors to investigate the working capital and to report to them on its adequacy. 
This enabled the directors and other advisers to demonstrate both to the Exchange and, if 
challenged, to others that due care and attention had been applied in making their 
                                                 
582  Stock Exchange (1930b); pages 5 and 16. 
583  Stock Exchange (1930b); page 5. 
584  This recommendation appeared in the private version of the committee’s report considered by 
the Committee for General Purposes, but not in the published version of the report. Stock Exchange 
(1930b); page 11. Stock Exchange minutes; 21 July 1930; Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
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judgements. This development in practice was encouraged by the empowerment of the 
committee to commission a report from an independent accountant. 
In short, these changes represented a turning from an approach based on formal compliance. 
In its place, there was a marked encouragement for the role and responsibility of professional 
advisers, but also of sponsoring brokers, as gatekeepers acting increasingly to protect 
members of the public rather than the narrower interests of members.585  
It remained for the Exchange to deal with members who had been associated with weak 
underwriting. 
In August 1929, before the crash, the Exchange’s sub-committee had recommended that the 
members concerned should ‘be seen’ and asked for an explanation. This had not happened 
before the crash, but the meetings duly took place after March 1930: i.e. involving the new 
committee that had been elected in March 1930. When these meetings took place, further 
reports were submitted giving details of the outcome of issues with which the members 
concerned had been associated. In the case of Charles Stanley & Sons, the report considered 
on 7 April 1930 listed 32 issues with which the firm had been associated since 1926. In most 
cases, subscription of the capital due had been in arrears: the highest reported case had been 
45% in arrears. The implication was that some capital had been subscribed by the public and 
accepted, but that underwriters had not contributed the amounts due from them. Thus the 
company had not received all the capital that it would have said in its prospectus was 
necessary but the public subscribers had nonetheless been deprived of the money they had 
contributed. In many of the cases reported, preliminary expenses represented a high 
proportion of the company’s capital; and reports, when submitted, were late. 
The committee’s minutes do not record in full what was said to each member save that whilst 
the member’s membership would be renewed for the current year, renewal in 1931 would 
receive special attention from the committee. In the event, memberships were renewed. The 
implication, however, was that the quality of the business that the member had introduced to 
the House had not been satisfactory. As the minutes record, one member was told: 
‘Mr James was admitted & told that the Committee had received a very serious report 
of companies which he had been the means of introducing to the Stock Exchange. The 
                                                 
585  The role is described and analysed in Coffee (2006); page 3 et seq. 
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Report would be considered by the new Committee: in the meantime he was warned 
to be very careful as to the class of business he transacted.’586 
Whatever was said, none of the members identified in the August 1929 report on weak 
underwriting sponsored any new issues between 1930 and 1939. Thus, whether by reason of 
changes in trading or of action by the committee, this business was stopped. 
Conclusions 
The Balfour Committee’s report discredited 
Rarely can any element of a public report have been discredited so quickly as the Balfour 
Committee’s conclusion that the financial system was working adequately. By an accident of 
timing, the report was published soon after the collapse in prices of the 1928 shilling share 
flotations and the beginning of disputes about underwriting. How could a system that had led 
in 1928 to IPOs for worthless companies backed by underwriting that disappeared like the 
morning mist be said to have been working adequately?  
The Balfour Committee had concentrated on the suggestion that action should be taken to 
outlaw company promoters and over-capitalisation because they had led to heightened 
industrial costs that had undermined the competitiveness of industries such as the Lancashire 
cotton industry. The committee had rejected this contention on the basis that the over-
capitalisation caused by promoters was undistinguishable in principle from over-capitalisation 
caused by over-optimistic and unwise management decisions from which companies had been 
known to survive. The committee was thus distracted from the effect of predatory promoters 
and share-pushers in abusing investors and misallocating resources – which had become sadly 
obvious as a result of the 1928 boom. 
Crash of the 1928 shilling shares 
By this stage, the London Stock Exchange at least suspected that many of the 1928 shilling 
share flotations had been assisted by the willingness of members to collude with all manner of 
off-market operators by seeking permission to deal in their worthless promotions. Their 
collusion had involved facilitating weak underwriting and supporting applications to deal in the 
shares by giving undertakings that were either incorrect or at best disingenuous. The 
Exchange’s suspicions had led in the late spring to appointment of a committee to investigate 
                                                 
586  Stock Exchange minutes; March 1930; Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
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weak underwriting, which in August confirmed the suspicions and named the members 
involved. In short, by August 1929 the committee knew that the Exchange’s members were in 
part responsible for what had happened.  
The Hatry crash 
The position was made much worse by the Hatry crash in September 1929, for Hatry had 
exploited weaknesses in the Exchange’s rules. 
Towards the end of September, it was realised that the share price support operation 
mounted  by Hatry followed by the collapse of his companies threatened the solvency of many 
country brokers who had, on the instructions of companies under Hatry’s influence, placed buy 
orders for his companies’ shares. It appeared therefore that the London Exchange’s rules had 
been inadequate to prevent the abuse of country brokers. In addition, it seemed that the 
market had been trading in suspect scrip that was indistinguishable from legitimate scrip. This 
threatened all parties involved in the London market (and probably others): personal and 
corporate investors alike. It threatened any organisation that had lent money against the 
collateral including traded securities, for if the suspect scrip was indistinguishable from 
legitimate scrip how could a lender tell the difference? It also threatened companies and 
authorities on whose behalf the suspect scrip appeared to have been issued. Were they liable 
in respect of losses caused by the suspect scrip issued in their name?587 Because some of the 
stocks used by Hatry were trustee stocks,588 it threatened trustees who otherwise would have 
believed they had complied with their duties as trustees. As the Exchange knew, these 
problems would not have arisen unless Hatry had been unable to exploit weaknesses in its 
own rules and procedures. 
                                                 
587  That this was a real concern was demonstrated by the legal action initiated by Kleinwort & Sons 
against Association Automatic Machine Corporation (AAM).  Kleinwort sought relief for the losses 
caused by the issue of suspect transfer certificates by the company secretary of AAM (a Hatry company). 
At first instance, Kleinworts’ claim was upheld (by Mr Justice Avory as it happened).  Later, when the 
case reached the House of Lords, the claim was dismissed on the Lords finding that a principal (AAM) 
should not be held liable for the criminal act of an agent (i.e. Hatry’s company Secretarial Services 
Limited). Thus, in the early stages of the crisis, companies would have been afraid that they would be 
held liable for actions taken by company secretaries issuing suspect documents on their behalf. 
588  Defined by the Trustee Investments Act 1925 for the purpose of identifying securities that were 
sufficiently risk-free to be held by trustees.  
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Hatry had not just caused the collapse of his own group, in a fashion similar to the collapse of 
the Horne Group a month earlier, but had caused a crash that was so large that it threatened 
to undermine the whole market and confidence in the Exchange as a place to do business. 
An existential threat? 
How could this be a system working adequately, as the Balfour Committee had suggested? 
Rather the crisis was another triumph for company promoters and share-pushers who had for 
many years flourished by exploiting weaknesses in the Exchange’s rules with the help of willing 
members. 
Unsurprisingly, this was believed to be an existential threat to the Exchange and the City. It 
validated the criticisms of the financial system in academic and political circles: even the more 
extreme criticisms as the crisis combined a demonstration of weak organisation with 
confirmation of the unscrupulous greed of members. It did this as a minority Labour 
government was elected on a manifesto that promised nationalisation of the Bank of England 
and threatened the creation of a National Investment Bank. In retrospect, it is tempting to 
decry the chances of the Labour government implementing all of its manifesto promises, 
especially in the light of Tawney’s contemporary criticism of the Labour Party’s election 
campaign: 
‘. . . why are Labour programmes less programmes than miscellanies – a glittering 
forest of Christmas trees, with presents for everyone, instead of a plan of campaign 
for what must be, on any showing, a pretty desperate business? Because the party is 
at present without any ordered conception of its task.’589 
Whatever Tawney may have thought, in the City the threat was treated as serious: 
‘We dined with Sir Basil and Lady Blackett [on 28 September 1929]. The Bank of 
England of which Sir Basil is a director, would have nothing to do with Hatry . . . but 
some of the Big Five were caught . . . “we are afraid a Labour Government would take 
over the whole business”.’590 
The critical question was: could the City deal with this threat? 
Any remaining doubt about the scale of the threat that was faced is dispelled by the scale of 
the action that was taken. 
                                                 
589  Tawney (1932); page 329. 
590  Inge (1949). 
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Caveat emptor? 
The first of the major actions represented a departure from a founding principle of the 
Exchange: caveat emptor. It was no longer possible to believe that parties dealing through the 
Exchange could manage their own risks when the scrip in which they were dealing was proved 
to be suspect and indistinguishable from legitimate scrip. If a bank’s trained securities clerk 
could not tell the difference, how could an investor? That losses had been caused by the 
Exchange’s weak systems and the collusion of members merely added to this misery. Caveat 
emptor seemed to be not a respectable organising principle for an exchange but a cynical 
device by which an investor could be duped out of his money by a predatory and exploitative 
system. The creation of a fund to cover settlement of the deferred Hatry-related deals involved 
acceptance for the first time that members would meet the cost of deals for which individually 
they had no responsibility and that the investors involved in those deals would not have to 
meet the liabilities for which, in law, they could be held responsible.  Members tried to limit 
the significance of this move by not supporting a proposal that there should be a permanent 
fund, but the most realistic members must have known that the Exchange would not be able 
to resist calls for compensation if similar circumstances arose again. 
This was a recognition that the Exchange’s members corporately had financial responsibility to 
outsiders.  
The Exchange’s attitude towards members 
The second major departure from the Exchange’s traditional approach concerned its attitude 
towards members. Until 1929, the Exchange’s regulatory activities had been concerned with 
relationships between members and the mitigation of counterparty risk. Members were 
regarded as men of honour. Until they were held to have been disgraced, their undertakings 
were accepted by the committee almost without question. After the crashes of 1929, this 
approach was no longer prudent. The Exchange’s reputation had been damaged, and in 
meeting the cost of the Hatry settlement, uninvolved members had been obliged to bear 
material costs as a result of other members’ actions. What was more, there was a possibility 
that if similar circumstances were to recur, members might again be asked to bear the costs of 
settlement without the cushion of a permanent fund to assist in meeting the liability. 
Understandably, members wanted to exclude this possibility and to this end supported the 
committee in pressuring a small number for firms to stop sponsoring new issues, changing the 
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rules to exclude insubstantial issues and taking power to investigate companies whose share 
issues members were sponsoring. In effect, the committee was to be more sceptical of 
members’ undertakings and the relationship between the committee and members was to 
become more distant.  
In effect, the abrogation of caveat emptor changed the balance of the members’ interests, and 
their expectations of the committee. To protect themselves from further such liabilities, they 
now looked to the committee to prevent a recurrence of the circumstances that led to the 
crashes of 1929. 
The Exchange’s attitude towards provincial brokers 
The third departure concerned the Exchange’s attitude towards the provincial exchanges and 
brokers. Traditionally, the London Exchange had held itself aloof from the provincial 
exchanges, not permitting direct access and refusing to make common cause. This approach 
was not tenable in dealing with the Hatry settlement. Co-operation was not long-lived, 
however, for the Exchange reverted to its traditional stance soon after the agreed settlement 
was implemented. 
A success for self-regulation? 
In some ways, the action taken in 1930 should be seen as a success for self-regulation by the 
Exchange, for it had taken radical action that before the events of 1929 many members would 
have viewed as contrary to their interests. The extent of the Exchange’s willingness to change 
was not immediately understood: introduction of the Committee’s reforms was noted briefly 
in the financial press but no more.591  Yet the changes were significant as can be judged by 
comparing them with the proposals for which Horace Samuel, one of the foremost technical 
critics, campaigned in his book entitled Shareholders’ Money.  
The book, which was published in 1933, consisted of a review of what Samuel regarded as the 
inadequacies of British company law in the light of the provisions of Blue Sky laws in the 
United States and included a draft bill to amend the Companies Act 1929. As Samuel was 
campaigning for new legislation, he included many proposals that went beyond the 
competence of the Stock Exchange. For example, the draft bill envisaged that anyone who 
                                                 
591  Manchester Guardian; 13 August 1930; page 11. 
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authorised publication of a prospectus would be liable to pay compensation to anyone who 
had subscribed for shares as a result (direct or indirect) of the prospectus. It also proposed 
that bankers, brokers and others who allowed the names to be mentioned in a prospectus 
should be regarded for this purpose as having approved its publication.592 A related proposal 
would have imposed on experts whose reports appeared in a prospectus liability for any 
incorrect statement or omission to subscribers who as a result suffered damage.593 Both of 
these proposals reflected but did not go as far as provisions in Blue-Sky laws and the federal 
Securities Act 1933 in the United States. The Act provided that subscribers could sue for 
rescission and recovery of their subscriptions without the need to establish that they suffered 
damage as a result of an incorrect statement or omission. Such measures required primary 
legislation and were thus not possible for the Exchange; action in these respects was delayed 
until the Companies Act 1947.594  
Other proposals covered by Samuel’s draft bill might have been considered within the 
Exchange’s competence but would have faced considerable professional opposition. For 
example, Samuel’s draft bill included extensive provisions concerning the contents of accounts 
submitted to shareholders, specifying, for example, the headings to appear in profit and loss 
accounts and balance sheets.595 That specification of the contents of accounts was technically 
possible for the Exchange is demonstrated by the Exchange beginning to do this at the end of 
the 1930s by requiring the publication of consolidated accounts. At the beginning of the 1930s, 
there would have been considerable opposition from the accounting profession. Whilst there 
were some who pointed to the consequences of allowing companies to decide how to present 
their accounts, there were others who strongly objected.596 Samuel observed: 
‘. . . the official policy of the Institute of Chartered Accountants to refrain from laying 
down specific rules of conduct, but instead to endeavour to lead Directors gently by 
the hand into the higher ethical planes, contrasts somewhat oddly with the 
authoritative exposition of the defects of the law by the recognised heads of the 
profession . . .’597 
                                                 
592  Sections 14 and 15 of the draft bill. Samuel (1933); pages 338 and 339. 
593  Section 17 of the draft bill. Samuel (1933); page 340 
594  For example, Samuel’s proposal in respect of the liability of experts foreshadowed section 65 of 
the 1947 Act. Magnus and Estrin (1947); pages 253 et seq. 
595  Sections 43 and 44 of the draft bill. Samuel (1933); pages 356 et seq. 
596  Sir Mark Webster Jenkinson, Sir Gilbert Garnsey, Sir Josiah Stamp and HA Hill pointed to a need 
for reform; Lord Plender opposed. 
597  Samuel (1933); page 327. 
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Inaction in this respect on the part of the Exchange was perhaps understandable. 
In other respects, however, the Exchange’s reforms met Samuel’s requirements. Section 9 of 
the draft bill required the Registrar of Companies to approve a prospectus, section 10 
empowered the Registrar to reject a prospectus and section 11 empowered the Registrar to 
make appropriate investigations. For its part, the Exchange extended its monitoring activity to 
include the commercial substance of an issue, taking the power to appoint investigating 
accountants and requiring members sponsoring an issue to confirm that they were themselves 
satisfied with that substance. 
Similarly, the Exchange matched Samuel’s proposals with regard to underwriting 
arrangements. The draft bill required publication of the details of the arrangements together 
with statutory declarations made by underwriters of their capacity to comply with the financial 
terms of the underwriting.598 The Exchange required that an  application for listing or 
permission to deal should include full disclosure of underwriting arrangements and be 
accompanied by a confirmation by the members sponsoring the issue that they had satisfied 
themselves as to the arrangements’ adequacy. 
Finally, in another proposal inspired by Blue Sky legislation in the United States, Samuel 
envisaged that all share dealers should be registered annually by the Board of Trade.599 Whilst 
the Exchange had no power to regulate dealers outside the Exchange, it already restricted 
membership to those it chose to admit, and from 1930 proposed to use its requirement for 
annual renewal of membership to insist on compliance by members with rules intended to 
exclude abusive issues. By August 1930, the effectiveness of this action was already evident. 
Weaknesses of self-regulation 
However successful the Exchange’s actions in 1930 may have been, they also served to 
demonstrate the weaknesses of the Exchange’s previous performance as a self-regulatory 
organisation. The crashes of 1929 resulted in part from failures by the Exchange during the 
1920s to draw inferences about the overall direction of the market from the evidence available 
from Members’ individual decisions.  
                                                 
598  Draft bill; sections 4(d) and 9(d). Samuel (1933); Appendix 1. 
599  Samuel (1933); page 94 et seq. 
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The two key predisposing factors were the gradual hollowing out of underwriting 
arrangements and the willingness of members to collaborate with disreputable off-market 
operators in arranging for the shares they were promoting to be dealt through the Exchange.  
Both of these should have been known to the committee before 1929. Samples of 
underwriting contracts were made available to the committee with all applications to deal 
during the 1920s so that changes in the liability of lead underwriters could have been observed 
by anyone scrutinising the applications. The identity of the off-market operators with whom 
members were collaborating would have been more difficult to identify as they would have 
hidden behind nominees of various descriptions. However, scrutiny of the applications 
demonstrates, as might have been expected, that advisers and supporters tended to act in 
groups which would have been easier to identify. For example, for many of his issues, Hatry 
used one firm of solicitors consistently (SJ Langton & Passmore), one firm of brokers (originally 
Ellis & Company) and one bank (Lloyds Bank, Threadneedle Street branch).600 There is no 
evidence that matters of this sort were raised by the sub-committee that considered 
applications to deal and that seems to have been concerned principally to make sure that 
disclosure requirements had been satisfied.  
At times, the committee also failed to see the implications of technical weaknesses in a rule. 
Possibly the most dramatic example of such failures was the committee’s failure to see that 
the retrospective effect of Regulation 30F would have been especially damaging for banks that 
had lent money against collateral including securities that the regulation would have been 
rendered untradeable.  
There were possibly other more strategic failures of foresight. In evidence submitted to the 
Greene Committee in 1925, the Exchange pointed to the operations of share-pushers who had 
come to England from New York. As was to become clearer in 1936, the prosecuting 
authorities failed to deal adequately with the crimes committed by these gangs of pushers and 
this became a factor in the search for other means, involving public law, of regulating share 
trading. In other words, the failure of the prosecuting authorities in this respect was to 
become another threat to the Exchange’s independence. There is no evidence that the 
                                                 
600  For many issues, other solicitors and brokers would also be named. For issues that Hatry 
initiated, auditors would also be named from a small group. For existing companies, the existing 
auditors would be named, in some cases jointly with a firm introduced for the purpose of the 
prospectus, presumably to add credibility within the City. 
 
  Chapter Seven 
1929 – The year of two crashes 
 
 
Page 199 
 
Exchange saw the potential threat or took any action to counter it, for example by referring 
potential cases to prosecutors, as happened in New York.601 
Such failures of foresight contributed to the effectiveness of self-regulation in the 1920s, to 
the damage suffered in 1929 by the Exchange’s reputation and to the costs that were borne 
ultimately by members.  
Of course, it is possible that even if the growing risks had been appreciated by the committee, 
members would not have supported any action that the committee might have proposed: a 
second weakness. During the 1920s, the membership was becoming more polarised and 
members in a small, more traditional way of business commanded a majority. This was used to 
block attempts to change the rules to accommodate the more corporate business on which 
some firms such as Cazenove concentrated, and might well have been used to block other 
attempts to fit the Exchange to changing market circumstances. Thus, although some 
members were taking advantage of the changing character of the market, this appreciation 
remained disaggregated. There is no evidence that the committee or the members generally 
appreciated the implications of these developments for the market overall or the threat to the 
Exchange that they would create. 
So why did the Exchange’s actions succeed in 1929? 
By October 1929, the threat had become blindingly obvious. It was plain that the Exchange‘s 
continued independence could be called in question and that action was needed. This was 
plain not only to the committee, but also to members whose incomes depended upon 
preservation of the Exchange. The full extent of what had to be done was not immediately 
evident, but in the mind of the majority of members there can have been no doubting the 
need.  
In proceeding to deal with the crisis, the Exchange had the benefit of some good fortune: 
Hatry’s folly in sanctioning the duplication of loan receipts and the false certification of share 
transfers. Hatry not only precipitated the crisis, but he provided a screen for the Exchange. His 
criminality enabled the Exchange and others to present the crisis as solely due to him, whilst 
                                                 
601  In New York, the Martin Act under which many prosecutions of share-pushers took place had 
become law in the 1920s and, as a result of heavy lobbying, had not adopted the approach of other 
States that imposed government regulation on exchanges or on new issues. The NYSE thus had a clear 
interest in ensuring the Martin Act was successful to discourage more intrusive regulation.  
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his prosecution distracted attention away from the Exchange itself. Behind this screen the 
Exchange was able to deal with matters in its own way and in its own time, where necessary 
choosing the punishments that it thought most appropriate without being troubled by a public 
clamour for retribution. Thus the Exchange was able to deal with the brokers who had 
colluded with off-market share pushers without damaging their public reputations. They were 
given time to mend their ways: and they did. This sensitivity was doubtless appreciated by 
other members and was certainly effective, but might well have seemed unacceptable if public 
attention had been drawn to it. In this sense, a public interest in retribution would arguably 
have been inimical to market management. The Exchange was thus fortunate in Clarence 
Hatry’s co-operation in his own prosecution. 
The Exchange was fortunate in another way. Any possible leadership failure was avoided by 
the stage management of Montagu Norman, the Governor of the Bank of England. He 
contributed the bifurcated strategy of managing the crisis while prosecuting Hatry and then 
ensured that each of the parties involved played out the various roles. The Chairman of the 
Exchange’s committee maintained his regular contact with the Governor and when he needed 
introductions to senior civil servants, the Governor obliged. As matters progressed, the 
Governor arranged that the Bank’s staff should review the Exchange’s proposals for reform. 
When the Hatry settlement fund fell short of the required amount, it was the Governor who 
arranged that the Bank would subscribe £25,000 and leant on the clearing banks to make up 
the difference. The Governor maintained his contacts with the DPP who made sure the 
prosecution went forward with the desired speed. When questions arose over reforming the 
rules for local authority loans it was the Governor who was contacted by the Permanent 
Secretary of the Ministry of Health. In short, the Exchange was fortunate that the process was 
stage-managed by a long-established, well-networked Governor who must in part have been 
interested in securing the Bank’s position, not just the Exchange’s.  
Thus the Exchange was fortunate: but it survived. 
  
  
CHAPTER EIGHT – 1930–1939 – THE MARKET’S RECOVERY 
 
Introduction 
The events of 1929 encouraged the market’s growing tendency towards risk aversion.  
The thrust of the Exchange’s reforms following the end of the 1928 boom in shilling shares and 
the Hatry crash was to deny access to the market to the most speculative issues. In this sense, 
the reforms were to be welcomed. 
There were, however, a number of negative consequences for members. Denial of access to 
the most speculative issues involved a denial of the business that those issues would have 
created: either for brokers who would have acted as sponsors or those who would have 
received commissions from clients wishing to deal in those issues. That income could only be 
replaced by an increase in the general level of activity. To the extent that it was not replaced, 
members’ incomes would suffer and, as smaller firms were likely to suffer disproportionately, 
the membership would tend to become even more polarised.  In turn, if the experience of the 
1920s were to be repeated, this would lead to members demanding that the rules should be 
strictly enforced, denying access to non-members and insisting on minimum commissions.  
Whilst members may have preferred to act as if the affairs of the Exchange could be managed 
in isolation from competition from outside markets and traders, in practice this was 
unrealistic.Increasing the costs of passing business to the London Exchange may have seemed 
a defence of members’ interests but provided a motive for others to find ways of bypassing 
the Exchange. Denial of access to traders or issues was not an end of the business: it served as 
an encouragement to find alternatives.  
Activity and incomes 
Stock Exchange activity did not return to the levels enjoyed during 1927 and 1928. Indeed, a 
number of developments ensured that overall activity was depressed for a number of years. 
The economic malaise that had contributed to the decline of the market during 1929 was to 
continue, and was reinforced by similar experience overseas. The Wall Street crash in October 
1929 served to reduce United States interest in the London market, and the international 
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financial crisis of 1931, which led to a political crisis in London and a change of government, 
delayed the possibility of recovery.  
Moreover, as the decline in overseas economic activity continued, so the number of 
international fixed interest loans being launched also declined and the competition among 
merchant and investment banks to launch such loans increased. One consequence was that 
merchant banks in London became more interested in public offerings of industrial and 
commercial shares and challenged stockbrokers who had been establishing themselves in this 
business. 
As in earlier years, reliable data about levels of activity are not available. 
Chart 8.1: Estimated value of dutiable Stock Exchange transactions 1928–1939602 
 
           
   
 
A similar pattern is shown by data for new issues: 
                                                 
602  Paukert (1961); page 304. The limitations to which these data are subject are explained in 
Chapter 4. 
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Chart 8.2: New capital issues of the United Kingdom 1928–1936603 
           
 
 
In short, the increase in Empire and overseas stocks, which in the early 1920s had served to 
counter the disappointing trend in domestic activity, was not a sufficient counter weight in the 
1930s. 
The effect on members’ incomes, which were largely based on commissions, was inevitable, 
especially when the level of Exchange activity declined markedly after the boom year of 1936: 
  
                                                 
603  Grant (1937); page 134. 
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Table 8.1: Data from tax assessments for brokers and jobbers 1909–1938604 
 
  1909 1927 1932 1936 1937 1938 
Net true income for all 
stockbrokers and 
jobbers (£)(current 
prices) 
9,450,000 15,540,000 12,370,000 15,720,000 3,520,000 170,000 
Average gross income 
per assessment 
(£)(current prices) 
2,750 5,500 4,800 6.200 1,850 100 
Net true income for all 
stockbrokers and 
jobbers (£)(deflated 
prices)(1909=100) 
9,450,000 8,202,000 7,254,000 9,334,000 2,014,000 96.000 
Average gross income 
per assessment 
(£)(deflated 
prices)(1909=100) 
2,750 8,202 2,815 3,981 1,059 57 
 
For the Exchange’s relationship with members, the consequence was that there was sustained 
pressure from smaller members to limit their costs and to resist all competitive pressures that 
appeared to them to challenge their business. Some issues that had previously been 
contentious, such as the size of the membership, proved untroublesome. This was hardly 
surprising in view of the disappointing level of members’ income which tended to reduce the 
attractiveness of membership and the pressure to admit new members. 
        
Other matters remained contentious. Although members agreed to support the compensation 
scheme that settled outstanding Hatry-related bargains after the crash in September 1929, 
when a permanent scheme was proposed in the first draft report of the subsequent Stock 
Exchange inquiry, it did not proceed. Such ideas were opposed by jobbers who did not of 
course deal directly with members of the public and by those brokers who were cautious in 
their dealings with the public and resented any suggestion that they should compensate the 
clients of fellow members who were not so conservative. Proposals for creation of a 
compensation scheme were to be brought back on several occasions; but the additional costs 
involved (estimated to be of the order of £20,000 per annum) were not welcomed. Eventually, 
in the face of public reaction, creation of a compensation fund was accepted in 1938, partly as 
a way of distinguishing between brokers who were members of the London Stock Exchange 
                                                 
604  Worswick and Tipping (1967); pages 99 et seq. 
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and those who were not. Participation in the scheme was to be voluntary for existing members 
but compulsory for new members. Although accepted in principle, the scheme had not been 
implemented by the onset of war in 1939.605  
Just as the creation of a permanent compensation scheme remained contentious, so did the 
question of relationships with provincial exchanges. In the immediate aftermath of the crash of 
September 1929, members had accepted the participation of provincial brokers in the 
compensation scheme; they were not prepared, however, to go further in the spring of 1930 
when the provincial exchanges sought assistance with the losses that their members had 
suffered as a result of Hatry’s share price support machinations. Throughout the 1930s, 
members resisted suggestions that provincial brokers might be granted direct access to 
London jobbers: provincial brokers were required to approach the London market through 
London brokers. Presumably members calculated that denial of direct access would not affect 
their business unduly in view of London’s advantage as the only market where large sales and 
purchases could be done quickly with a minimal risk of affecting the market price. In practice, 
provincial brokers increasingly tended to trade between themselves without going through 
London: a trend that was encouraged in 1931 by the extension to provincial jobbers of the 
concessionary rate of stamp duty that had been enjoyed by London jobbers since 1920.606 With 
the growing use of the telephone and telegraphs, it became possible for jobbers such as JW 
Nicholson & Son of Sheffield to deal with members from all provincial exchanges and thus to 
distract a substantial amount of business from London.  
By 1939, the scale of this business was sufficiently recognised by London members for them to 
support negotiations with the provincial exchanges in an attempt to contain the rivalry. 
London’s aim was to stop provincial jobbing in securities that were listed in the London 
market. The provincial exchanges were prepared to sacrifice the provincial jobbers: after all 
they only provided an alternative to London for a restricted range of securities. In return they 
wanted either direct access to London jobbers or big reductions in the fixed rate of 
commission charged by London brokers for passing business to the jobbers. This proved to be 
too much for London members so that the compromise that emerged provided only limited 
                                                 
605  Stock Exchange Committee minutes; 1 February 1937; 28 June 1937; 23 May 1938; 13 July 
1938. Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
606  From August 1920, London jobbers enjoyed a concession by which stamp duty was charged at a 
nominal rate of ten shillings per transaction on all stock held for less than two months, rather than 1% 
on all sales and purchases. 
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relief for both parties although the provincial exchanges agreed to enforce single capacity, 
preventing a country jobber from making a market for anyone but a broker. In the event, the 
compromise was short-lived and did not survive the onset of war in September 1939.607 
Determination on the part of a majority of members to deny direct access to provincial brokers 
and other non-member brokers was accompanied by antipathy towards the sharing of 
commissions, and, in particular, the sharing of commissions with brokers such as the London 
offices of American brokers. Although some of these offices had been closed in the wake of 
the Wall Street crash in October 1929, a number remained and were joined by others.608 In the 
face of the fixed commission rates that could not be shared with them, their business was 
directed abroad which led to a warning from a number of London firms involved in American 
securities: 
‘If we . . . discontinue the street market and cease dealing at 4 o’clock, a very 
considerable amount of the American business would be lost to the Stock Exchange 
members, and as a consequence, be driven into the hands of the outside houses, 
more particularly to the American firms who have established their own offices in 
London, or else the public would deal direct with New York. There is no doubt that 
that this is already being done to a certain extent, but it would undoubtedly be 
greatly increased if there were no street market.’609  
Brokers in other countries acted similarly as de Zoete & Gordon pointed out in 1934 in the case 
of French clients: 
‘Our clients say quite frankly that they want to put the business through the Stock 
Exchange but that they feel if this rate is to be maintained, they will not be able to do 
so on further occasions.’610 
There was to be no weakening in such cases. Fixed commission rates were to be maintained 
and not shared: presumably through fear that a compromise would have encouraged the re-
routing through overseas brokers of what would otherwise have been domestic business or 
demands for lower rates of commission for domestic business. 
                                                 
607  Conference between representatives of the London Stock Exchange Committee and the Council 
of Associated Stock Exchanges; 14–16 June 1939. Stock Exchange Committee minutes; 17 April 1939; 26 
June 1939. 14 August 1939. Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
608  Saint Phalle and Harvey Fisk closed. Fenner, Bean & Untergleide opened an office in London in 
1932 as did Batsell & Company in 1933. 
609  Stock Exchange Committee minutes; 17 October 1932. Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall 
Library. 
610  Stock Exchange Committee minutes; 9 April 1934. Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
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Some relief from this determination to sustain fixed commission rates was however granted in 
November 1930 in response to an appeal by Grumbar & See, acting on behalf of 63 firms 
involved in arbitrage business: 
‘ . . . in view of the small margin of profit obtainable at present on arbitrage 
operations, those houses will not be able to afford to pay the full scale of commissions 
and that an important shrinkage in the volume of business which this class of 
operation brings to the exchange is bound to result . . . 
‘We know that many big transactions take place between one outside house and 
another, and also that business is taken to such Houses direct without going to the 
Stock Exchange. The margin on which this class of business is transacted is in most 
cases so small that the full commissions will force outside Houses still more to deal 
between themselves.’611 
In this case, where simultaneous buying and selling was taking place, leading effectively to a 
balancing of commissions, a lower rate was permitted.  
In parallel, members also sought to limit the sharing of commissions more generally: spurred 
by the collapse in business following the 1929 crash. In 1932, a survey of brokers showed that 
between 1927 and 1929 the net profit earned by a broker had represented about 43% of 
commission income after taking account of commissions returned to business introducers, 
26%, and wages and office expenses, 31%. Between 1930 and 1932, the net profit percentage 
had fallen to 22%, after taking account of commissions returned to introducers that had 
remained almost unchanged at 27% and office expenses which had risen to 51%. As it was 
difficult to reduce staff costs and office expenses materially, attention was concentrated upon 
reducing the commission returned to introducers such as banks and others.612 Although the 
banks were a principal focus for the campaign to reduce commission sharing, there was a 
marked reluctance to take action against them because their connections were seen to be 
highly valuable for stockbrokers: 
‘ . . . by  virtue of the fact that there are few towns of any importance in the British 
Isles which have not a bank, or a branch of a bank, the banks are in a position to 
                                                 
611  Stock Exchange Committee minutes; 17 November 1930. Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall 
Library. 
612  Stock Exchange Committee minutes; 23 May 1932. Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
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institute business from the very small capitalists in every part of the country who have 
no means of getting in touch with stockbrokers . . .’613 
What is more, the banks made clear that they would resist any attempt to reduce their share 
of commissions: possibly bypassing the Exchange altogether.614 
The eventual outcome of this campaign was that a list was to be drawn up by the Exchange of 
all those who were to be entitled to share commissions. Two categories of recipient were to be 
identified: banks and related financial institutions, which were to be entitled to a rebate of 
50% (as before); and others, such as solicitors and accountants, who were to be entitled to a 
smaller rebate of one-third (reduced from 50%). The new rates and rules were approved in 
October 1932 and were in effect by February 1933.615 Once the list had been created, the 
Exchange was able to regulate the addition of new names to the list, as was to happen in 1937 
when a large number of country brokers applied for addition to the list of intermediaries 
entitled to receive the higher rate of rebate (50%). Of the 279 applicants, 121 were rejected on 
the grounds that their business was not substantial. Casual operators were to be 
discouraged.616 
This was not the end of the matter, however. Smaller members remained vigilant to ensure 
that the rules on commissions were not undermined by informal arrangements with the result 
that the matter was again referred to the committee in December 1938.617  On this occasion, 
the issue was not resolved before the onset of war. 
In general, loopholes in the commission rules were closed and the freedom to vary fees was 
gradually reduced. Whilst this reduced the freedom of members, especially the freedom of 
larger, better-established members to compete on price with smaller members, it also reduced 
the ability of the Exchange to compete for business with other exchanges on price at both ends 
of the scale. In effect, the Exchange was deciding not to compete with others on grounds of 
                                                 
613  Stock Exchange Committee minutes; 18 January 1932. Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall 
Library. 
614 Stock Exchange Committee minutes; 17 November 1930. Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall 
Library. 
615  Stock Exchange Committee minutes; 17 October 1932. Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall 
Library. 
616  Stock Exchange Committee minutes; 15 April 1937; 20 May 1937. Stock Exchange Archive; 
Guildhall Library. 
617  Stock Exchange Committee minutes; 19 December 1938. Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall 
Library. 
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price. Whilst Cazenove believed that fixed commission rates led some larger investors to 
bypass the Exchange, the business of small investors was also being lost. For example, the Post 
Office charged less for buying and selling War Loan and Consols.618 It was later to be argued 
that whilst price competition had been ruled out, the Exchange still competed: but on grounds 
of the quality of service. The difficulty was that clients were not able to assess readily the 
quality of the service being provided. Whilst clients knew whether a buy or sell order had been 
implemented in a reasonable time, they could not tell readily whether the price of any deal 
was the best available in the market. Moreover, the quality of such advice as was given would 
often not become apparent until long after the event. For much of the 1930s, the fact that 
business was bypassing the Exchange mattered less to members than the protection from 
competition that they felt was afforded by fixed rates. In short, in prosecuting their business, 
many members came to rely more upon defences created by the Stock Exchange’s rules than 
upon vigorous competition. 
The same defensive tendency can be seen in the Exchange’s reactions to members’ attempts 
to develop new lines of business such as unit trusts.  The first unit trust was launched in the UK 
in 1931 by Municipal & General Securities Limited, later M&G, under the inspiration of Ian 
Fairbairn, a member of the Exchange.619  The rationale behind the launch was to emulate the 
comparative robustness of US mutual funds through the 1929 Wall Street crash and to take 
advantage of the public’s reaction against investment trusts following the crash in 1929.620  The 
first trust, called the 'First British Fixed Trust', held the shares of 24 leading companies in a 
fixed portfolio that was not changed for the fixed lifespan of 20 years. The trust was re-
launched as the M&G General Trust and later renamed as the Blue Chip Fund and wound up in 
1951 at the end of its fixed life.  
Attempts were made to persuade the Exchange to permit dealings in the units of the trust, 
which were rebuffed: 
                                                 
618  The minimum charge made by a stockbroker was ten shillings. The equivalent Post Office 
charge was of the order of five shillings. 
619  He had been a noted rower and was the runner up in the Silver Goblets at Henley in 1920 in a 
coxless pair with Bruce Logan, who had been Hatry’s insurance broking partner in Patmore, Logan and 
Hatry Limited. 
620  Investors in closed end funds such as investment trusts suffered badly after the 1929 crash 
because the value of investment trust shares fell faster than the shares in which they had invested as 
the pressure from investors to sell their shares led to greater discounts against asset prices. Gleeson 
(1981); page 23. 
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‘ . . . the conclusion reached in the early part of the year 1934 was that, for the time 
being at any rate, it was not desirable to provide a  market on the Stock Exchange for 
the units and sub-units of  Fixed Trusts, or to take any official cognisance of the 
movement. After this date, however, the Fixed Trust “birth-rate” rose so steeply that 
the Stock Exchange felt itself constrained to make a further investigation of the 
position, mainly with a view to determining whether it lay in its power to guard the 
public from exploitation by affording a market restricted to the units and sub-units of 
such Fixed Trusts as might conform to standards set up by the Stock Exchange for the 
protection of the investor.’621 
This further investigation also ended with rejection because of concern that the prices of units 
might be manipulated by the respective unit trust managers. Of course, securities called units 
had long proved troublesome. James White’s application for permission to deal in the units of 
DA Trust Pool Limited in November 1919622 and the street selling of so-called units in Ford 
Motor Company in 1925 are merely two examples. In this light, the Exchange’s wariness may 
well have been understandable at a time when, in the aftermath of the Hatry crash, the 
Exchange was attempting to safeguard its reputation. Yet in hindsight, the decision not to 
permit dealing in the new units may have been regrettable for it denied access to the market 
for a new development that promised to address the public’s interest in investment. The 
decision was unwelcome at the time, for the Stock Exchange’s fresh consideration of the issue 
had been in part a response to suggestions made in The Economist,623 which greeted the 
Exchange’s announcement with heavy sarcasm: 
‘The Stock Exchange authorities, after an inquiry lasting many months, have decided 
that the fixed trust question is too important and complex for treatment under any 
auspices less powerful than the State itself . . .’624 
On this occasion, the Exchange’s wish was granted, for the Board of Trade responded quickly 
by appointing a departmental committee chaired by Sir Alan Anderson625 which reported in 
August 1936.626 
Similarly, when in 1932 and 1936 members sought permission to create branch offices as a 
means of serving that same public interest in investment, the Exchange denied permission.627 
                                                 
621  Stock Exchange minutes; 16 March 1936. 
622  Application for permission file; Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
623  The Economist; 6 April 1935; pages 795–796. 
624  The Economist; 7 March 1936; pages 530–531. 
625  MP for the City of London, 1935–1940; and Chairman of the Orient Steam Navigation Company. 
626  Anderson report (1936). 
627  Michie (1999); page 205. 
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As a result, the Exchange’s members did not develop retail business as members of the New 
York Stock Exchange had done, preferring to leave that business to banks, confident that the 
banks would combine their customer’s many individual transactions and then deal through the 
Exchange, taking advantage of the well-established commission-sharing arrangements.  
Indeed, throughout the 1930s, the Exchange tried to preserve all of its rules on the conduct of 
business: most importantly the rule that denied membership to corporate entities. When in 
1934, the committee became aware that Foster & Braithwaite had for some years been using a 
nominee company to hold shares on behalf of clients, approval for the practice to continue 
was only granted after the committee had been assured that the device was a precursor to 
converting the firm into an incorporated company.628  This was not the end of the matter, 
however. Later in 1934, Frisby Brothers, brokers who specialised in rubber shares, sought 
permission to convert into an unlimited company to avoid the tax disadvantages of trading as a 
partnership. In essence, the disadvantage arose from the treatment of the profits of a 
partnership as the income of the individual partners: i.e. as if all of the annual profit were 
distributed. They thus attracted liabilities to Income Tax and Super Tax immediately. In 
contrast, the profits of a company would only be treated as the income of the participators to 
the extent that they had been distributed. To the extent that such profits were not distributed, 
they did not attract a liability to Super Tax in the participators’ hands. Members continued to 
campaign for a change in the Rule that was eventually agreed in principle in January 1939 and 
in detail in April 1939. Members were to be allowed to register as private unlimited liability 
companies for tax reasons, a decision which the Committee regarded as maintaining the Rule 
denying membership to corporations: 
‘From the point of view of the Stock Exchange, the carrying on of business as a private 
unlimited liability company is for all practical purposes indistinguishable from the 
present practice of carrying on business in partnership.’629 
The Committee’s consistent stance was to oppose changes that might allow corporate entities, 
including banks, to gain access to membership and changes that might permit the 
development of large, well-capitalised broking or jobbing firms. In this way, the Exchange had 
become defensive. It was determined to use its control over the Rules to defend the interest of 
                                                 
628 Stock Exchange Committee minutes; 24 September 1934; 15 October 1934; 22 October 1934. 
Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
629  Stock Exchange Committee minutes; 9 January 1939; 3 March 1939; 6 January 1939; 3 April 
1939. Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
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the membership: with the result that sustaining that control became even more important 
than it had ever been.  It cannot have been a coincidence that in 1939 the Committee was 
prepared to consider relaxation of the rule on incorporation and to enter discussions with 
provincial stock exchanges about the rivalry that had led to business bypassing the 
Exchange.630 After all, these modifications to the Exchange’s normal stance occurred at a time 
when members had seen their incomes (and thus cash flow) fall materially after what may 
have been a peak in 1935/6, but would still have been required to make cash payments to 
clear Income and Super Tax liabilities arising from the higher profits in previous years.631 The 
principal difficulties for the Exchange lay in discerning the direction of events and where lay 
the long-term interest of members. 
Throughout these years, the polarisation of members and firms continued as the influence of 
corporate and institutional investors increased and some firms concentrated on their business. 
The experience of Phillips & Drew exemplifies this process. Before 1936, Phillips & Drew was ‘a 
smaller firm without institutional connections’.632 In March 1936, the firm recruited a new 
partner, Sidney Perry, who was an actuary with another firm of brokers, David A Bevan & 
Company, with a view to building a team to develop business with insurance companies. He in 
turn recruited two accountants, Lionel Potter and Charles Locatelli, and another actuary, Denis 
Weaver. Together this team developed a successful business in advising life insurance 
companies on gilt-switching: 
‘At this time we had a piece of luck that had an important influence on our 
development. Perry had among his private clients an actuary named CW Sanger. He 
had recently moved from the Eagle Star to the Royal London Mutual [another 
insurance company] and found himself in charge of the investments, an area in which 
he had little experience. The Royal London investments had not enjoyed any active 
supervision, new money being largely placed on underwriting terms with the issue of 
the moment and then left there. Sanger turned to Perry for help. We were given a full 
list of investments, and any suggestions we made for improvements were 
sympathetically considered.’633 
By 1939, the business generated by Perry’s team dominated Phillips & Drew. 
                                                 
630  This had led to public comment: ‘By-passing the Exchange’; The Economist; 12 February 1938; 
page 346. 
631  Liabilities in respect of Schedule D Cases I and II were payable between 18 and 24 months after 
the year in which the profits arose. 
632  Reader and Kynaston (1998); page 17. 
633  Weaver’s words quoted in Reader and Kynaston (1998); page 23.  
  Chapter Eight 
1930–1939 – The market’s recovery 
 
 
Page 213 
 
New issues 
The process of polarisation was spurred by the developing character of the new issues market. 
Although after 1929 there was a period during which the level of domestic new issues fell, in 
1932 the number and value of new issues began to rise again and this continued. In one 
respect, the character of new issues changed since the action taken by the Exchange in 1930 
discouraged the weakly underwritten issues that had been a prominent feature of the 1928 
boom; but the underlying trends which had encouraged business owners to seek a public 
listing for shares continued: 
‘A further analysis . . . discloses the fact that the greater part of the capital raised for 
home industry through the new issues market is absorbed by buying out existing 
owners. The public provides the vendors with cash, acquired the assets, but more 
often than not leaves the original owners in control. In effect, a great number of 
capital flotations are the capitalisation at an enhanced figure of industrial profits 
which have been accumulated by private concerns and reinvested therein over a 
period of years.’634 
In his study of the capital market, Grant reached a similar conclusion: 
‘ . . . the Stock Exchange is primarily an institution for imparting marketability to 
securities; only very secondarily is it an institution for providing new money for 
enterprise’635 
In the 1930s, the factors that led business owners to seek a listing were expanded by the 
influence of tax legislation.  
At the end of the 1914–1918 war, retention of profits within a company had provided a means 
of mitigating the full effect of the very high rates of personal taxation. A company was taxed 
on its profit at the standard rate of Income Tax, whereas an individual was liable to pay not 
only the standard rate of Income Tax but also Super Tax: but only on the income that had been 
received including any dividends. Thus, if a company did not declare a dividend, a liability to 
Super Tax would not arise. To discourage this practice, with effect from 1922, the Special 
Commissioners of Income Tax had been given the power to direct a company that had not 
been paying ‘reasonable’ dividends to pay the tax the shareholders would have had to pay as 
                                                 
634  Cole (1935); page 134. The essay cited was a study of ‘Recent Capital Issues’ by a group of 
Cambridge economists. 
635  Grant (1937); page 128. 
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Income Tax and Super Tax had such ‘reasonable’ dividends been declared.636 In assessing what 
was reasonable account was to be taken not only of the current requirements of the business 
but also of: 
‘ . .  such other requirements as may be necessary or advisable for the maintenance 
and development of the business.’637 
This provision was amended in 1927 to exempt a company if its shares were traded on a stock 
exchange and there was a substantial public holding of the shares, which was defined as not 
less than 25% of the shareholders’ voting power (excluding all shares entitled to a fixed rate of 
interest).638 As the effect of the charge introduced by the Finance Act 1922 was to increase the 
effective rate of tax on corporate profits and thus to reduce funds on which managers tended 
to call first to finance investment, the exemption introduced in 1927 was a strong inducement 
for companies to seek a quotation on a stock exchange. That this inducement was potent is 
demonstrated by the experience of Morris Motors which had become a publicly traded 
company in 1926. William Morris had retained all of the ordinary shares when the company 
was first listed and followed a policy of retaining profits so as to develop the business. The 
company was therefore vulnerable to a Super Tax direction which in due course it received in 
respect of the tax years 1922, 1923, 1927 and 1928. The directions were upheld against legal 
attack and Morris decided to begin placing his own equity on the market.639  
This encouragement to business owners to seek a quotation was supported by another: an 
amendment to Estate Duty legislation. From 1930, for Estate Duty purposes, if a company’s 
equity were traded on a recognised stock exchange the shares would be valued by reference 
to the stock market price during the year before death. Otherwise the shares would be valued 
by reference to an estimate of the value of the company’s net assets.640 In cases where there 
was a dominant shareholder, it was likely that valuation on the basis of stock market prices 
would be advantageous to the estate since the market would incorporate a minority discount 
reflecting the fact that the dominant shareholder’s shares were withheld from the market. This 
                                                 
636  Section 21(6); Finance Act 1922. 
637  Section 21(1); Finance Act 1922. 
638  Section 31(3); Finance Act 1927. 
639  Cheffins (2008); page 260. Andrews et al (1955); page 174. 
640  Section 37(1); Finance Act 1930. The effect of this provision was to bring to an end disputes 
over application of section 7(5) of the Finance Act 1894 which provided that property should be valued 
at the price it would have fetched if sold in the open market at the time of death. The varying 
interpretations of the section are described in Baynes (1966); page 33 et seq. 
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basis also had the advantage of avoiding the risks attached to agreeing a net asset valuation 
with the Inland Revenue.641  
One further change to tax legislation in the 1930s increased the propensity of business owners 
to seek a quotation for shares. To assist in financing rearmament, in 1937 a National Defence 
Contribution was introduced for a period of five years as a flat charge of 5% of all profits of an 
incorporated business and 4% of all profits of an unincorporated business.642 It had originally 
been proposed that the charge should be a graduated tax on any increase in profits compared 
with the average profits of 1933–35, but this proposal had been abandoned in the face of 
strong opposition.643 As the introduction of this new charge was followed in 1938 by the end of 
a period of economic recovery and a reduction in company profits, corporate cash flow 
became negative. The result was increased pressure on business owners to realise their 
equity.644 
For all of these reasons, there was increased interest on the part of business owners in seeking 
quotations for their companies’ shares, an interest which was matched by increasing interest 
on the part of potential investors. In part, investors were driven to investment in equities by 
disappointing returns on gilt-edged securities: 
‘The fall of the pound in September 1932 in due course made possible a sensational 
reduction in money rates in Great Britain. After a short interregnum of dear money, 
Bank Rate was reduced by stages to 2 per cent. The fall in short money rates was duly 
followed by the conversion of £2000 million of War Loan from a 5 to a 3 ½ per cent 
basis. This was the precursor of other Government conversion operations, and these 
exerted a powerful influence on the general level of long-term rates of interest . . . 
‘Thus from the end of 1932 onwards, the low yields on gilt-edged led investors to turn 
to new fields in the search for openings bringing in a larger return. The new issue 
market begins to revive . . .’645 
The effect of the government’s cheap money policy was keenly felt by insurance companies. 
Many life policies were designed on the basis of an assumed interest rate of 3% so that bonus 
distributions of ‘profits’ required investment yields (net of tax) to exceed this. Alternatively, if 
policy funds were entirely invested in gilt-edged stocks that by 1936 were yielding less than 
                                                 
641  Rubner (1996); page 125. 
642  Section 19; Finance Act 1937. 
643  Daunton (2002); pages 172–173. Peden (2004); page 127. 
644  Cheffins et al (2007); page 789. Hart (1965); page 21. 
645  Grant (1937); page 148. 
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3%, a life assurance company would be incurring a loss. In 1935, a review of life insurance 
observed: 
‘A life office which invests in British Government securities at present prices, is 
heading for insolvency.’646 
In contrast, there was a good market in corporate securities offering substantially higher 
yields, so that many insurance companies decided that they were obliged to invest in them. 
The result was that, as shown in Table 8.2, life assurance companies generally reduced the 
proportion of their funds invested in gilt-edged securities, having increased it following the 
crash of 1929, and increased the proportion invested in corporate securities. Taking account of 
the increase in the funds available to life assurance companies, this meant that their annual 
net investment in corporate securities in the mid-1930s exceeded the levels experienced in 
1927 and 1928. 
 
Table 8.2 : Percentage distribution of net life assurance company investment 1927–1937647 
 
 
 Brit. 
govt. 
Foreign 
& colonial 
govt. 
UK 
local 
govt. 
Total 
corp. 
secs 
Mtges 
and 
loans 
Land, 
property 
Others Total  All 
new 
issues 
 
Insce 
invt in 
corp 
secs 
 % % % % % % % £m £m £m 
1927 -19.7 8.0 13.1 54.9 36.6 1.8 5.3 60.45 355.2 33.2 
1928 -26.2 26.6 0.6 72.2 33.7 2.8 0.4 56.38 369.1 40.7 
1929 -35.0 6.7 0.3 68.6 54.8 2.3 2.4 58.67 285.2 40.2 
1930 -5.4 4.4 5.6 89.7 3.0 4.9 -2.2 39.22 267.8 35.1 
1931 54.5 -2.9 4.3 21.9 1.5 6.4 14.3 45.65 102.1 9.9 
1932 55.5 -0.7 12.5 -3.8 21.4 5.5 9.7 45.28 188.9 -1.7 
1933 68.2 14.7 25.4 27.7 -34.6 7.1 -8.5 60.72 244.8 16.8 
1934 28.4 9.3 8.9 47.9 -3.2 7.0 1.8 65.12 169.2 31.2 
1935 1.0 3.2 14.6 69.6 -1.8 11.0 2.4 66.90 236.1 46.6 
1936 5.5 2.3 14.3 56.2 14.2 10.8 -3.2 77.75 255.7 43.6 
1937 8.8 -2.6 10.4 57.9 8.9 6.3 10.4 75.56 251.6 43.7 
 
 
This tendency to look for domestic new issues was reinforced by discouragement of 
investment in overseas securities. In the 1930s, the Treasury encouraged discrimination 
against capital-raising from countries that were not part of the ‘sterling area’, a group of 
                                                 
646  Banker’s Magazine (1935); page 347. 
647  Table in Scott (2002); page 85. 
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countries who deemed it prudent to link their currencies to sterling in view of their 
connections to Britain.648 
Although the largest insurance companies invested directly in corporate securities, some 
smaller companies preferred to invest through investment trusts as a way of employing 
external expertise. Scott (2002) cites the examples of Clerical Medical, which in 1930 set up its 
own investment trust with the assistance of Robert Fleming & Sons, which in 1934 formed 
Equity & Law Investment Trust as a wholly owned subsidiary.  
More generally, investment trusts were also growing in numbers and strength, although the 
funds which they invested were much smaller than those of insurance companies.649   
The interest of insurance companies and investment trusts in corporate securities led to an 
increasing interest in issues of governance: 
‘Institutional investors began to negotiate collectively with issuers of securities and 
their merchant banks regarding securities restructurings. The term for this activity 
was “investment protection”. In 1932, the British Insurance Association established an 
Investment Protection Committee. Also in 1932, the Association of Investment Trusts 
(AIT) was established with the primary purpose of coordinating investment protection 
by investment trusts.’650 
Finally, the pressures that had led life assurance companies to consider investment in 
corporate securities were leading pension funds to consider a change in policy. Avrahampour 
(2015) cites the case of the Imperial Tobacco pension fund which had been created in 1929 
following the merger of 13 British tobacco firms: 
‘At the pension fund’s inception, Imperial Tobacco committed to a 5 per cent interest 
guarantee. This guaranteed rate, around 1 per cent higher than government bond 
yields, reflects the adoption of an aggressive investment policy that attempted to 
cheapen pension provision for Imperial Tobacco. However, low interest rates in the 
inter-war and early post-war periods caused the yield of the pension fund’s assets to 
fall below 5 per cent, triggering the need for additional sponsor contributions at each 
quinquennial actuarial valuation. In the attempt to procure a yield that could meet 
the sponsor guarantee, the portfolio had been diversified into corporate securities. 
                                                 
648  Ellinger (1940); pages 322–326. Cain (1996); page 336. 
649  Cheffins (2008); page 269. 
650  Avrahampour (2015); page 287. 
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From 1933 there was a declining allocation to UK government bonds, known as gilts, 
and an increasing investment in corporate bonds, preference shares, and equities.’651 
Adoption of more active investment policies by pension funds was slowed, however, by the 
fact that many trust deeds did not include powers to invest in equities. 
Apart from encouraging interest in new domestic issues, the combined effect reinforced the 
tendency of a number of issuing houses and stockbrokers to dominate the market. Business 
owners deciding to seek a quotation did not necessarily wish to cede control of their family’s 
business. Normally, the Stock Exchange required that two-thirds of a company’s shares should 
be distributed to the public. However, this rule did not apply to applications for permission to 
deal following, for example, private placements which had the added advantage of being 
relatively inexpensive. This option was therefore attractive for business owners who wanted 
their company’s shares to be quoted but did not want to cede control.652 Placements and 
introductions were attractive to vendors because they avoided some of the fixed costs of a 
formal issue and thus provided a relatively inexpensive way of raising money: 
‘ . . . in issues of comparatively small amount, the cost of a public prospectus or offer 
for sale, if not prohibitive, is a very serious charge. While underwriting, commissions, 
brokerage and some other expenses are automatically adjusted to the amount of the 
issue, being fixed percentages; other expenses, particularly advertising, are not so 
easily adjusted.’653 
A private placement required that the issuing house and stockbroker involved should have a 
network of contacts with prospective investors, not least institutional investors, and this in 
turn required a reputation for only being involved with sound and reliable undertakings and 
for offering fair terms to investors. This led to issuing houses and stockbrokers vetting 
prospective opportunities to test their standing, the capabilities of their management and the 
quality of their commercial prospects.654  
The Exchange responded to this development by modifying the application of the Rules so that 
approval was conditional upon whether a prospectus or public offer had been published and 
whether the sponsoring brokers were able to confirm that the securities had been distributed 
as widely as possible. By this means, it was intended to limit the possibility that these more 
                                                 
651  Avrahampour (2015); page 293. 
652  Cheffins (2008); page 299. Cole (1935); page 134. 
653  Stock Exchange Committee minutes; 11 July 1935; Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
654  Grant (1937); page 155. Ellinger (1940); page 289. Cutforth (1930); page 148. 
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private ways of raising finance might be abused either by denying an attractive offer to the 
market or by attracting subscriptions without a proper appreciation of the risks involved. 
The result of these developments was that by 1938, the ‘new-style’ issuing houses 
predominated in the new issues market: 
 
 
 
Table 8.3: New issues in 1938 (domestic commercial): top ten issuing houses ranked by total 
amount subscribed655 
 
   Number of 
issues 
Total amount subscribed Average size of 
issue £ £ %age of total 
Phillip Hill & Partners 5 9,500,000 23.9 1,900,000 
Erlangers 4 3,222,000 9.0 805,500 
Helbert, Wagg & 
Company 
8 3,166,000 8.0 395,750 
Power Securities 
Corporation 
2 2,250,000 5.7 1,125,000 
Robert Benson & 
Company 
3 1,780,000 4.5 660,000 
Lazard Brothers & 
Company 
1 1,630,000 4.1 1,630,000 
Morgan Grenfell 1 1,400,000 3.5 1,400,000 
British Shareholders Trust 4 1,393,250 3.5 348,312 
Ocean Trust 2 1,323,500 3.3 661,750 
Investment Registry 7 1,042,000 2.6 148,857 
 37 26,706,750 68.1 721,804 
Others 67 13,094,371 31.9 195,438 
 104 39,801,121 100.0 382,703 
 
 
In 1928, the top ten issuing houses had managed only 30.6% of the new issues in that year. A 
similar concentration had continued among stockbrokers, although the information in the 
Issuing Houses Yearbook requires careful interpretation as more stockbrokers provided 
information for the yearbook in 1939.  
                                                 
655  Based on information in the Issuing Houses Yearbook 1939 for domestic commercial new issues 
in 1938. Only lead issuing houses were taken into account. 
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Table 8.4: New issues in 1938 (domestic commercial): top five lead brokers ranked by total 
amount subscribed656 
 
   Number of 
issues 
Total amount subscribed Average size of 
issue £ £ %age of total 
Rowe Swan & Company 17 9,820,272 24.6 577,663 
Cazenove 13 8,697,288 21,8 669,067 
Joseph Sebag & Company 5 5,638,000 14.3 1,127,600 
W Greenwell & Company 4 5,125,000 12.9 1,281,250 
de Zoete & Gordon 7 3,281,494 8.3 468,784 
 46 32,562,054 89.1 707,870 
Others 58 7,239,067 10.9 124,821 
 104 39,801,121 100.0 382,703 
 
 As a reflection of the importance of placements, the yearbook shows that in a significant 
number of cases the issues managed by these five brokers did not involve an issuing house: 
Table 8.5: New issues in 1938 (domestic commercial): issues sponsored by top five lead 
brokers analysed by involvement of an issuing house657 
 
  Issuing house involved No issuing house involved  
Number of 
issues 
Amount 
subscribed £ 
Number of 
issues 
Amount 
subscribed £ 
Rowe Swan & Company 5 4,775,000 12 5,045,272 
Cazenove 8 5,927,288 5 2,770,000 
Joseph Sebag & Company 4 5,600,000 1 38,000 
W Greenwell & Company 0 0 4 5,125,000 
de Zoete & Gordon 3 2,654,000 4 527,494 
 20 18,956,288 26 13,505,766 
 
The yearbook shows that, in addition to the five top firms, 39 firms each managed a single 
transaction. It also shows that a small number of firms specialised in managing very small 
issues for provincial utility companies (which are not included in the above figures).658 None of 
the brokers that had handled weakly underwritten issues in 1928 appear in the 1939 yearbook. 
Exclusion of these firms from sponsoring new issues had doubtless contributed to the impact 
of the 1930 reforms that were regarded as successful, as was claimed in 1946 by Harold 
                                                 
656  Based on information in the Issuing Houses Yearbook 1939 for domestic commercial new issues 
in 1938. Only lead issuing houses were taken into account. 
657  Based on information in the Issuing Houses Yearbook 1939 for domestic commercial new issues 
in 1938. Only lead issuing houses were taken into account. 
658  Notably Seymour, Pierce & Company; and Snell & Swaffield. 
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Wincott, the long-term editor of Investors’ Chronicle that was responsible for many exposés of 
unattractive issues and promoters: 
‘. . . I would commend to you a study of the new issue boom of 1936 and 1937, as 
compared with the earlier booms I have mentioned. Of course, in 1936 and 1937, 
many rearmament companies were made the subject of public issues, and the fact 
that these companies were shortly afterwards geared to the effort of total war meant 
that prospectus estimates were often exceeded, whereas without the war matters 
might have gone the other way. Nevertheless, it remains true that there was a vast 
improvement in the quality of new issues made in the 1936/37 boom relative to those 
made in earlier booms, and that the proportion of the 1936/37 flotations which went 
wrong and cost investors the money they put up was only a tiny fraction of the whole. 
Part of this improvement was due to the new Companies Act of 1929; but I am sure 
that every reasonable authority will agree that most of the credit must go to the 
Stock Exchange authorities.’659 
Wincott’s observation was confirmed by Chambers’ analysis of survival rates for IPOs which 
showed a material improvement in five-year survival rates for IPOs between 1930 and 1938 
compared with IPOs in the 1920s: 
Table 8.6: Five-year survival rates by industry 1919–1938 (%)660 
 
  All Foreign New mfg Trad mfg Other mfg Non-mfg 
1919-1920 71 67 83 80 73 64 
1921-1926 85 83 92 79 88 84 
1927-1929 64 55 50 71 67 74 
1930-1933 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1934-1938 96 92 94 100 98 95 
 
Chambers attributes this improvement in survival rates to the action taken by the Exchange 
combined with a number of economic factors including tariff protection, collusion and 
rearmament spending.661 He also suggests that the Exchange heeded the advice of the 
Macmillan Committee: 
                                                 
659  Wincott (1946); pages 128–129. Wincott’s view was supported by the Cohen Committee which 
in several places commented favourably on the Exchange’s diligence. Cohen Committee report (1945); 
page 14. Cheffins (2008); page 280. 
660  Chambers (2010); page 58. The percentages quoted show the number of surviving firms divided 
by the total number of IPOs deducting those firms liquidated and acquired for value both from the 
numerator and the denominator. 
661  Chambers (2010); pages 66–70. 
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‘ . . . that you cannot prevent a fool from his folly is no reason why you cannot give a 
prudent man guidance.’662 
Whilst the Exchange probably did take note of the Macmillan Committee’s observation, it 
cannot have influenced the Exchange’s change in approach as the changes in the rules and in 
the committee’s practice occurred many months previously in 1930 in dealing with the crashes 
of 1929. The practical effect of these changes was that the committee began to reject or defer 
applications for permission to deal. As Chambers observes, between 1927 and 1929, the 
rejection rate had been 2%. Between 1934 and 1938, the rejection rate was 7%.663 
In another paper, Chambers presents data which suggest that the degree of price volatility also 
fell after 1930.664 
The Exchange sought to maintain the success of its changed approach firstly by modification of 
the rules on private placements and introductions, as explained above, but also later by 
tightening the disclosure requirements for holding companies. In February 1939, it was 
decided that permission to deal in the shares of holding companies would not be granted 
unless the company in question undertook to circulate consolidated balance sheets and profit 
and loss accounts to its shareholders. Although the new requirement only applied to new 
issues,665 there was a general hope that the practice would be adopted voluntarily by others: 
‘. . . the official recognition of the principle that consolidated accounts are essential 
for shareholders may provide a precept for [all companies] to follow.’666 
This new requirement was advanced somewhat cautiously. As the Exchange later explained: 
‘. . . we do not want to be told that we are laying the law down and arrogating to  
ourselves rights we do not possess and so on and we have to be rather cautious.’667 
The Committee’s caution is also evident from the disclosure in its annual report for the year to 
March 1939 that the statement on consolidated accounts had only been issued: 
                                                 
662  Macmillan report (1931). 
663  Chambers (2010); page 69. 
664  Chambers (2009); page 1423. 
665  Five years later it was extended to all companies.  
666  The Economist; 25 February 1939; page 402. The Accountant; 25 February 1939; page 246. 
667  Evidence to the Cohen Committee: Question 6268.  This point appears to have been made in 
recognition of criticism by the President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants that changes of this 
sort should be made by way of general legislation. The Accountant; 6 May 1939; page 608. 
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‘. . .  after searching investigation and consultation with interested parties to ensure 
that it would be effective in achieving its primary object – the better protection of the 
interests of the public.’668 
The initiative was effective not merely in improving the quality of disclosure in annual accounts 
but also in encouraging the involvement of the accounting profession in encouraging better 
disclosure. Before 1939, the Institute of Chartered Accountants had resisted all suggestions 
that it should issue guidance on the content and preparation of accounting statements, 
although a number of firms of accountants were known to have internal standards.669 
Publication by the Stock Exchange of a requirement for publication of consolidated accounts 
contributed to a nervousness on the part of the profession that its authority in matters of 
accounting may be challenged and thus to the creation in 1942 of the Institute’s Taxation and 
Financial Relations Committee which comparatively quickly began to publish 
‘Recommendations on Accounting Principles’. 
Off-market activity 
As a perverse consequence of the Stock Exchange’s action to exclude insubstantial company 
promotions, there was even more activity outside. It is no easier to estimate the extent of this 
activity in the 1930s than it is for earlier years. As before, one indication of the scale activity is 
that the number of reports of abuse in the columns of Money Market Review, Truth and John 
Bull increased materially again.  
For example, in its 1 March 1930 edition, Money Market Review warned readers of the 
activities of Gilbert Lycett & Company who described themselves as ‘stock and share brokers’. 
The business’s technique was to gain the confidence of investors by recommending substantial 
shares such as  Cunard and then to move on to less attractive securities such as Canadian Kevin 
Oils, which were being offered for sale in advance of the opening of a public market. Mention 
was also made of circulars produced by R Kenworthy & Company which was assumed to be 
connected to Gilbert Lycett & Company because the circulars seemed to be identical. Finally, a 
warning was issued in respect of Whitehall & Kingsway Investment Trust’s circulars offering 
shares in New Age Patent Writing Ink Syndicate.670 
                                                 
668  Bircher (1989); page 186. 
669  Cutforth (1934); page 13. 
670  Money Market Review; 1 March 1930; page 431. 
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Such warnings identified a series of allegedly bogus financial newspapers and circulars: 
Table 8.7 Exposés of allegedly bogus financial newspapers and circulars 1930–1937671 
 
Exposed by Date Title of allegedly bogus financial 
newspaper or circular 
Money Market Review (i.e. 
Investors Chronicle) 
18 January 1930 Investment Service 
Money Market Review (i.e. 
Investors Chronicle) 
18 January 1930 Finance and Stock Exchange Observer 
Truth 29 January 1930 Common Sense 
Truth 29 January 1930 Money in the Making 
Truth 1 February 1930 Stock Market Summary 
Truth 19 March 1930 Finance (formerly City News) 
Money Market Review (i.e. 
Investors Chronicle) 
5 April 1930 Financial Telegraph 
Money Market Review (i.e. 
Investors Chronicle) 
5 April 1930 Financial Empire 
Money Market Review (i.e. 
Investors Chronicle) 
18 October 1930 Financial Chronicle 
Money Market Review (i.e. 
Investors Chronicle) 
18 October 1930 Motor Finance 
Money Market Review (i.e. 
Investors Chronicle) 
18 October 1930 The Stock and Shareholder 
Money Market Review (i.e. 
Investors Chronicle) 
25 October 1930 Stock Market Record 
Daily Mail 25 October 1930 Financial Telegraph 
Daily Mail 25 October 1930 Finance 
Money Market Review (i.e. 
Investors Chronicle) 
15 November 1930 Financial Observer 
Money Market Review (i.e. 
Investors Chronicle) 
15 November 1930 Stock Exchange Analyst 
Truth 10 June 1931 Investment Facts 
Truth 2 September 1931 Bankers Gazette 
Truth 2 September 1931 Market Notes 
Truth 18 April 1934 The Financial Guide 
Truth 14 August 1935 Market News 
Truth 14 August 1935 The Financial Forum & Investors Guide 
Truth 14 August 1935 Financial Express 
Truth 15 April 1936 Stock Exchange Times 
Financial Times 13 May 1936 The Financial Press 
Financial News 25 November 1937 The Shareholder 
 
Porter suggested it was likely that there were more such newspapers and circulars than 
Newman identified.672  
                                                 
671  Table reproduced from Newman (1984); page 65. 
672  Porter (2006). 
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Exposés were helpful to daily newspapers that in the early 1930s found themselves in the 
midst of a circulation war, for their environment had also changed. They had come to depend 
to an increasing extent on the money they received from advertisements. Larger circulation 
meant higher advertising rates and hence more income. Each newspaper tried to attract 
readers by offering gifts of various sorts (e.g. silk stockings, encyclopaedias or sets of classic 
novels).673 All titles competed to publish features that would appeal to readers, and for the 
Daily Mail, share-pusher exposés were especially interesting as they appealed to a readership 
that had sufficient resources to be interested in investment and which was thus attractive to 
advertisers.674 
Matters came to a head in December 1935 with the hearing of a libel action against the Daily 
Mail. Maurice Singer and the Bank of London had both been named in a series of articles 
published by the Daily Mail during July and August 1934 that accused them of being fraudulent 
share-pushers. The first of these articles announced: 
‘The Daily Mail has to warn the public that an intensive share pushing campaign in 
this country by operators from across the Atlantic is now in preparation. Information 
from Montreal indicates that the nefarious share pusher Maurice Singer for long 
associated with Jacob Factor has become a naturalised Canadian and has been 
provided with a Canadian passport which entitles him to travel without let or 
hindrance in any part of the British Empire.’675 
Three days later, a further article stated: 
‘Maurice Singer, the notorious share-pusher, who has crossed the Atlantic for the 
express purpose of organizing a gigantic raid on the pockets of British investors, is still 
hesitating to set foot in England. He has been seen in Paris, where, with his trunks 
crammed with share boosting literature, he took a room at a fashionable hotel. His 
arrival coincided with the exposure in the Daily Mail and the Continental Daily Mail of 
his plans for foisting shares of his latest creation in Canada, the Associated Gold 
Mining and Finance Co. and of the Plymouth Gold Mining Co. Ltd. on the 
unsophisticated public.’676 
                                                 
673  Taylor (1965); page 311. 
674  The Daily Mail’s circulation was under attack from the Daily Express. Surveys of readership in 
the 1930s show that the Daily Express’s readership rose from about 1.1 million in 1930 to about 2.5 
million in 1939, while the Daily Mail’s circulation fell from about 1.8 million to about 1.5 million. The 
surveys also show that the Daily Mail’s penetration of the more prosperous elements of the middle class 
was greater than the Daily Express’s. Maintenance of the Daily Mail’s claim to be the leading newspaper 
depended upon clear success among the middle classes. Jeffery et al (1987); page 27 et seq. 
675  Daily Mail; 7 July 1934. 
676  Daily Mail; 10 July 1934. 
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On the next day, yet another article asserted that: 
‘[Mr Singer] has established a share pushing organisation in the Dutch capital in the 
form of a branch of the so-called Bank of London. This concern is a bucket-shop of the 
worst description and must not on any account be confused with the Bank of London 
and South America Ltd, an institution of the highest repute.’677 
In suggesting a connection with Jacob Factor, the Daily Mail was reminding readers of another 
share-pushing scandal. In October 1930, the Court had heard an action brought by Revd Arthur 
Travis Faber and his wife against Tyler Wilson & Company Limited in which the plaintiff 
claimed damages for loss caused in 1928 by investing in shares on the basis of fraudulent 
misrepresentation.678 It was claimed that the misrepresentations were made on behalf of Tyler 
Wilson & Company who claimed to be stockbrokers and that the name given by the person 
responsible was an alias for an American called Jacob Factor.679 The outcome of the hearing 
was that damages were awarded to the plaintiffs.680 Subsequently, charges were issued against 
Jacob Factor but could not be served as he was found to have left the country. Attempts were 
made to secure his extradition from Illinois but failed because of difficulties in establishing that 
the criminal code of Illinois recognised a crime that was equivalent to the charges issued in 
England681 and because Factor could not be found before the warrant expired.682 The result 
was that the charges against Factor had not been tried in the United Kingdom. 
In its defence to the allegation of libel, the Daily Mail claimed ‘justification’: in other words, 
that the articles had been correct.  As the judge put it in his summing up: 
                                                 
677  Daily Mail; 11 July 1934. 
678  The Times; 28–31 October 1930. McConnell (1943). 
679  Factor had been a share-pusher in the United States of America after the end of the 1914–1918 
war. In 1924, backed by money provided by a criminal gang in New York, Factor travelled to England to 
make money through share-pushing. Allegedly, during this first visit, Factor made a profit of US$ 1.5 
million. He returned in 1925, for a second share-pushing campaign, on this occasion using the name 
Tyler Wilson & Company. When his operation attracted press attention in 1930, he returned to the 
United States, by which point his accumulated profit is said to have amounted to US$ 8 million or £ 1.6 
million. Tuohy (2001); page 132. 
680  The Times; 31 October 1930; page 4. 
681  Memorandum dated 23 April 1932 by Albert Robbins, an American lawyer. National Archives; 
files FO 115/3402; CAB 24/248/36; CAB 24/248/39. 
682  It has been claimed that Factor arranged to be ‘kidnapped’ in Chicago when the warrant was 
about to expire. Tuohy (2001); page 140 et seq. 
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‘What the jury had to consider was whether Mr Singer was a swindling share-pusher 
and whether the Bank of London was a swindling bucket-shop. That was the real sting 
of the libel.’683 
In short order, the jury found that Mr Singer was a ‘swindling share-pusher’ and that the Bank 
of London was a ‘swindling bucket-shop’.684 The Daily Mail was acquitted of the alleged libel 
and awarded costs. 
Perhaps by coincidence, the verdict in the Singer libel case was reinforced in January 1936 in 
the hearing of an application by the Liquidator of Broad Street Press Limited, another of Jacob 
Factor’s companies: 
‘. . . the Official Receiver [as liquidator] desired directions as to the disposition of a 
fund amounting substantially to £360,000, which was extracted from Jacob Factor in 
America. Counsel read an affidavit by the Official Receiver in which it was stated that 
Broad Street Press Limited, had by false representations sold large numbers of shares 
in various companies, and that the person responsible for the incorporation of Broad 
Street Press Limited and mainly responsible for its fraudulent activities was John 
(otherwise Jacob) Factor who had left England at the beginning of October 1930 and 
went to Chicago. An order for his extradition not having been executed within the 
prescribed time he was still in Chicago. 
‘An agreement had been arrived at with Factor as a result of which the liquidator had 
received approximately £360,000.’685 
If the outcome of the Daily Mail libel action had left any doubt about Jacob Factor and his 
henchmen, it must have been dispelled by the fact that Factor had paid a substantial sum to 
the liquidator. From this point, if not before, it was evident that there had been a sustained 
attempt by internationally mobile fraudsters to take advantage of unsophisticated UK 
investors. 
Conclusions 
There are a number of similarities between the changing character of the market in the 1930s 
and in the 1920s. The search for expert advice  and for alleviation of tax liabilities led many to 
invest through financial institutions, whether life assurance companies, investment trusts or 
pension funds. Vendors, finding it more difficult to finance investment by profit retention saw 
in the market a source of finance; but they also looked askance at the risk of speculation and 
                                                 
683  The Times; 18 December 1935; page 4. 
684  The Times; 19 December 1935; page 4. 
685  The Times; 25 January 1936; page 4. 
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the troublesome relationship with shareholders that many companies that had floated in 1919 
and 1920 had experienced. They preferred to look for sustainable relationships. As in the 
1920s, these trends encouraged the development of new issuing houses in substitution for the 
old-style promoters and were of prime importance to the Exchange because domestic 
corporate securities were becoming more significant as international business declined. 
These developments validated the thrust of the Exchange’s reforms in 1930 that had 
discouraged the most speculative issues and thus favoured greater stability, and supported the 
recovery in the mid-1930s of the level of activity. Unfortunately, they brought with them other 
consequences for members. 
New institutional interest in investment in corporate securities and the growth of new issuing 
houses favouring stable relationships tended to concentrate the numbers of brokers involved 
in corporate business and diminished the role played by broker members. As institutional 
investors began to negotiate the terms of a new issue directly with the issuing house, so 
brokers were more likely to be seen as functionaries who facilitated transactions rather than 
as leaders who negotiated the terms of transactions. It was likely that the fees payable to 
brokers would be adjusted accordingly and there was, indeed, pressure to reduce rates of 
commission. The membership thus came to be even more polarised as the interests of the 
corporate business brokers continued to diverge from the interests of brokers concentrating 
on personal business. 
Unable to compete with the changing character of the market and its demand for services, the 
smaller firms used their control of a majority of the members’ votes to impede further changes 
to the rules. The perverse consequence was to encourage others to find ways of bypassing the 
Exchange whenever possible.  
In many cases, it proved possible for business to bypass the Exchange without significant risk 
through, for example, the service provided by country jobbers such as JW Nicholson & 
Company of Sheffield. In other cases, however, the business that bypassed the Exchange was 
highly abusive. In short, one consequence of the Exchange reforming to avoid speculative 
issues was to expose many unsuspecting investors who shared a desire to improve the returns 
on their small holdings to abusive traders who operated in an unregulated space.   
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Members of the London Exchange had always assumed that, provided that they managed their 
own marketplace successfully, their control would not be threatened by whatever happened 
outside that market. This assumption was to be tested by the public outcry that grew from the 
scandalous activities of off-market traders and the apparent futility of existing arrangements 
for controlling them. This was the significance of the Broad Street Press libel action, which 
appeared to suggest that Jacob Factor and Maurice Singer had been able to make money 
almost beyond the dreams of avarice with impunity. In this context, the subsequent payment 
by Factor to eliminate any obligation to the liquidator not only confirmed the conclusion of the 
libel action but would have seemed insultingly small when compared with the profit that he 
had allegedly made.  
 
It was inevitable that these events would lead to demands for action to control share trading 
and to a somewhat uncomfortable recognition for the Exchange that its unsupervised 
independence depended in part of society’s success in regulating off-market activity, from 
which the Exchange had traditionally held itself aloof. If the Exchange were to preserve the 
independent, unsupervised position it had created for itself, it would have to explain why any 
new rules to control share trading generally should not apply equally to its members and 
marketplace.  
 
  
  
 
CHAPTER NINE – 1930–1939 – REGULATING SHARE TRADING – PART II 
 
 
Introduction 
The outcome of the Broad Street Press libel trial was significant because it served to validate 
not only the campaigns of national newspapers such as the Daily Mail and the Daily Express 
but also the assertions of political commentators who criticised the financial institutions of the 
City, complaining that by permitting the misapplication of capital they were not serving the 
national interest. In the subsequent debate, the London Stock Exchange was to be 
embarrassed by the realisation of the threat posed by the unregulated market place because it 
had refused to broaden its responsibilities by accepting a proposal that it should be granted a 
Royal Charter, thus becoming the body to regulate all share traders. 
There was a further significance in the Broad Street Press trial: the absence of Jacob Factor. 
Vindication of the Daily Mail suggested that crimes had been committed for which someone 
could have been prosecuted. Whilst there was no difficulty in identifying the principal suspect, 
Jacob Factor, the criminal justice system had been unable to apprehend him whilst in the 
country and all efforts to secure his return were to fail. Politically the matter was taken so 
seriously that attempts to extradite Factor from the United States were discussed twice in 
Cabinet. 
Thus attention came to be focussed on the success of the criminal justice system in controlling 
or deterring share trading abuse. 
Prosecutions 
It was quickly recognised that the actions taken by the government in 1928 to 1929 in line with 
the Greene Committee’s recommendations had not been successful. The report had proposed 
measures aimed at providing more information to the DPP and had suggested that 
prosecutions initiated on the basis of information provided by Board of Trade Inspectors 
Chapter Nine 
1930–1939 – Regulating share trading – part II 
Page 232 
 
should be conducted at the public’s expense and not the shareholders’.686 In practice, no 
additional funds were forthcoming. 
Further, the committee proposed that door-to-door selling should be made an offence and 
that offers of shares should be accompanied by written statements of prescribed particulars.687 
Although implemented urgently in the Companies Act 1928, the proposed new offence proved 
ineffective because the offence was too rigidly defined. It could be avoided by a number of 
simple devices: one of which was already being used by many share-pushers. Mailing circulars 
to members of the public could not be construed as door-to-door selling and thus did not fall 
within the newly created offence. If a member of the public then responded to an invitation in 
a circular and in return received a call from a share-pusher it would not attract prosecution 
under the new offence for it was not unsolicited.  
Alternatively, a caller who chose to visit houses in alternate streets or alternate villages would 
not strictly be selling door-to-door, and so would not have committed the new offence.  
As a result there were few prosecutions under the new law.   
The ineffectiveness of these measures was reflected in information provided to the Bodkin 
Committee that was later to be appointed by the Board of Trade in 1936 to inquire into share-
pushing. The report, which appears to have been based on the registers maintained by the 
DPP, listed 29 cases which arose between January 1930 and the end of 1935. The list of cases 
is set out in Appendix One to this Chapter. Of those listed, only four cases that were brought to 
trial involved charges under the Companies Act 1929.688  Moreover, in 16 of the remaining 
cases it had either been decided that no further action should be taken or trials had not 
commenced. In other words, between 1930 and 1935, a time when there had been growing 
public concern, only 13 cases had proceeded to trial.689  
As the information provided to the Bodkin Committee did not cover subsequent years and 
because of the possibility that it may not have covered all of the cases brought against abusive 
                                                 
686  Greene Committee Report (1926); page 27. 
687  Greene Committee Report (1926); pages 50–51. 
688  Cases 38/30 (Cresset Trust); 7/33 (Herrick, Smithyes & White); 53/34 (Gilbert White & 
Company); and 268/35 (Period Investment Trust). 
689  Attribution of the data to the Director’s registers is suggested because the reference numbers 
quoted are similar to those in the Director’s registers which are held in the National Archives. 
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company promoters and share-pushers (perhaps because of offenders being charged with 
other types of offence), a search was performed for this study of cases reported in 
newspapers.690 This search, which included both civil and criminal actions, identified 66 cases 
between 1930 and 1938 (31 before the end of 1935, and 35 between January 1936 and 
December 1938). Even this search will not have traced all instances of prosecutions of 
fraudulent company promoters and share-pushers, probably because the cases were published 
under headlines that did not use the relevant words (e.g. the initial searches failed to trace the 
prosecution in November 1930 of Francis Lorang, the promoter of the Blue Bird companies,691 
and the prosecution in July 1932 of Eugen Spier, who in 1927 had been the promoter of 
Combined Pulp and Paper Mills Limited.692 Omissions may also have occurred because the 
three newspapers searched did not report a case such as the prosecution of three defendants 
in 1934 over the promotion of RMC Textiles (1928) Limited which was reported in The 
Accountant.693 
These two sources of information, together with the analysis of the reasons for the failure of 
prosecutions set out in the Bodkin report itself, demonstrate why prosecution activity was 
failing to prevent or deter abusive company promotion and share-pushing. 
Variations in the numbers of cases considered in each year suggest that the diligence of the 
authorities in chasing offenders varied from year to year.  
Table 9.1: Number of cases arising 1930-1938 
 
  1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 Totals 
Bodkin 
Committee 
data 
8 1 4 6 4 6 0 0 0 29 
Newspaper 
search 
10 6 6 4 1 4 9 17 9 66 
                                                 
690  The search was conducted digitally using the databases of issues of the Financial Times, The 
Times and the Manchester Guardian for the years 1930–1938. Searches were conducted in each case, 
using the terms: ‘share fraud’, ‘fraudulent prospectus’, ‘share pushers’, and ‘company promoters’. Only 
one reference to a case (usually the earliest) is included in the list: i.e. the list does not attempt to 
record all of the references to each case in all of the newspapers. For example, all three newspapers 
may have carried a separate report in respect of each day of a trial. Many of the reports were short, not 
describing the charges in detail. A list of the cases identified is set out in Appendix Two to this Chapter. 
691  The Times; 26 November 1930; page 5. 
692  Cheffins (2008); page 2823. The Times; 28 July 1932. 
693  The Accountant; 13 August 1934; page 201 et seq. The case included charges relating to an 
allegedly false statement in a prospectus and was presumably reported in The Accountant because one 
of the accused had been the company’s auditor. 
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Coverage in publications such as Money Market Review and Truth of abusive trading did not 
increase substantially in the months before 1936: it appears to have been reasonably constant 
between 1930 and 1936. This suggests that the increase in the number of cases arising in 
1936–1937 did not result from a marked increase in the activity of share-pushers and is more 
likely to have resulted from a marked increase in police activity. As an example of this,  in 1936 
the City of London Police created a specialist team to deal with such cases. 12 officers were 
trained in company law and set to ‘clean up’ the City. It was claimed that by February 1937, 40 
arrest warrants had been issued as a result of this team’s work.694 Unless there was a sharp 
increase in abusive activity in 1937, for which there is no other evidence, the increase in cases 
in that year implies a certain inactivity on the part of the police in earlier years. This suggestion 
is reinforced by the fact that the earlier years include a number of cases in which suspects who 
were believed to be fraudulent promoters or share-pushers were arraigned for immigration 
offences: either for giving false information to passport officers or for attempting to enter the 
country after ‘gating’ orders had been issued by the Home Secretary. 
Even when a crime was investigated and suspects identified, it was not straightforward to 
apprehend them. In a number of the cases reported to the Bodkin Committee, the suspects 
had not been apprehended: 
Table 9.2: Cases in which arrest warrants were not executed 
 
  Trading name Suspect Reasons given 
1930 G Lycett & Co RC Guest (American) Had left country. Prosecution of 
other suspects but they were not 
the prime movers. 
1930 Bank of London/Broad 
Street Press case 
J Factor (American) Had left country as warrants were 
issued. Prosecution continued 
against other suspects. Factor was 
prime mover and removed most 
of the gang’s profit. 
1933 Percy Bennett & 
Company 
C Young, White Could not be found. 
1933 Leonard Briggs AE Wagstaff Absconded. 
1934 Peter Gordon & Company Cranwell Absconded. 
1934 James Stewart & Crichton James Stewart Absconded. 
 
                                                 
694  Evening News; 23 February 1937. 
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The Bank of London/Broad Street Press case illustrates some of the difficulties that were faced 
in apprehending suspects. Jacob Factor, an American who was the prime mover in this affair, 
operated under a series of aliases. It is known, for example, that he held a bank account in the 
North of Scotland bank in the name of H Guest and took residence in London under the name 
of J Wise.695 As identification depended on written descriptions and photographs, it was not 
easy to pursue a suspect through changes in alias. In Factor’s case, he was known to have left 
the country with an allegedly substantial amount of money and was eventually traced to 
Chicago where he was living openly. Attempts to extradite him failed. Factor had been careful 
to avoid direct meetings with potential investors and the handling of their money, so that it 
was believed that on the available evidence a prosecution on charges of obtaining money with 
false pretences would be unlikely to succeed.696 As a result, the warrant for his arrest was 
issued for the crime of ‘receiving property knowing the same to have been fraudulently 
obtained’.697 Factor’s lawyers contended that there was no crime in the Illinois criminal code 
that matched this offence and that there was no common law equivalent so that extradition 
would be impermissible. This issue was to be considered by the Supreme Court, but that 
hearing was put off when Factor was ‘kidnapped’ (in a raid that he arranged) and by the time 
he reappeared, the arrest warrant had expired.698 
Even when suspects were apprehended successfully, as the Factor case and the record of 
prosecutions demonstrate, it was not always straightforward to decide which charges should 
be brought. As the Bodkin Committee pointed out, some of the available charges such as the 
charge of obtaining money with false pretences could present difficulty: 
‘The seller naturally praises the good he offers, and shares at one time worth little or 
nothing may “jump in value” on some sudden turn in the fortunes of the company. 
This may well happen in regard to such fortunes as mining or oil companies, where at 
the time when the shares are offered the company is profitably producing neither ore 
nor oil and may have abandoned the working, yet after events may show that the 
shares, worthless when sold, become worth the price paid for them.’699 
This may explain the variety of charges that were used in cases against share promoters and 
hawkers. 
                                                 
695  McConnell (1943); pages 9 and 12. 
696  The Times; 19 December 1935; page 4. 
697  Section 33 of the Larceny Act 1916. 
698  Tuohy (2001). 
699  Bodkin Committee report (1937); pages 22–23. 
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Once a charge was selected, it might prove difficult to collect the evidence necessary for a 
successful prosecution. After all, abusive promoters or pushers would have been aware that a 
prosecution would be assisted by any records that they caused to be created and held so there 
was an incentive either not to hold records or to destroy them when investigations began. 
‘. . . where a bucketeer was seeking to bamboozle a client, there was little incentive to 
store evidence that might subsequently assist a prosecution.’700 
 Notably at the end of the trial of Maurice Singer’s libel action against the Daily Mail, the 
newspaper’s barrister requested that the Court should retain the records adduced in Court by 
Singer to substantiate his case: 
‘Mr Holmes asked that the papers in the case should be retained in the custody of the 
Court. The allegation was that the words complained of by the plaintiffs meant that 
they had been engaged in defrauding the public and in a criminal conspiracy. The 
defendants had pleaded justification and had succeeded. Many of the books said 
counsel came from abroad.’ 
The appropriate order was made, and had the result that records which otherwise might easily 
have disappeared would have been available as the evidence in a subsequent prosecution of 
Singer.701 The significance of the documents was described by Roderick Dew of Lewis & Lewis, 
the Daily Mail’s solicitors, in a memorandum of evidence submitted to the Bodkin Committee: 
‘All these companies were registered in Canada, and one of the chief difficulties with 
which [the Daily Mail was] faced in the course of the proceedings was to prove that 
Mr Singer not only had formed the companies but that he was responsible for the sale 
of the shares in England and elsewhere. Naturally enough the actual sales were not 
carried out by Mr Singer himself and the difficulty was to find the link between 
Canada and England, but this [the Daily Mail was] able to do by obtaining in Canada 
duplicates of letters written by the secretary of the various companies to Maurice 
Singer and/or the Bank of London sending share certificates in blank the numbers of 
which were afterwards found to tally with those in the possession of people who had 
bought shares in England.’ 
The contents of these records can be judged from similar documents that were disclosed in 
another case: the prosecution of Stanley Grove Spiro, who in 1934 had gained control of a 
Scottish outside broking firm, Maclean and Henderson. In that case, the salesmen’s records 
included reports on the potential investors they had visited such as: 
                                                 
700  Porter (2006); page 105. 
701  The Times; 19 December 1935; page 4. Singer was prosecuted later on other charges. 
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‘Small house about six miles from Birmingham. Retired coachman. Very cautious. Has 
checked up on the firm. Prefers industrials to gold. Says “yes” to everything, but then 
switches. Think £3,000 could be lifted.’702 
Other documents mentioned by Mr Dew included the detailed notes kept by Bank of London 
of salesmen’s visits to potential investors who were being persuaded to buy worthless shares. 
Embarrassingly for Singer, it had been found necessary to keep records of which potential 
investors had been visited and what they had been told so that follow-up visits could be 
organised successfully.703 
If all else failed, fraudulent promoters and pushers appear to have resorted to bribery. As the 
Bodkin Committee was to put it: 
‘It was also made plain to us that it is very desirable that the superior officers of the 
Police Force should keep in close touch with the action of their subordinates, 
especially as it is to be borne in mind that several of the recent share-pushing cases 
have disclosed the possession of considerable capital and the obtaining of enormous 
sums of money from the public, with the result that there is the possibility of police 
officers being tempted to act otherwise than in accordance with their duties.’704 
This and other references in the report to the inefficiency of the City Police and the need for 
reorganisation, even possibly a merger of anti-fraud resources with the Metropolitan Police, 
caused some consternation in the City and led the Court of Aldermen to seek access to the 
evidence on which it had been based. Access was refused.705 Evidence to support the  
reference had come from a number of sources, including a memorandum or evidence 
submitted by Geoffrey Roberts, Treasury Counsel and adviser to the DPP: 
‘I believe that in the case of the Carlisle Investment Trust, a Bank applied in 
confidence to the Director of Public Prosecutions stating that they had some £70,000 
standing to the credit of that customer – that they suspected a bucket shop – but that 
they would be forced to pay the money out in a few days unless process was 
obtained. Thereupon the Director of Public Prosecutions asked for an officer from the 
City Police, and was allotted the Inspector who was in charge of the Murdoch & Barr 
case. Enquiries were made – and the statements of three victims taken. An 
application was then made for a warrant, but the victims were paid off, process could 
not be obtained, and the bank had to pay over the money. I do not know the details 
of this case, but it indicates that the Bucket shop proprietor was receiving information 
                                                 
702  Manchester Guardian; 25 March 1938; page 17. Cited in: Hollow (2015); page 81. 
703  National Archives; file BT 58/226, SP 25. 
704  Bodkin Committee report (1937); page 28. 
705  National Archives; file BT 58/228; COS 9390/1937. The Aldermen seem to have been especially 
concerned by the suggestion that there should be a merger of resources with the Metropolitan Police. 
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from the Inspector, and so was enabled to pay off the selected victims so as to avoid 
arrest and a stop being put on the bank account. Two different firms of solicitors in 
the City have complained that they reported a share-pushing concern and that he did 
nothing. These reports were quite independent of each other and were separated by 
some months.’706 
There is later evidence that bribery may have been a common practice. At the trial of his libel 
action against the Daily Mail, Maurice Singer and the Bank of London were represented by 
Frederick de Verteuil, a barrister who was later to be prosecuted for conspiracy to defraud 
Edward Guylee who himself had been convicted of fraudulent share-pushing: 
‘Edward Harold Guylee . . . gave evidence . . . of his association with de Verteuil who, 
he alleged, said he could “arrange” matters with three gentlemen in the Public 
Prosecutor’s office for £3,000. The witness said he gave de Verteuil that sum in £1 
notes. Later, Guylee added, he was arrested . . . after the hearing at Guildhall de 
Verteuil told him that he could stop reports in the Press of the Court proceedings for 
£1,000. He gave him that sum. . . On February 15, 1937, he was committed for trial 
after which Whelan707 told him that de Verteuil required 2,000 guineas to “grease the 
wheels” in his favour. . . the witness said that he understood that the money was to 
be handed to some legal people at the Court and that was why the payment was to 
be in guineas.’708 
The case ended with the conviction of both de Verteuil and his instructing solicitor, Whelan. In 
Guylee’s case, there does not seem to have been proof that the money was used to pay bribes, 
but Guylee accepted that the payment of bribes was normal, and was prepared to make 
considerable sums available for the purpose. De Verteuil had defended promoters and share 
pushers on other occasions, and was to find himself mentioned in libel proceedings brought by 
one of his former clients, Martin Harman,709 against London Express Newspaper in respect of 
an article that alleged that de Verteuil’s disgrace at the bar710 and the prosecution had been 
engineered by Harman who was embittered as a result of being convicted in spite of de 
Verteuil’s defence. In evidence, it was also suggested that when de Verteuil was defending 
Harman, he had tried to persuade him to bribe a public official. The libel action failed.711 
                                                 
706  National Archives; file 58/226, SP25. Related evidence was submitted by Valentine Holmes, 
another barrister; National Archives; file 58/226, SP 22. 
707  De Verteuil’s co-accused who was a solicitor. 
708  The Times; 3 June 1938; page 4. 
709  During the 1920s, Harman had become a director of Morris & Jones, a Liverpool grocery 
company for the express purpose of persuading the company to buy up worthless shares in his other 
companies: Robb (1992); page 131; Hollow (2015). 
710  He had been disbarred by Gray’s Inn. 
711  The Times; 28 April 1939; page 4. 29 April 1939; page 4. 2 May 1939; page 4. 
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For all these reasons, in the early 1930s, company promoters and share-pushers would have 
been justified in regarding the threat of prosecution as a distant and uncertain prospect: 
especially those such as Factor and Singer who were the ringleaders. To make their 
apprehension even more difficult, they were said to base themselves in Paris. When there was 
a need to visit England they would travel using false passports and the return halves of air 
tickets bought by others. This fitted the long-standing popular view that the courts tended to 
punish the foot soldiers rather than the generals of any scheme: 
‘Criminal prosecutions in cases of commercial fraud in this country are apt to go by 
fits and starts; sensational trials take place at the call of an angry public; but it is very 
seldom that the real authors and inventors of fraudulent schemes find their way into 
the dock. Some unfortunate dupe or over-sanguine capitalist becomes the scapegoat 
of the sins of others.’712 
This would have been held to be even more true for sophisticated City financiers as is 
demonstrated by the Royal Mail Steamship case. 
Superficially, the case might appear to have demonstrated that City financiers were vulnerable 
to prosecution since the company’s Chairman, Lord Kylsant, was convicted, and in spite of all 
manner of applications to the Home Secretary, was obliged to serve his sentence.713 Yet the 
case also suggested that prosecution and conviction could easily have been avoided by careful 
drafting of the prospectus in question and that Lord Kylsant’s problem arose as much because 
of inconsistencies in the law as from criminal acts on his part. 
These implications of the outcome of the prosecution were immediately appreciated: at least 
within the accounting profession. Speeches by the President of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants and the Society of Incorporated Accountants drew attention to the inadequacies 
of the law with regard to disclosure in accounts and the duties of auditors and were explored 
in articles in the professional journals: 
                                                 
712  HR Grenfell; ‘Banking and Commercial Legislation’; Nineteenth Century (March 1879); page 535. 
Cited in Robb (1992); pages 162–3. See also: ‘The Morals of Business’; Meliora (1858); page 51. Also 
cited in Robb (1992); page 162. 
713  Various appeals for clemency were made privately to the Home Secretary. National Archives; 
file HO 144/15364. 
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‘ . . . the ordinary investor does not realise the limitations which are placed upon an 
auditor by the failure of the Companies Act to lay down more explicitly the lines upon 
which the profit and loss account should be prepared.’714 
There were also people who believed that social standing served as a prophylactic against 
prosecution: 
‘ . . . one cannot help feeling that there exists on the part both of the authorities and 
of that block of vested interests compendiously known as the “City”, a certain 
aversion to the launching of proceedings which involve the ventilation of scandals 
affecting highly placed and influential personages.’715 
 Samuel went on: 
‘The prosecution of Lord Kylsant of Carmarthen in 1931 indicates, no doubt, a 
welcome progress in the direction of a somewhat more drastic administration of the 
law. But even in that case, no action was taken until approximately one year after the 
debacle, when various queries were addressed to the Attorney General . . . including 
the following pointed question by Mr Chuter Ede on 2nd March 1931: “Can my 
honourable and learned friend assure the House that any decision taken will be 
absolutely irrespective of the social prestige of the persons involved.”’716 
The case arose from the use for several years of transfers from secret reserves to augment the 
group’s annual profit with only the barest reference in the group’s accounts: 
‘In simple language the charges referring to the balance sheets amounted to this: 
that in 1926 and 1927 by the profit and loss accounts and the balance sheets, for the 
form of which Lord Kylsant, as chairman, was responsible, the public was led to 
believe that the RMSP group had in those two years made large trading profits 
whereas in fact the group made serious losses, and that the auditor to the company, 
knowing perfectly well what had been done, had condoned the deception and signed 
the report at the foot of each balance sheet, stating that a true and correct view of 
the state of the company’s affairs as shown by the books of the company had been 
given. The charge relating to the prospectus was not in substance dissimilar. It was 
that the document contained a false statement with regard to the issue of debenture 
stock and was intended to induce people to entrust or advance money to the 
company.’717 
                                                 
714  The Accountant; Volume 86; page 44–45. Volume 86; page 623. Volume 86; page 521. Edwards 
(1976); page 298 et seq. Stewart (1991); pages 45–46. 
715  Samuel (1933); page 8. 
716  Samuel (1933); page 9. The question was merely one of a series of questions put to the 
ministers almost on a weekly basis after the Royal Mail Steamship Group AGM on 12 February 1931. 
House of Commons Hansard: 17 February 1931; 24 February 1931; 2 March 1931; 3 March 1931; 30 
March 1931; and 20 April 1931. 
717  Brooks (1933); pages xxii-xxiii. 
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Convictions were not secured in respect of the charges relating to the annual accounts, as a 
result of expert accountancy advice that the inclusion of the words ‘after adjustment of 
taxation reserves’ were sufficient indication that some transfers had taken place. One of the 
curiosities of this case is that the evidence of one of the accountants called by the prosecution, 
Lord Plender, agreed on this point with the expert evidence tendered for the defence.718 On 
this point, the prosecution seems to have been ill-prepared. It was doubtless appreciated that 
the evidence of so distinguished and decorated an accountant as Lord Plender would be 
critical to the outcome of the case for Sir Patrick Hastings; the auditor’s barrister certainly took 
this view.719 To be unable to deal with his confirmation of the defence’s expert evidence 
suggests a lack of preparation and might also suggest that the decision to prosecute was taken 
without knowledge of the implications of all the expert opinions. 
Words similar to those used in the accounts had not been included in a relevant place in the 
prospectus. Under the law at the time the auditor had not been required to sign a report for 
inclusion in the prospectus and had not been involved in preparing the prospectus.720 
Impliedly, had the auditor been involved the words would have been amended and the 
possibility of conviction would have been avoided. As it was the jury gave the impression of 
being unenthusiastic about finding that Lord Kylsant was guilty. After considering their verdict 
for two hours, the jury sent a note to the judge asking whether to justify a verdict of guilty it 
was necessary for the intent of the accused to be fraudulent, adding: 
‘They can visualise an intent to deceive without being fraudulent’. 
The judge directed that: 
‘ . . . in my judgment, the intent to deceive must be fraudulent under the statute . . . 
An intent to deceive  . . . necessarily involves a fraudulent intent . . .’721 
In the event, Lord Kylsant was sentenced to the relatively lenient term of one year’s 
imprisonment, a precedent which was subsequently to constrain other judges.722 Unease about 
                                                 
718  The defence’s accountancy experts were HLH Hill, President of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, and BOD Manning of Cole, Bond & Company. Jones (1995); page 153. 
719  Ashton (1986); page 9. 
720  The prospectus was published before the commencement of the Companies Act 1929. 
721  Brooks (1933); pages 261–262. 
722  In the RMC Textiles (1928) Limited trial in 1934, John Waterhouse and John Monk were handed 
down sentences of one year and nine months respectively. The judge explained that the prospectuses 
and statements that were the subjects of that case ‘were published at about the same time as those in 
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Lord Kylsant’s guilt was not confined to the jury for his clubs were to decline his resignation 
and Sir Patrick Hastings, the barrister who had represented the auditor, later admitted: 
‘As a mere observer my opinion is completely valueless, but I was never completely 
satisfied of the justice of that conviction. I was very sorry for Lord Kylsant.’723  
The predicament of such as Lord Kylsant had been recognised by DM Evans in 1859: 
‘Evans explained that ‘high art’ crime subsisted as a spectrum marked by the 
extremes of the apprentice boy who robbed a few shillings from the till and the 
gigantic forger or swindler. Lying between these points lay a ‘reckless speculator’ who 
“would risk everything in the hope of sudden gain, rather than toil safely and 
laboriously for a distant reward. Evans conceded this speculator might well be a man 
of honour “who would instinctively shrink from any deed which would invoke the 
interference of the criminal law”, but who if fortune was adverse would move “ever 
closer to wrongdoing”, here appreciating the perpetrator with no criminal self-
image”.’724 
The overall implication of the experience of the early 1930s was that prosecutions were failing 
to deter the activities of company directors and company promoters let alone the gangs of 
share-pushers who had come to England from New York. In practice, the likelihood of 
prosecution was too remote to be taken seriously and if a suspect was prosecuted, ways could 
be found to limit the risk of conviction. As was said by Sir Horace Avory, the judge at Hatry’s 
trial: 
‘. . . the only real deterrent to crime is the certainty725 that the proper penalty will 
follow upon its commission.’726 
Of course, even if suspects were convicted and imprisoned, it was possible for them to 
recommence the activity immediately on release for there were no powers by which the Board 
of Trade or any other authority could prevent that. In the cases identified by the Board of 
Trade and the newspaper search for this study, there are two examples of serial offenders: 
                                                                                                                                               
the Kylsant case’. The auditor was criticised for being negligent but was acquitted. The Accountant; 6 
October 1934; page 479. 
723  Hastings (1949); page 346. Green and Moss (1982); page 142. Anon (1931). Anon (1932). 
Ashton (1986).  Arnold (1991). Davies (1981); Davies and Bourn (1972). Robb (1992); page 144. 
724  Wilson (2104); page 89 quoting Evans (1859);  pages 1-2. 
725  Emphasis added. 
726  Address to the Grand Jury at Exeter Assizes, May 1922. Quoted in Bell (1939); page 237.  
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Table 9.3: Serial company promoter/share-pusher prosecutions 
 
  First prosecution Subsequent prosecutions 
Date Description Year Description 
Tanfield January 1931 Financial Telegraph 
case 
February 
1938 
Metropolitan Chain 
Stores 
Harman October 
1933 
Chosen Corporation 
case 
February 
1938 
Metropolitan Chain 
Stores 
 
Jacob Factor and Maurice Singer had also been involved in such activities in the mid-1920s and 
it had been possible for them to continue until the mid-1930s. 
Appointment of the Bodkin Committee 
The unsatisfactory state of affairs was brought to a head when Maurice Singer’s failed libel 
action against the Daily Mail attracted political interest and led to a number of questions in the 
House of Commons. On 15 July 1936, in a debate on the Estimates, the MP for North 
Tottenham, RC Morrison, asked the President of the Board of Trade to appoint a departmental 
committee to consider what might be done to curb the activities of share-pushers as 
misleading circulars were going out in their thousand almost every day and new firms were 
springing up with high-sounding names that were defrauding innocent people of thousands of 
pounds. He was supported by others who suggested that the time had come for a thorough 
review of company law. In response, the President said that he would give the matter careful 
consideration.727  
Doubtless encouraged by the Daily Mail, Roderick Dew, a solicitor who had acted for the Daily 
Mail in the Singer libel case, began to speak in public both about the Singer case itself, the 
inadequacy of the existing law and the means by which the abuses of promoters and pushers 
could be remedied. For example, he spoke on this subject to the provincial meeting of the Law 
Society in September 1936.728 In this address, having explained why the London Stock 
Exchange opposed the most obvious remedy of granting a charter to the Exchange so that it 
could regulate all share trading, Dew raised the possibility of requiring that all share traders 
should be required to seek a licence and be registered.  
                                                 
727  House of Commons Hansard; 15 July 1936.  Morrison referred to Factor expressly, reporting 
that he had said: ‘I guess the British government is tired of spending money on me’. 
728  The Accountant; 24 October 1936; pages 559–563. 
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In October 1936, to campaigning of this type was added the arrival in London of the Jarrow 
marchers. Unemployment in Jarrow had become unbearably high following the closure of the 
Palmers shipbuilding yard. This company had floated a debenture stock in 1919729 to finance 
expansion and in the 1920s had invested in new facilities. The last merchant vessel to be built 
at Jarrow was launched in 1931.730 There had been later attempts to encourage employment in 
the shipyard – notably led by Sir John Jarvis, the erstwhile partner in the company promoters, 
Clare & Company – but they had not been equal to the town’s problem. In the political rhetoric 
surrounding the march, blame was attached to the City. In the words of Ellen Wilkinson, MP 
for Jarrow: 
‘The great shipyard of Jarrow was dead . . . killed because it was a powerful 
competitor, . . . rooted out, not because it was inefficient but because it stood in the 
way of a group of big financial interests, who wished to consolidate their grip on the 
shipping industry and get control of shipping prices in the doing of this . . . this group 
have crippled the British shipbuilding industry.’731 
Within the Board of Trade, the subject was being considered: but slowly. At the end of 
October, Edwin Marker,732 the Comptroller of the Companies Division, prepared a 
memorandum examining the possibilities that had been raised in the debate on 15 July and 
concluded that the suggestion that company law should be reviewed as a whole was the least 
attractive: 
‘To sum up – so far as Company Law Amendment is concerned, there is no real case 
for enquiry at present and the President . . . might continue to reply . . . that the time 
is not yet ripe for enquiry.’ 
                                                 
729  Exceptionally this stock was promoted by a clearing bank: National Provincial Bank. Minutes of 
the Court of the National Provincial Bank, 25 March 1919. RBS Archive; file NAT/934/3. 
730  MV British Strength. Cuthbert et al (2004); page 40. 
731  Wilkinson (1939). Dougan (1968); page 168. ThIS study has found no evidence that abusive 
company promotion or share pushing contributed directly to the failure of Palmer’s yard at Jarrow. 
There had been a public offer of debentures in 1919, respectably sponsored by a clearing bank. The 
funds raised by that issue had been invested in facilities in Jarrow which had not been fully used 
because of the slump in demand for shipbuilding which had not been foreseen. Campaigners principally 
complained that financial interests had concluded that shipbuilding capacity should be reduced and that 
the yard at Jarrow was sacrificed as a result without taking into account the social distress that would be 
caused. Arrival of the Jarrow marchers in London was however significant as it coincided with debate 
within government over share-pushing and served to heighten political attention. Ironically, Sir John 
Jarvis, the erstwhile partner in Clare & Company which had promoted new issues in 1919, became a 
leader of efforts to bring relief to Jarrow, acquiring old ships that were taken to Jarrow to be broken up.  
732  An exact contemporary of Clarence Hatry at St Paul’s School. 
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The memorandum admitted that the case for action on share-pushing was much stronger; but 
Marker suggested that the real difficulty lay in knowing what to do. Of the possible courses of 
action, licensing of share traders was the first and only substantial proposal considered in the 
memorandum. In other words, at this early stage, registration of share trading was already 
emerging as a credible, perhaps the only credible, option. It was thought that appointment of a 
committee of inquiry should be considered.733 
However slowly the board had been acting, from this point movement was rapid. On 4 
November 1936, Marker discussed the subject with Sir Horace Hamilton, the Permanent 
Secretary of the Board of Trade, who agreed that share promotion was a subject that should 
be taken forward by the board’s appointment of a committee. By this stage, Marker had been 
told that the Treasury and the DPP, E Tindall Atkinson, were firmly in favour. Moreover, the 
Treasury, the Bank of England and the Stock Exchange also supported the appointment of a 
committee. All seemed agreed that Sir Archibald Bodkin, the former DPP, should be invited to 
serve as Chairman. Dew was the only other person named as a possible member of the 
committee. This suggests that although there was no certainty about the outcome of an 
inquiry, the introduction of registration was thought likely as Dew, whose paper was 
mentioned by Marker, was known to be a supporter of the proposal. 
By 18 November 1936, matters had moved forward. Terms of reference had been considered 
in some detail, membership of the committee had been given further thought and the Home 
Office had said that it supported the proposed committee.734 
On 2 December 1936, in the midst of the abdication crisis and just a few weeks after Marker 
wrote his original memorandum, the committee was appointed.735  Dew was not named as a 
member. 
Appointment of the committee had eventually received wide departmental support.  For the 
Board of Trade, the committee offered a way of dealing with a problem that had caused public 
concern and threatened to encourage those who were campaigning for widespread reform of 
company law. Moreover, since the board had appointed other committees to examine areas of 
company law (e.g. fixed trusts and motor insurance) it was more difficult to resist examination 
                                                 
733  National Archives; file BT 58/226, COS 6734, SP17. 
734  National Archives; files BT 58/226 COS 6734. SP17. 
735  Bodkin Committee report (1937); page 2. 
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of share-pushing. For the Treasury and the Bank of England, the committee offered a way of 
dealing with concerns about distraction of investment by untrammelled speculation and 
roguery. For the Home Office and the Stock Exchange, wider considerations must have been 
involved. 
At this time, Clarence Hatry was residing in Maidenhead Prison. By all accounts he had proved 
an untroublesome prisoner, save in one respect. Throughout the early years of Hatry’s 
sentence, the Governor of the prison received a series of requests seeking Hatry’s assistance 
with litigation arising from the crash of Hatry’s companies in 1929. In dealing with these 
requests, the Governor, the Prisons Commission and the Home Office were concerned not to 
accord Hatry privileges that would not be permitted to any other prisoner and that by 
permitting such visits, they should not find that they had inadvertently permitted Hatry to 
continue with his business activities whilst still in prison.736 It seems likely that a further 
concern was added in late 1935, when the family recommenced their campaign737 to seek an 
early release for Hatry with the publication of a pamphlet reviewing the story of Hatry’s 
collapse. Although there was wide support for the application for the early release,738 the 
Home Office was concerned that as there were no powers to prevent anyone from acting as a 
share trader, on release, Hatry would have been able to return immediately to his previous 
activities. It thus seems probable that the call for Hatry’s release provided a clear 
                                                 
736  They were unable to prevent this. Through his solicitor, Atherton Powys, and his son, Cecil 
Hatry, Clarence Hatry appears to have been able to pass instructions for investment of his wife’s funds. 
During Hatry’s incarceration, Atherton Powys acted in respect of Hatry’s personal affairs, whilst Sir John 
Crisp of Ashurst Morris Crisp continued to act in respect of Hatry’s corporate matters and as a leading 
light in the campaign to free Hatry. Powys had first encountered Hatry in 1915–1916 when he acted as 
solicitor for the Earl of March who served as a director of various companies promoted by Hatry. 
National Archives; file HO 144/21218. 
737  It seems probable that the recommencement of the campaign occurred then because the judge 
at Hatry’s trial, Sir Horace Avory, died on 13 June 1935. It was known to be the normal practice of the 
Home Secretary to consult the trial judge on any application for early release from a prison sentence 
and it was assumed that Sir Horace would not have approved an early release in Hatry’s case. In due 
course, the Home Secretary was to consult the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Hewart. National Archives; file 
HO 144/21218. 
738  Applications for early release were supported by Sir William Jowitt, who as Attorney General 
conducted Hatry’s prosecution, and GB McClure who had assisted Jowitt. The campaign was also 
supported by other MPs (AP Herbert, Harold Nicolson and George Lansbury), Henry Newnham (the 
editor of Truth which campaigned against promoters and share-pushers) and Ben Tillett (the 
dockworkers’ union leader). Anon (1937); pages 3–5. 
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demonstration to the Home Office of the weakness in regulation of share speculation that 
might be resolved by registration of share traders.739 
For the Stock Exchange, appointment of a committee of inquiry was challenging. The prospect 
of a committee which was expected to recommend the introduction of a licensing system for 
share traders could potentially threaten the independence of the Stock Exchange by, for 
example, recommending that registration should apply to all: even members of the Exchange. 
Even a recommendation for the Stock Exchange’s members to be excluded from registration 
could be a threat if it carried with it a suggestion that the exemption should be subject to a 
review of the acceptability of the Exchange’s rules. That the Exchange welcomed the 
appointment of a committee suggests that the Exchange accepted that the need for action was 
paramount and trusted that appointment of its Deputy Chairman to the committee would 
provide a means of securing a congenial outcome. 
The overriding question nonetheless is why fraudulent company promotion and share-pushing 
seemed so important in 1936 that a committee should be appointed quickly: especially as it 
was likely to recommend a change from the long-standing policy of lukewarm deterrence to 
regulation by compliance. That the existing policy of deterrence through prosecution was weak 
and demonstrably ineffective had long been recognised, as the comment in periodicals shows. 
Yet the position had been tolerated and allowed to continue. Indeed, after a period in the 
1890s when the efforts of a campaigning official had engineered a series of successful 
prosecutions, on the official’s retirement the Board of Trade took steps to reorganise his 
department with the result that the flow of prosecutions from that source dried up. It is almost 
as though it had been decided that the use of prosecutions as a regulatory approach was too 
burdensome so that a period of deregulation was introduced. 
                                                 
739  As matters developed, a decision to release Hatry was delayed by the Home Secretary 
personally by six months until mid-1938. His release was finally approved by the Home Secretary in July 
1938, two days after the Cabinet had approved the draft legislation that would introduce registration of 
share traders and the date chosen for his release was just before Parliament’s approval of the bill that 
became the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1939. The decision to release Hatry early was not 
made known in a formal statement but ‘leaked’ on a date chosen by the Home Secretary immediately 
before the Prime Minister visited Munich to meet the German Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, and immediately 
after a Cabinet group (including the Home Secretary) had met throughout the weekend to consider the 
diplomatic crisis created by Hitler’s speeches. As the newspapers’ attention concentrated on foreign 
affairs, the decision to release Hatry received little attention. In modern parlance, it was a ‘bad news 
day’.No formal statement was ever made. The manner of the announcement was chosen on the basis of 
advice from officials. National Archives; file HO 144/21218. 
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What had changed is the political environment, which in 1936 was febrile. In the words of 
Middlemass and Barnes (1969): 
‘The crises seemed to grow like a geometrical progression.’740 
To the gathering international storms of Germany, Italy, Abyssinia and Spain, were added 
domestic concerns over the growth of extreme political factions which led to the Public Order 
Act being passed in December 1936. This was a time when there was a widespread debate 
over the extent to which the institutions of capitalism were failing to meet reasonable 
aspirations.  
 Horace Samuel’s book ‘Shareholders’ Money’, published in 1933 had argued for 
thoroughgoing reform of company law: 
‘So far as the author is aware, the present impetus of Company Law Reform tends 
mainly to be confined to the question of company accounts. Without in any way 
detracting from the importance of this question . . . the author puts forward the view 
that in . . . wide and important matters . . . the law, as it now stands, is also riddled 
with loopholes.’741 
Samuel was a solicitor who specialised in company law matters and wrote from a technical, 
rather than a political, perspective. In this he was supported by a number of voices in the 
accounting profession and industry who argued for reform on technical grounds.742 But 
Samuel’s book was followed a year later by two others. In 1934, Tom Johnston published The 
Financiers and the Nation. Johnston had been a Cabinet member in the former Labour 
government and had declined to be a member of the national government when it was formed 
in 1931. Unsurprisingly for an author who had attacked the financiers who had profited from 
the 1914–1918 war,743 Johnston’s new book exposed what he regarded as the pernicious 
effects of fraud and the attempts made by the City to negate campaigns for reform. As Sydney 
Webb wrote in his preface to the book: 
‘Whenever the Government, or some important members of Parliament, are at last 
moved to devise some legislative reform, which would make the successive financial 
swindles more difficult or more dangerous to their perpetrators, there is only the 
                                                 
740  Middlemass and Barnes (1969); page 926. 
741  Samuel (1933); page viii. 
742  Such as Henry Morgan, President of the Society of Incorporated Accountants, and the 
Association of British Chambers of Commerce. Maltby (2007); pages 43–44. 
743  Johnston (1917). 
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faintest support from “the City”. Presently . . . memoranda begin to pour in, showing 
that the proposed new restrictions to prevent swindling, or the suggested additional 
requirement in the revelations of promoters’ prospectuses would “interfere with 
legitimate business". The desired reforms are obstructed, whittled down and often 
prevented. That legitimate concern for their own profits, which the honest and 
respectable financiers are so prompt to manifest, actually keeps open the door for 
renewed swindles. It is even argued that the losses from such swindles are the price 
that had to be paid for industrial and financial freedom.’744 
Although it did not propose replacement of the Exchange, Johnston’s book supported radical 
institutional reform, whose introduction might in his view require extra-parliamentary action: 
‘Johnston, also on September 11, expressed agreement with Brockway, and said that 
he doubted for the first time in his life whether gradual evolutionary progress was 
possible.’745 
In 1935, Johnston’s book was followed by a collection of essays published by the New Fabian 
Research Bureau which opened with an essay by HD Dickinson, a Professor at Bristol 
University, arguing that economic individualism had failed and that the financial system 
needed radical reform. A later essay in the same book reviewed recent new issues of capital 
and argued for a central planning agency that would direct capital and into which insurance 
companies and investment trusts would be absorbed.746  
Books such as these were significant because related ideas had appeared in the manifestoes of 
political parties, and in the thinking of many who did not necessarily support the market 
socialism of Professor Dickinson.747 For many of these commentators, company law reform 
offered an opportunity: 
‘. . . to enable what Laski called “public regulation of the company”. This was a 
staging post on the way to public ownership. Both Tawney and Laski recognised the 
desirability of minimising private ownership, but also the need for governance 
arrangements which would increase public accountability over the transitional 
period.’748 
                                                 
744  Webb (1934); page vii. 
745  Speech in the debate on the National Economy Bill; 11 September 1931. Bassett (1958); page 
233. 
746  Cole (1935); page 168. 
747  Currie (1979); page 104 et seq. Middlemas (1979); page 214 et seq. Smith (1979); page 28 et 
seq. Newton et al (1979); page 65 et seq. Clift (1999). 
748  Maltby (2007); page 42. Clift (1999). Tawney (1921); page 96. Laski (1925); page 113.  
Chapter Nine 
1930–1939 – Regulating share trading – part II 
Page 250 
 
Similar ideas were shared by wide range of opinion including groups such as the Oxford-based 
Liberty and Democratic Leadership which included Conservative MPs as well as Liberal and 
Labour members.749 In July 1935, the group published 'The Next Five Years' proposing the 
creation of an Economic General Staff to work through a National Investment Board, which 
would: 
‘ . . . centralize and coordinate . . . the issue of all loans for the Government, local 
authorities, and public bodies of all kinds. It should further have the right to exercise a 
certain supervision over other issues.’ 
Apart from discouraging fraudulent promotions, it was anticipated that the board would: 
‘ . . . discourage issues of a kind which it considered to be already overdone, and 
conversely to encourage issues in directions where further investment seemed to it to 
be desirable.’750 
Although the detailed proposals of all of these groups, and others, differed in detail, they were 
unanimous in believing that management of the capital market and direction of investment 
should not be left to a private body such as the Stock Exchange.  
Any thoroughgoing attempt to review company law and the raising of finance in particular 
would therefore have been bound to take into account a wide range of proposals for 
institutional reform with an outcome that might not have been predictable or manageable. In 
the political atmosphere of 1936, the desire to avoid a broad spectrum review of company law 
was understandable.  
The problem of company promotion and share-pushing could not simply be ignored, however, 
not least because it seemed a live demonstration that existing arrangements were flawed. The 
newspaper campaigns, culminating in Singer’s libel case against the Daily Mail, appeared to 
justify the lurid criticisms of such as Samuel, Johnston and the New Fabian Research Bureau; 
and they had attracted political attention. A narrow inquiry into the extremes of company 
promotion and share-pushing offered a means of dealing with this issue and of heading off 
demands for a thoroughgoing reform of company law. It thus offered a means of controlling 
the political risk that share-pushing presented: a threat to the government’s legitimacy in 
managing demands for wider reform. In effect, the larger political issue was avoided by 
                                                 
749  The group included Sir Francis Acland MP and Harold Macmillan MP; Tom Johnston had 
formerly been associated with the group. 
750  Liberty and Democratic Leadership (1935); page 120. 
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examination of the technical question of how a system of registration could be introduced to 
deal with share-pushing.751 
There remained a risk that the committee might recommend a form of regulation that would 
be inimical to the interests of the City and this was guarded against by careful selection of the 
members, who included Charles Vickers VC, a partner in Slaughter & May, the eminent firm of 
City solicitors;752 RP Wilkinson, the Deputy Chairman of the London Stock Exchange; CL Dalziel, 
a partner in Higginson & Company; JH McEwen, Chairman of the Associated Provincial Stock 
Exchanges; and Sir Malcolm Hogg, the Deputy Chairman of the Westminster Bank. Whatever 
such a group might recommend, it was likely to be well aware of and to take account of the 
City’s interests. 
The Bodkin report 
So it proved.  
Almost all witnesses before the committee urged that share dealing should be restricted to 
properly registered persons. By 16 March 1937, barely two months after the committee had 
commenced its work, the chairman, Sir Archibald Bodkin, was able to circulate a memorandum 
entitled ‘Points for Consideration’ which suggested what the eventual report might say: 
‘The majority of suggestions made by witnesses before the Committee indicate that 
there should be some kind of machinery for insisting on Registration of all 
stockbrokers and dealers in stocks and shares, who are not already members of the 
London Stock Exchange, or of one of the recognised Stock Exchanges . . . Registration 
involves some general legislative provisions prohibiting any form of dealing in stocks 
and shares by unregistered persons and any form of approach to the public by offers 
to deal in or to dispose of securities, by advertisement or circularisation, except as 
permitted by the rules of membership of any such organisation.’753 
That was to be the approach adopted in the final report which recommended that no person 
should be permitted to transact business in shares with any member of the public or to 
describe himself in a way that indicated that he transacted such business unless he were 
registered or were an exempt person. Members of the London Stock Exchange and certain 
                                                 
751  Haines (2011); page 48. 
752  Whose name had been preferred to that of Roderick Dew. 
753  National Archives; file BT58/226, SP 22. 
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other exchanges should be exempt for this purpose.754 It was envisaged that the Board of 
Trade should appoint a Registrar to maintain a register for this purpose and to define the 
conditions of registration. Those conditions should include the provision of appropriate 
references by a bank, a member of a recognised stock exchange and a solicitor, barrister or 
Justice of the Peace. An applicant would be required to give undertakings about the way in 
which he proposes to conduct his business. The Board of Trade was to be empowered to 
recognise additional stock exchanges and other associations whose persons would be 
exempted from the requirement for registration, and to make such changes in the list of 
recognised stock exchanges as seemed from time to time to be appropriate. As far as share-
pushing was concerned, the committee proposed that it should be unlawful for anyone who 
purported to be a dealer in shares during any call (including a telephone call) made by him 
upon any other person to offer any shares for subscription or to negotiate the purchase of 
shares by that other person.755  
From the point of view of the Stock Exchange, these proposals may not have appeared too 
troubling. Whilst a licensing scheme had been recommended, the Exchange’s position had 
been protected as it was suggested that the implementing statute should recognise the 
Exchange’s members as exempted persons. The practical effect of this would have been to give 
some statutory recognition without the Exchange being subjected to oversight by the Board of 
Trade that the Exchange had always regarded as objectionable. Moreover, recognition in 
primary legislation would have been likely to be long-lived as pressure on parliamentary time 
discouraged amendment. In other words, such recognition would have provided some 
safeguard of the Exchange’s position without the disadvantages that had led the Exchange to 
resist proposals that it should become a Chartered body. 
Satisfaction at this position was to be short-lived. 
The Board of Trade’s reaction 
The Board consulted on the committee’s recommendations and found that there was general 
support for them, subject to a small number of reservations. These concerned the definition of 
                                                 
754  The other exchanges listed by the committee were the ‘Associated Stock Exchanges’, the 
Provincial Brokers’ Stock Exchange, the Mincing Lane Tea and Rubber Share Brokers’ Association 
Limited. Bodkin Committee report (1937); page 67. 
755  Bodkin Committee report (1937); pages 67–70. 
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‘calling’, which it was suggested would impose serious restrictions on the business of 
legitimate outside dealers; the requirement for a dealer to produce a reference from a 
member of a recognised stock exchange as it was thought this would give such exchanges an 
unjustified veto on recognition; the absence of a disciplinary power to remove names from the 
register except after a court judgment; and the form of the register, which some argued should 
include all of those recognised.756   
After reflection, the board therefore proposed that the Bodkin Committee’s recommendations 
should be implemented by creating a register to include the names of all people entitled to 
deal in shares (whether members of a recognised exchange or not). In recognition of the 
standing of the London Stock Exchange and certain provincial stock exchanges, the Board of 
Trade would have the power to recognise them so that their members would automatically be 
included in the register. In other words, the primary legislation would not include an 
exemption for the London Stock Exchange’s members. Inclusion in the register would be open 
to other dealers, subject to their satisfying conditions to be specified by the board; and 
subsequent exclusion from the register would follow decisions of the court. 
In departing from the recommendations of the committee, the board was risking the 
opposition of the Stock Exchange for rather than primary legislation giving members of the 
Exchange the right to automatic authorisation, the Board of Trade proposal would have made 
that recognition subject to a decision of the department which could, presumably, be revoked 
if thought appropriate. In discussion with the Exchange on Trafalgar Day 1937, this changed 
approach was explained in the following way: 
‘ . . . the difficulty that the department felt about the Committee’s recommendation 
was primarily a political difficulty in that it would be urged in debate on the Bill that 
discrimination in favour of members of a club which might refuse membership on 
other than objective grounds was involved. [The minister] made it clear that the 
department’s tentative solution of the problem carried no intention of trenching on 
the privileges of the Stock Exchange.’ 
Strikingly, these words suggest that, against the implicit view of the Bodkin Committee, the 
Board of Trade had accepted that regulation could not be left to a private body such as the 
Stock Exchange. 
                                                 
756  Board of Trade memorandum on criticisms of the committee’s report: National Archives; file BT 
58/226, SP3. 
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As the minister’s brief for the meeting had observed: 
‘To have a register which omits by far the most important would be like Hamlet 
without the Prince of Denmark or a medical register which omitted from it Fellows 
and Licentiates of the Royal College of Surgeons and the Royal College of Physicians.’ 
At the same meeting, the Exchange’s Chairman responded: 
‘ . . . members of the Stock Exchange would resent the new proposals mainly on the 
ground that they would alter the status of members of the Stock Exchange who would 
be placed on a level with outside brokers and for the first time in history a measure of 
governmental control over them would be introduced.’757 
No conclusion was reached immediately, and the argument continued for some months. In the 
end, the Board of Trade gave way to the Stock Exchange, and were encouraged to do so by the 
Treasury as was recorded in a somewhat tart memorandum: 
‘The reason for exempting the London Stock Exchange by Statute is that we know we 
shall, in any case, have to give an exemption and that, so far as it is possible to 
foresee, there is no possibility of the exemption being withdrawn. This is not the case 
with the Provincial stock exchanges taken as a body. The order exempting the London 
Stock Exchange would, therefore, to that extent be farcical. 
‘If it should be decided that the London Stock Exchange should be exempted by 
Statute, then it may be suggested that it should be impressed upon them that they 
should do what they profess to do and that is act in the public interest in connection 
with share-pushing legislation and not merely in what they conceive to be the narrow 
interests of the London Stock Exchange. This came out forcibly recently in connection 
with their refusal to extend commission terms to persons who should join the 
proposed Association of Outside Dealers . . . It is suggested that a body that takes so 
narrow a view of its public duties cannot properly be placed in the special position in 
which it desires to be placed.’758 
The department would have been especially irritated by the Exchange’s lack of co-operation 
over the proposed Association of Outside Dealers. It had no wish to become heavily involved in 
regulation of individual dealers and to this end was attempting to arrange that associations 
existed that every dealer could be encouraged to join rather than seeking approval from the 
department itself. An agreement with the Exchange over commission rates would have 
provided an incentive for dealers to join the proposed association but had been refused by the 
Exchange, holding to its customary position. 
                                                 
757  Notes of a meeting between the Board of Trade and representatives of the Stock Exchange on 
Trafalgar Day 1937; National Archives; file BT 58/226, SP4. 
758  Memorandum; undated; probably spring 1938; National Archives; file BT 58/226, SP 4. 
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In this respect, the Board of Trade was adopting an approach that was similar to that adopted 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States which promoted ‘over 
the counter’ (OTC) organisations to deal with the difficulty for the commission of regulating so 
decentralised an activity: 
‘A trade association would facilitate regulation by providing the cohesive force that 
was lacking. Moreover, self-regulation by means of a trade association held three 
additional promises: (1) if regulatory authority were vested in a private institution 
representing the OTC brokers and dealers, the administrative costs of regulation 
could be borne by the regulated themselves, (2) because the rules would be drafted 
and enforced by a voluntary organisation, any members that rejected a particular 
regulation could simply leave the association thus limiting the SEC’s exposure to legal 
challenges, and (3) the use of an association as an organ of self-regulation could 
prove more effective than government regulation, allowing an extension of regulation 
to activities normally beyond the detection of the SEC.’759 
Officials may not have understood fully the Exchange’s position and did not expect the 
Exchange’s negative response. At root, the Exchange still saw itself as an association of people 
who agreed to undertake a particular business in a common market place and subject to 
common rules. The members had attempted to create an orderly place in which share dealing 
could be undertaken at a time when no public agency considered that it was a public 
responsibility to arrange this. For all members, their continued membership depended on the 
sustained demonstration that the benefits of membership outweighed the costs of 
membership: not simply the direct financial cost of membership but also the costs which 
flowed from subjection to the common rules of the Exchange and the constraints that they 
placed on the conduct of members’ business. 
Since 1919, the members had gradually become more defensive about their business interests 
and their control over the rules was becoming more important. Any suggestion that their 
control of the rules would be subject to oversight from some external agency was bound to 
attract suspicion and opposition, as was any suggestion of external interference with the 
committee’s freedom to deal with applications for membership. 
                                                 
759  Eisner (2000); page 110. Adoption of this approach became possible for the SEC after 
amendment of the Exchange Act in 1938: the year in which the Board of Trade was negotiating 
implementation of the Bodkin Committee’s recommendations. In the event, the amended US legislation 
led to the creation of only one body: the National Association of Securities Dealers which registered in 
1939, the year in which the PF(I) Act was promulgated. Macey and Novogrod (2011–2012); page 968. 
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Moreover, as concern was growing that the Exchange was being bypassed, suggestions such as 
the preparation of a common register that appeared to diminish the differences between 
Exchange and outside brokers were inevitably contentious. That this appears to have caught 
officials by surprise suggests that they had forgotten Roderick Dew’s paper which attempted to 
explain his understanding of the reasons for the Exchange’s opposition becoming a Chartered 
body: that it would involve equal recognition of outside brokers and that it would lead to their 
inclusion in the membership. It was seen as a first step to government control and eventually 
nationalisation.760 
In its battle with the department, the Exchange was assisted by the fact that the pre-eminent 
issuing houses in the City were no more enthusiastic about joining any form of register that 
included the outside dealers. Indeed, in discussions with the Board of Trade they made it clear 
that they simply would not register.761 Yet the Board of Trade could not afford to exclude them 
from share dealing and new issues in particular, and needed to find a way of exempting them 
from the registration requirements. In other words, the Board was fighting on two fronts and 
the Exchange had powerful allies. 
In the end, a resolution was found for most of these difficulties. The Prevention of Fraud 
(Investments) Act 1939 was passed and provided that a licence would be required by anyone 
carrying on business as a share dealer.762 Members of stock exchanges and of associations of 
dealers recognised by the Board of Trade were to be exempted from this requirement,763 as 
were persons carrying on banking activities who were recognised for this purpose by the Board 
of Trade764.  
                                                 
760  ER Dew (1936); Share-pushers and the Law; The Accountant, 24 October 1936, pages 559–563. 
761  The principal houses concerned were Baring Brothers and Company Limited, NM Rothschild 
and Sons, Morgan Grenfell and Company Limited, Lazard Brothers and Company Limited and J Henry 
Schroder and Company. The Board of Trade considered that if these houses were to be granted some 
form of exemption it would in practice also be necessary to exempt Higginson and Company, Helbert 
Wagg and Company Limited, Erlangers Limited and S Japhet and Company Limited. Undated 
memorandum; National Archives; file BT 58/226, SP5. 
762  Section 1. 
763  Sections 12 and 1. The power to recognise associations of dealers was introduced as the Board 
wished to encourage the formation of new associations that would take responsibility for monitoring 
their members and thus relieve the Board of Trade. 
764  The terms of the power of recognition were drafted with assistance of lawyers acting for a 
number of issuing houses to exclude them from the requirement to register. Sections 13 and 1. 
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In effect, the Stock Exchange had won its most important battle, with the support of HM 
Treasury765. The Act defined ‘recognised stock exchange’ as: 
‘. . . the Stock Exchange, London, or a body of persons declared by an order of the 
Board of Trade for the time being in force to be a recognised stock exchange for the 
purposes of this Act.’766 
Some minor arguments were also won.  For example, the Board of Trade was required to 
publish only the names of people who were granted licences to deal (i.e. there was no 
requirement to publish a register naming all those permitted to deal whether licensed or in 
some way exempted from licensing);767 although the Stock Exchange had undertaken privately 
that it would provide to the Board of Trade a copy of its register of members which the Board 
agreed not to publish. 
In Parliament, the bill’s passage was not without incident. Although the bill was generally 
welcomed by the Opposition, which did not formally oppose it, questions were raised over the 
powers being granted to stock exchanges without effective oversight: 
‘ . . . nowhere in this Bill is there anything to prevent stock exchanges from continuing 
to be what they are now, private unregulated bodies. A stock exchange can refuse 
any application for membership and give no reasons. It can and does from time to 
time act unreasonably. . . At present any stock exchange can refuse membership on 
any ground it pleases, or on no grounds at all. Such arrogant power is bad enough at 
present, but when this Bill passes into law it will be much worse.’768 
In effect, this was the point that the Board of Trade had put to the Exchange in negotiating the 
way in which the Bodkin Committee’s recommendations should be implemented. For the 
Opposition it was suggested that certain stock exchanges (including London) used their power 
to exclude women from membership and that the passage of the bill would seriously 
disadvantage women who were trading as share dealers independently unless they were able 
to secure individual licences from the Board of Trade. One of the few amendments proposed 
by the Opposition which would have empowered the Board of Trade to oversee all exchanges, 
including the London Stock Exchange, was lost on a division after a junior minister had argued 
                                                 
765  Board of Trade files, National Archives; file BT 58/215, SP4. 
766  Section 26(1). 
767  Section 7. It was agreed privately between the Stock Exchange and the Board of Trade that a 
list of the Exchange’s members would be provided periodically to the Board. 
768  Speech by William Leech, MP for Bradford Central; House of Commons Hansard; 14 February 
1939; column 1627. 
Chapter Nine 
1930–1939 – Regulating share trading – part II 
Page 258 
 
that oversight of such matters as admission to membership, ‘a minor matter’, was not 
necessary to prevent fraud among their members.769 
Whilst it may have seemed a minor matter to the minister, for the Exchange the amendment 
was aimed at a key freedom: the freedom to control the composition of the membership. 
The Act was passed on 28 April 1939,770 and the Board of Trade intended that it should be 
implemented forthwith. To this end, preparatory work had been undertaken so that a 
consultation on drafts of the enabling regulations could begin almost immediately. The 
regulations themselves were promulgated in July 1939.771 Although the Board of Trade did not 
immediately announce the date on which the requirement for registration would come into 
force, applications were invited by 15 September 1939 by those intending to register as 
dealers. In the event, the declaration of war intervened and the deadline for applications was 
put off, in the first instance until 15 March 1940. 
Conclusions 
By the onset of war in 1939, the legislation had been passed that would in due course provide 
the framework of regulation of share trading within which the Stock Exchange would be 
obliged to operate. 
That the need for the legislation was recognised reflects the interest in investment that had 
developed since the end of the 1914–1918 war and the exposure of many unsuspecting 
investors to the attentions of unscrupulous off-market traders, partly as a result of the failure 
to make more conventional support services available to them. 
It also reflects the outcome of the Broad Street Press libel action which incontrovertibly 
demonstrated that the criminal justice system did not offer a reliable means of controlling 
share trading abuse. Although prosecution might offer a means of satisfying a public appetite 
for retribution in a few visible cases, the incidence of prosecution appeared to vary according 
to the degree of public and private attention afforded to it. Hence the number of prosecutions 
                                                 
769  Ronald Cross, Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade; House of Commons Hansard; 14 
February 1939; column 1633. 
770  House of Lords Hansard; 28 April 1939; column 793. 
771  Licensing Regulations were issued on 26 July 1939; SR&O 1939 Number 794. Conduct of 
Business of Licensed Dealers were also issued on 26 July 1939; SR&O 1939 Number 787. The Conduct of 
Business Rules did not prohibit advertising by Licensed Dealers. 
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seems to have increased in the years after 1936 when the conclusion of the Broad Street Press 
case had demonstrated publicly that the criminal justice system was failing. In particular, the 
City Police became especially active in 1937 after the continued existence of its fraud squad 
independently of the Metropolitan Police was called into question. 
In any event, prosecutions operated retrospectively: after a crime had been committed and 
investors had suffered losses they could ill afford. Without a compensation scheme for all 
share trading, including off-market transactions as well as market transactions, the socially 
unacceptable abuse of unsuspecting investors would not be avoided or corrected by a 
subsequent prosecution. 
That the legislation was passed reflects the poisonous impact of the off-market abuses against 
the background of widespread political acceptance that the City’s financial institutions were 
not serving the national interest. It was more appealing politically to deal with the limited issue 
of share trading abuse than to try to manage a debate over thoroughgoing reform. This 
calculation imposed a constraint upon any scheme of registration as it would need the 
acquiescence of those institutions, including, in particular, the London Stock Exchange. Since 
the Exchange, with the support of the Bank of England and the issuing houses, was strongly 
opposed to being placed under any supervision, this was a serious impediment. Whilst 
recognising the undesirability of delegating powers to an unsupervised private body, the Board 
of Trade had no option but to accept the Exchange’s position. Ultimately this was to prove a 
flaw in the scheme of regulation, but, in the context of 1939, it was regarded as a politically 
acceptable compromise that enabled a desirable reform to be introduced without unavoidable 
constraints. 
From the Exchange’s point of view, the legislation represented the best possible outcome once 
the inevitability of a scheme of registration had been accepted. It was granted a measure of 
legislative recognition without suffering the imposition of oversight that might have interfered 
with its control of the rules.  
From the government’s point of view, acceptance of the flaw recognised pragmatically that the 
Exchange could not afford to ignore the government’s wishes. After all, trading in government 
securities formed a considerable proportion of the market’s volume and thus of members’ 
income. Acceptance thus offered a reasonable prospect that the government would 
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nonetheless be able to achieve its objectives by co-operation and avoided a debilitating 
dispute with the Exchange. 
In reaching this conclusion, there had been almost no reference to the reforms that were 
being implemented elsewhere: not least in the United States, beginning in 1933. Horace 
Samuel’s book had referred to the Blue Sky laws, but not to the federal legislation that had 
been introduced by FD Roosevelt and led in 1934 to the creation of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. Nor was there any reference to the consultations taking place in the 
United States of the regulation of off-market traders which led to the Mahoney Act772 in 1938 
and the subsequent creation of the National Association of Securities Dealers under the 
oversight of the SEC, a parallel to the creation in the United Kingdom of associations of off-
market dealers that could be recognised by the Board of Trade following the PF(I) Act 1939. 
Although there were similarities between the problems faced in both countries, there were 
also differences. In London, the Exchange, under Montagu Norman’s direction, had been able 
to manage the crisis created by the Hatry crash in September 1929. The NYSE had not been 
able to manage the crisis created by the crash in October 1929. In London, the crash appeared 
in public to have been caused by the criminal activities of outsiders. In New York, responsibility 
for the crash appeared to be borne by insiders.  
 
  
                                                 
772  Which defined the powers of the SEC with regard to off-market dealers. 
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APPENDIX ONE TO CHAPTER NINE – CASES OF SUSPECTED SHARE-PUSHING 
JANUARY 1930–FEBRUARY 1936 
 
Number Name of concern and 
individuals 
Date of 
complaint 
Principal shares 
involved 
Action taken Modus operandi 
10/30 G Lycett & Co 
E Kenworthy & Co 
R Kenworthy, RC Guest 
(American), JF Nigell, GI 
Charman, EH Sheay 
March 1930 Anglo-Colonial 
Territories 
Kenworthy arrested. 
Result unknown. 
Issued circulars – 
employed share 
touts who induced 
investors to sell 
good shares and 
buy worthless 
shares. 
129/30 Union Securities Co Ltd 
CC Willson, WT Whalley, JB 
Cowly, D Beaumont, Earl of 
Carnwath, EG Bonering 
March 1930 Not known Report to the Board of 
Trade. 
No prosecution. 
Issued circulars. 
180/30 Seward Fraser & Co 
PS Seward, Jacob Factor, S 
Fraser, JW Davis, HJ Speller, 
SW Moncrieff, H Elman, AJ 
Elkin, RC Guest, S Godfrey, 
RB Logan, M Gershow 
April 1930 Hellim Sulphur  Issued financial 
journal – The 
Stock & 
Shareholder – 
employed share 
touts and induced 
shareholders to 
sell good shares 
and buy worthless 
shares. 
38/30 Cressett Trust Ltd 
HE Setts, B Quint, Lt Col G 
Paget, R Vanderell 
May 1930 Cressett Trust Ltd 
– British Feeding 
Meals Ltd – British 
Dominions and 
Settlement 
Corporation  Ltd 
Cressett Trust fined £200. 
Setts and Quint both 
sentenced to four 
months’ imprisonment at 
the Old Bailey – February 
1931 – for offences 
contrary to Companies 
Act 1929. 
Share tout called 
on and induced 
investors to sell 
good shares and 
buy worthless 
shares – issued 
circular offerings 
shares for sale 
which did not 
comply with 
Companies Act. 
283/30 Bank of London Ltd 
Sir Arthur Beck, H Bliss, J 
Miller, PH Ableson, JN 
Farmer, P Seligman 
Business controlled by M 
Singer 
July 1930 Various 
speculative gold 
mining shares 
No prosecution May 
1930. 
Company compulsorily 
wound up. 
Issued circulars – 
also operated on 
continent from an 
office in 
Amsterdam.  
61/30 Stock Marker Record 
GC McMillan, EH Guyler 
(suspected) 
September 
1930 
Bogosu Gold 
Mines Ltd 
Enquiries at instigation of 
DPP. 
No prosecution. 
Issued financial 
journal – The 
Stock Market 
Record. 
86/30 Edward Coates 
E Coates, ES Donallon 
December 
1930 
Various Coates fined £110 and 
ten guineas costs at 
Mansion House, March 
1932 for offences against 
Registration of Business 
Names Act 1916. 
Board of Trade case. 
Issued circular. 
12/21 British Investors 
Association Ltd 
(Pinners Hall) 
J Campbell, Lillian N 
Garrett, S Godfery, AJ Klein 
(suspected) 
February 
1931 
Power Oil and 
Mining Co Ltd 
Enquiries at instigation of 
DPP. 
No prosecution. 
Company in voluntary 
liquidation June 1933. 
Issued financial 
journal. 
31/32 Douglas W Wells 
British & Dominions 
Investment Trust Ltd 
DW Wells 
June 1932 General 
Engineering 
Development 
Trust Ltd 
Enquiries at instigation of 
DPP. 
No prosecution. 
Issued circulars. 
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Number Name of concern and 
individuals 
Date of 
complaint 
Principal shares 
involved 
Action taken Modus operandi 
45/32 Contract Finance 
Corporation  Ltd 
HC Brown, R Maurice 
M Hindle (suspected) 
May 1932 Not known Brown and Morris each 
fined £50 and five 
guineas costs at Mansion 
House June 1932 for 
offences against 
Companies Act 1929. 
Board of Trade case. 
Issued circulars. 
44/32 John A Anderson 
J Anderson, E Young 
November 
1932 
Blackburn 
Philanthropic 
Assurance Co Ltd 
Anderson sentenced to 
12 months’ hard labour 
at Old Bailey in January 
1933 for attempted false 
pretences. 
Offered shares 
that he did not 
possess to 
complainant – 
obtained cheque 
for same – but 
payment was 
stopped. 
7/33 Herrick, Smithyes and 
White 
WF White, P Lockyer, ES 
Smithyes,  
February 
1933 
Cameroons 
Alluvial Gold 
Syndicate Ltd, 
Associated Tin 
Mines of Nigeria 
Ltd 
Merrick, Smithyes and 
White each fined £125 
and three guineas costs 
at Guildhall in April 1933 
for offences against 
Companies Act 1929. 
Issued financial 
journal. 
Underwriters 
Registry – 
employed share 
touts to call on 
investors. 
27/33 Vincent Devereux & Burle 
R Burle 
May 1932 Rowntree Ltd 
Bobbys Ltd 
Application for warrant 
against Burle refused at 
Guildhall – May 1933. 
Warrant issued in June 
1933 at Clerkenwell 
Police Court to 
Metropolitan Police. 
Not executed. 
Issued circulars – 
offering shares 
below Stock 
Exchange 
quotations. 
32/33 Ward Dew & Co 
Federal Industrial 
Development Bank Ltd 
RW Day, F Townes, HE 
Bates, T Appleton 
(suspected) 
July 1933 Pool operations. Enquiries proceeding. Issues circulars – 
firm bank with 
Federal Industrial 
development bank 
under same 
control – to which 
they refer clients 
for banker’s 
references. 
34/33 Percy Bennett & Co Ltd 
C Young, White, AN 
Chapman, RE Land, I 
Baumgarten 
August 
1933 
J&J Colman Baumgarten sentenced 
to 18 months’ hard 
labour at Old Bailey in 
May 1936. 
Warrants for White and 
Young not yet executed. 
Employed share 
touts who 
obtained shares 
from investors 
ostensibly to be 
held as collateral 
security against 
the purchase of 
other shares. 
Shares so 
obtained were 
sold and 
fraudulently 
converted. 
22/33 Leonard Briggs 
AE Wagstaff 
July 1933  Warrant issued at 
Guildhall – July 1933. 
Not yet executed. 
Purchased 
established 
brokering 
business. Induced 
clients to part with 
shares to be sold 
in order that other 
shares might be 
purchased. 
Fraudulently 
converted 
proceeds – 
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Number Name of concern and 
individuals 
Date of 
complaint 
Principal shares 
involved 
Action taken Modus operandi 
absconded. 
29/33 Hugh Longman & Crane 
E Crane, I Primhak 
May 1933  Primhak sentenced to 18 
months’ imprisonment at 
Old Bailey in January 
1934 for fraudulent 
conversion and false 
pretences. 
Wrote to investors 
offering shares for 
sale – obtained 
money – 
absconded. 
151/33 Laurence Duncan & Co 
L Duncan, J Duncan 
October 
1933 
Raycol British 
Corporation 
Report April 1934 shows 
that facts were 
submitted to the Chief 
Clerk, Mansion House – 
expressed opinion that 
there was insufficient 
evidence for criminal 
process. 
Issued circulars 
and telephoned 
investors inducing 
them to sell good 
shares and buy 
worthless shares. 
12/34 Lee, Watson & Murray 
D Murray 
April 1934 Foster Lodge Gold 
Mines Ltd 
Warrant issued in 
Edinburgh subsequently 
withdrawn – defalcations 
made good by friend. 
Issued circulars 
and telephoned 
investors inducing 
them to sell good 
shares and buy 
worthless shares. 
14/34 Peter Gordon Company 
Cranwell 
April 1934 Various Warrant issued for 
Cranwell at Guildhall – 
August 1935. 
Not executed. 
Issued circulars. 
29/34 Financial Express 
Charlton 
March 1934 Building 
Construction 
Investment Ltd 
Charlton charged at 
Edinburgh with offences 
relating to the sale of 
shares by the Financial 
Express. 
Result not known. 
Issued financial 
journal – Financial 
Express – 
employed touts to 
sell to investors. 
53/34 Gilbert White & Co 
J Brunton 
November 
1934 
General Brisk and 
Finance 
Corporation 
Limited 
Brunton fined £200 and 
£75 costs at Bow Street 
Police Court in July 1935 
for offences against 
Companies Act. 
DPP case. 
Employed share 
touts to call on 
investors. 
5/35 Jackson Bruce & Co 
J Bruce 
February 
1935 
Building 
Construction 
Investment Ltd 
and General Brick 
and Finance 
Corporation  
Enquiries at instigation of 
DPP. 
Proceeding. 
Issued circulars. 
363/34 James Stewart and Crichton 
J Stewart 
September 
1934 
Consolidated Gold 
Mining 
Corporation Ltd 
Report submitted to DPP 
at his request. 
No prosecution. 
Warrant issued April 
1935 at Duns 
Berwickshire for arrest of 
Stewart for fraud. 
Not yet executed. 
Issued circulars 
and employed 
share touts. 
189/35 Austin Childs Co 
H Courtauld 
British and Dominions 
Securities Trust 
J Johnson 
July 1935 City Gold Reefs & 
Dredging Co Ltd 
and pool 
operations 
Johnson sentenced to six 
months’ and three 
months’ hard labour 
(consecutively) at 
Mansion House – 
September 1936 – for 
false pretences 
(2 cases). 
Issued circulars. 
278/35 E Rankin Nevens & Co 
ER Nevens 
August 
1935 
Kirkland Gold Rand Enquiries at instigation of 
DPP. 
No prosecution. 
Issued circulars. 
277/35 Maclean & Henderson 
Underhill. 
August 
1935 
Brucefield 
Collieries Ltd, Gold 
Warrants against 
Underhill and 
Acquired an 
established share 
Chapter Nine 
1930–1939 – Regulating share trading – part II 
Page 264 
 
Number Name of concern and 
individuals 
Date of 
complaint 
Principal shares 
involved 
Action taken Modus operandi 
Elphinstone. 
 
Refs of West Africa 
Ltd, West African 
Mining 
Corporation Ltd. 
Elphinstone withdrawn. 
Further warrants issued 
against all principals. 
Underhill and 
Elphinstone and  
arrested. 
broking business. 
Circularised and 
called on all 
clients and 
induced them to 
buy worthless 
shares at high 
prices. 
268/35 Period Investment Trust 
Limited. 
Caddey. 
Hurlock. 
February 
1936 
Pool operations Caddey and Hurlock each 
fined £105 and ten 
guineas costs at 
Guildhall, July 1936. For 
offences contrary to 
sections 34 and 35, 
Companies Act 1929. 
Issued circulars. 
449/35 Spencer Bradley Co Ltd December 
1935 
Universal 
Carburation 
Limited, Building 
Construction 
Investment Ltd, 
Amalgamated 
Electrical & 
Lighting 
Equipment 
Enquiries at instigation of 
DPP still proceeding. 
Issued circulars. 
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APPENDIX TWO TO CHAPTER NINE – CASES RELATED TO SHARE-PUSHING AND FRAUD 
OCTOBER 1929–SEPTEMBER 1939 
 
 
No. Dates Parties Nature of 
process/charges 
Comments Source 
1 October 
1929 
R v Louis Gordon Trial – making a false 
statement to obtain a 
passport. 
American citizen – alias 
for Murray Cole – 
alleged share pusher. 
The Times; 18 
October 1929. 
2 January 1930 R v Hatry 
R v Tabor 
R v Dixon 
Trial – forgery and 
fraud. 
Austin Friars Trust 
offences. 
The Times; 25 
January 1930. 
3 March 1930 R v Shapiro Trial – being in UK 
without the 
permission of an 
immigration officer. 
American citizen – 
entered UK on a 
weekend ticket from 
France – alleged share-
pusher. Cresset Trust. 
The Times; 27 
March 1930. 
4 September 
1930 
R v Osborne 
R v Bayford 
Police court – 
conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Circulars inviting 
subscriptions for 
shares. 
Manchester 
Guardian; 20 
September 
1930. 
5 October 
1930 
R v Laidlaw 
R v Popham 
R v White 
Police court – 
obtaining money by 
false pretences. 
Trading in shares in 
Pitts Tucker Limited – 
said to be an estates 
company (name similar 
to that of a firm of 
solicitors). 
Manchester 
Guardian; 20 
October 1930. 
6 October 
1930 
Faber and 
another v Tyler 
Wilson & Co 
Limited and 
others 
Damages for loss 
through fraudulent 
misrepresentations. 
Allied Mines Syndicate 
Limited. 
 
Allegedly linked to 
Jacob Factor. 
The Times; 28 
October 1930. 
7 November 
1930 
R v Spellen 
R v Wise 
R v Moncrieff 
Trial – conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Traded in the name of 
Broad Street Press. 
The Times; 11 
November 1930. 
8 November 
1930 
R v Morrison Police court – 
obtaining money by 
false pretences. 
American. 
 
Fraud involving 
Canadian Pacific 
Railway shares. 
Manchester 
Guardian; 30 
November 1930. 
9 December 
1930 
R v Newbury Police court – 
conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Traded as Broad Street 
Press. Conspired with 
Spellen, Wise and 
Moncrieff. 
 
Cases consolidated and 
subsequently heard 
together. 
The Times; 1 
December 1930. 
10 December 
1930 
R v Kenworthy Trial – conspiracy to 
defraud and offences 
against the 
Registration of 
Associated with a 
number of Americans. 
The Times; 12 
December 1930. 
Chapter Nine 
1930–1939 – Regulating share trading – part II 
Page 266 
 
No. Dates Parties Nature of 
process/charges 
Comments Source 
Business Names Act. 
11 January 1931 R v Kennedy 
R v Bowering 
R v Godfrey 
R v  Tanfield 
Magistrate’s court – 
conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Alias Bruce Logan. 
 
‘Financial Telegraph’ 
case. 
The Times; 22 
January 1931. 
12 February 
1931 
R v Betts 
R v Qunit 
Trial – offences 
against CA 1929. 
Through Cresset Trust. 
 
British Dominions Land 
Settlement 
Corporation. 
Financial Times; 
3 February 1931. 
13 March 1931 Clifton v Weil & 
others 
Damages for loss 
through fraudulent 
misrepresentation. 
Concerned Cliftophone 
& Records Limited. 
 
Through Frederick 
Investment Corporation 
Limited. 
The Times; 12 
March 1933. 
14 June 1932 R v Turner 
R v Lofthouse 
R v Ratcliffe 
Trial – conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Concerned Rayon 
Corporation and 
Yorkshire Artificial Silk 
Company. 
Manchester 
Guardian; 16 
June 1932. 
15 September 
1931 
R v Clements Police court obtaining 
money by false 
pretences. 
Fraudulent share 
trades. 
Manchester 
Guardian; 5 
September 
1931. 
16 November 
1931 
R v Kylsant 
R v Morland 
Trial – false accounts 
– fraudulent 
prospectus. 
Royal Mail Steamship 
Group. 
The Times; 5 
November 1931. 
17 November 
1931 
R v  Newbery 
R v Elman 
Appeal – trial was not 
satisfactory. 
Allegations of 
fraudulent pretences – 
Broad Street Press case. 
The Times; 18 
November 1931. 
18 January 1932 R v Crane (alias 
Kent, alias 
Kershaw) 
R v Braithwaite 
Trial – conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Shares in Mendala 
Development 
Corporation. 
Financial Times; 
22 January 1932. 
19 January 1932 R v Klein Trial – conspiracy to 
defraud. 
‘City News’ case. 
 
Associated with Broad 
Street Press. 
The Times; 27 
January 1932. 
20 February 
1932 
Morris & Jones 
Limited v 
Harman, Clarke 
and Williams 
Action to recover 
money lost through 
alleged breach of 
trust. 
Involved transactions in 
shares of Ascot Motor 
and Manufacturing 
Company and Chosen 
Syndicate Limited. 
Manchester 
Guardian; 3 
February 1932. 
21 April 1932 R v Young 
R v Todd 
R v Tomlinson  
R v Morison 
R v Wilkie 
R v Johnstone 
R v Coats 
Trial – conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Scottish Silks case.  
22 September R v Firth Trial – obtaining Concerned Economic Manchester 
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No. Dates Parties Nature of 
process/charges 
Comments Source 
1932 R v de Castro 
R v Holdaway 
R v Clinton 
R v Hilton 
R v Harding 
R v Greenboam 
money by false 
pretences. 
Finance Corporation. Guardian; 28 
September 
1932. 
23 January 1933 R v Geen Trial – conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Received money from 
Broad Street Press. 
The Times; 18 
January 1932. 
24 May 1933 R v Turner 
R v Huntley 
Trial – fraudulent 
prospectus. 
False statements in 
prospectus for Linen 
and Artsilk. 
Financial Times; 
16 May 1933. 
25 July 1933 R v Factor Application to US for 
extradition. 
 Manchester 
Guardian; 10 
July 1933. 
26 October 
1933 
R v Conigrave 
R v Pounds 
R v Harman 
R v Changeat 
Trial – conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Concerned Chosen 
Corporation. 
Manchester 
Guardian; 25 
October 1933. 
27 January 1934 R v Distelmen 
R v More 
R v McGregor 
Police court – 
conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Venezuelan 
Consolidated Oil 
Company. 
 
Plea of mistaken 
identity was 
successfully raised by 
Montague Baumgart – 
who was discharged. 
The Times; 18 
January 1934. 
28 February 
1935 
R v Laub Trial –  
failing to stay out of 
UK after a 
deportation order 
had been made. 
Share-pusher 
associated with Jacob 
Factor and with Broad 
Street Press. Known in 
music halls as the 
‘human bird’. 
The Times; 18 
February 1935. 
29 July 1935 R v Gordon 
R v Markus 
R v Brunton 
R v Mather 
Police court – 
Companies Act 1929 
offences – door-to-
door selling of shares. 
Through Gilbert White 
& Co. 
Financial Times; 
24 July 1935. 
30 September 
1935 
R v Riley 
R v House 
R v House 
Trail – forgery, 
uttering false 
documents, 
conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Concerned Household 
Stores Limited. 
Manchester 
Guardian; 29 
November 1935. 
31 December 
1935 
Singer v 
Associated 
Newspapers 
Limited 
 
Bank of London v 
Associated 
Newspapers 
Limited 
Libel action 
concerning articles 
identifying Singer 
with the Broad Street 
Press case. 
 The Times; 6 
December 1935. 
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No. Dates Parties Nature of 
process/charges 
Comments Source 
32 January 1936 Application by 
liquidator of 
Broad Street 
Press Limited, 
Vulcan Copper 
Mines Limited 
and Rhodesia 
Border Mining 
Corporation 
Limited 
Liquidator sought a 
court order directing 
how to apply funds 
provided under an 
agreement with Jacob 
Factor. 
As John Slade, Factor 
had incorporated Broad 
Street Press. Funds had 
been extracted from 
deposits (US$ 2 million) 
in Factor’s name in 
Chicago. 
Manchester 
Guardian; 25 
January 1936. 
33 February 
1936 
R v Bishirgian 
R v Howeson 
R v Hardy 
Trial – conspiracy to 
defraud by publishing 
a false prospectus. 
Concerned a public 
company: James & 
Shakespeare. 
Financial Times; 
21 February 
1936. 
34 March 1936 R v Baumgart Magistrate’s court – 
conspiracy to 
defraud. 
American citizen by 
naturalisation. 
The Times; 12 
March 1936. 
35 March 1936 Dunn  Trust 
Limited v Canon 
Paynter 
Recovery of funds 
due on bills of 
exchange. 
 
Defence alleged that 
the bills had been 
obtained fraudulently 
through the action of 
SW Tanfield. 
Concerned a company 
called John Dew 
Limited, apparently 
involved in share 
trading. 
Manchester 
Guardian; 14 
October 1936. 
36 April 1936 R v Wright Trial – obtaining 
cheques by false 
pretences. 
Mortimer, West & Co, 
investment brokers. 
 
Said to have been the 
‘catspaw of two 
ingenious share 
pushers’. 
The Times; 25 
April 1936. 
37 May 1936 R v Marinus Police court – 
obtaining money by 
false pretences – 
warrant for 
extradition to France. 
Alias De Koregel. 
 
Edited ‘Letters of a 
stockbroker’. 
The Times; 18 
May 1936. 
38 September 
1936 
R v Corrigan 
(Alias Cassidy) 
Trial – obtaining 
money by false 
pretences. 
Interests in Mexico. Manchester 
Guardian; 28 
September 
1936. 
39 November 
1936 
R v Angus Police court – 
obtaining money by 
false pretences. 
United British Oilfields 
of Trinidad. (‘U-Boats’). 
The Times; 5 
November 1936. 
40 November 
1936 
R v Abrams Magistrate’s court – 
making a false 
statement under the 
Aliens Order and 
being in possession of 
an irregular passport. 
American citizen –
requested to leave UK 
in 1928 – said to be 
known as an active 
share-pusher – alias 
John van Allen. 
The Times; 16 
November 1936. 
41 February R v Novak Magistrate’s court – American citizen – The Times; 5 
  Chapter Nine 
1930–1939 – Regulating share trading – part II 
 
 
Page 269 
 
No. Dates Parties Nature of 
process/charges 
Comments Source 
1937 charged with 
contravening the 
Aliens Act – making 
false statements to 
immigration officers. 
convicted in 1931 in US 
for share-pushing –
principal of a chain 
store bucket-shop. 
February 1937. 
42 February 
1937 
R v Korbin Magistrate’s court – 
unlawfully in UK in 
defiance of an order 
of expulsion. 
Alias: Theodore Kroll. 
Expelled from UK in 
1933 for share-pushing. 
The Times; 8 
February 1937. 
43 March 1937 Brendon, 
Cunningham, RE 
Brendon, JW 
Brendon, AG 
Brendon v Spiro, 
Maclean & 
Henderson, SR 
Bunt & co, Taylor 
and Underhill 
Action to recover loss 
through a fraudulent 
share conspiracy. 
Spiro believed to be in 
Mexico. 
Manchester 
Guardian; 2 
March 1937. 
44 March 1937 R v Guylee 
R v Cheeseley 
R v Bennett 
R v Narramore 
R v Noirtham 
R v Dixon 
Old Bailey – 
preliminary hearing – 
conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Donald Grant & 
Hamilton of Coleman 
Street; Murdoch & Barr, 
Basinghall Street; Lloyd 
Palmer & Co, New 
Broad Street. 
 
Alleged to have 
associated with 
Maurice Singer. 
The Times; 4 
March 1937. 
45 April 1937 Pearson v 
Charlton and 
Singer 
Action to recover loss 
caused by allegedly 
fraudulent 
misrepresentations. 
Concerned Building 
Construction 
Investment Limited. 
 
Subscriptions for shares 
invited through 
‘Financial Express’. 
 
Evidence in the Singer 
libel action used re 
Bank of London. 
Manchester 
Guardian; 14 
April 1937. 
46 April 1937 R v Underhill 
R v Taylor 
R v Elphinstone 
 
 
Magistrate’s court – 
conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Alleged to have 
conspired with Stanley 
Spiro. 
 
Maclean & Henderson 
of New Broad Street. 
 
Gold Reefs of West 
Africa. 
The Times; 17 
April 1937. 
47 September 
1937 
R v Brown 
R v Brander 
R v Robinson 
Trial – conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Kenwest Limited, 
dealers. 
 
The Times; 9 
September 
1937. 
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No. Dates Parties Nature of 
process/charges 
Comments Source 
Consolidated Gold 
Alluvials. 
48 September 
1937 
R v Agard 
R v Laker (alias 
Wegoda) 
R v Spinelly 
Trial – conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Through Smith Lawrie & 
Co. 
Manchester 
Guardian; 21 
September 
1937. 
49 September 
1937 
R v Rothfield 
R v Isaacs 
Trial – conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Livingstone Trust – the 
solicitor for the trust 
was said to be Burnett 
Elman, an associate of 
Jacob Factor. 
The Times; 24 
September 
1937. 
50 October 
1937 
R v Scher Police court – offering 
shares without the 
formal statement of 
particulars required 
by CA 1929. 
Patent Paper Packing 
(Foreign) Limited. 
 
A native of Dublin. 
Associated with share-
pushers in London and 
Paris. 
The Times; 30 
October 1937. 
51 October 
1937 
R v Allingham 
R v Brownlow 
R v Harbarow 
Trial – conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Allegedly conspired 
with Louise Crum. 
 
BM Clarke & Co., 
stockbrokers, Copthall 
Buildings. 
 
Associated with 
Maurice Singer. 
The Times; 30 
October 1937. 
52 November 
1937 
R v Woods 
R v Hamilton-
Mowforth 
R v Campbell 
R v Rockfelt 
R v Wegoda 
R v Barnes 
Magistrate’s court – 
conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Through Carlisle 
Investment Trust, 
Cannon Street. 
 
Selling shares in 
Universal Carburation 
Co. 
The Times; 3 
November 1937. 
53 November 
1937 
R v Daw 
R v Darwin (alias 
Daw) 
R v Long 
Magistrate’s court – 
conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Through Ward, Daw & 
Co, stockbrokers of 
London Street. 
The Times; 10 
November 1937. 
54 November 
1937 
R v Borden 
R v Zoller 
Trial – conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Employed by Henry 
Rothfield to write Stock 
Exchange reports. 
 
Norden had previous 
convictions in US. 
The Times; 20 
November 1937. 
55 November 
1937 
R v Louvain 
R v Kaye 
R v Waldron 
Magistrate’s court - 
conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Through Grey Waldron 
& Co Limited of 
Bishopsgate. 
 
Shares in Reservations 
Limited, a promotion 
linked to the 
The Times; 22 
November 1937. 
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No. Dates Parties Nature of 
process/charges 
Comments Source 
coronation. 
56 November 
1937 
R v Dreyfus Magistrate’s court – 
obtaining money by 
false pretences. 
Through Federal 
Industrial Development 
Bank Limited of Mincing 
Lane. Bank established 
to assist in fraudulent 
share-pushing. 
Manchester 
Guardian; 30 
November 1937. 
57 December 
1937 
R v Shulman 
R v Seeley 
Police court – 
offences under the 
CA 1929 relating to 
share-pushing. 
Shulman was a member 
of the Canadian bar – 
had arrived in UK 
allegedly to lead a 
‘gang’ of 4/5 share-
pushers. Claimed to be 
Jacob Factor’s legal 
adviser.  
The Times; 3 
December 1937. 
58 February 
1938 
R v Burnett 
R v Grimes 
R v Byford 
R v Tanfield 
R v Hazard 
R v Roberts 
R v Banfield 
Magistrate’s court – 
conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Through Wetnall 
Jenkins & Co. Limited, 
stockbrokers. 
 
Metropolitan 3d and 6d 
Chain Stores. 
The Times; 16 
February 1938. 
59 February 
1938 
R  v Appleton Magistrate’s court – 
conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Involved in Wetnall 
Jenkins case. 
The Times; 17 
February 1938. 
60 February 
1938 
Williams v Brady 
and others. 
Damages for loss 
through fraudulent 
misrepresentation 
and breach of 
contract. 
Concerned Aeronautical 
Corporation of Great 
Britain Limited. 
The Times; 25 
February 1938. 
61 April 1938 R v Westwood 
R v Smith 
Policed court – 
obtaining money by 
false pretences. 
Debentures in Bescar 
Cabinet Company of 
Scarisbrick. 
Manchester 
Guardian; 12 
April 1938. 
62 September 
1938 
R v Hamlisch Police court – false 
statement to an 
immigration officer. 
Coming to UK for share-
pushing – shares in 
Yellowstone Gold Mine 
Corporation. 
 
Associated with 
Maurice Singer. 
Manchester 
Guardian; 2 
September 
1938. 
63 September 
1938 
R v Spiro Trial – conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Through Maclean & 
Henderson, 
stockbrokers. 
Manchester 
Guardian; 6 
September 
1938. 
64 October 
1938 
R v Firth 
R v Broughton 
R v Dickeson 
Police court – 
conspiracy to 
defraud. 
Through Sir John Seton 
& Company, Took’s 
Court, Chancery Lane. 
 
Business associated 
with or successor to 
Ward Daw & Company. 
Manchester 
Guardian; 14 
October 1938. 
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65 October 
1938 
Silverman v 
Wolfenden, 
Junction Boxing 
Stadium Limited 
Action to recover loss 
through allegedly 
fraudulent 
misrepresentations.  
Concerned promotion 
of shares in Junction 
Boxing Stadium. 
Manchester 
Guardian; 15 
October 1938. 
66 November 
1938 
Ullstrom v 
Petter, Naar, 
Owen, 
Richmand, and A 
Williams & Co. 
Action to recover loss 
through fraudulent 
misrepresentations. 
Concerned shares in 
Nash (London) Limited. 
 
Through Williams & Co, 
outside brokers. 
 
Petter currently in USA. 
Manchester 
Guardian; 24 
November 1938. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER TEN – 1939–1945 – SURVIVING ANOTHER WAR 
 
 
Introduction 
When war came on 3 September 1939, it had long been expected. Remembering the 
experience of the 1914–1918 war, preparations had been made. The hard-learned lesson that 
success might depend on which countries could best harness their economies to the 
overwhelming national objective did not have to be re-learned; and senior officials who had 
begun their careers in the earlier war found that they could build upon their experience.773 
Members of the public knew what they could expect to happen. In the City, the markets 
understood what their role would be and that business as usual could not be expected.774 As a 
result, the onset of war was accompanied by the introduction of capital issue controls which 
largely avoided the difficulties experienced in 1915. 
Inception of capital issue controls 
Consequently, the transition to a wartime economy began smoothly. Accomplishing the 
transition in terms of financial policy had been considered by the Committee on Economic 
Information775 immediately before the war. In a report entitled ‘Defence Expenditure and the 
economic and financial problems connected therewith’ the committee recommended that: 
‘. . . the rationing of the investment expenditure which firms and individuals in this 
country are permitted to incur, with a view to  maintaining the capacity in the 
investment industries available for defence production and for exports.’776 
Thus, in the committee’s view, financial control was not as important as control of materials. 
Indeed, Keynes argued that control of new issues would have such slight effect that it would 
                                                 
773  For example, Edwin Marker, who was to be Comptroller of Companies during the 1939–1945 
war and responsible for implementation of the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1939, had worked 
with the Ministry of Reconstruction and was secretary of the Committee on the Shipping and 
Shipbuilding Industries in 1918. Ministry of Reconstruction (1918); page 8. 
774  Kynaston (2000); page 460-461. Michie (1999); pages 287–288. 
775  Originally set up in 1931 as a standing committee of the Economic Advisory Council, this 
committee was charged with making regular reports on the economic situation. It was chaired by Lord 
Stamp, and in 1939 the other members were GDH Cole, HD Henderson, JM Keynes, Sir Alfred Lewis, 
Professor DH Robertson, Sir Arthur Salter, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross and Sir Frederick Phillips. 
776  Sayers (1956); page 163. 
Chapter Ten 
1939–1945 – Surviving another war 
Page 274 
 
be immaterial to control of materials and not worth introducing at a preparatory stage. This 
view did not convince the committee, partly because of the administrative simplicity of a 
control of new issues, and Keynes’ view was not supported. The desirability of a new issues 
control was also urged by others, including the Committee on Control of Savings and 
Investment which reported in August 1939, making the suggestion that the peacetime Foreign 
Transactions Advisory Committee, chaired by Lord Kennet, should extend its work to cover 
‘domestic and imperial; as well as “foreign”’ issues: 
‘The chief consideration on which the Committee judges applications at present, 
support for the sterling exchange, will stand for foreign issues, for domestic issues the 
prior needs of rearmament finance should be the decisive consideration and issues 
permitted only if they can be related to rearmament.’ 777 
These recommendations were incorporated in the Treasury’s War Book immediately. On 25 
August 1939, Lord Kennet returned to London on being advised by the Treasury that his 
committee might be required to take action rapidly. His committee met on 1 September 1939 
to consider the implications. The necessary regulations were issued by the Treasury on 3 
September 1939, and announced in a press release on Monday 4 September 1939. On the 
same day, the Treasury sent Lord Kennet a memorandum of guidance that elaborated the 
information provided in the press release and specified the manner in which the committee 
should consult with interested parties. The Times reported: 
‘Two principles may be traced in the regulations for the control of capital issues. No 
issue of whatever nature may be made without the prior consent of the Treasury. But 
broadly permission will be given when the operation does not involve the subscription 
of new money or where it is shown to be in the natural interest. Nor in ordinary cases 
will the Treasury withhold its permission when it is merely a question of renewal of 
bills or other short-dated maturities. Issues in replacement of longer term obligations 
‘maturing upon a definite date’ will be given special consideration. 
None of the various measures is more than is prudent or necessary and though they 
entail a restriction of individual enterprise the change is not as radical as that entailed 
at the outset of the last war.’778 
The Treasury had learned a lesson from the 1914–1918 war: the control of capital issues was 
implemented by government regulation779 that thus applied to outside as well as Exchange 
issues, rather than by a temporary regulation of the Exchange that could only apply to 
                                                 
777  Sayers (1956); page 164. 
778  The Times; 4 September 1939; page 14. 
779  Defence (Finance) Regulation Number 6 under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939. 
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members. Other lessons had been learned. Rather than establish a new committee to apply 
the new controls, it was decided to adapt an existing committee: the Foreign Transactions 
Advisory Committee. That committee had been established in April 1936 under the 
chairmanship of Lord Kennet to advise the Chancellor of the Exchequer on application of the 
restrictions on borrowing for the purpose of foreign lending or the purchase of foreign 
securities.780 Although the committee’s work had not been completely uncontroversial, under 
the chairmanship of Lord Kennet, a stockbroker, it had a reputation for beneficence and a 
manner of working that was well understood.781 Moreover, it was to work with a certain 
elasticity782 that ensured that there were few complaints about its operations: indeed, the 
earliest public complaint to be reported came in March 1945 from the Chairman of the 
Premier Investment Company Limited who complained of a slow response to application to 
raise new capital.783 Most comments were positive; for example, the comment by Philip Hill of 
Philip Hill & Partners, whose new issue business had been decimated by the regulations: 
‘Under existing conditions, no sane man could find fault with these regulations.’784 
In other words, the Treasury had learned other lessons from the way in which the equivalent 
committee had worked and been criticised during the 1914–1918 war. 
Relationship with the Stock Exchange 
This benign state of affairs owed much to the constructive relationship between the 
committee and the Stock Exchange. From the beginning, there were clear divisions of 
responsibility between Lord Kennet’s committee and the Exchange. Whilst Lord Kennet’s 
committee dealt with the approval of new issues within the terms of the government’s 
regulations, the Exchange dealt with questions relating to trading within the exchange and the 
grant of permission to deal in a newly issued security. To this end, in parallel with the issue of 
the Defence (Finance) Regulations in September 1939, the Exchange issued its own Temporary 
                                                 
780  House of Commons Hansard; 7 April 1936.  Sayers (1976); Volume II; page 582. For the terms of 
reference and initial membership of the committee see Sayers (1976); Volume III; Appendix 30; page 
299. Apart from Lord Kennet, the members included the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England and 
the Chairman of the Stock Exchange. Peden (2000); page 314. 
781  The Times; 15 September 1939; page 13. Remarkably, Lord Kennet was to remain as Chairman 
of this committee until March 1959: almost to the end of the committee’s life. The Times; 23 March 
1959; page 10. 
782  ‘The war-time Treasury control of capital issues has always, and rightly, been characterised by a 
certain degree of elasticity . . .’ Financial Times; 24 November 1942; page 2. 
783  Financial Times; 9 March 1945; page 1. 
784  The Times; 7 June 1940; page 11. 
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Regulations which provided that if the Treasury’s committee objected to an issue it would not 
be listed or traded and, as in 1915, required that all trading was to be for cash and for 
immediate delivery (i.e. fortnightly settlement was suspended). Continuations and options 
were banned. Minimum prices were set for all government debt and associated securities.785 
By these means, it was hoped to avoid speculation particularly in relation to news of military 
successes or failures. 
There was thus an active co-operation between the Exchange and the Treasury in which the 
Exchange readily accepted its junior role. As the Exchange’s committee was to suggest in its 
Annual Report for the year ended 24 March 1942: 
‘The Stock Exchange has settled down to a wartime routine which not only affords all 
essential facilities to the investing public but at the same time provides means for 
carrying out the policy of the Government in various important directions such as the 
control of new capital issues.’786 
There were, of course, occasional difficulties in the relationship as practical problems in 
applying the government’s controls arose and were resolved. Although the legal framework 
established in September 1939 was to remain largely unchanged throughout the war, there 
was continual agitation for changes to be made. Sayers (1956) suggests that the explanation 
for this ‘paradoxical contrast’ between the stability of the framework and the agitation for 
change lies in confusion over the purposes for which the control had been introduced. He 
suggests that public opinion accepted that its principal purpose had been to check the use of 
real resources for inessential purposes, although a control of new issues was of little use for 
this. In practice, the Treasury and the Bank of England turned it to quite different service as an 
instrument to ‘groom the market’ in gilt-edged securities. He therefore suggests that the 
control became devoted to questions not of whether an issue should be permitted but of what 
should be the terms of the issue. If so, it would help to explain why market reaction to the 
operation of the control during the 1939–1945 war was so much less negative than reaction 
during the 1914–1918 war.787 
Agitation was incited in May 1940 when the Chancellor of the Exchequer introduced a 
Limitation of Dividends Bill which aimed to set a maximum level for dividend declarations but, 
                                                 
785  Stock Exchange (1945); pages 74–77. 
786  Financial Times; 2 October 9142; page 3. 
787  Sayers (1956); page 167. 
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inter alia, provided that no securities should be issued by way of capitalisation of profits or 
reserves.788 It was proposed that the maximum amount should be determined by reference to 
dividends declared by a company between 1936 and 1939 irrespective of subsequent changes 
such as the issue of additional capital. Thus, even if the issue of additional capital had been 
sanctioned by Lord Kennet’s committee, it would not have been permissible to increase 
proportionately the total amount paid by way of dividend. After consultation, and protests, the 
bill was withdrawn.789 
Similarly, a practical solution was found by agreement in 1942 when experience showed that 
companies had been taking advantage of an exemption from the ban on new issues that had 
been granted to facilitate mergers and amalgamations. A holding company would be formed 
to acquire the capital of another, usually in the same trade, by the allotment of shares that 
would then be sold to stockbrokers for introduction to the market. This was thought to be 
contrary to the spirit of the regulations and was dealt with by an agreement that permission to 
deal on the London Stock Exchange (or the provincial exchanges) would not be granted except 
with the consent of the Treasury. As The Times observed: 
‘The [Stock Exchange] Committee and the Treasury have hitherto worked 
harmoniously together, and probably the new procedure (which is designed to close 
certain loopholes that experience has shown to have been left open by those 
regulations) will entail in practice little change from those at present.’790 
The position of members 
The fact that the Exchange was able to work harmoniously with the Capital Issues Committee 
did not mean that wartime conditions were proving benign for members. In the years 
immediately before the onset of war, members’ incomes had proved disappointing. No 
member can have expected that incomes would be improved by wartime conditions, but the 
experience may have been worse than expected. After all, the Exchange’s position had 
deteriorated since 1919. There had been a gradual development of the volume of business 
handled by provincial exchanges partly as a result of the London Stock Exchange’s policy on 
rates of commissions and its attitude towards the provincial exchanges. Although an attempt 
                                                 
788   Bill 1940/46; 9 May 1940; BPP. Financial Times; 17 May 1940; page 2. 
789  ‘Exit Dividend Limitation’; Financial Times; 5 June 1940; page 2. The bill was dropped in part 
because Excess Profits Tax was raised to 100%; but also because it was believed that the bill’s objects 
could be achieved through the existing controls on capital issues.  
790  The Times; 23 May; page 7. Financial Times; 22 May 1942; pages 1 and 2. 
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had been made in 1939 to reach an accommodation with the provincial exchanges in the hope 
that the activities of country jobbers might be restrained, the attempt had been undermined 
by the London Stock Exchange’s refusal to grant provincial brokers direct access to the London 
market. Even the limited compromises that were reached faded away following the onset of 
war.791 At the same time, overseas brokers remained active competitors through their offices 
in London. In September 1939, there had been 15 offices, all of which became members of the 
newly formed Association of New York Stock Exchange Member Firms having representation in 
the United Kingdom.792 
Above all, although there had been a considerable increase in public interest in investment and 
shareholding, the London Stock Exchange had done little either to attract this new business or 
to encourage the lower cost investment media that were being developed to meet the 
demand. 
There was yet one other factor. The government’s need to borrow to finance the war might 
have led to an increase in business for members. Yet among the lessons that the Treasury and 
the Bank of England had learned from the 1914–1918 war was that there were ways of raising 
loans that did not involve the Exchange or the cost of that involvement. In other words, the 
government tended to design its securities so that they appealed directly to institutions and to 
members of the public: 
‘An important feature of wartime borrowing was the large sums raised in various 
securities not quoted on the Stock Exchange; Treasury Bills, Treasury Deposit Receipts, 
Tax Reserve Certificates, Savings Certificates, Defence Bonds, and annuities issued to 
the savings bank. Thus at the end of the financial year 1945-6, the total internal 
national debt was £23,373 million, but only £12,268 million was in Stock exchange 
securities. Of this, £2,019 million was held by the National Debt Commissioners, the 
Bank of England, the Exchange Account and other public departments. Individuals 
seem to have done their saving largely through the institutions and the National 
Savings Movement, and their holdings of Stock exchange securities increased by much 
less than they had done in the First World War. The holdings of the banks, the 
discount market, insurance companies and pension funds all increased greatly and 
there was also a big rise in foreign holdings.’793 
                                                 
791  Conference between the London Stock Exchange and the Associated Stock Exchanges; June 
1939; Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. Michie (1999); page 239. 
792  Financial Times; 16 September 1939; page 3. 
793  Morgan and Thomas (1961); page 196. 
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All of these factors cohered to undermine the volume of business transacted on the Exchange 
and thus the incomes of members. The initial decline in the volume of business is reflected in 
Paukert’s statistics, based on Stamp Duty data: 
 
 
Table 10.1: Estimated value of dutiable Stock Exchange transactions 1938–1946794 
 
Year 1938–9 1939–40 1940–1 1941–2 1942–3 1943–4 1944–5 1945–6 
£m 464 348 233 301 409 522 553 788 
 
As a comparison, Paukert’s data suggest that the highest annual volume reached during the 
1930s was £1,034,000 in the year 1936–1937, a level that was not reached again until the year 
1946–1947.  Although matching data for members’ incomes do not exist for these years, they 
must have been proportionately lower than in the pre-war years as without fees from new 
issues and without income from ‘own account’ speculation, which was discouraged by the 
requirement of cash trading, income was bound to be almost wholly commission-based. 
Consistent with this conclusion, the numbers of members fell between 1939 and 1945: 
 
Table 10.2: Members’ numbers: brokers and jobbers 1938–9 compared with 1945–6795 
 
   Brokers  Jobbers 
1938–9 1945–6 +/-% 1938–9 1945–6 +/- % 
Number of firms 466 402 -13.8 344 254 -26.2 
Number of partners 1,765 1,486 -15.8 1,127 852 -24.4 
Number of partners per 
firm 
3.8 3.7  3.3 3.4  
Number of clerks 2,447 2,132 -12.8 1,292 1,062 -15.7 
Number of clerks per firm 5.3 5.3  3.8 4.2  
Total of partners and clerks 4,212 3,618 -14.1 2,419 1,914 -20.8 
Gearing; i.e. partners as a 
proportion of total of 
partners and clerks 
41.9% 41.1% -1.9 48.3% 44.5% -7.9 
 
                                                 
794  Paukert (1961); page 304. 
795  Stock Exchange committee Annual Reports; Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
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These data demonstrate that there was an absolute decline in the numbers of firms between 
1938 and 1946, and that this decline affected jobbers more than brokers. Moreover, among 
jobbing firms, the decline in profit-sharing participants was greater than the decline in 
participants remunerated largely by salary. This is consistent with pressure on the profitability 
of jobbing firms reflecting the increased cost of maintaining trading liquidity against a 
background of declining trading volume. As further confirmation of the pressure on incomes, 
the cost of a nomination remained low throughout the war.796 
There were other signs that members were under pressure. The increased cost of maintaining 
trading liquidity led jobbers to try to increase the margin between quoted buying and selling 
prices.797  
For brokers, as there was no possibility of increasing trading volumes, the obvious response 
was to re-examine commission rates and rebates although this option was not without risk. 
Both increases in commission rates and reductions in rebates payable to introducers 
threatened to increase the incentive for counterparties to bypass the Exchange. The campaign 
on these issues began soon after the beginning of the war for in February 1940 JB Braithwaite 
of Foster & Braithwaite was suggesting that there was both an opportunity and need to reduce 
rebate costs: 
‘. . . war conditions present us with a unique opportunity . . . We cannot raise our 
charges to the public to meet these conditions, as is being done on every hand by 
other businesses and industries, but we can, and I think that in the interests of 
members that we must, achieve a similar end by the internal economy of reducing our 
rebates to agents.’798 
Discussions led to a proposal in May 1940 that the rebate payable to all agents should be 
reduced from 50% to 33%: a proposal that encountered opposition from banks. It was 
eventually agreed that, with effect from June 1941, the rebate payable to banks would be 
reduced to 33% and that, at the banks’ insistence, the rebate payable to all other agents would 
be reduced to 25%.799  
                                                 
796  Michie (1999); page 302. 
797  Stock Exchange Committee minutes; 16 October 1939; Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall 
Library. 
798  Stock Exchange Country Jobbing Sub-Committee; 27 February 1940; Stock Exchange Archive; 
Guildhall Library. 
799  Stock Exchange Committee minutes; 28 January 1941; Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall 
Library. 
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There always was a possibility that reductions in rebates would encourage introducers to 
direct their business away from the Exchange, either managing transactions through their own 
private networks in the case of issuing houses and institutional investors or directing business 
to provincial or overseas brokers. In an attempt to mitigate this possibility, the Exchange was 
prepared to recognise all members of certain overseas exchanges as eligible to be agents who 
would qualify for the higher level of rebates of commission.800 Members of the New York Stock 
Exchange were not included in this arrangement as the London offices of New York brokerage 
houses presented direct competition for London brokers. 
Sources of competition 
Provincial brokers were regarded as a greater and more dangerous form of competition, 
however. Indeed, in May 1940, when commissions and rebates were being re-examined, there 
was support for a suggestion that provincial brokers should not be eligible for any rebate at 
all.801 The result was that the Exchange looked again at its relationship with provincial 
exchanges and in particular at the threat posed by provincial jobbers which dominated 
attention at the conference with provincial exchanges in June 1939, before the war. The 
outcome of the Exchange’s re-consideration was to attempt to deny access to non-members 
who were involved in jobbing and thus involved in closing deals that otherwise might have 
been directed through London. To this end, as was to be done for members of overseas 
exchanges, the London Stock Exchange offered the higher rate of rebate to provincial stock 
exchanges, thus treating them in the same way as banks.  The offer was, however, conditional 
on provincial exchanges outlawing double capacity.802 Although this change was implemented, 
it proved unsuccessful because provincial brokers who had combined broking business with 
jobbing easily evaded its effect by dividing their businesses between broking and jobbing 
activities. The divided firms that were the result thus formally complied with the London 
Exchange’s requirement for eligibility for rebates although they continued to operate in 
practice as joint businesses. Time was to show that the provincial exchanges remained 
disinclined to assist in eliminating this practice unless the Exchange permitted direct access for 
provincial brokers to the London market: a negotiating position that had long been held by the 
                                                 
800  Stock Exchange Committee minutes; 5 August 1941; 8 September 1941; Stock Exchange 
Archive; Guildhall Library. 
801  Stock Exchange Committee minutes; 6 May 1940; Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall Library. 
802  Stock Exchange Country Jobbing Sub-Committee; March 1940; Stock Exchange Archive; 
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provincial exchanges. This the London Exchange would not grant as it threatened the income 
earned by London brokers by handling business on behalf of provincial brokers.  
Frustration over the difficulty of finding a way of mitigating the competition from provincial 
brokers was joined by frustration over the tendency for issuing houses and institutional 
investors to close deals in larger blocks of shares outside the Exchange. Although the 
regulations introduced in September 1939 regulated new issues, they did not apply to private 
placements of shares. It was thus possible for blocks of existing shares to be placed with 
purchasers acting privately outside any organised exchange. Such sales were not illegal since 
the regulations on new issues did not apply to existing shares. If the transaction was to be 
unaccompanied by any request for permission to deal in the shares on the Stock Exchange, 
such a placing would escape all independent scrutiny on grounds of investment merit or public 
interest. This single route to realisation of an equity interest appears to have been used by 
business owners for whom the attractions of continuing to own a business were undermined 
by the introduction in 1939 of an Excess Profits Tax levied at a rate of 100% on excess profits 
calculated by reference to pre-war profits and subject only to a credit of 20% payable only 
after the end of the war.803 As The Times was to point out in November 1943: 
‘By by-passing the Sub-Committee of the Stock Exchange the parties in effect contract 
out of the conditions and obligations which the Stock Exchange has attached to its 
grant of permission to deal. The directors give no undertaking of responsibility, for 
example, for any statements made in connexion with the operation. There is no need 
for disclosure of any intermediary profits derived from the placings.’804 
Of course, this was a problem that had arisen during the 1914–1918 war, although in that war 
the problem was even more extensive as in regulating the new issue market reliance was 
placed upon the Stock Exchange’s own regulations which did not apply to non-members. By 
September 1942, the problem was causing such concern to members that the Exchange was 
obliged to complain to the Treasury: 
‘For the placing of issues of the highest class, the Stock Exchange has developed a 
system which works satisfactorily as an alternative to an offer through the press. The 
brokers who handle such issues have learnt by experience the type of investor with 
whom the stock can best be placed; the amount of stock which it is wise to offer to 
each, and the extent to which the market can best be sued for the transaction of the 
business. . .  
                                                 
803  Cheffins (2008); page 324. Sayers (1956); pages 88–89. 
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‘If brokers are to be debarred from the exercise of their knowledge and experience in 
the placing of securities for the companies for whom they act the gradual 
development of an outside and uncontrolled market both for the original placing and 
subsequent transactions in securities is a danger which cannot be ignored. . .  
‘The issue is confined to a very small circle of large institutional investors, and the 
price received by the Company may be, through lack of competition, thereby 
depressed. The public can only participate later at an advanced price.’805 
This complaint did not bring forth a response from the Treasury, perhaps understandably since 
extending the existing regulations to cover private transactions of the sort that had led to the 
complaint would have involved a serious interference with private dealing. Thus the Exchange 
returned to its complaint in December 1943: 
‘The capital market is controlled by the Treasury through its Advisory Committee and 
by agreement gives to the Treasury complete control over all Stock Exchange 
markets, but it leaves wholly uncontrolled the very large and powerful, but mainly 
non-professional markets that are outside the Stock Exchange jurisdiction. The 
principal constituents of those markets are the Banks, the Insurance Companies, the 
Investment Trust Companies, the Acceptance Houses, the Finance and Issuing Houses, 
the Association of Stock and Share Dealers, the Mincing Lane Tea and Rubber Brokers’ 
Association, and the large number of ‘Somerset House’ and other outside stock and 
sharebrokers up and down the country. . .  
‘The effect of leaving this large outside market uncontrolled is naturally to drive into it 
that very business that the Treasury thinks it is against the national interest to 
permit.’806 
The combination of pressure on members’ incomes and the inability of the Exchange to secure 
any significant improvement in their circumstances either by reaching agreement with 
provincial exchanges or by lobbying the Treasury led the Exchange to take a number of new 
directions. 
New directions 
In June 1942, a committee was created jointly with the provincial exchanges to discuss matters 
of common interest on a regular basis for although the interests of the various exchanges were 
not completely aligned, there were points on which they were in agreement.807 
                                                 
805  Stock Exchange Committee minutes; 21 September 1942; Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall 
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806  Stock Exchange Committee minutes; 6 December 1943; Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall 
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Also in spring 1942, informal discussions began between members and the proprietors of the 
London Stock Exchange with a view to unification of control: discussions that were to lead in 
July 1942 to the formation of a joint committee to develop proposals and in May 1943 to an 
agreement to the formation of the Council of the London Stock Exchange to replace both the 
Committee for General Purposes and the Committee of Trustees and Managers.808 In part this 
constitutional innovation resulted from the parlous financial condition of the Exchange which, 
as between 1914 and 1918, had resulted from the reduction in activity and active membership 
brought about by the war.  
But at this time thoughts were beginning to turn to post-war conditions and their implications 
for the Exchange. In July 1943, Nuffield College, Oxford, published a report entitled 
‘Employment Policy and Organization of Industry after the War’ which was based on private 
conferences during the previous 12 months that had involved representatives of many 
interests. The report envisaged that after the war there would be a continuing need for some 
form of control of investment, both domestic and overseas: 
‘The certainty of a high post-war demand for capital goods will make it necessary to 
see that resources for investment are not frittered away and that priority is given to 
forms of investment most serviceable to the community.’809 
These objectives were similar to those of the Treasury in establishing the Capital Issues 
Committee in 1939 and implied that there would be support for continuation of capital issue 
controls after the end of the war. In other words, the Stock Exchange must have been 
contemplating a future in which members would be permanently disadvantaged by a 
permanent system of new issue controls that allowed certain types of unregulated trading to 
continue outside the Exchange. Added to this prospect would have been the realisation that 
however harmoniously the exchange had been able to work with the Capital Issues 
                                                                                                                                               
807  The committee consisted of four delegates from the London Stock Exchange, four from the 
Council of Associated Stock Exchanges and two from the Provincial Brokers Stock Exchange. Financial 
Times; 2 October 1942; page 3. 
808  Morgan and Thomas (1961); page 232. The council was to consist of nine Trustees and 
Managers ex officio as foundation members and 30 ordinary members elected by ballot. The 
constitution therefore recognised the supremacy of the membership in all matters. In 1920 negotiations 
about mutualisation had foundered on the issue of acquisition of the proprietors’ shares. In 1943, this 
issue was deferred and finally resolved in 1948 when for the shares were substituted redeemable 
annuities. 
809  Nuffield College Social Reconstruction Survey (1943). The Times; 1 July 1943; page 5. The 
Survey had begun work in 1941. Nuffield College Library: MSS NCSRS. 
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Committee, it had not been able to capitalise upon this relationship when lobbying the 
Treasury to seek relief for members from outside trading. The Exchange needed to become 
more effective in lobbying on behalf of members’ interests and to find a way in which outside 
trading could be regulated.  
The formation of a joint committee with provincial exchanges was one element of a response, 
for chances of success in lobbying were bound to be maximised by campaigning together. 
Moreover, the innovation in London of a council replacing the two former committees was 
intended to create a single unified voice that could speak authoritatively for the London Stock 
Exchange. 
It was against the background of these developments that in December 1943 the Exchange 
had renewed its request that the government should discourage the outside trading in blocks 
of shares. To this request was added a request that the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 
1939 should be brought into force: 
‘If the Prevention of Fraud Act had been brought into force, the Treasury would have 
had ready to its hand an easy means of exercising its control over the outside market, 
because all dealers in stocks and shares outside the recognised Stock Exchanges 
would have had to become either licensed or exempted dealers and so would have 
been known and controllable.’810 
Although the proposed legislation had caused the Exchange some difficulty in 1937, these 
difficulties had subsequently been resolved and the Board of Trade’s draft regulations had 
found general approval in the City: 
‘While, therefore, the regulations might seem extremely severe, they were necessarily 
so in view of the type of business they were designed to control.’811 
Moreover, in 1939 it had seemed that implementation of the Act would have the desired 
effect on outside activity: 
‘The recent decisions of two well-known and reputable firms of outside share dealers 
to go into voluntary liquidation underline the stringent control over dealings in 
                                                 
810  Stock Exchange Committee minutes; 6 December 1943; Stock Exchange Archive; Guildhall 
Library. 
811  Financial Times; 2 June 1939; page 5. 
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securities which will be imposed by the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act when  it 
becomes fully operative.’812 
Although the onset of war had prevented full implementation in the autumn of 1939, in formal 
terms it had only been postponed by six months: a postponement that had subsequently been 
repeated at six-monthly intervals. The Stock Exchange’s request in December 1943, doubtless 
supported by the provincial stock exchanges, found a receptive audience in the Board of Trade, 
a rumour that implementation was about to be ordered appearing in the newspapers as early 
as 1 January 1944.813 A month later, on 1 February 1944, it was formally announced that 
applications for licences should be submitted by 15 April 1944 in preparation for 
implementation in mid-July 1944.814  
The ‘grey’ market 
Although the Board of Trade thus responded positively to the Exchange’s request for the 1939 
Act to be brought into force, it did not agree that the Act could or should be used as a form of 
protection against the circumvention of its controls and thus against the grey market; although 
it was accepted that there was a problem that required some action. Instead, the Bank of 
England was invited to open negotiations with issuing houses and institutional investors which 
led to a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ in June 1944. It was agreed that shares involved in a placing 
would only be sold to institutions on an approved list. In turn, those institutions undertook 
that they would not re-sell the securities at a discount within six months and that they would 
not buy new unquoted securities unless the proposed placing had first been approved by the 
Treasury: approval that would be given on the basis of voluntary disclosure as the regulations 
were not amended to require prior disclosure of proposed placings. This approach was 
adopted because of nervousness over the extent of interference that would be involved in an 
attempt to regulate private transactions of this sort (i.e. transactions that did not take place 
through a recognised exchange). This agreement appears to have reduced the incentive to 
bypass the recognised exchanges but did not eliminate it since houses that were not parties to 
the agreement were not be bound by it. In the end, the agreement collapsed.815 
                                                 
812  Financial Times; 10 August 1939; page 4. 
813  Financial Times; 1 January 1944; page 1. 
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In December 1944, matters came to a head when the Stock Exchange refused an application 
for permission to deal in the 2 million new 4¼% ‘C’ preference shares of General Electric 
Company Limited which had been issued to repay a loan from an insurance company. In 
accordance with the informal agreement with the Bank of England, although it was not 
intended that the shares would be offered to the public or to the existing shareholders, the 
Capital Issues Committee’s approval was sought, and obtained, before the shares were placed 
with a syndicate of finance houses. Subsequently, the shares were placed with institutions on 
the approved list, including an allotment of £150,000 to three firms of jobbers. A delay had 
occurred between approval of the transaction and its completion, during which time prices 
rose on news that the German offensive in the Ardennes had been defeated with the result 
that the allottees of the shares benefitted from a substantial unforeseen profit. This caused 
some resentment as the financial institutions involved in this transaction appeared to have 
benefitted from a private arrangement: especially since an opportunity to subscribe for the 
shares would normally have been a right of the existing shareholders. Whatever the merits of 
the case and the Stock Exchange’s decision may have been, it exposed the unattractiveness of 
reliance upon an informal agreement, leading The Times to adopt a parsonical tone: 
‘It will be generally agreed that it is desirable to avoid any risk of a further Order, with 
all its disadvantages at this stage of the war; and the Treasury, which may be 
expected to share this view, would not doubt refrain from making one so long as it 
can be avoided. However, it is clear that the efficacy of a gentleman’s agreement 
depends on the willingness of all people either at the one stratum of the market or at 
the other – that is to say, either the finance houses who place the shares or the 
institutions which buy them – to be gentlemen. Whether the restriction as such is 
necessary in the national interest is of course quite another question and opinions 
thereon differ widely.’816 
In response to these events, in February 1945, the Bank of England proposed with Treasury 
support that those to whom securities were allotted in similar circumstances should not be 
permitted to dispose of them for six months: a proposal that the Exchange opposed on the 
grounds that it would discourage anyone from investing in new securities. Whilst this 
suggestion was withdrawn, the penalty for the Exchange was an agreement by which issues 
would continue to be cleared with the Bank which would also be entitled to declare that the 
new issue market was closed. By this point, the timing and amount of new issues could be 
determined by the government acting through the Capital Issues Committee and the Bank of 
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England whilst the Exchange was left considering applications for permission to deal and thus 
determine whether the securities were acceptable. 
Conclusions 
By the end of the 1939–1945 war, there was no questioning the position: statutory regulation 
had arrived and would continue in the form of the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1939 
under the umbrella of the Board of Trade. In parallel, the Capital Issues Committee would 
continue and was soon afterwards to be given formal statutory authority, working under the 
guidance of the Treasury.817 
Public regulation had once been an anathema to the Exchange, even the remotest form of 
oversight that was implicit in the grant of a Charter. Ironically, when the 1939 Act was brought 
into force in 1944, it was in response to a request from the Exchange. Compared with 1914, 
when such an eventuality would have been unthinkable, the Exchange’s position had changed. 
Before the 1914–1918 war, the Exchange had been robust in its independence: confident in 
the ability of its members to compete with all-comers and prevail. As The Economist observed 
in an article published in June 1945: 
‘Forty years ago, that is, at a time when some of those who are today the leading 
figures of the profession were already in, or about to enter, the ‘House’, competition 
between brokers was nearly as absolute as may be. Between 1905 and 1909, 
however, as a result of continuous pressure, the committee was persuaded to 
introduce the scales of minimum commissions, which remain in force, with minor 
changes until today. To a large extent, this reform substituted competition in service 
for competition in price, a distinction which has been of growing importance from 
then on.’818 
By 1945, after years of poor trading, both in peacetime and in war, the Exchange had lost its 
pre-eminent position internationally and was aware that it was being bypassed domestically. 
Through refusal to seek out opportunities for business development, either by meeting the 
new broader public interest in investment or the new investment media others were 
developing to take advantage of that interest, the Exchange had lost ground. Increasingly its 
members had come to rely upon their control of the rules as a means of defensively protecting 
their interests rather than confidently sustaining their reputation as a safe place in which to do 
                                                 
817  Borrowing (Controls and Guarantees) Act 1946. A draft memorandum of guidance to the 
committee was then published by the Treasury as a White Paper. (Cmd 6726).  Peden (2000); page 376. 
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business. As The Economist went on to observe, having reviewed the developments that had 
occurred between 1914 and 1945: 
‘All these changes add up to an altered mentality among brokers, which is the 
counterpart of similar movements in so many other fields. It is a mentality which 
prefers reasonable, but secure, profits to long risks with the alternatives of brilliant 
success or equally striking failure. The business of stock broking is becoming a service 
industry, and the members are behaving in a way which tends to limit the possibilities 
of speculation both for themselves and for the public.’819 
For the government, acceptance of the Exchange’s control of the Conduct of Business Rules 
was justified by the avoidance of a repetition of the experience of January 1919 when 
opposition to the continuation of capital controls had led to a humiliating withdrawal. 
Realistically, this concession was unlikely to result in frustration of the government’s wishes in 
terms of market management. Trading in government securities represented too large a 
proportion of the market for the Exchange to ignore government pressure. By pragmatically 
accepting the compromise, a debilitating dispute with the Exchange was avoided together with 
any collateral effect this may have had on proposals for reforms of other City institutions. If 
nothing else, the role played by Montagu Norman in stage-managing the Hatry crisis had 
demonstrated the potency of his role compared with the more limited influence of the 
Exchange and thus the greater significance of proposals to nationalise the Bank of England. 
  
                                                 
819  ‘Responsible Stockbroking’; The Economist; 23 June 1945; page 859. 
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At the close of business on 14 May 1945, a week after VE Day, members gathered around the 
South African War Memorial on the trading floor for a service of thanksgiving to mark the end 
of the war. In the presence of the Lord Mayor and a Sheriff,820 the Doxology was sung in hearty 
voice821 as had happened at a similar gathering in November 1918:822 
‘Praise God from whom all blessings flow.’ 
It was as if members were determined to show that little had changed since 1918 when there 
had been a similar gathering in the same place singing the same hymn. Appearances belied 
reality. The Exchange, its practices and its prejudices had changed beyond measure.  
In 1945, the groups that the Exchange existed to serve were looking for risk-free execution: a 
share transmission system that did not itself add to the risks of investment. In contrast, some 
have likened the market before 1914 to the Wild West. In 1945 the Exchange was operating in 
the context of a statutory framework of registration and regulation. To the members of 1914, 
this would have been an anathema. 
As The Economist was to note in an article a month later: 
‘ . . . stock-broking is becoming a service industry . . .’823 
This study has examined the process by which these changes had come about and in particular 
the pressures that led to a series of flawed regulatory interventions and, ultimately, the 
statutory regulation of share traders. In the process of change, 1929 was a watershed that led 
to the abandonment of the Exchange’s traditional approaches. 
                                                 
820  The Sheriff in question was also a member: the senior partner of Charles Stanley & Company, 
one of the firms involved in weak underwriting in 1929. 
821  Financial Times; 15 May 1945. 
822  On that occasion in the presence of the Lord Mayor and the Governor of the Bank of England. 
The Times; 12 November 1918; page 13. 
823  ‘Responsible Stockbroking’; The Economist; 23 June 1945; page 859. 
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Stock Exchange attitudes before 1929 
At the turn of the century, the Exchange viewed itself as a private club which provided a place 
where members could undertake a particular kind of business. Its function was to facilitate 
members’ trading: no more. No corporate responsibility was accepted for the trading activities 
of members: they were the responsibility of members alone. Whilst members were required to 
comply with the rules of the Exchange, the purpose of the rules was to facilitate trading and to 
protect the reputation of the Exchange. These rules served to mitigate counterparty risk for 
members, but only tangentially affected investors’ risks. The Exchange mediated disputes 
between members, but was not concerned with disputes between members and their clients.  
The market was expected to be volatile and from time to time investors incurred losses. That 
was a matter for them. The Exchange did not accept responsibility for mitigating the risks for 
investors. 
This attitude persisted during and after the 1914–1918 war. New issue controls were 
welcomed by members in 1915, as the price of the government’s acquiescence to the 
reopening of the Exchange. In January 1919, the Exchange supported the introduction of 
Regulation 30F to discourage the transfer of business to off-market traders. When Regulation 
30F was opposed by members appalled by the prospect of prolonging government control, the 
Exchange campaigned for the early removal of all wartime controls and restraints. In effect, 
the Exchange ignored the warnings that an early return to pre-war trading conditions might 
expose unsuspecting new investors to abuse. The Exchange was doing no more than holding to 
its pre-war position. For the Exchange, this was reversion to ‘business as usual’. 
After the war, the Exchange continued to hold to this approach.  It protected the rules against 
manipulation, for example when it acted in December 1919 to conform the rules for offers for 
sale to those for prospectuses, but it did not act to limit the incipient risks of a crash. When the 
first crash of 1929 occurred, it was realised that standard underwriting contracts had been 
rendered unreliable. Removing the liability of lead underwriters for defaults by sub-
underwriters had cleared the way for placing underwriting with insubstantial companies that 
could not honour their undertakings. The result was that a large number of insubstantial 
companies floated in 1928 failed in 1929 and many investors lost their money. It was then 
realised that the shares in question had been promoted by off-market operators involved in 
abusive selling. Both the degradation of underwriting contracts and the character of the off-
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market interests involved ought to have been known to the Exchange’s committee, which 
could have refused the applications for dealing in the shares. This had not been done, 
presumably because the committee accepted without question the sponsoring brokers’ 
undertakings that the issues were sound. Investors’ risks were not the Exchange’s concern.  
Whilst the Exchange was holding to this view, others had been dismayed by the failure to 
realise post-war hopes of economic reconstruction. There had been a prolonged debate in 
academic and political circles about the failure of capitalism and the need for reform of 
financial institutions. The reports of two government committees show why the Exchange 
could hope to be untouched by this debate. The Greene Committee was charged with 
examining company law, and found that the law on share issues and prospectuses was largely 
satisfactory. It accepted that the law on abusive selling of shares was inadequate, and that 
arrangements for investigation of company failure were disappointing. Yet the measures it 
proposed were not grounded in a detailed analysis of the success or failure of methods of 
control employed in other jurisdictions and proved futile. 
The Balfour Committee was charged with examining the effectiveness of the financial system 
in providing finance for industry and also concluded that the system worked adequately. It 
inquired into the consequences of over-capitalisation caused by predatory company 
promoters but found that there was no difference in principle between over-capitalisation 
caused by promoters and that caused by strategic management errors. Companies could and 
did survive over-capitalisation. This analysis distracted attention from the losses of 
unsuspecting investors duped by the promoters. 
 Buoyed by such analyses, it was possible for the Exchange to maintain its traditional position. 
There is no evidence that, before 1929, anyone within the Exchange had foreseen the 
implications of the growing risk that recent issues of insubstantial companies would collapse 
and the development of an increasingly risk-sensitive marketplace. Indeed, there is no 
evidence that the Exchange understood the implications of the changing character of investors 
and vendors. Many newly involved investors were ill-equipped to manage their own risks and 
were not able to rely on advice from members or on the support of the network of close 
relationships within the City. Such investors easily became the prey of abusive share-pushers 
operating either in collusion with members or completely outside the Exchange. Meanwhile, 
an increasing number of companies looked to the Exchange to finance investment or 
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reorganisation as their own internal sources of finance proved inadequate. Such investors and 
vendors looked to the Exchange for a marketplace that was less speculative and volatile than 
had traditionally been the case, and which by its undue volatility did not add significantly to 
the risks that they were obliged to manage.  
Although some members were able individually able to manage their businesses to take 
advantage of changes in the market, it proved difficult for the Committee to infer from this 
disaggregated evidence how the overall market would develop.  
The two crashes of 1929 
By posing an existential threat, the two crashes of 1929 convinced the Exchange that its 
traditional attitude was no longer tenable. In the first crash of 1929, failure so quickly of so 
many companies floated in 1928 caused intolerable losses for many unsuspecting investors, 
including many whose interest had been kindled during and since the war. The second 1929 
crash, the Hatry crash, threatened to impose losses on investors as a result of a failure of the 
Exchange’s processes, and thus caused increasingly important corporate investors to question 
whether they could rely on the Exchange to provide a risk-free transmission system. 1929’s 
crashes were a validation of criticisms of the City’s financial institutions that had gained 
currency in academic and political circles. They appeared to justify the policies of the new 
minority Labour government. 
Encouraged by the Governor of the Bank of England, the Exchange’s response was direct and 
effective, entailing for the first time abrogation of caveat emptor, acceptance of responsibility 
on behalf of members who were not personally exposed to the deferred Hatry settlement and 
an acceptance that provincial exchanges must be involved in the scheme for the deferred 
settlement. This acceptance is implicit in the members’ creation of a fund to settle deferred 
Hatry-related deals irrespective of the individual members who had been responsible for the 
deals. It is also implicit in the emphasis placed on the role of sponsoring brokers in assuring the 
substance of new issues, and by the Exchange taking power to confirm for itself that members’ 
undertakings were reliable. Coupled with ‘warning off’ the brokers that had been prepared to 
collaborate with discredited off-market operators, these actions were not only radical, but 
they were costly to members since they involved terminating a source of income at a time 
when members’ incomes were under pressure. They were, however, undeniably successful in 
eliminating virtually all insubstantial issues, as the Exchange itself was later able to boast: 
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‘The new attitude to promotions was so effective that when there was another boom 
in 1936 it was completely unaccompanied by the scandals and misfortunes of 
previous booms.’824 
Stock Exchange attitudes after 1929 
Ironically, the Exchange’s success contributed to its ultimate failure to stave off government 
intervention. The market always responded to regulatory interventions in the same way. At 
first an attempt would be made to find a way of achieving the clients’ objectives within or 
around the rules. If that attempt failed, the business would move outside the market. In the 
early 1930s, denied access to the Exchange’s market, abusive share traders continued their 
activities outside the market. Beyond the reach of the rules of any recognised exchange, 
traders knew that the threat of prosecution was the only constraint on their activities and 
evidently had no respect for that threat. The ensuing boom in abusive off-market share-
pushing was gleefully seized by newspapers as an opportunity to campaign on behalf of middle 
class investors in a bid to increase readership. Notable among the campaigning newspapers 
was the Daily Mail which had been instrumental in drawing attention to the American Jacob 
Factor in the 1920s and focussed on him again in the 1930s. In an attempt to put an end to the 
Daily Mail’s campaign, Maurice Singer, one of Factor’s associates, initiated a libel action that 
exonerated the Daily Mail by the unqualified acceptance that its articles were true in every 
particular. In political circles, this judgment was regarded as a new validation of a critique of 
the City’s financial institutions and led to renewed pressure for reform. Rather than resist, the 
government opted to appoint a committee to investigate ways in which share-pushing could 
be controlled, thus turning a debate about institutions into a technical argument about 
methods of control. Having conclusively established that prosecutions had not deterred 
abusive trading, the Bodkin Committee recommended that all share traders should be 
registered under arrangements that would respect and favour the independence of the 
Exchange.  These arrangements were accepted by the government even though they involved 
delegation of authority under public law to an unsupervised private body: an arrangement that 
preserved the Exchange’s independence and enabled it to manage the Conduct of Business 
Rules in defence of members’ private interests. 
Although these arrangements were not brought into force before the onset of war in 
September 1939, they came into operation in 1944, following a request by the Exchange. 
                                                 
824  Address by the Vice-Chairman of the Quotations Committee. The Accountant; 2 February 1952. 
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Capital issue controls had been re-introduced at the beginning of the war. By 1943 it was clear 
that they would remain for some time after the war had ended, and the Exchange decided that 
it should not leave reaching agreement with the government on regulation of share trading 
until after the end of the war. For the government, agreement on implementation was 
preferable to imposition and justified acceptance of a compromise in which the Exchange was 
not explicitly subject to oversight by the Board of Trade. It was thus allowed to retain its formal 
independence, in return for an understanding that there would in private be consultation and 
co-operation. 
Thus the Stock Exchange had been able to preserve the appearance if not the full substance of 
independence and largely remained in control of the Conduct of Business Rules which had 
proved to be important in defence of the members’ interests. For its part, the government had 
accepted that the Exchange retained a measure of control over its rules with the appearance 
of independence but in return had secured acceptance of its influence over the market’s 
management. This delicate balance between substance and appearance was to be the 
foundation for the relationship between government and the Exchange for 30 years. 
The cost of settlement 
In reaching this settlement, both parties had been obliged to accept a price that they would 
both have preferred to avoid. 
As far as the government was concerned, the main price was acceptance that it should not 
have the statutory power to oversee the Exchange. Rather than power to direct, the 
government accepted that achievement of its policy objectives would rest upon the 
Exchange’s acceptance of government influence communicated privately. 
As far as the Exchange was concerned, the price was more substantial. Apart from an 
acceptance that government influence would continue, in part through the prolongation of 
capital issue controls, it included the abandonment of caveat emptor as an organising 
principle, a change in its relationship with members and a change in its relationship with the 
provincial exchanges. 
In 1929, the Exchange had been obliged to accept that it had a responsibility to investors 
beyond the membership by creating a fund to meet the cost of settlement of Hatry-related 
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deals which had been deferred following the crash of Hatry’s group of companies. Since its 
foundation, the Exchange refused to accept any such responsibility, concentrating solely on its 
duty to mitigate counterparty risk for the benefit of members. The change was only accepted 
when it became clear that the collusion of members with disreputable off-market operators 
created the danger that the Exchange’s adherence to the principle of caveat emptor could be 
made to appear as a cynical device to take advantage of unsuspecting and unsophisticated 
investors. 
This departure changed the financial risk for members and inevitably brought with it a change 
in the relationship between members and the committee. Although the fund to cover the costs 
of the deferred Hatry settlement was not to become a permanent arrangement, members 
must have known that if similar circumstances ever arose again, they would not be able to 
avoid financing a similar compensation arrangement. From this point it was in the members’ 
interest that the committee should seek to prevent a recurrence of events such as those of 
1928 when members had colluded with disreputable interest. A recurrence would bring with it 
financial liabilities for all members: a prospect that the members would expect the committee 
to avoid. 
Adoption of a sterner disciplinary regime within the Exchange involved a greater sense of 
distance between members and the committee, which took powers to investigate members’ 
undertakings where previously it would have tended to accept them readily. That this change 
in the relationship with members was likely to be permanent was eventually recognised by the 
Exchange in its new constitution, foreshadowed during but agreed after the war, in which the 
annual committee elections were to be replaced by election of committee members for three-
year terms. 
By 1944, the Exchange had also accepted that the wartime capital controls would continue 
after the war, and that government’s continuing role required a change in the relationship 
between the London and provincial stock exchanges to avoid the risk of the exchanges’ 
influence being undermined by the government exploiting their divisions. 
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Dawning realisation 
Reaching this settlement took many years. Only slowly and at times reluctantly did the 
government and the Exchange acknowledge the changed circumstances that emerged from 
the 1914–1918 war. 
Government interest in securities trading 
As a consequence of the 1914–1918 war, securities trading and the Exchange became more 
important to the government. Having realised by the end of 1914 that a functioning stock 
exchange was necessary if its borrowing needs were to be satisfied, the government facilitated 
the reopening of the Exchange. The national debt was never to return to pre-war levels so that 
the Exchange’s role in its financing became a permanent concern for government.  
To this interest was added the political imperative of managing the country’s return to 
prosperity and thus the importance of a properly functioning capital market.  
By the summer of 1918, the Treasury had acknowledged these concerns, as the development 
of Regulation 30F shows. In supporting rather than opposing the introduction of Regulation 
30F, the Exchange’s committee had also shown that it recognised these concerns. The 
Exchange’s members did not share this conclusion, however, and joined the opposition which 
forced withdrawal of the regulation. Moreover there is no evidence that either the Treasury or 
the Exchange realised that the government’s interest in the market would last longer than a 
period of adjustment to peacetime conditions. The acknowledgement that the interest must 
be regarded as permanent came only with the end of the 1920s. 
Importance of market insight and support 
It also took the government many years to learn that market regulation works better when 
there is agreement between regulators and those regulated over the objectives of regulation. 
If there were substantial disagreement, then any regulatory intervention would be 
undermined by members seeking to exploit weaknesses in the regulations and, if that failed, 
trading outside the regulated marketplace. 
This should have been evident from the experience of the Fresh Issues Committee during the 
war. Appointment of a committee with no market experience, which behaved in an autocratic 
manner and made decisions that seemed irrational, forfeited the market’s initial support and 
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encouraged off-market activity. However clear this now seems in retrospect, the Treasury was 
not deterred from drafting Regulation 30F, without prior consultation, to prolong the controls 
beyond the end of the war, only showing a draft to the Exchange shortly before promulgation. 
Subsequently the regulation had to be withdrawn in the face of fierce opposition.  
The importance of market support had been acknowledged by 1939, for in the 1939–1945 war 
new issue controls were administered by an existing committee that had already established a 
satisfactory reputation for its manner of working and the rationality of its decisions.  
The advantage of the approach adopted in 1915 was that the Fresh Issues Committee was 
isolated from pressures within the market that might have led it to compromise the purpose of 
the controls, as articulated by the Chancellor in private to the committee’s chairman: the 
denial of approval to as many new issues as possible. In other words, it served to avoid the risk 
that the committee might be ‘captured’ by the market. Conversely, the disadvantage of the 
approach adopted in 1939 was a risk that the committee might be ‘captured’. 
Market support for interventions was better understood by the Exchange, for the committee 
was constrained by the practical requirement that its innovations required the approval of 
members.  The committee must always have been mindful that any lack of support would lead 
to defeat at the next annual election.  
Throughout the 1920s, this constraint proved troublesome for the Exchange. Changes in the 
character of the market tended to polarise the membership between those who concentrated 
on serving the increasingly important institutional investors and those who concentrated on 
more traditional, personal business, who were in the majority. There is no evidence that either 
the committee or the members generally were able to infer from the disaggregated trading of 
individual members the implications for the market overall of the changes that were taking 
place: the growing expectation that the market’s processes and behaviour should not add 
unduly to the risks that investors and vendors were obliged to manage. Thus, not only were 
proposed rule changes frequently rejected but there was no action to stave off the risks to the 
Exchange’s independence that would eventually be made evident by the crashes of 1929. 
This failure of insight was not corrected until 1930, by which time the consequences of further 
inaction had been made unavoidably clear for all members by the crashes of 1929. 
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Reliance on prosecutions 
Abusive off-market share-pushers were not a creation of the 1920s: there had been many 
before. But with a broadening interest in investment they were to thrive in the 1920s so that 
their abuses became more troublesome and the failure of prosecutorial activity to deter share-
pushers became more evident.  
The danger had been recognised officially as early as 1925 when the Greene Committee’s 
report recommended the creation of a new offence of door-to-door share selling which 
implicitly accepted that the existing law was inadequate to prevent abuses occurring and 
unsuspecting investors incurring heavy losses. Acknowledgement by government that the 
position had become untenable did not come until 1936, after it had become clear that the 
Exchange’s 1930 reforms had driven all abusive activity off-market. This acknowledgement was 
precipitated by the outcome of a libel action in which Maurice Singer sought redress in respect 
of articles published by the Daily Mail in which Singer had been described as an unscrupulous 
share-pusher. The Court’s acceptance that the articles had been true in every particular and 
the subsequent news that Jacob Factor, the leader of the gang of which Singer was a member, 
had paid back a substantial amount of cash to a liquidator vindicated newspaper campaigns for 
more aggressive action against share-pushers. Just as the Exchange had resisted suggestions 
that the market’s practices should change, the government had resisted suggestions that 
either prosecutorial activity should be redoubled or that alternative approaches should be 
considered. In the Exchange’s case it took the crashes of 1929 to bring about change. In the 
government’s case, it took the Opposition’s use of the Daily Mail’s libel case as a pretext for 
renewed argument about fundamental reform of financial institutions.  
The Daily Mail’s case was influential principally because it was an unavoidable demonstration 
that, for an extended period, the criminal justice system had failed not only to deter but also 
to apprehend and punish a determined gang of share-pushers. It also demonstrated that the 
Stock Exchange’s regulation was irrelevant. Although the disciplinary action taken in 1930 had 
been successful in deterring members from colluding with Jacob Factor so that shares he 
pushed were traded on the floor of the Exchange, that success had driven Factor and his 
associates from the Exchange. His share-pushing continued but beyond the jurisdiction of the 
Exchange. The result was that many were duped. Those who recalled the Faber v Tyler Wilson 
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case of 1930,825 would have realised that prospective investors of many classes and degrees of 
education were vulnerable to these activities, especially if denied access to reliable advice and 
the benefit of the personal relationships on which City operators themselves tended to rely. 
For those who made the comparison, the laws of New York provided an example of a regime 
that had been effective in limiting the share-pushers, for Jacob Factor had transferred his 
attention to London to escape the attention of a new Attorney General in New York. In 
essence, the success in New York had been brought about by intrusive investigative powers 
which were exploited by a determined official. In short, even the strongest prosecutorial 
powers might not be effective to control share-pushers unless matched by a consistent 
determination to use them. 
Private influence rather than statutory direction 
The final acknowledgement of the need to secure the willing co-operation of the Exchange and 
its Members came in 1938 when the government realised that it could achieve its policy 
objectives more successfully by influencing the Exchange privately rather than by taking 
powers to oversee the Exchange. Throughout the period, the Exchange had proved amenable 
to government suggestions: not least because from time to time the Exchange needed the 
government’s assistance: as happened towards the end of 1915 when government assistance 
was needed to enable the trading floor to reopen. Moreover, as time passed, and the volume 
of trading in gilts grew in significance, the government became an important generator of 
trading volume and thus commission income for members.  
When consideration was first given to implementing the recommendations, it was thought 
unwise to delegate powers to the Exchange without providing that the Board of Trade should 
oversee the Exchange’s use of its powers: a suggestion that the Exchange strongly resisted. 
The impasse that resulted was broken when the Treasury advised the Board of Trade to accept 
the Exchange’s position. This change in approach appears to have been justified by a 
calculation that the government could achieve its objectives by influence, even if there were 
no statutory power of oversight, and would avoid a long dispute with the Exchange.  
                                                 
825  Case 6, Appendix Two to Chapter Nine. This was a case brought by a clergyman to recover a 
loss from associates of Jacob Factor. 
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In effect, this was an acknowledgement partly of the vulnerability of the Exchange, and partly 
of the need for market support. In practice, the Exchange could not afford to ignore the 
government’s wishes, but the government needed the market to support its interventions. 
The changing character of the market 
Whilst the debates about the Exchange’s relationship with government continued, the 
practices of the Exchange were changing to provide a forum for the transmission of securities, 
which did not itself add to the inherent risks of investment. The new issue process changed.  
Company promoters disappeared. New issuing houses grew up. Brokers largely withdrew from 
financing their clients’ speculations.  None of this happened because a regulator decreed that 
it should be so, but because the outcome better reflected the preferences of investors and 
vendors.  
Gradually, the Exchange was adjusting its role. Before 1914, the Exchange had not only 
provided a place where people could speculate on share prices, but its members were 
prepared to assist by financing clients’ speculations. It was a private club where vendors could 
hope to realise a profit by selling their equity interests. By 1945, the Exchange no longer 
regarded itself as a private club, but instead acknowledged responsibility to a wider 
community. It was a market place where vendors could more confidently seek finance based 
on stable relationships with investors.  
Members were largely remunerated by earning commissions rather than by financing clients’ 
speculation or speculating themselves.  Accomplishment of this change in part had depended 
upon maintaining control of the Conduct of Business Rules and control over access to 
membership. In becoming more reliant on these controls, the Exchange risked becoming less 
open to new influences that might lead to innovation such as Hatry’s challenge to market 
control of local authority loan issues. Concentration on the provision of a share transmission 
service created a risk that members would find themselves competing on price and that the 
members who were financially weakest would suffer.  
In preserving the rules’ constraints on competition the Exchange had benefited from good 
fortune in two ways. By its manner, the collapse of Hatry’s companies crystallised among 
members recognition of the existential threat to the Exchange. That recognition united 
members in support of dealing with the threat: a unity that had not been evident during the 
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1920s and without which action would have been impossible. By itself, the opportunity was 
not enough. Seizing it required vision to see how it could be exploited and leadership to ensure 
that it was. Both vision and leadership were provided not by the Exchange but by the Governor 
of the Bank of England, Montagu Norman, by using the authority and network of influence that 
had grown with his many years in office. The effectiveness of the reforms implemented by the 
Exchange under Norman’s stage-management demonstrated that self-regulation could be 
effective.  
Of course, the potency of Norman’s leadership also demonstrated to politicians seeking to 
extend their influence over the City that achieving statutory oversight of the Exchange was less 
important than gaining control of the Bank of England. 
What became of Clarence Hatry? 
In the years after his imprisonment, unease grew about the severity of Hatry’s punishment. As 
further abuses were exposed, it became clearer that he did not bear responsibility for all of the 
City’s shortcomings. Widely supported campaigns eventually led to his early release in 1939. 
Hatry was by then a sadly diminished figure compared with the ebullient, self-confident 
operator of the 1920s. He was welcomed by friends such as Sir Francis Towle who arranged 
that he should live at Grosvenor House,826 but the Home Secretary advised against friends 
holding a celebratory dinner at the House of Commons as was originally proposed.  During the 
war, with his wife’s financial support, Hatry bought a controlling interest in Hatchards, a 
bookshop in Piccadilly situated very close to Hatry’s former office at 180 Piccadilly. He 
completed this purchase by a ruse typical of his days as a company promoter. Finding that the 
bookshop was financially embarrassed by customers who failed to pay their bills, he wrote to 
all debtors promising that lists of their names and the amount that they owed would shortly be 
displayed in the bookshop’s windows as the shop was so proud of its connections. Threat of 
exposure led most customers to pay their outstanding bills instantly. Hatry used the cash to 
pay the final instalments of the consideration for his purchase of the shop.  
After the end of the war, supported by old friends and associates such as Arthur Collins, Hatry 
built a group of companies around Hatchards including a publisher, a printer and a printing 
                                                 
826  The newly built hotel was close to Stanhope Gate, where Hatry had lived before imprisonment.  
Hatry appears to have continued in residence for some time. The Grosvenor House was built with 
capacious basements that were used as a favoured bomb shelter during the 1939–1945 war. 
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machine manufacturer in an ill-fated expectation of increasing profits through vertical 
integration. Although he was never able to register as a dealer in shares, he raised money by 
selling shares privately under agreements that the shares would be re-purchased at prices 
fixed  to produce profits equal to the amount of interest that would have been paid had the 
arrangement taken the form of a loan. For people paying the highest rates of Income Tax, such 
arrangements were attractive: they avoided Income Tax as the profits were regarded as capital 
gains that were not taxable. Although the scheme was initially successful in raising money, it 
ran into difficulty. In the early 1950s, the group collapsed amid a series of dazzling financial 
schemes engineered by Hatry in a vain attempt to prevent the collapse. The Board of Trade 
appointed an Inspector to investigate the collapse who in a series of reports failed to unravel 
the effect and purpose of the schemes Hatry had devised.827 No further action was taken and 
the matter faded from public attention: not least because his investors feared that their 
interest in tax avoidance would be exposed.  
On recuperation, Hatry returned to his former activities, continually looking for opportunities 
to acquire and dispose of companies. At root, however, he was a schemer and dealer, not a 
manager. He remained under suspicion and was monitored by the Metropolitan Police whose 
files record his associates and their joint transactions.828 
On a personal level, Hatry’s life was touched with sadness. He had not been able to return to 
the style of business to which he had been accustomed during the 1920s and does not seem 
ever to have recovered his former joie de vivre. Instead he is recorded as a chronic insomniac, 
frequenting the 24-hour Savoy Turkish baths of Jermyn Street near the Cavendish Hotel at all 
hours.829 Although his wife, Dolly, stayed with him, his daughter Diana left the country for West 
Africa. His son, Cecil, who had led the campaign for Hatry’s release from prison, emigrated to 
Southern Rhodesia. On the collapse of Hatchards, Hatry sought permission to emigrate to 
Southern Rhodesia to join his son but was refused on the advice of the Metropolitan Police. 
Cecil eventually returned to London and worked with his father. 
                                                 
827  The Inspector was Stanley Duncan of Price Waterhouse & Company who had acted as Sir 
Gilbert Garnsey’s manager. Hatry shares with Captain Robert Maxwell the distinction of twice being the 
subject of Board of Trade Inspections. 
828  National Archives. 
829  Sunday Times; 1 January 1967; pages 10–11. 
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Clarence Hatry died in 1965.  At the time of his death, he was still looking for investment 
opportunities. 
Hatry was well suited to the financial roles he played. He was a superlative networker: forming 
good relationships even with the most unlikely associates and maintaining those relationships 
over many decades. He was loyal to his associates and they were loyal to him. He was brilliant 
when seeking solutions for a client’s problem. Yet he also displayed weaknesses. He was not a 
good manager. It seems to have bored him to manage a business over a period: he preferred 
the challenge of finding solutions to a client’s problem. Possibly as a result, he depended too 
often on people who let him down, in part because he was a bad judge of character. He did not 
know when to give up, pursuing schemes beyond the point at which failure had become 
inevitable or the scheme had become uncommercial. Perhaps he trusted too much his ability 
to find a solution to any problem. 
Whatever adversity he had to surmount, he rose again repeatedly, rekindling his optimism and 
communicating a sense of excitement about his latest project. Above all, he was a survivor. 
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